2010-235, The State of New Hampshire v. Paul McDonald

The defendant, Paul McDonald, appeals his conviction, by

and orally, for the defendant. ___________________________ Lisa L. Wolford, assistant appellate defender, of Concord, on the brief

assistant attorney general, on the brief and orally), for the State. a.m. on the morning of their release. T , attorney general (Susan P. McGinnis, senior reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address:

THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New

page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme.

well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as week.

p. 2 agreed to take $1,000 less if Eighmey would hold the motorcycle for another

motorcycle up for sale again. McDonald again requested more time, and 9, Eighmey told McDonald to complete the deal or else Eighmey would put the and postponed completion of the transaction for several weeks. Around June

a 1994 Tacoma, and $4,200. McDonald, however, repeatedly made excuses,

McDonald agreed to give him the 2008 Tacoma in exchange for the Shovelhead,

Some time after leaving the repair shop, McDonald drove to Vermont.

gave Eighmey the title to Wilcox’s 2008 Tacoma. Eighmey testified that few weeks to negotiate a purchase. Early during these negotiations, McDonald motorcycle repair shop. motorcycle, and called and visited the dealership several times over the next inquired about purchasing a Shovelhead from Dan Glidden, the owner of a interested in purchasing a Harley Davidson Shovelhead. He frequently

McDonald arrived, he had something wrapped around his bleeding hand.

testified that McDonald, posing as Wilcox, was enthusiastic about the

McDonald owned a Harley Davidson Ironhead motorcycle, but was

Glidden’s son, David, to fix the motorcycle that week. David testified that when and $3,200. McDonald then went to the motorcycle repair shop and asked traded Wilcox’s 2008 Tacoma for the 1994 Tacoma, the Shovelhead motorcycle,

dealership and inquired about purchasing the Shovelhead. Eighmey also himself as Richard Wilcox, but who was actually Paul McDonald, came to his Eighmey testified that in mid-to-late May 2008, a man who identified since their divorce in 2000, McDonald never seemed to have any money. had lived in several places and frequently changed jobs. She also testified that

transaction. He arrived at Eighmey’s dealership a little after 8:00 a.m. and

account had a deficit of $7.21. At trial, McDonald’s ex-wife testified that he

On June 12, McDonald, still posing as Wilcox, completed the

sales and repair business, also owned a Shovelhead. name. Glidden later informed McDonald that Dan Eighmey, the owner of a car had only $220.05 in his checking account. By the end of May, his checking credit card, but Glidden declined because the card was not in McDonald’s when the tenant renting it moved out. Shortly before McDonald moved in, he one of the spare bedrooms. The other bedroom was occupied until late May,

Eighmey agreed.

what the motorcycle was worth. McDonald attempted to pay the $6,500 with a

In March 2008, McDonald moved into Wilcox’s home and began renting

and quoted a price of $6,500. According to Glidden, this price was well above

time in Burlington, Massachusetts, and owned a 2008 Toyota Tacoma truck. lived in the house, but rented out the two spare bedrooms. He also worked full

The victim, Richard Wilcox, owned a three-bedroom home in Danville. Wilcox The record supports or the jury could have found the following facts. p. 3 3

whether the defendant’s emotional reactions appeared genuine. language and demeanor was admissible, as was opinion testimony regarding defendant’s motion, ruling that testimony describing the defendant’s body

the credibility of a witness.” After a hearing, the trial court denied the

and body language are inadmissible opinion evidence . . . [that] comment on argued that the officers’ “interpretations and observations of [his] demeanor from Gilbert and Armaganian regarding the police interrogation. The defendant

Before trial, the defendant moved to exclude certain opinion testimony

The only issue for the jury was whether he did so in self-defense.

just a “stupid” idea. At trial, McDonald admitted to causing Wilcox’s death.

read McDonald his Miranda to the plan to steal Wilcox’s truck, and described his plan to steal the truck as the sale with Eighmey, but claimed that the murder was completely unrelated clean up the blood, and left. He admitted to posing as Wilcox when negotiating

led to the corner of the basement,

them at the Vermont Police barracks. Once there, Gilbert and Armaganian

penis. He told the police that after he killed Wilcox, he panicked, attempted to

Eventually, they found bloody marks on the basement stairs, and blood that

Armaganian and Scott Gilbert went there and McDonald agreed to speak with friends in Castleton, Vermont. New Hampshire State Police Sergeants Mark name in Vermont. The next day, the police learned that he was staying with woke up with his pants around his ankles and felt Wilcox’s mouth on his Wilcox, but claimed he only attacked Wilcox because he “snapped” when he anything about Wilcox’s death. A short while later, he admitted that he killed

them found pools of blood in one of the bedrooms and a towel soaked in blood. bathroom. He called for assistance. After another officer arrived, the two of hallway. Furman found blood on the ceiling, floor, and walls of the hallway

On June 17, McDonald registered the 1994 Tacoma in his brother’s

At first, McDonald claimed that he had been gone and did not know

He then noticed a hole in the wall next to the counter and proceeded down the

about Wilcox’s death. (1966), and he waived them. Gilbert and Armaganian then questioned him

the living room was orderly and noticed a plate of food on the kitchen counter. Finding the front door ajar, Furman entered the premises. Inside, he saw that Sergeant Ryan Furman drove to Wilcox’s home to check on his well-being.

Wilcox.

On June 1 p. 3 3, in response to a call from Wilcox’s employer, Danville Police was a very, I thought, over exaggerated, shook [sic

p. 4 truck and the killing of Richard Wilcox were related. Gilbert explained, “[T]here

defendant’s facial expression after Gilbert asked him whether the theft of the portion of the audio recording, the State asked Gilbert to testify about the played the remainder of the recording for the jury. After playing the second

portion of the audio recording of the interview for the jury. The State later

The State then distributed a transcript of the interrogation and played a

that go – I – how could you think that? No. That kind of reaction. A: Yeah. There was a lot of, you know, a lot of eye rolling and the hands

and made a, sort of, exaggerated expression on your face. Q: Okay. And since this is being recorded, you kind of raised your eyes

over exaggerated.

would be a very flamboyant no, and he’d – goodness, no. And it’s very A: Well, if . . . I asked him a certain question and he says well, no, it

interrogation.

Q. Okay. Can you explain what you mean by that?

genuineness of his body language and demeanor during the police

the State to present opinion testimony from Sergeant Gilbert about the On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by allowing

overly dramatic.

think that type of expression.” A: I thought everything was overly – his body motions – emotions were

throughout the interview? Q: All right. Did you make any observations about his body language

A few moments later, the State inquired of Gilbert

shock, like oh, my goodness. I never thought of that. How could you possibly

demeanor was . . . his emotion to me seemed very feigned. able to turn his emotion on and off quickly and easily. . . . [H]is completely stammering nonsensical to other certain questions. He was

was succinct and clear to the point on certain questions, and then I observed how quickly he was able to turn his emotion on and off. He

the course of the interview.” Gilbert responded,

examination, the State asked Gilbert to “explain . . . what [he] observed during At trial, only Gilbert testified about the interrogation. During direct testify about their opinion on topics such as smell, State v. Brooks p. 5 Witnesses, including law enforcement officers, have been permitted to

express any opinion about the defendant’s credibility. lay opinions about the defendant’s body language and demeanor, and did not the other hand, contends that Gilbert’s testimony expressed only permissible

different from testimony that the defendant seemed to be lying. The State, on

the defendant’s emotions were “overly dramatic” and “over-exaggerated,” is no

his statements that the defendant’s “emotion . . . seemed very feigned” and that defendant’s credibility. The defendant argues that Gilbert’s testimony, such as whether Gilbert’s testimony actually constitutes an opinion about the

defendant’s credibility would be inadmissible. Rather, they disagree about

defendant’s demeanor. See

The parties do not dispute that lay opinion testimony about the

credibility).

limited circumstances, it is also permissible for a witness to characterize the testify that a noise sounded “like an engine running at fairly high speed”). In sound, Heath v. Joyce, 114 N.H. 620, 622 (1974) (lay witness permitted to permitted to “opine” that impressions at crime scene were “drag marks”), and kerosene), appearance, State v. McCue, 134 N.H. 94, 107 (1991) (officer 618, 621-22 (1985) (officer permitted to testify that a jacket smelled of

police interrogation amounted to impermissible lay opinion on the defendant’s

credibility of a witness. Id

an opinion. See N.H. 170, 173 (2003) (analyzing whether police officer’s testimony about the A witness need not qualify as an expert to give testimony in the form of defendant who does not testify as a witness at trial. See State v. Stott, 149 Id. This prohibition applies with equal force to testimony about a criminal

topics, they are not permitted to give lay opinion testimony regarding the Therefore, while witnesses may give lay opinion testimony on a variety of credibility of witnesses. State v. Reynolds, 136 N.H. 325, 328-29 (1992). However, it is the province and obligation of the jury to determine the perception of the witness” and helpful to the trier of fact. N.H. R. Ev. 701. testimony as long as the witness’s opinion is “rationally based on the

N.H. R. Ev. 701. The trial court may permit lay opinion

made. State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296 (2001). establishes an objective basis sufficient to sustain the discretionary decision ruling is a proper exercise of judicial discretion, we consider whether the record discretion. State v. Lopez, 156 N.H. 416, 420 (2007). In determining whether a the trial court’s decision to admit evidence absent an unsustainable exercise of the trial court. State v. White, 155 N.H. 119, 123 (2007). We will not reverse The admissibility of evidence is a matter left to the sound discretion of

direct statement about the credibility of the defendant is impermissible.

jury to determine credibility. Huard Allowing this testimony was an invasion of the province and obligation of the the defendant’s demeanor demonstrated that he was not being truthful. improper. The State’s argument seems to rely upon the assumption that only a

the defendant. In other words, Gilbert effectively testified that, in his opinion, the truth, commenting on the genuineness of that body language is not that because a person can feign or exaggerate body language even while telling comments on the credibility of the statements themselves.” The State reasons

and allowed the jury to determine the significance of those actions. See turn his emotion on and off” and that the defendant did “a lot of . . . eye rolling” emotions and body language this way, Gilbert implied that he did not believe

of a person’s physical and emotional reactions while making statements and

could have testified, as he did, about “how quickly [the defendant] was able to comment on the defendant’s credibility. By characterizing the defendant’s genuineness of the defendant’s physical reactions, and was tantamount to a exaggerated and overly dramatic. This testimony was a comment on the permissible because “there is a distinction between comments on the credibility to a comment on the credibility of the defendant’s demeanor, which is The State argues that, if anything, Gilbert’s testimony merely amounted

to the jury. See simply describe, without characterizing, the details of the defendant’s actions Undoubtedly, it would have been permissible in this case for Gilbert to

the victim, and the steps taken after that discussion). For example, Gilbert

emotions as “feigned,” and described the defendant’s body language as over-

credibility where the testimony related solely to the facts of a discussion with

interview with the defendant”); State v. Kulas However, Gilbert went further. He characterized the defendant’s

there were no tears”). 2003) (permitting testimony that the defendant “began to cry and sob, but v. Griffin, No.#C-020084, 2003 WL 21414 p. 6 664, at *8-9 (Ohio Ct. App. June 20,

[parties and] witnesses are truthful and what evidence is trustworthy.” State v. (finding that the witness’s testimony was not an opinion on the victim’s

to nothing more than a detailed factual narration of [the police officer’s]

Stott, 149 N.H. at 173 (permitting testimony that “amount[ed]

the defendant’s demeanor when the characterization is tantamount to a Huard, 138 N.H. 25 p. 6 6, 259 (1994). Accordingly, a witness may not characterize

not present evidence to preempt the jury’s often difficult job of deciding which witness appeared “scared” and “not able to think”). However, the “State may 705 N.E.2d 329, 340 (Ohio 1999) (permitting lay opinion testimony that the defendant was “laughing and using a mocking tone of voice”); State v. Stojetz, S.W.3d p. 6 635, 663 (Ky. 2004) (permitting lay opinion testimony that the self-defense, p. 7 the plan to steal the Tacoma, and his defense was that he killed the victim in the victim. Although the defendant claimed that the homicide was unrelated to

Vermont and assuming his brother’s name. face down when most of the wounds were inflicted. conceal the death by hiding the victim’s body in the basement, fleeing to

an error is harmless. State v. Pseudae

no bloodshed or struggle in the living room and that the victim was probably presented evidence of consciousness of guilt: the defendant attempted to

testimony, the error was harmless. The State bears the burden of proving that

photographs and the testimony of a forensic crime scene expert, that there was Tacoma from the victim’s office and gave it to Eighmey. The State also struggle ensued. However, the State presented evidence, including room and that when he awoke to find his penis in the victim’s mouth, a

The State argues that even if the trial court erred in admitting the

should not have been admitted. Further, the defendant admitted to the police that he took the title to the the jury his doubts about the defendant’s overall credibility. This testimony the victim and negotiated a sale of the victim’s brand new Toyota Tacoma. example, the defendant alleged that the sexual assault occurred in the living for the murder: testimony from Eighmey that for weeks, the defendant posed as the State presented extensive evidence to the contrary. For

Wilcox’s death. See had to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant purposely caused For the jury to convict the defendant of first-degree murder, the State

inconsequential in relation to the strength of the State’s evidence of guilt. Id

believed the defendant’s statements were false, his testimony communicated to defendant’s guilt was overwhelming. The State presented evidence of a motive

evidence. Id. evidence presented at trial as well as the character of the inadmissible In determining whether an error was harmless, we consider the alternative

weight and if the inadmissible evidence is merely cumulative or evidence of the defendant’s guilt is of an overwhelming nature, quantity or comment on credibility). Although Gilbert did not explicitly state that he was not affected by the error. Id. An error may be harmless if the alternative harmless only if it is determined, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the verdict credibility indirectly. See, 154 N.H. 196, 202 (2006). An error is

(explaining that a witness cannot make statements that are “tantamount” to a

comments on credibility explicitly, as well as testimony that comments on However, the prohibition on opinion testimony applies both to testimony that p. 8 8

him. In order for the defendant to be justified in using deadly

that a non-consensual sexual act was about to be performed on enough to constitute self-defense if the defendant merely believed about to commit a forcible sex offense against him. It is not

he reasonably believed that the other person was committing or A person is justified in using deadly force upon another person if

State’s proposed instruction read:

but requested language different from that proposed by the defendant. The

The State did not dispute that a self-defense instruction was required,

performing fellatio on him.”

committing or about to commit the crime of aggravated sexual assault by

person to defend himself if . . . [h]e actually believed that the other person was

instruction stated: “A person had the right to use deadly force on another statute, but omitted the words “forcible sex offense.” The defendant’s proposed defendant requested an instruction that explained the requirements of the

kidnapping or a forcible sex offense . . . .” RSA 627:4, II(c) (2007). The

of . . . eye rolling.” See the defendant “was able to turn his emotion on and off” and that he did “a lot believes that such other person . . . [i]s committing or about to commit it the admissible portions of Gilbert’s testimony, including his statements that justified in using deadly force upon another person when he reasonably self-defense statute, RSA 627:4, II(c), provides in relevant part: “A person is

inadmissible evidence had been excluded, the jury still would have had before

At trial, the defendant sought a jury instruction on self-defense. The

he spoke, and any hesitation in answering questions. Further, even if the could evaluate his inflection and tone of voice, the volume and speed at which recording, the jury could not observe the defendant’s physical behavior, they

evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

played for the jury. See

assess the defendant’s demeanor from the tape. Although with only an audio

error the trial court made in admitting Gilbert’s opinion testimony into

should not have been permitted to testify that the defendant’s reactions were inadmissible evidence in this case was merely cumulative. Although Gilbert

characterized the defendant’s emotional responses at trial, the jury could the hearsay declarant testified at trial). Regardless of how Gilbert (finding that improper admission of hearsay evidence was harmless error where

Not only was the alternative evidence of guilt extensive, but the p. 9 9

surprise.

encompass RSA 632-A:2, I(i), the provision regarding AFSA by concealment or “forcible sex offense,” as used in the self-defense statute, must be read to statute in his closing argument. The defendant argues that the phrase

his requested jury instruction and by prohibiting him from referring to the On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying

was used.

commit a forcible sex offense against him when the deadly force

the defendant to believe Mr. Wilcox was committing or about to reasonable. In other words, there must be reasonable grounds for committed or is about to be committed, his belief must be

defendant actually believed that a forcible sex offense is being

about to commit a forcible sex offense against him. Even if the

he reasonably believes that the other person is committing or

A person is justified in using deadly force upon another person if

said:

sustained the State’s objection. In its instructions to the jury, the trial court [does not] equate[] with the provision of AFSA, concealment or surprise” and on a finding that the aggressor was committing a forcible sex offense, which

concealment or surprise. The court ruled that the self-defense statute “relies

aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA) statute that describes AFSA by

The State then objected to defense counsel reading only the section of the

for rape. When an actor overcomes the victim through actual –

felonious sexual assault. That’s the highest, most serious offense

15 different ways somebody can be convicted of aggravated while sleeping, is forcible rape. And to support that, there are over any uninvited sexual penetration, such as a mouth on a penis

you’re sleeping, that is force. To put it bluntly, we all know that When someone is having sex with you, sexual penetration while

argued before the jury:

The parties then gave closing arguments. In closing, the defendant

because “[f]orcible means something.” court declined to eliminate the statutory term “forcible” from its instruction

statute is clear. The language is not difficult for the jury to understand.” The

that included the phrase “forcible sex offense.” The court explained, “[O]ur

The trial court decided to give an instruction that neither party proposed, but

target of a non-consensual sexual act committed with actual force. force, he must reasonably believe that he is or was about to be the p. 10 We agree with the State. See

construed in the context of the overall scheme of the self-defense statute. contrast, the State argues that the term “forcible sex offense” must be

relies upon the legislative history and policies behind the AFSA statute. In

“should not be excessive in relation to the harm threatened.” State v. Warren argument ignores the statutory scheme of the self-defense statute, and instead that deadly force is to be “used only when, and to the extent, ‘necessary’” and (2007). In construing the self-defense statute in the past, we have explained

with the term “aggravated felonious sexual assault.” However, the defendant’s asks us to replace the term “forcible sex offense” in the self-defense statute is committing or about to commit . . . a forcible sex offense.” RSA 627:4, II(c) must be read to include all variants of AFSA. In other words, the defendant

21, 2011). 147 N.H. 567, 569 (2002); see State v. Etienne, ___ N.H. ___, ___ (decided Dec.

(Supp. 2010). Deadly force is permitted in self-defense against “[a person who] New Hampshire on the violent nature of AFSA, the term “forcible sex offense” sometimes non-deadly, in defending himself from various harms. RSA 627:4 The self-defense statute permits a person to use force, sometimes deadly and

State v. Lamy have said nor add language that the legislature did not see fit to include.”

statute it appears that a different meaning was intended.” N.H. Resident Ltd.

light of the extensive reform to rape law in the last fifty years, and the focus in isolation. Appeal of Union Tel. Co. self-defense statute. In support of his position, the defendant contends that in evoke a single, plain meaning” and urges us to look beyond the language of the The defendant argues that the phrase “forcible sex offense do[es] not

, 158 N.H. 511, 515 (2009). adequately and accurately explained the law. Id

(2011) (quotation omitted). We will not consider “what the legislature might Partners of Lyme Timber v. N.H. Dep’t of Revenue Admin., 162 N.H. 98, 101

“according to the common and approved usage of the language unless from the the language of the statute, Kenison, 152 N.H. at 451, and construe it

interpret statutes in the context of the overall statutory scheme, not in which we review de novo. Kenison v. Dubois, 152 N.H. 448, 451 (2005). We The jury instruction at issue raises a question of statutory interpretation,

157 N.H. at 407. When reviewing jury instructions, we determine whether they of that instruction, are within the sound discretion of the trial court. Johnson, Whether a particular jury instruction is necessary, and the scope and wording Littlefield, 152 N.H. 331, 333-34 (2005) (quotation and brackets omitted). and intelligible language, the rules of law applicable to the case.” State v. purpose of the trial court’s charge is to state and explain to the jury, in clear the defendant.” State v. Johnson, 157 N.H. 404, 407 (2008). Rather, “the The trial court is not required to “use the specific language requested by p. 11 11 defense statute since the enactment of the AFSA statute, see

necessary, and proportionate with, the harm threatened. See term “forcible sex offense” instead. The legislature has thrice amended the self- act, but in all other circumstances, could only use deadly force to the extent D:1, I(c) (2007). However, in the self-defense statute, the legislature used the scheme, we need not set forth a technical meaning for the term “forcible.” See mean “effected by force used against opposition or resistance: obtained by “[a]ny . . . aggravated felonious sexual assault under RSA 632-A.” RSA 193- However, in light of the plain language of the statute and the overall statutory We agree with the trial court that the term “forcible” means something.

that a person could use deadly force to defend against any non-consensual sex The defendant concedes that the term “forcible” is commonly understood to similarly defined the phrase “[a]ct of theft, destruction, or violence” to include statutorily defined are to be given their common, ordinary, or usual meaning.”). State, 165 S.W.3d 785, 790 (Tex. App. Ct. 2005) (“Words that are not adopted”). See N.H. Resident Ltd. Partners of Lyme Timber, 162 N.H. at 101; Tovar v. the legislature intended the ordinary meaning of the term “forcible” to apply. “forcible sex offense” a technical legal definition, but chose not to. We assume “non-deadly force.” See RSA 627:9, II, IV (2007). It could have given the term RSA 627:9, the legislature specifically defined the terms “deadly force” and explain non-technical terms or phrases that are readily comprehended”). In State v. Dominguez, 128 N.H. 288, 289 (1986) (“the judge has no duty to

legislature did not see fit to include. It would also lead to the illogical result defense statute meaningless, and would require us to insert language the 2010). In RSA chapter 193-D, the statute on safe school zones, the legislature defendant asks us to, would render the word “forcible” as used in the selfoffense” includes aggravated felonious sexual assault. RSA 135-E:2, XI (Supp. To construe the term “forcible sex offense” to mean any AFSA, as the predators, the legislature specifically explained that the term “sexually violent unreasonable meaning of the language used, the reasonable meaning is to be Poulicakos, 160 N.H. 438, 444 (2010) (“[a]s between a reasonable and we decline to adopt such an unreasonable interpretation. Petition of N.H. at 569. Such a result is contrary to the rest of the statutory scheme and

E, the chapter regarding the involuntary civil commitment of sexually violent “forcible sex offense” with the term “aggravated felonious sexual assault.” Laws 20 p. 11 11, 268:1 (effective Nov. 13, 2011), yet did not replace the term 347:1, :2 (effective Aug. 16, 1981); Laws 2010, 361:1 (effective Jan. 1, 2011);

felonious sexual assault” in other statutes. For example, in RSA chapter 135statute. Indeed, the legislature has used the specific phrase “aggravated “aggravated felonious sexual assault” by using that term in the self-defense The legislature could have permitted the use of deadly force against any p. 12 Affirmed

meaning. Dominguez

assault statute in its closing argument. 12

commonly understood ordinary meaning, rather than a technical legal further define the term “forcible sex offense” because the phrase has a and used the exact language of the statute. The trial court was not required to err by prohibiting the defense from referring to the aggravated felonious sexual For the reasons discussed above, we also find that the trial court did not

DALIANIS, C.J., and HICKS, CONBOY and LYNN, JJ., concurred.

meaning). In this case, the trial court properly explained the law of self-defense

to the jury was proper. on the commonly-used word ‘force.’”). We hold that the trial court’s instruction an element of the crime . . ., there is no reason to require a further instruction

unless they have a technical legal meaning as distinguished from their ordinary

1096, 1100 (Colo. 1986) (“Where . . . a jury properly is instructed that force is

543, 548-49 (Iowa 1986) (holding that jury instructions need not define terms the jury. Dominguez, 128 N.H. at 289; see also State v. Hoffer, 383 N.W.2d The trial court is not required to define commonly understood terms to

strength [and] power”). a number of meanings,” its “ordinary meaning refers to the application of States, 130 S. Ct. 1265, 1270 (2010) (finding that although the word force “has the use of some amount of “strength” or “power.” See Johnson v. United meaning of the word is unambiguous because each definition has in common number of definitions. Despite these multiple definitions, the ordinary (unabridged ed. 2002). He points out, however, that the noun “force” has a compulsion or violence.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 888