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2009-102 & 2009-103, General Insulation Company v. Eckman Construction & a.
Company.
respondents Youngblood Co., Inc. and International Fidelity Insurance Moore and Anthony S. Augeri on the brief, and Mr. Moore orally), for Devine, Millimet & Branch, P.A., of Andover, Massachusetts (George R.
American Specialty Insurance Company. respondents Eckman Construction, Northern Peabody, LLC and North Donovan and Michael J. Kenison on the brief, and Mr. Kenison orally), for McLane, Graf, Raulerson & Middleton, P.A., of Manchester (Thomas J.
orally), for the petitioner. Sherman Law, PLLC, of Portsmouth (John P. Sherman on the brief and
to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address: Opinion Issued: January 28, 2010
Argued: October 15, 2009
ECKMAN CONSTRUCTION & a.
v.
GENERAL INSULATION COMPANY page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme.
2009-103 Nos. 2009-102 editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Hillsborough-northern judicial district Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New ___________________________
THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00
well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as the surety on the statutory performance bond issued to Youngblood. performance bond issued to Northern Peabody, and International Fidelity was According to the petitioner, North American was the surety on the statutory
enrichment/restitution and quantum meruit.
Insulation was a subcontractor to Northern Peabody and Youngblood.
enforce the statutory bonds and to assert common law claims for unjust
opinion as to their validity.
2
Northern Peabody and Youngblood were subcontractors to Eckman; Advanced Project” in Bedford. Eckman was the general contractor on the project. Insulation) for a bonded project known as “Bedford Middle/High School 2007. On March 6, 2008, the petitioner filed petitions in superior court to
petitions against Advanced Insulation remain pending and we express no
August 2008, after the court issued orders of notice to the respondents.
required by RSA 447:18 (2002).
respondent R & H Enterprises d/b/a Advanced Insulation (Advanced court pursuant to RSA 447:17. It amended this notice of claim on May 3,
and did not separately file a motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the petitioner’s Insulation did not join the motions to dismiss filed by the other respondents petitions, which the trial court granted, and this appeal followed. Advanced see also Super. Ct. R. 124. The moving respondents moved to dismiss the
See id;
did not provide the respondents with copies of its petitions, however, until
See RSA 447:18. The petitioner
respondents with copies of the petitions within one year of filing its claims as statutory performance bonds because the petitioner failed to provide the respondents). The trial court dismissed the petitioner’s petitions to enforce respondents did not pay for insulation and related materials it supplied to On March 15, 2007, the petitioner filed a notice of claim in superior
447:16.
See RSA
Insurance Company (International Fidelity) (collectively, the moving The record evidences the following facts. The petitioner claims that the
I. Background
allege sufficient facts to support them. We affirm and remand. enrichment/restitution and quantum meruit because the petitions failed to also dismissed the petitioner’s alternative claims for unjust
See RSA 447:16, :17 (Supp. 2009). The court
American), Youngblood Co., Inc. (Youngblood) and International Fidelity (Northern Peabody), North American Specialty Insurance Company (North filed by respondents Eckman Construction (Eckman), Northern Peabody LLC an order of the Superior Court (Abramson, J.) granting the motions to dismiss DUGGAN, J. The petitioner, General Insulation Company, appeals from (the contractor or subcontractor).” 3 S. Stein,
owner’s property.” 3 Stein,
3
performance of contract obligations owed to the second party by its principal promises a second party (the owner or general contractor) the successful bond is a three-party instrument by which one party (the surety) guarantees or subcontractors and suppliers, who might otherwise file liens against the
supra at App. 9-27. “A performance bond is one
to include. public works projects and the statutory scheme that governs such bonds. “A payment bond assures the owner that the prime contractor will pay its legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit Neck Prop. Owners Assoc. v. Town of Wolfeboro, 146 N.H. 449, 453 (2001). “A perform according to the contract referenced in the bond.” Id.; see Wolfeboro “A performance bond guarantees to the owner that a prime contractor will guarantees that the bidder will enter into the contract for the bid amount. Id. or purpose sought to be advanced by the statutory scheme. bid bonds, performance bonds, and payment bonds. Id. A bid bond at App. 9-27 (Sept. 2006). Three kinds of bonds are common in construction:
Construction Law Appendix 9J,
the trial court’s statutory interpretation
We begin with a brief general discussion regarding bonds issued for further indication of legislative intent, and we will not consider what the
2. Overview possible, ascribe the plain and ordinary meaning to the words used.
Id.
words of the statute considered as a whole. the legislature’s intent and to interpret statutory language in light of the policy Elks v. Marcoux, 149 N.H. 581, 585 (2003). This enables us to better discern isolation, but within the context of the statute as a whole. Franklin Lodge of N.H. 625, 628 (2008). Additionally, we do not consider words and phrases in statutory scheme and not in isolation. Liam Hooksett, LLC v. Boynton, 157 respondents within one year of filing its claim under RSA 447:17. We review Id. We also interpret a statute in the context of the overall
a statute’s language is plain and unambiguous, we need not look beyond it for
Id. When
N.H. 67, 72 (2008). We first examine the language of the statute, and, where
Appeal of Parkland Med. Ctr., 158
We are the final arbiters of the legislature’s intent as expressed in the
157 N.H. 211, 213 (2008).
de novo. Chesley v. Harvey Indus.,
RSA 447:18 to require it to send copies of its petitions to the moving The petitioner first argues that the trial court erroneously interpreted
1. Standard of Review
A. Compliance with RSA 447:18
II. Discussion repair of equipment used in carrying out said contract. labor and parts furnished upon the order of said contractor for the by said principal and used in carrying out said contract, and for
fuels, lubricants, power, tools, hardware and supplies purchased
equipment hired, including trucks, for all material used and for
subcontractors for all labor performed or furnished, for all upon, conditioned upon the payment by the contractors and of the estimated cost of the work if no aggregate price is agreed
project by the contracting party” file with the proper public entity “a statement
in an amount equal to at least 100 percent of the contract price, or
4
claimant must “within 90 days after the completion and acceptance of the
execution of the contract, sufficient security, by bond or otherwise, expenditure of less amount, obtain as a condition precedent to the involves an expenditure of $25,000, and may if it involves an
To obtain the benefit of bonds issued pursuant to RSA 447:16, a
Erectors Inc. v. Company, 86 N.H. 349, 350 (1933). Petition of Keyser, 97 N.H. 404, 407 (1952) (quotation omitted); Guard Rail them and at the same time to save the state or municipality from annoyance.” an alternative security to lienors, in general more practically adapted to protect The purpose of this provision, which was first enacted in 1927, is “to furnish
highways, bridges or other public works shall if said contract
bonds at issue. assume for the purposes of this appeal that RSA 447:16 to :18 govern the
construction, repair or rebuilding of public buildings, public in behalf of the state or any political subdivision thereof for the combined.” 3 Stein, Officers, public boards, agents or other persons who contract
RSA 447:16 provides:
of their claims against the municipality.” 14 P. Loughlin, suppliers, and laborers who otherwise might be without recourse for payment though the petitioner characterizes them as performance bonds. We, therefore, § 789, at 46, no party argues that they do not govern the bonds at issue even appears that these statutes only apply to payment bonds, see Loughlin, supra RSA 447:16 to :18 govern bonding for public works projects. Although it
supra at App. 9-27.
“Performance and payment bonds can be separate documents or may be provisions requiring the posting of performance and/or payment bonds.” Id. municipal contracts, especially capital building contracts, must have Practice, Local Government Law § 789, at 45 (1995). In New Hampshire, “[a]ny
New Hampshire
project,” while “[a] payment bond is exacted for the protection of materialmen, exacted for the protection of the public body to guarantee completion of a owners.”
parity, in respect to their liens, with those who perform a like service for private those who supply materials [and labor] for the erection of state property on a furnishing materials or supplies.” The purpose of this lien provision “is to put the respective amounts due such party claimants.” claims as herein provided, and to the principal and surety or sureties, and find
performance of which contract the lienor participated by performing labor or
duly filed” and hold a hearing, “with notice to all creditors who have filed
5
contract for any public work or construct, alteration, or repair, in the due from the state or from any political subdivision thereof by virtue of any order.” RSA 447:18. The court then “shall examine all claims having been (2002) allows for a mechanic’s lien to attach “to any money due or to become copy to the principal and surety, and such further notice as the court may notice of claim],” files a petition in superior court to enforce the claim “with Signs, Inc. v. Evroks Corp., 132 N.H. 156, 158 (1989).
American Bridge Co. v. Company, 87 N.H. 62, 63 (1934); see Lyle use.
In addition to the remedy of seeking payment on the bond, RSA 447:15
statutory bond provided that the claimant, “within one year after filing [the 136. failure to comply with RSA 447:18 is “usually held fatal.” Cray, 105 N.H. at Id. As with the failure to comply with RSA 447:17, we have held that the claims, or require such official to furnish a copy of such claims” for the court’s interminable delay in settlements between contractors and subcontractors.” “the attendance of any official with whom claims have been filed, with such
Id. The court may require
In the event that there is no settlement, a claimant may sue on a
Id. (quotation omitted). 447:17 is a condition precedent to any claim against a statutory bond. prevents both double payments by prime contractors and the alternative of 153 N.H. at 287 (quotation omitted). The notice required by RSA 447:17 “thus fear of additional liability to sub-subcontractors or materialmen.” Fastrack II, purpose is to allow the prime contractor to pay his subcontractors “without Envtl. v. Abatement Int’l/Advatex Assocs., 149 N.H. 671, 674 (2003). Another an opportunity to settle the claim without resorting to litigation.” Mountain “[T]he main purpose of [this] notice requirement is to provide parties with
287 (2006) (Fastrack II). Fastrack Crushing Servs. v. Abatement Int’l/Advatex Assocs., 153 N.H. 284,
See
have also held that giving notice within the ninety-day period required by RSA Abatement Int’l/Advatex Assocs., 149 N.H. 661, 666 (2003) (Fastrack I). We Fidelity Co. v. Cray, 105 N.H. 132, 136 (1963); see Fastrack Crushing Servs. v. of claim be filed with the designated party “is usually held fatal.” American held that the failure to comply with the statutory requirement that a statement mail by the office where it is filed to the principal and surety.” Id. We have of the claim.” RSA 447:17. A copy of the statement of claim is then “sent by We will not interpret a statute to require such an illogical result.
receive, process, and return an Order of Notice for service on a Respondent.”
for a party filing a Petition to predict when a particular Court might be able to issue orders for further notice. As the petitioner contends: “[I]t is impossible the court may order” because a petitioner has no control over when a court will
copy of such Petition within a specific timeframe (i.e., one year).” surety.” It would not make sense to apply the phrase to “such further notice as
6 particular subjects and those of obligation applied to others.” its meaning from its composition and structure.”
Enforce” and “does not create a specific obligation to provide a Respondent a year after filing such claim” are “file a petition” and “with copy to principal and
reddendo singula singulis and the words giving power and authority limited to is to read and examine the text of the statute and draw inferences concerning words apply to the several branches of the clause. It may be construed State v. are found at the beginning of a clause, it is not necessary that each of the
J.D. Singer,
447:18 qualifies and relates only to the date of the filing for the Petition to RSA 447:18 because “[t]he one year statute of limitations contained in RSA In this case, the subjects most properly related to the phrase “within one March 2007 claim. The petitioner argues that, nonetheless, it complied with the phrase “within one year after filing such claim” applies.
Id. at 441.
grammar and composition, a widely accepted method of statutory construction 2007). Thus, “[w]here several words granting power, authority, and obligation
Statutes and Statutory Construction § 47.26, at 438 (7th ed. mandatory enforcement.” that seem most properly related by context and applicability.” 2A N. Singer &
rules of statutory construction, the word ‘shall’ is a command, which requires they are to be read distributively. The words are to be applied to the subjects “Where a sentence contains several antecedents and several consequents
the moving respondents until August 2008, more than one year after filing its 12, 17 (1985) (quotation omitted). Here, we must determine to what subject
In re Richard M., 127 N.H.
“Although the legislature is not compelled to follow technical rules of
surety, and such further notice as the court may order.” “Pursuant to general
The petitioner concedes that it did not provide copies of its petitions to
must be strictly observed.” Id. (quotation omitted). law is well settled that in giving statutory notice the requirements of the statute Substantial compliance with this statute does not suffice. See id. at 666. “Our
Fastrack I, 149 N.H. at 664-65 (quotation omitted).
his claim or intervene in a petition already filed, with copy to the principal and year after filing such claim, file a petition in the superior court . . . to enforce RSA 447:18 provides, in pertinent part: “Said claimant shall, within one
3. Interpretation of RSA 447:18 respondents by the trial court.
first files the petition and again when the petitioner is ordered to serve the
respondents with two copies of the same pleading, once when the petitioner notice.” In other words, the statute requires that the petitioner provide the the first notice and court-ordered notice given thereafter is “such further
7 ordered notice. The copy of the petition given when the petition is first filed is
respondents with a copy of its petitions within one year after filing its notice of
different interpretation.”
of the filing of a lawsuit under similar circumstances.
principal and surety when the petition is filed is in addition to any court-
same person or thing last mentioned.” read on its own. In this case, because the petitioner did not provide the moving
date suit was filed).
there is something in the subject matter or dominant purpose which requires a
New Hampshire is not alone in requiring a petitioner to provide separate notice
antecedent rule. this rule, “such further notice” means that the copy of the petition given to
See Piper, 75 N.H. at 442. Applying
‘such,’ when used by way of reference to any person or thing, shall apply to the together, while the phrase “such further notice as ordered by the court” is to be Railroad, 75 N.H. 435, 442 (1910). RSA 21:14 provides: “The words ‘said’ and phrases “file a petition” and “with copy to principal and surety” are to be read This rule has been adopted by statute. See RSA 21:14 (2000); Piper v. ordered by the court” from the rest of the sentence. This indicates that the two Statutory Interpretation 84 (2008); Singer & Singer, supra § 47.33, at 487-89. satisfaction of stop notice be mailed to subject of lawsuit within five days after Id. (quotation omitted); see L. Jellum, Mastering
construction that a modifying clause is confined to the last antecedent unless singula singulis, “is the general rule of statutory as well as grammatical a respondent with “two (2) copies of the exact same pleading.” We disagree. 144 N.H. 642, 652 (2000). The last antecedent rule, a subset of reddendo
See Mountain Valley Mall Assocs. v. Municipality of Conway,
to “such further notice as the court may order” is consistent with the last principal and surety with a copy of the petition to enforce the bond in addition Moreover, construing the statute to require a petitioner to provide the
comma and that there is a conjunction separating “such further notice as § 48-2A-9 (Michie 1995) (requiring that written notice of lawsuit to obtain
See N.M. Stat. Ann.
The petitioner argues that it is “absurd” to require a petitioner to provide
principal and surety” is separated from the phrase “file a petition” with a Further aiding our construction is the fact that the phrase “with copy to
477, 479 (1964). Yates, 152 N.H. 245, 255 (2005); see General Electric Co. v. Dole, 105 N.H. be “unconscionable” for them to retain. These are legal conclusions, however,
8
substantial benefit without compensating Petitioner for same,” which it would
damages for breach of contract.” 26 R. Lord, independent basis for a cause of action.” 42 C.J.S. unconscionable to retain, and unjust enrichment generally does not form an wrongfully secured a benefit or passively received one which it would be
to retain that benefit.” defendant received a benefit and it would be unconscionable for the defendant The petitioner’s petitions alleged only that the respondents “received a
133 (2001). 17 (2007); see Kowalski v. Cedars of Portsmouth Condo. Assoc., 146 N.H. 130,
Implied Contracts § 10, at enrichment are allowed by the courts as alternative remedies to an action for
construction that would permit recovery.” only unjust enrichment, but that the person sought to be charged had 145 N.H. 15 8, 163 (2000). “The party seeking restitution must establish not
Nat’l Employment Serv. Corp. v. Olsten Staffing Serv.,
respondents. “A plaintiff is entitled to restitution for unjust enrichment if the
(1994). We first address the petitioner’s restitution claim. 5 (4th ed. 2003); see Kondrat v. Freedom School Board, 13 8 N.H. 683, 686
Williston on Contracts § 6 8:1, at
respondents. Restitution and quantum meruit recovery based upon “unjust claim for restitution or for quantum meruit recovery against the moving allegations in the petitioner[’s] pleadings are reasonably susceptible of a The petitioner’s petitions failed to allege facts sufficient to state either a
improper to grant the motion to dismiss. McNamara, 157 N.H. at 73. and if the allegations constitute a basis for legal relief, we must hold that it was alleged sufficient facts to establish these claims against the moving threshold inquiry that tests the facts in the petition against the applicable law, petitioner contends that, contrary to the trial court’s decision, its petitions Matter of Kenick & Bailey, 156 N.H. 356, 35 8 (2007). We then engage in a alternative claims for unjust enrichment/restitution and quantum meruit. The petitioner’s pleadings, however, that are merely conclusions of law. In the favorable to it. Id. We need not assume the truth of statements in the pleadings to be true and construe all reasonable inferences in the light most 73 (2008) (quotation and brackets omitted). We assume the petitioner’s
McNamara v. Hersh, 157 N.H. 72,
“In reviewing a motion to dismiss, our standard of review is whether the
The petitioner next asserts that the trial court erred by dismissing its
B. Unjust Enrichment/Restitution and Quantum Meruit Claims
court did not err by dismissing its petitions. See Fastrack I, 149 N.H. at 666. claim, the petitioner did not strictly comply with RSA 447:1 8, and the trial them.
General Insulation, complying with the court’s order of notice, served copies on
elevating form over substance, affirms. I cannot join such a decision.
principals and sureties on the project did not receive copies of the petition until the trial court still dismissed the petition as untimely merely because the of the project by the contracting party.” RSA 447:17. The public entity with 447:17 (Supp. 2009) and its petition to enforce pursuant to RSA 447:18 (2002),
sometime later was fatal to General Insulation’s petition. The plurality,
9
statement of claim is filed “within 90 days after the completion and acceptance General Insulation having timely filed its notice of claim pursuant to RSA
the principals and sureties did not obtain their copies of the petition until
The filing of a claim to enforce a bond involves two steps. First, a bonded project known as “Bedford Middle/High School” in Bedford. Despite
payment.” Insulation’s petition was filed within one year of its notice of claim, the fact that under circumstances that make it reasonable for the plaintiff to expect See Super. Ct. R. 124. The trial court ruled that, even though General
inequitably retained[,] [i]n
Insulation Company (General Insulation), for materials it supplied on the This case involves a petition to enforce a bond filed by the petitioner, General BROCK, C.J., retired, specially assigned under RSA 490:3, dissenting.
BROCK, C.J.
, retired, specially assigned under RSA 490:3, dissented. HORTON, J., retired, specially assigned under RSA 490:3, concurred; by the plaintiff; (2) with the knowledge and consent of the defendant; and (3)
Affirmed and remanded.
dismissal of the petitioner’s petitions against the moving respondents. While “[d]amages in unjust enrichment are measured by the value of what was For all of the above reasons, therefore, we affirm the trial court’s
recovery against the moving respondents. of these requisite facts, and, thus, failed to state a claim for quantum meruit
Id. (quotation omitted). The petitioner’s petitions did not allege any
quantum meruit requires [that]: . . . (1) services were rendered to the defendant Balano, 708 A.2d 269, 271 (Me. 1998) (citation omitted). “A valid claim in based on the value of the services provided by the plaintiff.” Paffhausen v.
quantum meruit, by contrast, the damages . . . are
We next turn to the petitioner’s claim for quantum meruit recovery.
to impose a duty of restitution”). benefit from materials furnished by respondent, “this is not sufficient in itself See Cray, 105 N.H. at 137 (concluding, even assuming that surety received these legal conclusions, and, therefore, failed to state a claim for restitution. Bailey, 156 N.H. at 358. The petitions alleged no predicate facts to support which we are not obliged to accept as true. See In the Matter of Kenick & claimant, however, is also required to provide “such
RSA 447:18. as long as the petition is filed within this one-year period, it is timely under by commas, and, thus, modifies only the phrase “file a petition.” Accordingly, principal and surety is the first “notice” that the “court may order.” The required by Superior Court Rule 124. The copy of the petition provided to the to the principal and surety until the court issues its orders of notice as
10
statute is plain. The phrase “within one year after filing such claim” is set off project on August 6 and August 8, respectively.
further” makes clear that the claimant need not provide a copy of the petition
contrary to the plain language of RSA 447:18. General Insulation’s notice of claim). This result is not only unfair, but is copies of it in August 2008 instead of before March 15, 2008 (within one year of may order.” (Emphasis added.)
further notice as the court
surety, and such further notice as the court may order.” The meaning of this complied with the court’s orders and served the principals and sureties on the
further notice as the court may order.” The use of the words “and such claimant to provide a copy of the petition to the principal and surety “and such The next phrases in RSA 447:18 must be read together. They require the
Insulation’s petition was untimely because the principals and sureties received
claimant must provide a copy of the petition to the principal and surety “
his claim or intervene in a petition already filed, with copy to the principal and year after filing such claim, file a petition in the superior court . . . to enforce which were returnable on September 2, 2008. General Insulation diligently RSA 447:18 provides, in pertinent part: “Said claimant shall, within one
notice of claim
Nonetheless, the trial court ruled, and the plurality agrees, that General
after filing [the notice of claim].” RSA 447:18. As part of this process, the enforce the claim. To be timely, the petition must be filed “within one year
and RSA 447:18, the trial court issued its orders of notice on August 1, 2008, within one year of its notice of claim. Pursuant to Superior Court Rule 124 notice of claim on March 15, 2007, and its petition on March 6, 2008, well
and its petition to enforce its claim. General Insulation filed its
In this case, it is undisputed that General Insulation timely filed both its
such further notice as the court may order.” Id. (emphasis added).
and
The second step, governed by RSA 447:18, is to file the petition to
Assocs., 149 N.H. 671, 674 (2003). without resorting to litigation.” Mountain Envtl. v. Abatement Int’l/Advatex requirement is to provide parties with an opportunity to settle the claim of claim to the principal and surety. Id. “[T]he main purpose of [this] notice which the claim is filed is then responsible for sending a copy of the statement By no means are these situations remotely “similar.”
to a year and ninety days after the completion and acceptance of the project.
construction of the statute that is unjust and unfair.
447 does not suffice; strict compliance is required. 11
we should look to what the legislature intended.
the instant case, which simply involves a suit upon a bond that can be filed up construction funds equal to the amount of the claim stated in the stop notice.
RSA 447:18 requires. Nothing in this rule compels the court to adopt a
mailed within five days after the suit is filed. of the filing of a lawsuit under sixty days after the stop notice is delivered and that notice of the lawsuit be substantial compliance with the statutory notice requirements of RSA chapter jurisdiction, the statute requires both that a lawsuit be filed between thirty and Co., 104 N.H. 472, 474 (1963) (legislative intent, not arbitrary canons of
See Chagnon v. Union-Leader
Rather than slavishly following arcane canons of statutory construction,
period for filing a lawsuit expires after sixty days. This sharply contrasts with “stop notices,” which require a construction lender or owner to withhold that could otherwise be disbursed are tied up by the stop notice, and the the lender or owner know quickly whether a lawsuit has been filed since funds reliance is misplaced. This rule is of no assistance in construing exactly what Servs. v. Abatement Int’l/Advatex Assocs., 149 N.H. 661, 666 (2003). This
See Fastrack Crushing
“New Hampshire is not alone in requiring a petitioner to provide separate notice In construing RSA 447:18, the plurality relies, in part, upon our rule that court.” Unfazed by the lack of logic in its conclusion, the plurality argues that contractor until the claim is satisfied or adjudicated by a court of competent again when the petitioner is ordered to serve the respondents by the trial
filed.” The New Mexico statute relied upon, however, involves the issuance of
The purpose of requiring notice within five days is obvious – it is important that
See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 48-2A-9(A).
the ability of the lender or owner to disburse construction funds to the copies of the same pleading, once when the petitioner first files the petition and See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 48-2A-8(A) (Michie 1998). Because the stop notice limits
stop notice be mailed to subject of lawsuit within five days after date suit was the petition must be given to the principal and surety. describes as “requiring that written notice of lawsuit to obtain satisfaction of date by which a claimant must file a petition, not the date by which copies of support of this statement, the plurality cites a New Mexico statute, which it claim has been filed. The clear intent of this statutory provision is to set the similar circumstances.” (Emphasis added.) In
that “the statute requires that the petitioner provide the respondents with two linguistic sophistry and shrouded in Latin to divine legislative intent, conclude Justices Duggan and Horton, using an analytical process grounded in
court’s orders of notice occur within one year after the claimant’s notice of Nothing in RSA 447:18 requires that the claimant’s compliance with the 12
bonds at issue. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. trial court erred when it dismissed the petitioner’s petitions to enforce the
interpretation and reliance upon the statutory language at issue.
petitioner fully complied with RSA 447:18. I would hold, therefore, that the
plurality is draconian given the petitioner’s and its attorney’s reasonable with the legislature’s obvious intent. Moreover, the result reached by the reading of the statute, as set forth above, avoids absurdity and is consistent
respondents with copies of them after the court issued orders of notice, the
reject that construction. This is particularly apt here, where a common sense
Here, because the petitioner timely filed its petitions and provided the
provide the respondents with two copies of the exact same pleading, we should by construing the statute, as the plurality does, as requiring the petitioner to as the petitioner rightly observes, no purpose of the statute would be advanced as stated in Hanchett v. Brezner Tanning Co., 107 N.H. 236 (1966). Because, statutory construction, is controlling), superseded on other grounds by statute