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2008-813, State of New Hampshire v. Joshua A. Boutin
Michael A. Delaney
Opinion Issued: November 24, 2010 Argued: October 21, 2010
JOSHUA A. BOUTIN
v.
THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
No. 2008-813
Grafton
Superior Court (Bornstein DUGGAN, J. The defendant, Joshua A. Boutin, appeals a decision of the
Stephanie Hausman
___________________________ travel, but facing east. The car was at least eight feet from the edge of the parked in what he described as a “pull off” adjacent to the westbound lane of Trooper Matthew Koehler observed a Jeep Cherokee with its headlights on approximately 8:35 p.m., while driving on Bradley Hill Road in Bath, State The record supports the following facts. On January 27, 2007, at
obtained as a result of the stop of his automobile. We reverse and remand.
, J.) denying his motion to suppress evidence
brief and orally, for the defendant.
, assistant appellate defender, of Concord, on the THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
general, on the brief and orally), for the State.
, attorney general (Karin M. Eckel, assistant attorney
page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address: editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as not argue that Boutin was illegally parked, and, therefore, we need not address needed assistance, and not to seize evidence or make an arrest. The State does primary purpose in making the stop was to determine whether the occupants occupants may have needed assistance. The State also argues that the officer’s specific and articulable facts supporting his conclusion that the vehicle’s The State counters that the officer’s seizure of Boutin was based upon
from seizing him in this case. that his interest in being free from government intrusion prevented the police him if he needed assistance in a manner that did not constitute a seizure, but assistance. He further asserts that the police could have stopped and asked did not establish specific and articulable facts indicating that he needed police caretaking exception to the warrant requirement. He contends that the State motion to suppress because his seizure was not justified by the community On appeal, Boutin argues only that the trial court erred in denying his
convicted following a jury trial. indicated that the occupants of Boutin’s vehicle needed aid. Boutin was then caretaking exception because the totality of the circumstances reasonably criminal activity to seize Boutin, the seizure was valid under the community The superior court ruled that while the police lacked reasonable suspicion of the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement did not apply. alleging that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to seize him and that Prior to his trial, the defendant moved to suppress the marijuana,
2
motor vehicle, contrary to RSA 265-A:43 (Supp. 2009). during a subsequent search. Boutin was charged with possession of drugs in a denied that there was marijuana in the vehicle, but marijuana was found marijuana in the interior of the vehicle. Upon questioning, the driver, Boutin, window. While speaking with the occupants, Koehler smelled the odor of observed two men in the front seat and asked the passenger to lower his
potential occupants needed assistance. When he approached the Jeep, he vehicle was occupied, whether an accident had occurred, or whether any the vehicle and other motorists of his presence. He did not know whether the cruiser’s blue lights and spotlight in order to alert any potential occupants of wrong, just checking things out.” He pulled behind the Jeep and activated his Based upon these observations, Koehler stopped “to see if anything was
RSA 265:71 (Supp. 2009), which governs parking on a roadway. Additionally, he believed the manner in which the Jeep was parked violated vehicle parked similarly to the defendant’s was a contributing factor. had covered a fatal motor vehicle accident several weeks earlier, in which a it was unusual to see a car parked in such a manner. He also testified that he road markings were visible. At the suppression hearing, Koehler testified that roadway. It was a dark, cold night and there was snow on the ground, but the Boyle
the action taken was appropriate. the seizure warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of warrant the intrusion. We judge these facts by an objective 3 together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken
reasonable, we must “balance the governmental interest in the police officer’s whether a seizure by a police officer acting in a noninvestigatory capacity is , 148 N.H. at 308 (quotation and citation omitted). In determining
requirement in State v. Psomiades We first recognized the community caretaking exception to the warrant
the police officer in Boyle. We explained that in order to justify a seizure under this exception, application of the community caretaking exception to the seizure of a motorist Psomiades dealt with the seizure of property, we later considered the safeguard the defendant’s own property.” Id. (quotation omitted). While than a routine and good faith attempt, in the exercise of reasonable caution, to that it applies to the seizure of property “when [the seizure] constitutes no more Constitution, using federal cases only to aid in our analysis. See erroneous. State v. Craveiro the Federal Constitution. We consider his arguments first under the State the trial court’s findings unless they lack support in the record or are clearly, 139 N.H. 480, 482 (1995), where we held Article 19 of the New Hampshire Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we accept The defendant argues that the seizure violated his rights under Part I, seizure falls within one of these exceptions is on the State. Id. exception. Craveiro, 155 N.H. at 426. The burden of establishing that a unreasonable, unless they fall within the narrow confines of a judicially crafted all his possessions.” Warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable searches and seizures of his person, his houses, his papers, and Constitution provides that every citizen has “a right to be secure from all Sawyer, 147 N.H. 191, 193 (2001). Part I, Article 19 of the New Hampshire
State v.
State v. Boyle, 148 N.H. 306, 307 (2002). appeal, we need to determine only whether the seizure was constitutional. See blue lights. See State v. Steeves, 158 N.H. 672, 676-77 (2009). Accordingly, on behind the defendant’s vehicle and activated both his rear and forward-facing neither party disputes, that the defendant was seized when the officer parked the trial court’s legal conclusions de novo. Id. The trial court found, and
, 155 N.H. 423, 426 (2007). However, we review
alleged violation of RSA 265:71. whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to seize the defendant for an need. See lost children to their parents, and generally assisting and protecting citizens in community caretaking functions such as helping stranded motorists, returning Finally, we are cognizant that police officers perform a broad range of
4 we need not reach the federal issue. See
Because we conclude that Boutin prevails under the State Constitution,
but to do so in a nonintrusive manner and without seizing the occupants of a importance of these functions and encourage police officers to perform them,
State v. D’Amour, 150 N.H. 122, 125 (2003). We recognize the
(1983).
State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 237
the road, but facing the wrong way. As in Boyle that essentially renders [Part I, Article 19] protections seasonal.” Id concerns. He also observed that Boutin’s vehicle was pulled off to the side of. was abandoned or if any occupants may have needed assistance or had health are traditionally long in [New Hampshire], and we cannot adhere to a theory concerned in part because it was dark and snow covered the ground, “[w]inters okay.” He testified that he could not tell if there was an accident, if the vehicle amounted to little more than a hunch. While the officer testified that he was “[j]ust to see if everything – if anything was wrong, make sure everything was Burgess In this case, the officer testified that he approached Boutin’s vehicle,, 657 A.2d 202, 204 (Vt. 1995). In short, the officer’s concerns was disabled, or that the passengers were in any type of distress. See State v. and the officer did not observe any obvious signs of an accident, that the car In Boyle Boutin’s protected interests. Boutin’s car was parked legally in a pull-off area describe any specific and articulable facts that justified the intrusion of generalized concerns about the vehicle and its potential occupants, he did not
, while the officer may have had
justify the driver’s seizure. Id. Id. Accordingly, we held that the community caretaking exception did not driver, the only person actually in the vehicle at the time, required assistance. believed the drunk female required aid, he had no reason to believe that the defendant to investigate further.” Id. at 309. While the officer may have cause a reasonable person to believe that it was appropriate to seize the cruiser. Id. We determined that these facts, judged objectively, “would not his front takedown lights, front spot light, and the strobe light on top of the potential medical or safety issues and pulled behind the vehicle and activated “drunk female.” Id. At that point, the officer became concerned about broken down. Id. at 306. The driver told the officer he had just dropped off a residential street and pulled up next to the driver to ask whether he had
, an officer saw a vehicle stopped in the travel lane on a
omitted). interest in being free from arbitrary government interference.” Id. (quotation exercise of his or her community caretaking function and the individual’s 5
BRODERICK, C.J.
, and DALIANIS, HICKS and CONBOY, JJ., concurred.
Reversed and remanded
.
government interference.” Boyle, 148 N.H. at 308. caretaking function and the individual’s interest in being free from arbitrary governmental interest in the police officer’s exercise of his or her community This type of police inquiry strikes a permissible balance between “the night “to illuminate what would otherwise be plainly visible in daylight.” Id. N.H. at 676. We have also determined that an officer may use his spotlight at activate his rear-facing blue lights without seizing a motorist. Steeves, 1 58 strong need to warn passing traffic of [the police’s] presence,” an officer can have previously determined that when there are circumstances that create “a also recognize the need to warn passing motorists of an officer’s presence, and person in a parked car and asks questions, the individual is not seized). We Licks, 154 N.H. 491, 493 (2006) (noting that when an officer approaches a point, the driver was free to decline the assistance and leave. See State v. Boyle, 148 N.H. at 306. The officer offered assistance to the driver, but at that officer pulled next to the vehicle and asked the driver if he had broken down. nonintrusive manner). For example, in Boyle, prior to seizing the driver, the concern for safety could justify approaching a vehicle and making contact in a vehicle. See Ozhuwan v. State, 786 P.2d 918, 922 (Alaska 1990) (a generalized