2011-819, Kenneth Bond & a. v. Paul Martineau & a.

City). We reverse and remand.

No. 2011-819 Hillsborough-northern judicial district

as Commissioner of the Manchester Welfare Department (collectively, the

defendants, the City of Manchester and Paul Martineau in his official capacity reporter@courts.state.nh.us of the Superior Court (Brown, J.) granting summary judgment to the behalf of themselves and a class of others similarly situated, appeal an order DALIANIS, C.J. The plaintiffs, Kenneth Bond and Deborah Thibault, on

orally), for defendant City of Manchester. ___________________________ City Solicitor’s Office, of Manchester (Peter R. Chiesa on the brief and THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Berry and Dan Feltes on the brief, and Mr. Feltes orally), for the plaintiffs. New Hampshire Legal Assistance, of Manchester and Concord (Elliott to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address:

editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New

page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home

well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as income/money/resources since [their] prior appointment.” See

p. 2 financial information update sheets that they had not received “any

was observed that the plaintiffs stated on their March 25, April 1, and April 8 [the plaintiffs] would then have had to provide receipts).” In the decision it plaintiffs] had other financial resources to put gas in [the] vehicle ([for] which

check [the] fuel gauge [and] . . . odometer which would inform [the City] if [the

concealing the vehicle, the plaintiffs “prevented [the City] from being able to appointments. The April 9 notice of decision further averred that by arrived for their April 8, 2010 appointment and had seen the vehicle at prior

broken down, a City security officer saw them exit their vehicle when they

asserted that even though the plaintiffs told the City that their vehicle had

information related to their vehicle. The April 9, 2010 notice of decision plaintiffs all assistance for six months because they had misrepresented On April 9, 2010, the City revoked the April 8 voucher and denied the

have stated that it broke down three or four days ago. the car. Today you state you did not drive your car here. You and have not been able to look at mileage or the amount of gas in

gallons of car gas. Since that date we have not seen the vehicle

assistance for up to six (6) months and may result in prosecution.” for gasoline assistance. On March 25th we assisted with five attorney clearly stated what he believed to be legitimate reasons for vehicle gas last week. In a March 15, email to this worker your

information by a client is grounds for denial or termination of all City

Today you have not asked for vehicle gas, just as you did not ask

General Assistance Guidelines, which states: “Misrepresentation/omission of I(a). The April 9 decision referenced Section XII, subsection C(2) of the City’s

The April 8, 2010 notice of decision stated: The plaintiffs again received one week of rental assistance on April 8, 2010. On April 1, 2010, the plaintiffs received rental assistance for one week.

resource.” stated [they] had previously purchased through an alternate financial “unable to show compliance with the $30 purchase of vehicle gas that [they]

used to buy gas for a vehicle. See provide certain documentation, including that related to $30 the plaintiffs suspended this assistance for seven days because of the plaintiffs’ failure to

suspension on March 25, 2010, noting, however, that the plaintiffs were

$140.00 per week in rental assistance. On March 18, 2010, the City 165. See RSA 165:1, I (2002). On February 24, 2010, the City approved plaintiffs applied for general assistance from the City pursuant to RSA chapter The following facts are derived from the record. In January 2010, the

I. Background p. 3 Guidelines. Preemption may be express or implied. N. Country Envtl. Servs. We first turn to the plaintiffs’ argument that RSA 165:1-b preempts the

as “the Guidelines.”

having been made under both sections and, for ease of reference, refer to them

and Section VIII are nearly identical, we treat the plaintiffs’ arguments as regulation. See

prohibits or vice versa. Id

information by a client may result in prosecution.” Because Section XII(C)(2) of all City assistance for up to six (6) months. Misrepresentation of field,” which means that it evinces legislative intent to supersede local VIII states: “Misrepresentation of information by a client is grounds for denial

the statute’s purpose. See id. conflict with a State statute, it will be impliedly preempted when it frustrates

when a municipal ordinance or regulation permits that which a State statute an actual conflict between State and local regulation. See id. A conflict exists non-moving party. Id id. State law also impliedly preempts local law when there is

comprehensiveness and detail of the State statutory scheme “preempts the sought to enjoin the City from enforcing Section VIII of the guidelines. Section claimed here. See id. Implied preemption may be found when the v. Town of Bethlehem, 150 N.H. 606, 611 (2004). Express preemption is not

II. Analysis substantive law. Id of the City. This appeal followed.

and all inferences properly drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the of information to the [City] Welfare Department.” See

plaintiffs’ benefits pursuant to Section XII(C)(2) of the guidelines, the plaintiffs We review de At the outset, we observe that although the City suspended the

is material if it affects the outcome of the litigation under the applicable Guidelines. The trial court disagreed and granted summary judgment in favor matter of law, then we will affirm the grant of summary judgment. Id. A fact issue of material fact and if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

522, 524-25 (2012). We consider all of the evidence presented in the record, assistance program for six (6) months . . . on the grounds of misrepresentation its summary judgment ruling. Brown v. Concord Group Ins. Co., 163 N.H. currently or will in the future be disqualified from [the City’s] general novo the trial court’s application of the law to the facts in own behalf and as representatives of a class consisting of “all persons who are

summary judgment. The plaintiffs argued that RSA 165:1-b preempted the The court certified the class, and the parties filed cross-motions for

suspending their assistance for six months. They brought the action on their The plaintiffs petitioned the superior court to enjoin the City from such notice.

p. 4 (b) A 7-day period within which to comply after receiving

take in order to comply; and (a) A written notice stating those specific actions he must

from assistance pursuant to paragraph I until he has been given: II. No person shall be found ineligible for assistance or suspended

. . . .

financial data; (a) Disclosure of income, resources, or other material

suspension. See

to disclose financial information, it does not authorize a blanket six-month although RSA 165:1-b allows a municipality to suspend benefits for the failure misrepresented information related to their financial resources. By contrast, the town or city relating to:

were suspended for six months because they allegedly omitted or to comply with written guidelines adopted by the governing body of shall become ineligible to receive such assistance if he willfully fails I. Any person otherwise eligible for assistance under this chapter

misrepresentation of information. In this case, the benefits of the plaintiffs

provides, in pertinent part: RSA 165:1-b, “Disqualification for Noncompliance With Guidelines,”

RSA 165:1-b, I, V.

ordinary meaning. Id

a statute considered as a whole. Appeal of Union Tel. Co. benefits to a person for a period of up to six months because of omission or the statute and the Guidelines conflict. The Guidelines allow the City to deny The plaintiffs argue that RSA 165:1-b preempts the Guidelines because

isolation. Id. interpret statutes in the context of the overall statutory scheme and not in ambiguous, we need not look to legislative intent. Id. Furthermore, we

itself, and, if possible, construe that language according to its plain and (2010). In interpreting a statute, we first look to the language of the statute

are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of de novo. ATV Watch v. N.H. Dep’t of Transp., 161 N.H. 746, 752 (2011). We 234, 236 (2006). Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review construction. Blagbrough Family Realty Trust v. Town of Wilton, 153 N.H. Preemption, then, is essentially a matter of statutory interpretation and out the specific actions” required of him or her. Id

p. 5 day or 14-day disqualification period[,] [the person] continues to fail to carry of ineligibility or suspension” may be longer, “if upon the expiration of the 7then the suspension period is for fourteen days. RSA 165:1-b, V. “The period

occurs “within 6 months after the end of [a] prior suspension period,” however,

b, I(a). The initial suspension period is for seven days. If the suspension “disclosure of income, resources, or other material financial data.” RSA 165:1comply with certain municipal guidelines, including those related to

Assistance becomes ineligible to receive such assistance for willfully failing to

Thus, under RSA 165:1-b, I, a person otherwise eligible for General

determine that issue . . . . person shall be given an opportunity to request a hearing to

requirements set forth in the notice required by paragraph III, such

such person that he has satisfactorily complied with the noncompliance . . . , and there is a dispute over a contention by continues beyond the 7 or 14-day period due to continued

however, that in the event such disqualification or suspension

to disqualification or suspension under this section; provided, an application for general assistance from a person who is subject VI. The overseers of public welfare shall not be required to accept

until the person complies.

notice required in paragraph III, the disqualification shall continue continues to fail to carry out the specific actions set forth in the expiration of the 7-day or 14-day disqualification period the person

period shall be for 14 days; and provided further that if upon the

occurred within six months of their March 18 suspension, RSA 165:1-b suspension within 6 months after the end of any prior suspension financial resources related to their vehicle. Because their April 9 suspension section shall be 7 days; provided, however, that any such V. The period of ineligibility or suspension pursuant to this

because they allegedly misrepresented or omitted information about their

Here, the plaintiffs were deemed ineligible for further receipt of benefits . . . . “shall continue until the person complies.” Id. days.. In that case, the period

written notice of the opportunity to request a hearing within 5

not in compliance, those actions necessary for compliance, and notice shall include a list of the guidelines with which the person is ineligible for assistance or suspended from assistance. The written

may issue to the person a written notice that the person is III. If a person does not comply within the 7 days, the town or city who is “otherwise eligible for assistance . . . become[s] ineligible p. 6 assistance” is misplaced. RSA 165:1-b, I, specifically applies when a person The City’s narrow focus upon the phrase “otherwise eligible for

to the plaintiffs.

applies only to those who are “otherwise eligible for assistance,” does not apply in violation of the Guidelines. Thus, the City contends, RSA 165:1-b, which because they misrepresented information related to their financial resources

City reasons that the plaintiffs were not “otherwise eligible for assistance”

because they were not “otherwise eligible for assistance.” RSA 165:1-b, I. The The City also argues that RSA 165:1-b does not apply to the plaintiffs

ineligibility and suspension.

to the City’s assertions, RSA 165:1-b does not distinguish between periods of b, V specifically refers to “[t]he period of ineligibility or suspension.” Contrary person is ineligible for assistance or suspended from assistance.” RSA 165:1-

within seven days, the municipality “may issue . . . a written notice that the

comply. RSA 165:1-b, III similarly provides that if the person does not comply

forth “criteria for determining eligibility,” and, therefore, were consistent with

or she has been given written notice and a seven-day period in which to for assistance or suspended from assistance pursuant to paragraph I” until he suspensions. RSA 165:1-b, II provides: “No person shall be found ineligible

for determining eligibility.” The City contends that the Guidelines merely set

RSA 165:1-b, on its face, governs both eligibility determinations and

165:1, II(b) requires a municipality to adopt guidelines regarding the “criteria The City’s reliance upon RSA 165:1, II(b) (2002) is also misplaced. RSA

meaning of RSA 165:1-b does not support this construction. determinations, while RSA 165:1-b governs only suspensions. The plain

resources. Accordingly, RSA 165:1-b applies.

does not apply to this case because the Guidelines govern eligibility

because they misrepresented or omitted information about their financial until the City deemed them ineligible for further receipt of that assistance (Emphasis added.) Here, the plaintiffs were “otherwise eligible for assistance”

In arguing for a contrary result, the City contends that RSA 165:1-b

preempted by, RSA 165:1-b. We agree with this analysis.

assistance because of willful failure to comply with certain written guidelines.

applied to them and others similarly situated, conflict with, and are impliedly

six-month suspension. The plaintiffs argue, therefore, that the Guidelines, as circumstances, however, did RSA 165:1-b allow the City to impose a blanket b allowed the City to suspend them until they did comply. Under no

fourteen days. If the plaintiffs failed to comply after fourteen days, RSA 165:1allowed the City to suspend them from receiving further assistance for terms of the Guidelines and RSA 165:1-b did not p. 7 actually conflict with RSA 165:1-b, and are impliedly preempted by it. See conflict with the purpose of RSA chapter 165 would be relevant only if the month suspension. In this way, the Guidelines, as applied to the plaintiffs, not to comply, until the person does so, the Guidelines impose a blanket six-

with the humanitarian purpose of RSA chapter 165. Whether the Guidelines

it is also immaterial that, according to the City, the Guidelines are consistent Because we hold that RSA 165:1-b and the Guidelines actually conflict, to disclose financial information. However, whereas RSA 165:1-b provides with this opinion. instant case, the Guidelines, like RSA 165:1-b, I(a), provide penalties for failing not at issue. RSA chapter 167 does not apply to this case. material financial data.” RSA 165:1-b, I(a). Accordingly, as applied in the

warrant extended consideration. See

HICKS, CONBOY and LYNN, JJ., concurred.

judgment in favor of the City and remand for further proceedings consistent persons, and to dependent children. This is immaterial as State assistance is For these reasons, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary because the plaintiffs allegedly failed to disclose “income, resources, or other

reviewed the City’s remaining arguments and conclude that they do not

chapter 167, which concerns State assistance to the blind, aged, or disabled omission of information. They were applied to the plaintiffs specifically The City also argues that the Guidelines are consistent with RSA The Guidelines provide for a six-month penalty for misrepresentation or Country Envtl. Servs., 150 N.H. at 611.

similarly situated, do not support this construction. RSA 165:1, II(b). The Guidelines, as applied to the plaintiffs and others