2010-846 Anthony Hayes v. Southern New Hampshire Medical Center

Smith-Weiss Shepard, P.C.

No. 2010-846

Hillsborough-southern judicial district

of the Superior Court (Lynn CONBOY, J. The appellant, Anthony Hayes (Anthony), appeals an order

Welts, White & Fontaine, P.C. The following undisputed facts are drawn from the record and Southern

New Hampshire Medical Center v. Hayes, 159 N.H. 711 (2010). The petitioner

owned by him. We affirm. Southern New Hampshire Medical Center (SNHMC), on certain rental property and finding valid and executable the prejudgment attachment of the appellee, , C.J.) denying his petition to enjoin sheriff’s sale

the brief and orally), for the defendant.

and orally), for the plaintiff.

page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address: editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule p. 2 22 as 2

property was scheduled for November 30, p. 2 2010. execution for $88,849.59. Subsequently, the sheriff’s sale for the Amherst Karen W. Hayes.” On July 20, 2010, the superior court issued a writ of sale on . . . [the Amherst property] in order to satisfy its judgment against for the purpose of requesting a writ of execution to “proceed with a Sheriff’s In the spring of 2010, SNHMC obtained limited probate administration

insurance. Id each was responsible for his or her own medical expenses not covered by By order of March p. 2 28, 2007, the Trial Court (Brennan Hayeses were divorced pursuant to a stipulated agreement. Under its terms, During the pendency of these proceedings, on January 18, 2007, the died. Amherst and Merrimack properties to Anthony. On August 25, 2007, Karen id. Pursuant to their stipulation, on January 22, 2007, Karen quitclaimed the properties, which he acknowledged were subject to SNHMC’s attachments. See balance of $0.00. Id. Anthony was awarded the Merrimack and Amherst Karen received one automobile valued at $1,200 and her bank account with a to SNHMC as well as any other medical debts or bills.” Id. (brackets omitted).

. at 713. Specifically, “Karen was responsible for paying the debt

Id. at 713, 716, 7 p. 2 21. judgment entered against Anthony and remanded the matter for a new trial. affirmed the grant of summary judgment against Karen, but reversed the See id. Both judgments were appealed. Id. at 713. On February 11, 2010, we Anthony in the same amount – $85,238.88 – under the doctrine of necessaries. Following a bench trial, the Trial Court (Smukler, J.) entered judgment against petitioned to attach a portion of the couple’s real estate. See $85,238.88, plus costs, but denied the motion as to Anthony. See id. at 714. Hayeses for Karen’s unpaid medical expenses. At the same time, SNHMC SNHMC’s motion for summary judgment against Karen in the amount of In November 2006, SNHMC filed suit in superior court against the, J.) granted

attachment was subsequently recorded. parcel of the couple’s real estate. This petition was also granted, and the on November 30, p. 2 2006. In January 2007, SNHMC petitioned to attach another Merrimack property). The attachment petition was granted and it was recorded Amherst (the Amherst property) and their primary residence in Merrimack (the survivorship, two unencumbered parcels of real estate – a rental property in initiated its civil action, the Hayeses owned, as joint tenants with rights of

resulting in a balance due of $85, p. 2 2 p. 3 38.88. Id. medical treatment at SNHMC for complications stemming from alcoholism, In 2006, Karen, who did not have health insurance, received emergency and his wife, Karen, were married in 1977. S. N.H. Med. Ctr., 159 N.H. at 713. 3

Relying on Roaf v. Champlin

unless they are erroneous as a matter of law. Sutton v. Town of Gilford unsupported by the evidence and will affirm the trial court’s legal rulings We will affirm the trial court’s factual findings unless they are

as of possession. See ownership. Joint tenants are said to have a unity of title and of interest as well “[f]ocus[] upon and follow[] Karen’s interest A joint tenancy with right of survivorship is a unique type of property” at the time SNHMC attached the , 79 N.H. 219 (1919), Anthony urges us to

SNHMC’s attachment on the Amherst property. attachment. Nevertheless, Anthony maintains that Karen’s death extinguished also concedes that Karen quitclaimed her interest subject to SNHMC’s become tenants in common.”); see also Wentworth, 47 N.H. at 227. Anthony simple title in Anthony subject to its attachments. interest in the property, the joint tenancy is said to be severed and the owners tenancy when she quitclaimed the Amherst property to Anthony, creating fee See 17 C. Szypszak, supra § 5.0 p. 3 3, at 100 (“If a joint tenant conveys his or her of law. Specifically, SNHMC maintains that Karen voluntarily severed the joint of the joint tenancy, Anthony had no right of survivorship upon Karen’s death. court’s order was supported by the evidence and was not erroneous as a matter her interest in the Amherst property. Accordingly, as a result of the severance terminated SNHMC’s prejudgment attachment. SNHMC counters that the trial Karen severed the joint tenancy when she conveyed to him, by quitclaim deed, court erred as a matter of law when it failed to find that Karen’s death Mulvanity v. Nute, 95 N.H. 526, 528 (1949). Here, Anthony concedes that interest in the property prior to entry of final judgment against her, the trial defeat the right of survivorship. Boissonnault, 137 N.H. at 231; see also On appeal, Anthony contends that, because Karen quitclaimed her joint tenant may alienate or convey her interest in the property, and thereby id.; see also Boissonnault v. Savage, 137 N.H. 229, 231 (1993). However, a succeeds to the entire real estate upon the death of the other joint tenant. See joint tenancy is the survivorship right, by which a surviving joint tenant Practice, Real Estate § 5.03, at 100 (2003). The distinguishing feature of a joint tenant has full ownership rights. 17 C. Szypszak, New Hampshire Wentworth v. Remick, 47 N.H. 226, 226 (1866). Each

satisfy its judgment against her.” remains valid and that SNHMC is entitled to execute against the property to “SNHMC’s attachment of Karen Hayes’s interest in the Amherst property hearing. After that hearing, the Trial Court (Lynn, C.J.) concluded that contingent upon Anthony posting adequate security, and scheduled a further and for Declaratory Judgment. The Trial Court (Nicolosi, J.) enjoined the sale, On November 29, 2010, Anthony filed a Petition to Enjoin Sheriff’s Sale p. 4 4

Anthony further argues that this case is controlled by Beland v. Estey

In Beland

Id. at 8. Several months later, Bernard conveyed to his wife his interest in Bernard was working, was damaged by fire allegedly caused by his negligence. Fraudulent Transfer Act, RSA chapter 5 p. 4 45-A), when their property, on which Estey, within the terms of RSA chapter 545 (the predecessor of the Uniform , the plaintiffs became “creditors” of the defendant, Bernard

death. We agree with the trial judge that Beland is distinguishable. SNHMC’s attachment since a sheriff’s sale was not conducted prior to her distinguishable. Relying on Beland, he argues that Karen’s death extinguished 116 N.H. 8 (1976), and that the trial court erred in finding Beland Roaf,

conveyance to Anthony, which defeated his right of survivorship. “[f]ocus[] upon and follow[] Karen’s interest” and disregard her inter vivos interest. Thus, we are not persuaded by Anthony’s assertion that we should Therefore, unlike the creditor in Roaf, SNHMC did not attach a contingent originally made, and the lien resulting therefrom, that controls . . . .”). Anthony asserts that, here, as in Roaf (“It is the [debtor’s] interest in the real estate at the time the attachment was undivided one-half interest. See Rodman v. Young, 1 p. 4 41 N.H. 236, 238 (1996) attachment, Karen had a present, alienable interest in the property; namely, an had a future interest in the subject property, at the time of SNHMC’s

, however, is distinguishable. Unlike the debtor in Roaf, who only

Karen’s death terminated her interest and in turn SNHMC’s attachment. interest in Roaf and consequently the creditor’s attachment, Anthony argues Amherst property. Just as the conveyance extinguished the debtor’s remainder attachment is similarly contingent on Karen’s continued interest in the In Roaf was conditioned upon the debtor’s continued interest in the property, SNHMC’s

estate. Id. at 22 p. 4 4. never materialized, the plaintiff acquired no interest by attaching the real [the debtor] had.” Id. Accordingly, because the debtor’s remainder interest of all the real estate of [the debtor], could not acquire any greater interest than real estate to a third party. Id. We held that “[t]he plaintiff, by his attachment remainder interest, however, the tenants of the life estate legally conveyed the held a remainder interest. Id. at 221. Before the debtor obtained his

, the plaintiff creditor attached real estate in which the debtor

attachment terminated at the moment of her death.” survivorship, and the attachment was based upon that same interest, the Karen’s interest in the Amherst property was that as a joint tenant with right of that Karen had in that property” and “[b]ecause, at the time of the attachment, jointly owned by Karen and Anthony Hayes, it could only attach the interest property. He contends that “when SNHMC attached the Amherst property then p. 5 Id the attachment. whole interest of the debtor, upon such change, shall be held by to the debtor of any conveyance pursuant to a contract, but the

levy thereon and sell Bernard’s interest during his lifetime. obtain this interest plaintiffs would have had to obtain a judgment, redemption of a mortgage or other encumbrance or the execution

fee depending upon which joint tenant survived. However, to any change in the nature of the debtor’s right thereto, as by attached is similar to a life estate with a contingent remainder in No attachment of any interest in real estate shall be defeated by

share was subject to attachment by the plaintiffs. The interest RSA 511:17 (2010) provides:

conveyance. During the joint lives of the defendants Bernard’s to levy on Bernard’s interest in the property as it stood before the [the] plaintiffs would be entitled to have it set aside to enable them

Anthony argues that, similar to the plaintiffs in Beland

husband. during Karen’s lifetime and while she held the property jointly with her this case. Here, SNHMC’s prejudgment attachment was obtained and recorded Anthony fails to acknowledge, however, the key distinction between Beland and attachment, Karen’s survival, was not satisfied, and therefore it lapsed. property during her lifetime. Thus, he contends, the condition of the obtain a judgment, levy thereon, and sell Karen’s interest in the Amherst

interest of the plaintiffs. Id. death, his wife became the sole owner of the property free and clear of any any claims by the plaintiffs. Id. We concluded, therefore, that at Bernard’s happen. Id. Further, there was no evidence that Bernard’s wife was subject to matter of law,. at 9 (citations omitted). The record established, however, that this did not upheld the plaintiffs’ contention that the conveyance was fraudulent as a In affirming the trial court’s dismissal order, we explained that if we

died. Id. for its finding. Id. Subsequently, during the pendency of the appeal, Bernard violate the statute. We did not indicate whether the trial court stated reasons The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ bill, finding the conveyance did not equity to set aside as fraudulent Bernard’s conveyance to his wife. Id. at 8. property they held jointly. Id. at 8-9. The plaintiffs then brought a bill in p. 6 6

Affirmed

DALIANIS, C.J.