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2011-833, In re Name Change of Alexander Goudreau
The Crisp Law Firm, PLLC
Opinion Issued: October 30, 2012 Argued: September 13, 2012
IN RE NAME CHANGE OF ALEXANDER GOUDREAU
Law Office of Joshua L. Gordon
No. 2011-833 1st Circuit Court – Berlin Family Division
preferred that mother give the child up for adoption, and did not provide her to the pregnancy, told mother that she was crazy for wanting to keep the child, pregnant, the couple broke up. According to mother, father reacted negatively
order of the 1st Circuit Court – Berlin Family Division (Carroll LYNN, J. The respondent, Veronica Goudreau (mother), appeals the
entered into a romantic relationship in high school. After mother became The following facts are drawn from the record. Father and mother
We affirm. of Andrew Lemieux (father), to change the name of mother and father’s child. request of the petitioners, Maurice and Gisele Lemieux, parents and next friend recommendation of the Marital Master (Barber, M.), granting, in part, the ___________________________, J.), upon the
THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE brief and orally), for the respondent.
, of Concord (Joshua L. Gordon on the reporter@courts.state.nh.us
to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address: and orally), for the petitioners.
, of Concord (Jack P. Crisp, Jr. on the brief
editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New
page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home
. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00
well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as On appeal, mother requests that we review de
Goudreau’s.
should be demonstrated in Alexander’s name, as should Veronica care for him and love him. Andrew Lemieux’s commitment to Alexander on the best interests of Alexander. Alexander has two parents who both
not last beyond Alexander’s birth. The court makes it[s] decision based
immediately to accept responsibility for Alexander. The reluctance did The court declines to fault a fifteen year old boy for his reluctance
Goudreau Lemieux. The court reasoned:
child’s name be changed from Alexander Bailey Goudreau to Alexander
son.” After the hearing, the court granted the petition in part, ordering that the that he was “very satisfied with the road [he] chose, really getting to know [his] name.” Father testified that he was conflicted about becoming a father, but
much, and “deserve[d] just as much as [father] to have [Alexander] have [her]
mother testified that she had carried Alexander for nine months, loved him very Bailey Goudreau to Alexander Bailey Lemieux. At a hearing on the petition, under RSA 490-D:2, X (2010) to change Alexander’s full name from Alexander
prepared for a hearing on a final parenting plan, the petitioners filed a petition When Alexander was approximately fourteen months old, as the parties
paternity testing, which subsequently confirmed father’s paternity.
making major decisions about Alexander. In addition, the court ordered
arbitrary, and naked; that the standard “usually reflects the custom of giving a
father to see the child, and ordered that the parents share responsibility for
2
the best interest standard applied by the trial court is vague, undefined, and restore Alexander’s name to Alexander Bailey Goudreau. She argues that
novo the trial court’s order
residential responsibility for Alexander, created a regular weekly schedule for temporary parenting plan. The plan, among other things, gave mother primary father’s parenting time with Alexander to one hour per week, the court issued a After the petitioners returned to court alleging that mother had limited
parent his child.” The court granted the motion. prepared, through the assistance of his parents, to accept responsibility and
adjusting emotionally to the reality of being a father at the age of 15, and [wa]s
weekly contact with the child. The motion contended that “[father] ha[d] been date for father to see Alexander and recognition of father’s right to regular and responsibilities. The motion for parenting time requested both a specific The parenting petition requested a parenting plan allocating parental rights parenting petition and an ex parte motion for parenting time with Alexander. Almost immediately after the child’s birth, the petitioners filed a
named him Alexander Bailey Goudreau. with emotional or financial support. Mother later gave birth to a boy and factors bearing on the child’s welfare and is not compelled to treat any single interests are served when a trial court has broad discretion to consider all
virtue, not a sign of arbitrariness. Our precedent establishes that a child’s best
characterization of the best interest standard. The standard’s elasticity is a contention is based upon a misreading of Moskowitz v. Moskowitz of a child under RSA 490-D:2, X. We do not accept mother’s negative that a trial court must consider when ruling on a petition for a change of name
3 making and residential responsibilities. See that the child would be adversely affected by its current name.” This naked. Therefore, we decline her request that we enumerate specific factors interest standard applied by the trial court is vague, undefined, arbitrary, and this “solution” because mother does not ask us to adopt such a rule. hyphenate the parents[’] surnames and give the child a compound name.” We decline to address Turning to the merits of mother’s arguments, we disagree that the best 1 Mother asserts that “one solution when parents cannot agree [on their child’s name] is to simply before us.
by the custodial parent is in the child’s best interest.
involving parental disputes over children, including those regarding decision- require that to change a name the petitioner must show a substantial reason We disagree with mother’s contention that “the law today appears to
been made.” Id we will not disturb the trial court's determination if it could reasonably have an objective basis sufficient to sustain the discretionary judgment made, and and legally distinguishable, and, therefore, of little value in deciding the case permitted such restoration. RSA 458:24 (Supp. 1975). Moskowitz is factually unsustainable exercise of discretion.” In the Matter of Kurowski & Kurowski of two divorced women to restore their maiden names under a statute that under RSA 490-D:2, X, or that we adopt a presumption that the name chosen 199 (1978), a decision pre-dating RSA 490-D:2, X and concerning the motions
, 118 N.H.
child-naming disputes. Historically, we have applied this standard in cases
de. (quotation and citation omitted). As an initial matter, we reject mother’s argument that we should review
161 N.H. 578, 585 (2011). “We consider only whether the record establishes
,
determining whether it clearly appears that the trial court engaged in an trial court to consider when ruling on a petition for change of name of a child Choy, 154 N.H. 707, 713 (2007). Accordingly, “our role is limited to interest. Therefore, she requests that we either enumerate specific factors for a, e.g., In the Matter of Choy & father failed to prove that changing Alexander’s name was in the child’s best
review of decisions allocating parental rights and responsibilities applies in novo the trial court’s order. We conclude that our discretionary standard of
argument and request in turn.
1 We address each
that even if we affirm the best interest standard applied by the trial court, child its father’s surname, and therefore reflects sexist social conventions”; and interest standard, like almost any other standard, may be abused. See either parent[,]” and cites scholarly commentary observing that the best
jurisdictions, we conclude that no parent should benefit from a presumption in
contends that “[n]ormative law says it does not give precedence to the name of
resolutions of child-naming cases.” Id particular name is in a child’s best interests – factors that lead to inconsistent with his mother”). In accord with the majority of courts from other different and frequently conflicting subjective factors for deciding whether a
parent is in the child’s best interest. See mothers); Schroeder v. Broadfoot cites no decision from any jurisdiction reaching this conclusion. Instead, she
4 presumption could result in bias in favor of maternal surnames. See
maternity being established by nature, custody of an infant almost always is the vagueness of [New Jersey’s best interest] standard, judges have proposed “would have the practical effect of incorporating a maternal preference because, (finding that presumption in favor of a name chosen by the custodial parent by the New Jersey Supreme Court that the name chosen by the custodial, 790 A.2d 773, 784 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002) statistics of the U.S. Census Bureau that 82.2% of custodial parents are father’s surname, and therefore reflects sexist social conventions.” Mother We also reject mother’s request that we adopt a presumption articulated Evans, 35 A.3d 684, 688 (N.J. Super. Ct. App Div. 2012) (citing recent
Emma v.
evidence of such practices in New Hampshire. Moreover, we note that such a
. at 868. The record contains no
apply to petitions to change the name of a child. See 868-69 (N.J. 1995). In crafting this rule, the court noted that “as a result of standard for allocating parental rights and responsibilities, RSA 461-A:6, may Gubernat v. Deremer, 657 A.2d 856, decide this issue to resolve the present case, we note that the best interest
applied by the trial court “usually reflects the custom of giving a child its reflects sexist social conventions.” Next, we reject mother’s contention that the best interest standard “usually reflects the custom of giving a child its father’s surname, and therefore We are not persuaded that the best interest standard applied by the trial court that the standard has been abused to maintain “discriminatory traditions”). Omi, The Name of the Maiden, 12 Wis. Women’s L.J. 253, 270 (1997) (arguing
, e.g.,
name of a child under RSA 490-D:2, X. Additionally, although we need not
consider the factors set forth therein when ruling on such petitions. Regardless of whether RSA 461-A:6 applies, we conclude that trial courts may responsibilities parents have concerning their child.” (emphasis added)). 2012) (“‘Parental rights and responsibilities’ means all rights and
RSA 461-A:1, IV (Supp.
would better serve a child’s interests in the context of petitions for a change of reason why an enumeration of specific factors that a trial court must consider In the Matter of Hampers & Hampers, 154 N .H. 275, 281 (2006). We see no 161 N.H. at 581; In the Matter of Peirano & Larsen, 155 N.H. 738, 748 (2007); factor as dispositive of the inquiry. See In the Matter of Kurowski & Kurowski, .
5
court’s determination if it could reasonably have been made .” In the Matter of sustain the discretionary judgment made, and we will not disturb the trial consider only whether the record establishes an objective basis sufficient to
Alexander’s full name should include both parents’ surnames . On appeal “[w]e
DALIANIS, C.J.
, and HICKS and BASSETT, JJ ., concurred. trial court had an objective basis sufficient to sustain its conclusion that which mother does not challenge on appeal. Accordingly, we conclude that the Affirmed mother and father cared for, loved, and were committed to Alexander – findings name Alexander Goudreau Lemieux was in the child’s best interest. order, we conclude that the trial court could reasonably have found that the Although additional fact finding might have aided our review of the trial court’s Kurowski & Kurowski, 161 N.H. at 585 (quotation and citation omitted).
supports the trial court’s findings that, at the time of the petition’s filing, both changing the child’s name to Alexander Goudreau Lemieux . The record Finally, we hold that the trial court sustainably exercised its discretion in
re A .C.S., 171 P.3d 1148, 1151 (Alaska 2007). child-naming disputes. See, e.g., In re Wilson, 648 A.2d 648, 650 (Vt. 1994); In