2010-548 Chase Home for Children & a. v. New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families

No. 2010-548

Merrimack

I. Facts

Youth and Families (DCYF), appeals the order of the Superior Court (Sullivan DUGGAN, J. The defendant, the New Hampshire Division for Children,

2004, 2005 and 2006. It has been ongoing for over five years, and has already This dispute concerns rates that DCYF paid the plaintiffs in fiscal years Orr & Reno, P.A. Michael A. Delaney

Pine Haven Boys Center. We affirm. Family Services, Hannah House, NFI North, Odyssey House, Orion House and J.) to pay $3,553,479.55 to the plaintiffs, Chase Home for Children, Child &

brief, and Ms. Smith orally), for the State. attorney general, and Rebecca L. Woodard, assistant attorney general, on the THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE , attorney general (Nancy J. Smith, senior assistant

Goldwasser on the brief, and Ms. Wade orally), for the plaintiffs.

page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address: editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as reconsideration of the rates. DCYF refused. The providers appealed the rates

p. 2 increasing the rates, citing fiscal concerns. The providers requested a In FY 2005, DCYF again informed the providers that it would not be

were not consistent with the methodology set forth in He-C 6422. administrative hearing panel. The hearing panel ruled that the FY 2004 rates to RSA 170-G:4-a, the providers appealed the rates to a three-person rates were inconsistent with He-C 6422. DCYF declined the request. Pursuant rates.” The providers asked DCYF to reconsider, claiming that the FY 2004 2 fiscal situation, [DCYF] will not be able to approve any increase in residential In fiscal year (FY) 2004, DCYF told the providers that “due to our current

paying for residential childcare services. DCYF. Class lines 90, 92 and 93 of that PAU are specifically dedicated to lines. The Child and Family Services PAU funds the services provided by program appropriation units (PAUs), which are then broken down into class budget. As with all department budgets, DHHS’s budget is broken down into DCYF’s budget for residential childcare services is part of DHHS’s overall

Medicaid beneficiaries. (PNMI), which is billed to Medicaid. The PSAs only cover services provided to the full board and care rate less the private non-medical institution rate board and care rate. For children who are Medicaid beneficiaries, DCYF pays child. For children who are non-Medicaid beneficiaries, DCYF pays the full The rates cover board and care and are computed on a per diem basis for each accordance with New Hampshire Administrative Rule, He-C 6422 (He-C 6422). be provided and requires the payment rate for those services to be set in and contained automatic renewal clauses. Each PSA outlines the services to Agreements (PSAs) that covered the period from July 1, 2003 to June 30, 2004, In 2003, DCYF and the providers entered into Provider Service

services. and Human Services (DHHS) responsible for providing residential childcare defendant, DCYF, is the division of the New Hampshire Department of Health found to be in need of services, see RSA ch. 169-D (2002 & Supp. 2010). The who have been abused, see RSA ch. 169-C (2002 & Supp. 2010); and children adjudicated as delinquents, see RSA ch. 169-B (2002 & Supp. 2010); children provide residential placements on behalf of the State to children who have been The plaintiffs are residential childcare providers (the providers) who

opinions that are the subject of this appeal. taken from those opinions, as well as the record and the superior court Div. for Children, Youth, & Families, 155 N.H. 577 (2007). The facts below are See Petition of Chase Home for Children, 155 N.H. 528 (2007); Petition of N.H. been the subject of two administrative appeals and two opinions of this court. p. 3 3

also indicates that approximately $ p. 3 39 million of the aforementioned lapse was routinely requests and receives permission to transfer funds. The record here committee and the Governor and Council. The record shows that DHHS class lines and PAUs. Such transfers require the permission of the fiscal To cover fiscal shortfalls, a State agency can transfer money between

of DHHS, showed a total lapse of approximately $70 million. million, while a document produced for trial by Stephen Mosher, an employee fund. An internal DHHS letter showed a total lapse of approximately $61 2005 DHHS, as a whole, lapsed a significant amount of money to the general He-C 6422. However, the evidence at trial established that in FY 2004 and insufficient funds in class lines 90, 92 and 9 p. 3 3 to cover the rates as required by it failed to pay the appropriate rates. In FY 2004, 2005 and 2006 there were As mentioned above, DCYF consistently pointed to fiscal concerns when

the paid rates. DCYF appealed the panel’s ruling to this court. In Petition of percent over what the FY 2005 rates should have been under He-C 6422, not panel disagreed and ruled that the FY 2006 rates had to be increased by five rates, not the FY 2005 rates as calculated under He-C 6422. The hearing argued that the five percent increase should be based on the FY 2005 paid Trailer Bill it had to increase the FY 2006 rate by only five percent. It further 2005, 177:117 (Trailer Bill). DCYF argued that under the Budget Bill and budget restrictions imposed by Laws 2005, chapter 176 (Budget Bill) and Laws longer had a legal obligation to set the rates according to He-C 6422 because of 2006 rates to the hearing panel. This time DCYF took the position that it no (2007), we affirmed the panel’s decision. New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families While the above dispute was ongoing, the providers appealed the FY, 155 N.H. 577

hearing panel does not have the authority to order such payments. Id. at 5 p. 3 35. are entitled to retroactive payments at the [appropriately] calculated rates,” the providers. Id. at 534-35. However, we held that even though the “[providers] We affirmed the hearing panel determinations that DCYF had underpaid the were consolidated in Petition of Chase Home for Children, 155 N.H. 528 (2007). seeking review of the FY 2004 and 2005 hearing panel decisions. The cases The providers then filed two petitions for writ of certiorari in this court

the panel ruled that it lacked the authority to do so. hearing panel to order DCYF to compensate them for the underpayment, but 2005, a fact that is not disputed by the parties. The providers requested the providers by approximately $1. p. 3 3 million in FY 2004 and $1.6 million in FY The hearing panel’s rulings established that DCYF had underpaid the

inconsistent with He-C 6422. to the hearing panel. The hearing panel ruled that the FY 2005 rates were court disagreed, ruling that because the “statutes have addressed [DCYF’s] p. 4 nevertheless, any private cause of action is barred by sovereign immunity. The could not have intended such a result.” DCYF went on to argue that, no way to enforce the results of the appeal process, and . . . the legislature appeal granted by RSA 170-G:4-a would be rendered meaningless if there was court ruled that a private cause of action does exist because “the right to create a private cause of action for the providers’ underpayment claim. The DCYF also argued that RSA chapters 169-B, 169-C and 169-D do not

must fail on summary judgment because, among other things, the providers Next, DCYF argued that the providers’ unconstitutional taking claim

issues of material fact on this claim. that DCYF had underpaid them. The court found that there were genuine DCYF’s refusal to reimburse the providers after the hearing panel determined support their good faith and fair dealing claim. The providers’ claim rested on DCYF next asserted that the providers failed to allege sufficient facts to

Prior to trial, the Superior Court (Fauver

limitations barred some of the providers’ contract claims. existed. The court also rejected DCYF’s argument that the statute of but that more facts were needed to determine whether implied-in-fact contracts implied-in-fact contracts. The court ruled that the PSAs are express contracts, parties’ course of dealing for services for non-Medicaid children created the PSAs are express contracts for services for Medicaid children, and that the claim. DCYF argued that no contracts existed. The providers responded that in a civil action in superior court.” Petition of N.H. Div. for Children, Youth & summary judgment. The court first addressed the providers’ breach of contract any, [were] available to the [providers], such as whether they [can] obtain relief In our prior opinions, we declined to address “what further remedies, if, J.) denied DCYF’s motion for

and associated laws. just compensation, and violations of RSA chapters 169-B, 169-C and 169-D, implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unconstitutional taking without underpayments. Specifically, they alleged breach of contract, breach of the a complaint against DCYF in superior court, seeking damages for the N.H. at 535. Eventually, the providers did seek such relief. In 2008, they filed Families, 155 N.H. at 584, accord Petition of Chase Home for Children, 155

there was a significant lapse in FY 2006 that could have covered those rates. into class lines 90, 92 and 93. The record, though, does not indicate whether 2005 rates. In spite of this, DHHS did not request permission to transfer funds available for transfer, an amount that could have fully covered the FY 2004 and chose not to include sufficient funds in those lines. p. 5 into the relevant class lines because the Governor and legislature explicitly that it would have been improper for it to seek permission to transfer funds authority to second-guess its decisions on such matters. Third, DCYF argued alter the rate-setting rules by under-funding, and a court does not have the with its insufficient funds. According to DCYF, the legislature has the power to subject to the availability of funds, and, therefore, its rates had to be consistent voted by the legislature.” Second, it argued that its ability to set rates is prohibits state officials from “expending any money . . . in excess of the amount its contracts to the extent that they exceed appropriations because RSA 9:19 class lines had insufficient funds. First, it argued that it cannot be bound to court could not order it to pay damages to the providers because the relevant DCYF argued that, regardless of its findings and rulings, the superior

C, 169-D and 170-G. statutory claims, the court ruled that DCYF violated RSA chapters 169-B, 169reiterating that the providers had a private cause of action to bring their decision. The court did, however, address the statutory violations claim. After that DCYF had breached the contracts provided sufficient grounds for its the court declined to reach the merits of the taking claim because its ruling As to the final counts – unconstitutional taking and statutory violations –

Governor and Council to transfer funds into class lines 90, 92 and 93. without attempting to obtain permission from the fiscal committee and 90, 92 and 93 without paying the providers, and DHHS lapsed $65 million because during the relevant fiscal years DCYF lapsed $790,735 from class lines court found that DCYF breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires the rates to be set in accordance with He-C 6422. Additionally, the in-fact contracts because it did not comply with the term of the PSAs that PSAs. The court concluded that DCYF had breached the express and impliedfact contracts existed and that the terms of those contracts are identical to the exhibits, the court issued a lengthy ruling. The court found that implied-in- After a seven-day trial with seventeen witnesses and approximately 300

administrative hearing[] panel.” statutes and regulations, as well as adhere to the findings of its own would simply resolve a contract dispute and require DCYF “to adhere to its own with legislative spending power. The court disagreed, ruling that such an order would violate the doctrine of separation of powers because it would interfere Constitution, DCYF argued that any order requiring it to pay the providers Finally, relying upon Part I, Article 37 of the New Hampshire

claims. that RSA 491:8 waives the State’s sovereign immunity for breach of contract liability, . . . the state has waived sovereign immunity.” The court also ruled p. 6 6

A. Express and Implied-in-Fact Contracts II. Discussion

parties must have assented to the same contract terms. Behrens v. S.P. meeting of the minds on all essential terms of the contract, meaning that the was no meeting of the minds. For a contract to be valid, there must be a DCYF’s first claim is that the PSAs are not valid contracts because there

question of fact. See Syncom Indus. v. Wood, 155 N.H. 73, 82-83 (2007). the minds has occurred is analyzed under an objective standard and is a underpayments in FY 2004, 2005 and 200 p. 6 6. argument in turn. Constr. Co., 153 N.H. 498, 501 (2006). The question of whether a meeting of DCYF to pay the providers $3,553,479.55, the total amount of the DCYF violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. We address each the General Court for requisite appropriation.” Accordingly, the court ordered action under RSA chapters 169-B, 169-C and 169-D; and (5) in ruling that the state for breach of contract], the attorney general shall present the claim to powers and RSA 9:19; (4) in finding that the providers have a private cause of 491:8 states that “if there is not sufficient [funding to cover a judgment against compensation for the providers in violation of the doctrine of separation of even if DHHS had insufficient funds, DCYF would still be liable because RSA does not bar the providers’ FY 2004 and 2005 contract claims; (3) in ordering in-fact contracts. DCYF argues that no such contracts exist. We do not agree. fulfillment of . . . contractual obligations.” Moreover, the court suggested that and implied-in-fact contracts exist; (2) in ruling that the statute of limitations because RSA 9:18 states that there “shall be no lapse until the satisfaction or On appeal, DCYF argues that the court erred: (1) in finding that express The trial court found that the parties entered into express and impliedthe rates. According to the court, DHHS’s lapse of funds was improper providers for the underpayment because DHHS had sufficient funds to cover in the relevant class lines, DCYF still had an obligation to compensate the Finally, the court said that regardless of whether funding was available

DCYF to pay the rates in accordance with He-C p. 6 6422. reasoned that this action indicated that the legislature in fact intended for modify He-C 6422 to condition the rates on appropriations. The court Legislative Committee on Administrative Rules rejected DCYF’s request to have their rates conditioned on appropriations. Third, it noted that the Joint obligation to follow the rate-setting rules because the providers did not agree to not bar the providers’ contract claim. Second, it ruled that DCYF has an The court rejected these arguments. First, it ruled that RSA 9:19 does p. 7 Morgenroth & Assoc’s. Inc. v. Town of Tilton terms of the parties’ agreement must be inferred from their conduct.” implied in fact contract is a true contract that is not expressed in words; the parties formed implied-in-fact contracts for non-Medicaid children. “An DCYF next argues that the trial court erred when it found that the 7

finding that the PSAs are express contracts. not condition rates on appropriations. Accordingly, we uphold the trial court’s been formed is a factual question. Id. Thus, we will sustain the trial court’s the rate term is objectively unambiguous, the parties assented to it, and it does Lake Water Dist., 153 N.H. 818, 821 (2006). Whether such a contract has amply supports the trial court’s finding that there was a meeting of the minds – acceptance, consideration and a meeting of the minds. Durgin v. Pillsbury the rates. It simply does not condition rates on appropriations. The evidence all contracts, implied-in-fact contracts cannot be formed absent an offer, provided are affected by legislation, and then provides only for renegotiation of, 121 N.H. 511, 514 (1981). Like services will be renegotiated.” This term is triggered only if the services priorities and expenditure requirements . . . , in which event the rate for such impact on the services described herein, [DCYF] has the right to modify service Provider agrees that, to the extent future legislative action . . . may have an rates to be conditioned on appropriations. That term reads as follows: “the We do not agree with DCYF that paragraph XII of the PSAs requires the

objective viewpoint the parties assented to the same rate term. See term, though, is irrelevant. To reiterate, what matters is whether from an always understood otherwise. The parties’ subjective understanding of the rate availability and continued appropriation of funds.” See rate term as being conditioned on appropriations, while the providers have standard state contract term that makes “payments . . . contingent upon the contract term. Specifically, DCYF asserts that it has always understood the evidence shows that the parties did not agree on the rates, an essential conditions rates on appropriations. Indeed, conspicuously absent is a accordance with He-C 6422.” There is no express term in the PSAs that paragraph IX of the PSAs expressly states that rates shall be set “[i]n The PSAs were prepared by DCYF and signed by both parties. Exhibit A,

not intend to condition the rates on appropriations. ns.pdf. The exclusion of this boilerplate term demonstrates that the parties did http://sunspot.nh.gov/statecontracting/documents/contractorgeneralprovisio

DCYF argues that there was no meeting of the minds because the

Indus. v. Wood, 155 N.H. at 82.

law. Behrens, 153 N.H. at 500-01. the minds unless it is lacking in evidentiary support or tainted by an error of Therefore, we will sustain the trial court’s finding that there was a meeting of p. 8 8

B. Statute of Limitations

proceeding if that proceeding is a prerequisite to a civil action. See A statute of limitations is tolled during a pending administrative

children. the parties entered into implied-in-fact contracts that covered non-Medicaid implied-in-fact contracts. Accordingly, we uphold the trial court’s finding that the PSAs, we likewise hold that there was a meeting of the minds for the decisions were final – March 6, 2006 for FY 2004 and December 2 p. 8 8, 2005 for contracts. Given that the terms of the implied-in-fact contracts are identical to pursuing their civil claims, the statute of limitations was tolled until the panel’s because the providers were required to go to the hearing panel prior to for the implied-in-fact contracts, the same argument DCYF made for the PSA barred by the three-year statute of limitations in RSA 508:4. We disagree. Youth, and Families DCYF also argues that there was no meeting of the minds on the rates, No. 04-E-0145 (N.H. Super. Ct. 2004). Therefore, to the hearing panel. See DCYF argues that the providers’ FY 2004 and 2005 contract claims are N.H. Partners in Service v. N.H., Div. of Children, precisely because the providers brought their claim prior to appealing the rates 2004 the providers sought a declaratory judgment, which was dismissed Services v. Allard, 138 N.H. 604, 607 (1994). This doctrine applies here. In the administrative level before seeking judicial review. N.H. Div. of Human Under the exhaustion doctrine, parties are required to pursue their claims at Comm’r, N.H. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, 147 N.H. 458, 461-62 (2002).

services provided to non-Medicaid children. overall conduct shows that they intended the terms of the PSAs to apply to the children was paid by DCYF, not Medicaid. In short, the evidence of the parties’ groups was that the PNMI portion of the services provided to non-Medicaid providing such services. The only substantial difference between the two to follow the terms of the PSAs and the regulations referenced therein when to the services provided to non-Medicaid children, the providers were required provided were the same. And, even though the PSAs technically do not apply services was the same as the rate paid for Medicaid children. The services for the services provided to non-Medicaid children. The total rate paid for these Medicaid children identically. DCYF still undertook the responsibility to pay for Medicaid. Nevertheless, DCYF and the providers treated Medicaid and non- Medicaid beneficiaries at the time of their placement, though they were eligible occasionally fell outside the scope of the PSAs because the children were not The trial record establishes that children cared for by the providers

error of law. Behrens, 153 N.H. at 500-01. finding on this issue unless it is lacking in evidentiary support or tainted by an p. 9 9

C. Separation of Powers and RSA p. 9 9:19

Opinion of the Justices As a State agency, DCYF is cloaked with the State’s sovereign immunity.

superior court by this section includes any set-off, claim or the court without a jury. The jurisdiction conferred upon the section shall be instituted by bill of complaint and shall be tried by implied contract with the state. Any action brought under this against the state of New Hampshire founded upon any express or actions “constitute a breach of [DCYF’s] contracts with [the providers].” The superior court shall have jurisdiction to enter judgment Complaint, on December 5, 2008, the providers expressly claimed that DCYF’s immunity as to the contract claims. RSA 4 p. 9 91:8 provides: Amended Bill of Complaint. This is incorrect. In their First Amended Bill of claims until May 19, 2009, the date on which the providers filed their Second The trial court relied upon RSA 491:8 in finding that the State waived its DCYF also claims that the providers did not raise their breach of contract do not agree. grant a right to sue” the State. Chasse v. Banas, 119 N.H. 93, 96 (1979). providers is barred by the doctrine of separation of powers and RSA 9:19. We however, are strictly construed. Id. They must evidence “a clear intent to Brosseau DCYF argues that the trial court’s order requiring it to compensate the, 124 N.H. 184, 190 (1983) (quotation omitted). Such waivers, waive immunity either “expressly or by reasonable implication.” State v. v. N.H. Admin. Office of the Courts, 152 N.H. 632, 634 (2005). A statute can against DCYF unless there is an applicable statute waiving immunity. Lorenz New Hampshire courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear cases from suit in New Hampshire courts. See RSA 99-D:1 (2001). This means that

decisions. See when we issued our opinion reviewing the hearing panel’s FY 2004 and 2005 final, and thus that the statute of limitations was tolled until June 8, 2007, The superior court suggested that the hearing panel’s decisions were not

scenarios the providers timely filed their contract claims. need not decide when the hearing panel decisions became final, for under both claims were still brought within the three-year statute of limitations. We thus the statute of limitations began to run on June 8, 2007, the providers’ contract

Petition of Chase Home for Children, 155 N.H. 528 (2007). If

raised their contract claims and thus RSA 508:4 does not bar them. reconsideration. Within three years, on December 5, 2008, the providers FY 2005, the dates on which the panel denied the providers’ motions for p. 10 10

states have statutes that waive sovereign immunity in contract disputes. See Our holding, moreover, is consistent with that of other courts. Many

express or implied contract with the state.” Id court “to enter judgment against the state of New Hampshire founded upon any State for breach of contract. The jurisdictional grant permits the superior Haley, 687 P.2d 305, 318 (Alaska 1984) (“By enacting section 250, the RSA 491:8 (20 p. 10 10). The clear intent of RSA 491:8 is to grant a right to sue the – that the state can be held liable for breach of contract. See, e.g, State v. had little difficulty in holding that their respective statutes mean what they say (Michie 2007); Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t § 12-201 (2009). Those states have e.g., Alaska Stat. § 09.50.250 (Lexis 2010); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 45A.245

branch usurps an essential nature of a free government will admit.” This clause “is violated only when one potential separation of powers problems. ought to be kept as separate from, and independent of, each other, as the a statutory command. Accordingly, the waiver in RSA 491:8 nullifies any Hampshire Constitution provides that “the legislative, executive, and judicial, usurping an essential power of another branch; rather, it is dutifully following answers DCYF’s separation of powers argument. Part I, Article 37 of the New judgment against the State pursuant to RSA 491:8, the judicial branch is not RSA 491:8 does not just waive sovereign immunity, though; it also Hampshire in contract disputes. Therefore, when the superior court enters a authorization for the judiciary to enter judgment against the State of New appropriation. 491:8, however, waives that immunity. The statute is thus a specific legislative 99-D:1, prevents state courts from entering judgments against the State. RSA Prison, 154 N.H. 737, 747 (2007). The State’s sovereign immunity statute, RSA power of another.” Duquette v. Warden, N.H. State

here, as this is a breach of contract dispute. is an express and detailed waiver of sovereign immunity directly applicable shall present said claim to the general court for the requisite general to present the judgment to the General Court. Id is not sufficient balance in said appropriation, the attorney general. In sum, RSA 491:8 appropriation contains an insufficient balance, then it directs the attorney under which the contract was entered into; provided, that if there requires the judgment to be paid out of the relevant appropriation. Id shall manifest said claim for payment from the appropriation. If that outlines the mechanics of such an action. Id which entered into the contract, and said department or agency. It requires a bench trial. Id. It the state, shall submit the claim to the department or agency. The statute specifically upon the presentation of a claim founded upon a judgment against

commencing an action under this section. The attorney general, demand whatever on the part of the state against any plaintiff p. 11 We interpret statutes to give meaning to every word and phrase. State v. – RSA 9:19 would prevent the superior court from entering it in the first place. general would never have to go to the General Court to satisfy such a judgment RSA 9:19 would make this part of RSA 491:8 superfluous. The attorney insufficient appropriations to cover that judgment. DCYF’s interpretation of 11 present a breach of contract judgment to the General Court if there are greater than appropriations. RSA 491:8 instructs the attorney general to entering judgments against the State that award damages in an amount RSA 9:19 does not, as DCYF argues, prevent New Hampshire courts from

the power to sue the state official who entered into the contract in order to cover such a judgment, while RSA 9:19 and RSA 9:20 give the attorney general RSA 491:8 contemplates that the General Court will appropriate money to by appropriations. Duran, 158 N.H. 146, 155 (2008). The more reasonable interpretation is that personal liability for state officials who enter into contracts that are not covered excess expended above appropriations. Thus, RSA 9:19 and RSA 9:20 create any person who violates RSA 9:19 may be personally liable for the amount of in excess of the amount voted by the legislature.” RSA 9:20 goes on to say that RSA 9:19 states that “[n]o state official . . . shall . . . in any way bind the state because it requires the department to pay rates in excess of appropriations. Finally, DCYF argues that the superior court’s order violates RSA 9:19

immunity. See state enters into an authorized contract it implicitly waives sovereign Indeed, a few state courts have gone so far as to hold that every time a

follow the course of other state courts acting under similar statutes. not go so far. We are merely acting pursuant to RSA 491:8, and in doing so Construction Co., Inc. v. State, 485 S.W.2d 52, 57 (Mo. 1972). Today we do expressly consented to the maintenance of the suit.” V. S. DiCarlo contract but you can’t do anything about it because the government has not permitted to disavow and say to the citizen that the State has breached the with a citizen and assume obligations under the contract and then be antithesis of responsibility by government would be to say that it may contract 1976). As a justification for this rule, one court has said that “[t]he very 1005, 1009-10 (Idaho 1968); Smith v. State, 222 S.E.2d 412, 423-24 (N.C. P.2d 278, 280-81 (Colo. 1957); Grant Construction Co. v. Burns, 443 P.2d

, e.g., Ace Flying Service v. Colorado Dept. of Agriculture, 314

immunity provided by S.G. § 12-201(a).”). “the contract was duly executed and falls within the waiver of sovereign contract.”); Beka v. Board of Ed., 18 A.3d 890, 901 (Md. 2011) (holding that 425A.245(1) waives sovereign immunity for a lawfully authorized written Commonwealth v. Whitworth, 74 S.W.3d 695, 699 (Ky. 2002) (“KRS to waive the State’s immunity to suits asserting contract claims against it.”); legislature has exercised its authority, pursuant to Alaska Const. art. II, § 21, p. 12 Affirmed

requiring DCYF to pay the providers $3,553,479.55. would undermine this trust. Accordingly, we affirm the superior court’s order Hampshire citizens. Allowing the State to disregard its contractual obligations functionality of state institutions depends on the trust and confidence of New Such a result finds no support in New Hampshire law. Furthermore, the directives and to permit a State agency to disregard its contractual obligations. contract. To hold otherwise would require us to ignore these legislative courts to enter a monetary judgment against the State when it breaches a In conclusion, we hold that the legislature has specifically authorized the

DALIANIS, C.J.