2010-656, Claire Crowley & a. v. Town of Loudon; The Ledges Golf Links, Inc. v. Claire M. Crowley

The petitioners, Residents of Green View Drive (the

in part, vacate in part, and remand. Drive and could recover road maintenance costs from the Residents. We affirm Ms. Crowley was responsible for the continued maintenance of Green View Ledges Golf Links, Inc. (The Ledges) against Claire Crowley; and (3) ruled that partially granted and partially denied the petition to quiet title filed by The no “occasion” to lay out Green View Drive as a class V public highway; (2)

easement agreements. We review the trial court’s interpretation de cart paths.” Resolving this issue requires that we interpret the pertinent I. Quiet Title Petition Ledges “has a permanent easement to use . . . Green View Drive . . . for [golf] The Residents argue that the trial court erred when it decided that The

parties when they wrote it. Id. N.H. 192, 196 (2010). We give an agreement the meaning intended by the affected by the court’s decree. Austin v. Silver reading the document as a whole. Birch Broad. v. Capitol Broad. Corp., 161 party to prove good title as against all other parties whose rights may be the circumstances and the context in which the agreement was negotiated, and we give the language used by the parties its reasonable meaning, considering The Ledges’ quiet title action. In an action to quiet title, the burden is on each We first address the Residents’ challenge to the trial court’s decision in Close v. Fisette, 146 N.H. 480, 484 (2001). When interpreting an agreement,

law or unsupported by the evidence. Id. will uphold the trial court’s determination unless it is erroneous as a matter of , 162 N.H. p. 3 352, 353 (2011). We

followed. the superior court to lay out Green View Drive as a public road. See she has in the past.” This appeal, in which Ms. Crowley has not participated, The Town denied the petition. Ms. Crowley and the Residents then petitioned entitled to recover road maintenance costs from Green View Drive residents as Drive as a public road in November 2008; the Residents joined in this request. Ms. Crowley’s motion, the trial court further ruled that she “continues to be in March 2007. Ms. Crowley again petitioned the Town to accept Green View responsible for the continued maintenance of Green View Drive. In response to selectmen to accept Green View Drive as a town road. Her petition was denied After Mr. Crowley died, Ms. Crowley petitioned the Town’s board of The Ledges’ petition in part. The trial court also decided that Ms. Crowley is was no “occasion” for laying out Green View Drive as a town road and granted Drive with The Ledges’ petition to quiet title, and ultimately decided that there Crowley. The trial court consolidated the petitioners’ petition about Green View moved to intervene. The Ledges also brought a quiet title action against Ms. 2 p. 3 31:38, I (2009). While this action was pending, The Ledges successfully

system or portion thereof” currently on the Crowleys’ land. the September 2001 easement defined as “any water, electrical or similar maintain, and/or replace any portion of the Golf Course Infrastructure,” which easement included a grant of a permanent easement to The Ledges “to repair, the Crowleys’ property. Like the August 2000 easement, the September 2001 permanent easement to use for all golf course purposes” a particular portion of p. 4 4

defined, but the phrase “similar system.” This phrase, as used in the August The pertinent term in our view is not “infrastructure,” which the parties View Drive right-of-way for the cart paths.” See easement was created, “the Ledges has a permanent easement to use the Green way of Green View Drive, and have been in this approximate location since the further concluded that because the golf cart paths are now within the right-ofthe golf cart paths were part of the golf course’s infrastructure. The court terms of the August 2000 and September 2001 easement agreements because this definition, the court ruled that golf cart paths were included under the relying, in part, upon a dictionary definition of “infrastructure.” Based upon for the purpose of golf cart travel. The trial court reached this conclusion by 2001 agreements as granting The Ledges an easement to use Green View Drive Nevertheless, the trial court construed the August 2000 and September

control when, as here, the contracting parties have defined a term. See dictionary definition of the term “infrastructure.” Common usage does not We agree with the Residents that the trial court erred by relying upon the

of this term. system or portion thereof”; thus, common usage does not control the meaning defined the term “infrastructure” to mean “any water, electrical or similar Combined Ins. Co. of America, 125 N.H. 395, 396 (198 p. 4 4). Here, the parties Cole v.

[are] reasonably necessary to enable them to enjoy [the easement] beneficially”). p. 4 43 (1894) (under express grant, grantees take “by implication whatever rights

that Mr. Crowley would grant such an easement, the subsequent documents granted. In the trial court’s words: “Although the settlement agreement states despite the May 2000 settlement agreement requiring such an easement to be express easement to use Green View Drive “for all golf course purposes,” language of both agreements does not demonstrate that The Ledges had an included Green View Drive. As the trial court aptly observed, the plain electrical or similar system or portion thereof” on the Crowleys’ property, which The Ledges a “permanent easement” to maintain and repair “any water, Both the August 2000 and September 2001 easement agreements gave

evidence and are not legally erroneous. Id. at 197. findings by the trial court to which we will defer if they are supported by the understood the ambiguous language to mean necessarily involves factual standard to determine what the parties, as reasonable people, mutually understood the ambiguous language to mean. Id. Applying an objective under an objective standard, what the parties, as reasonable people, mutually omitted). If the agreement’s language is ambiguous, it must be determined, could reasonably disagree as to the meaning of that language.” Id. (quotation “The language of a contract is ambiguous if the parties to the contract p. 5 5

assessing whether “occasion” for laying out a road exists. Green Crow Corp. We have outlined a two-step process for a trial court to undertake when occasion for the layout exists.” Id. (quotation omitted). “If the balancing required by the second step favors the public interest, the layout against the burden imposed upon the town. Id. (quotation omitted). court must engage in a second step, which is to balance the public interest in justifies . . . taking . . . the land without the landowner’s consent,” then the occasion for laying out the road. Id. If, on the other hand, “the public interest the rights of the affected landowner outweigh the public interest, there is no layout against the rights of the affected landowner.” Id so. Wolfeboro Neck Prop. Owners Assoc.. (quotation omitted). If 1 p. 5 57 N.H. at 350. First, the court must “balance the public interest in the If a town refuses to lay out a road, the trial court may be petitioned to do

and is not legally erroneous. Id. “occasion” for laying out the road exists “if it is supported by some evidence,” omitted). We will uphold the superior court’s determination as to whether an requested.” Wolfeboro Neck Prop. Owners Assoc., 146 N.H. at 4 p. 5 52 (quotation do so. Wolfeboro Neck Prop. Owners Assoc. v. Town of Wolfeboro determination of the occasion, or appropriateness, of laying out a road as road. Upon petition, a town will lay out roads when there is an “occasion” to “The superior court conducts a de novo hearing to make an independent it decided that there was no “occasion” to lay out Green View Drive as a public, 146 N.H. at 452; see RSA 231:38, I. We next address the Residents’ assertion that the trial court erred when

II. Petition to Classify Green View Drive as Class V Public Highway roads would impose upon the town.” Id. (quotation and brackets omitted). selectmen “must balance the public need for the roads against the burden the Town of New Ipswich, 1 p. 5 57 N.H. 344, 350 (2008). Specifically, a town’s board of involves an equitable balancing of competing interests.” Green Crow Corp. v. interest requires the town’s acceptance of the roads. Id. “Assessing occasion 449, 451 (2001). “Occasion” for the lay out of public roads exists if the public

mutually understood the phrase “similar system” to mean. See id. at 140-41. determine, in the first instance, what the parties, as reasonable people, therefore, vacate this portion of the trial court’s order and remand for it to we cannot determine what the parties intended the phrase to mean. We, However, because the trial court did not make factual findings on this issue, parties.” N.A.P.P. Realty Trust v. CC Enterprises, 147 N.H. 137, 141 (2001). agreement, keeping in mind our goal of giving effect to the intention of the the circumstances surrounding execution and the object intended by the it, we must “consider the parties’ intent by examining the contract as a whole, 2000 and September 2001 easement agreements, is ambiguous. To interpret emergency services. See

p. 6 as an “emergency lane,” residents on the road had adequate access to their needs, and that because the Town previously declared Green View Drive although school children live on Green View Drive, a nearby bus stop meets or ease existing traffic flow since it is a dead-end road. The court found that not frequently used, and improving it would not improve convenience of travel as a public road was minimal because there are few houses on the road, it is 6 The court found that the public’s interest in laying out Green View Drive

“great public need” for Green View Drive to be public. and liability for Green View Drive, and their lack of notice somehow creates a purchased their homes without notice that the Town had limited responsibility because the Town allegedly did not comply with RSA 674:41, I(d) (2008), they laying out Green View Drive as a public road, the Residents first argue that To challenge the trial court’s determination that no occasion exists for

by the burden imposed on the town from doing so. public interest in laying out Green View Drive as a public road was outweighed interest justified taking the land without The Ledges’ consent, the minimal interest in the layout. Alternatively, the trial court ruled that even if the public owner of a portion of Green View Drive – The Ledges – outweigh the public out Green View Drive as a public road in part because the rights affecting the In this case, the trial court found that there was no occasion for laying

electrical lines run underneath it. repairing or reconstructing the road because the golf course’s water and Drive as a public road, which, the court found, included added expense from benefit, the court weighed the burden on the Town from laying out Green View

as increased costs for school, fire, police and emergency systems. See well as the impact on the town’s infrastructure due to municipal growth, such construction and ongoing maintenance costs pertaining to the road itself, as In assessing the “town burden,” trial courts may consider anticipated

frequency of road use. Id small fraction of the town tax base or year-round residents; and (8) anticipated and police services; (7) whether it would benefit a significant portion or just a district and employment centers; (6) improved accessibility for fire, emergency transportation for school children; (5) improved accessibility to business 350-51. traffic flow; (3) improvement to convenience of travel; (4) facilitation of other factors: (1) integration within an existing road system; (2) ease of existing id. at In assessing the “public interest,” the trial court may consider, among

p. 7 Green View Drive’s status as an emergency lane. We disagree that this was The Residents next contend that the trial court erred when it considered

issue. with the Town that RSA 674:41, I(b)(2) (2008) governed the building permits at a street on a subdivision plat, which the planning board approved, we agree governed permits to build on Green View Drive. Because Green View Drive was Third, the Residents’ argument mistakenly assumes that RSA 674:41, I(d)

to knowing that the road was private when they bought it. private subdivision road. . . . Indeed, some of the residents admit

approving them and, thus, whether the burden from fixing their deficiencies public, the trial court did not resolve whether the town had been negligent in When assessing the “burden” upon the town from laying out the roads as

deeds to property along Green View Drive refer to the road as a Merrimack County Registry of Deeds. . . . Finally, many of the

Id. at 450-51. standards and that fixing the deficiencies would cost approximately $295,000. inspection, the town discovered that the roads, in fact, did not meet town petitioned the town to accept the roads as public roads. Id Relying upon Wolfeboro Neck Property Owners Association. at 450. Upon Thereafter, the plaintiffs, thinking that the roads met town standards, at issue did not meet town standards, the town approved them. Id. at 450-51. 146 N.H. at 453. In that case, the plaintiffs alleged that even though the roads the subdivision roads at issue, it erred. Wolfeboro Neck Prop. Owners Assoc., relied upon any burden that was the result of the town’s negligent inspection of represented this intent through the plans recorded with the Property Owners Association View Drive would be a private road. . . . Mr. Crowley also, we held that, to the extent that the trial court Association represented to the [planning] board that what would become Green is distinguishable from the instant case. In Wolfeboro Neck weighed in the “occasion” analysis. Wolfeboro Neck Property Owners created by the Town’s unreasonable actions,” and, thus, should not have been 453, the Residents next assert that “[t]he burdens cited by the lower court were

Green Crow Corp., 157 N.H. at 350.

From the beginning of Mr. Crowley’s plans to subdivide, he

for it. As the trial court observed: necessarily entails notice that the Town had limited responsibility and liability found that they had notice that Green View Drive was a private road, which Second, although the Residents claim lack of notice, the trial court expressly demonstrated that their need for notice equates to a public need for the road. This argument fails for several reasons. First, the Residents have not p. 8 Affirmed in part; vacated in part; and remanded

could recover road maintenance costs from Green View Drive residents. Ms. Crowley was responsible for maintaining Green View Drive and that she were legally enforceable. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s finding that record does not show that the parties litigated whether any of these obligations Green View residents had reimbursed the Crowleys for maintenance costs, the 8 to be a private road, that the Crowleys had previously maintained it, and that private. While there was ample evidence that Green View Drive was intended Residents – were responsible for maintaining Green View Drive if it remained include deciding which of the private parties – Ms. Crowley, The Ledges or the The record before us reveals that the issues before the court did not

DALIANIS, C.J., and DUGGAN and LYNN, JJ., concurred.

they lack merit and warrant no extended consideration. See

III. Maintenance Obligations for Green View Drive.

argument in their joint appellate brief. not have been decided. The Town and The Ledges have not responded to this We have reviewed the Residents’ remaining arguments and hold that court, the Residents asserted that Ms. Crowley agreed that this issue should this issue was not properly before the trial court. In their motion to the trial from Green View Drive residents as she has in the past.” They contend that Green View Drive and that she is entitled “to recover road maintenance costs when it decided that Ms. Crowley continues to be responsible for maintaining Lastly, we address the Residents’ contention that the trial court erred

View Drive against the burden imposed upon the Town in doing so. court’s equitable balancing of the benefit to the public from laying out Green develop Green View Drive as a private road. We find no legal error in the trial when it approved Mr. Crowley’s subdivision plan, which included his plan to In this case, by contrast, there is no claim that the Town was negligent

137 N.H. 321, 322 (1993). Vogel v. Vogel,

in negligently inspecting the roads. Id. in the “occasion” analysis any burden on the town from its unreasonable action decide whether the town negligently inspected the roads and, if so, not to weigh unreasonable actions.” Id. at 453. We instructed the court, on remand, to ‘burden’ the town may have had in laying out the roads caused by its own laying out of public roads, the trial court . . . should not . . . consider[ ] any required to determine whether there is an ‘occasion’ under RSA 231:8 for the court’s decision, holding that “when undertaking the equitable balancing was a burden of the town’s own making. Id. at 451. We reversed the trial