2011-682, In the Matter of Christian A. Poulin and Rose Marie (Poulin) Wall

college expenses:

Bossie & Wilson, PLLC

provision, in which the parties agreed to contribute to their two children’s IN THE MATTER OF CHRISTIAN A. POULIN AND ROSE MARIE (POULIN) WALL

reference, into the divorce decree. The stipulation included the following

and entered into a permanent stipulation, which was incorporated, by The record supports the following. The parties divorced in October 1996 No. 2011-682 9th Circuit – Goffstown Family Division

, of Manchester (David P. Eby

contempt of a court order. We reverse and remand.

reporter@courts.state.nh.us

requesting the court to find the appellee, Christian A. Poulin (Father), in the 9th Circuit – Goffstown Family Division (DeVries, J.) dismissing her petition ___________________________ HICKS, J. The appellant, Rose Marie Wall (Mother), appeals a ruling of THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE A. Ames on the brief, and Mr. Eby orally), for the appellee. Devine, Millimet & Branch, P.A. and Heidi

to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address: and orally), for the appellant.

editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New

page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home

well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as p. 2 In support of its ruling, the trial court cited In the Matter of Scott & Pierce because “[t]he provision at issue in the parties’ divorce decree lacks specificity.” hearing on July 18, 2011, the trial court dismissed the Mother’s petition

specific dollar amount to” their younger daughter’s college expenses. After a

Court order or decree that orders [the Father] to contribute a set percentage or dismiss, arguing that the petition should be dismissed because “there is no provision from the parties’ stipulation. The Father objected and moved to

provision of the divorce decree, and apparently asking the court to enforce the

requesting the court to find the Father in contempt of the college expense

The Mother then filed a “Petition to Bring Forward and for Contempt,”

college expenses at all.

the amount and the Father has not yet contributed to the younger daughter’s

responded by offering to pay some amount, but the parties could not agree on requested that the Father contribute 75% of the remaining costs. The Father tuition and room and board for the 2011-2012 academic year. The Mother savings are considered.” The Father asserts that our decision in Scott party is financially able after financial aid, scholarships and any children’s parent [will] contribute to the children’s college expenses to the extent each

She received a scholarship, as well as a loan covering a portion of the cost for

parties’ [divorce decree]” because the provision “clearly provide[s] that each

unsustainable exercise of discretion or an error of law. Id

N.H. at 365-66, set forth a bright line rule of law that “absent a set percentage in divorce and separation cases are conferred entirely by statute.” In the, 160 Their younger daughter was accepted at Southern New Hampshire University.

application. did not have the authority to enforce the [college expense] provision in the On appeal, the Mother argues that the trial court erred in ruling “that it

disturb the trial court’s rulings regarding child support absent an We afford broad discretion to the trial court in divorce matters, and will not Matter of Johnson & Johnson, 158 N.H. 555, 558 (2009) (quotation omitted).

“The court’s powers in custody, maintenance, and education of children

N.H. 354 (2010). This appeal followed.

apply for financial aid or use her own savings for said expense. age. A child, entering college, in the first instance, however, shall contributions shall be determined when each child is near college

to the extent each party is financially able. The actual The parties agree to contribute to their children’s college education daughter. Id

because there was no court order requiring him to do so. Id

among other things, certain college expenses for both the son and the obligations while the mother requested that the father be ordered to pay for, In 2008, the father filed a petition to terminate his child support

original divorce decree only required that the parties “meet in the future to

held that the father could not be required to contribute to such expenses expenses of the parties’ son. Id to do so. Id. at p. 3 365-66. As to the daughter’s college expenses, however, we children’s college expenses.” Id contribute to the son’s college expenses because the 2003 order required him to discuss the financial responsibility each of them shall bear for their. On appeal, we determined that the father was obligated to best college education available to them and that they would meet in the future contribute to their children’s college education.” Donovan vacate [a] provision in [a pre-existing] divorce decree that requires [parents] to

daughter’s] plans.” Id Recently, we again addressed the effect of the 2004 amendment in Scott. (2004) (recodified as RSA 461-A:14, V (Supp. 2011)); see expenses, but required [the mother] to consult with him about [their educational expenses beyond the completion of high school.” RSA 458:17, XI-a whether [the father] had to contribute to [their daughter’s] eventual college

Hampshire court ordered the father to contribute $ p. 3 3,000 per year to the college

agreement, in which “the parties agreed that their children should receive the Id. at p. 3 356. The divorce decree expressly incorporated their separation 160 N.H. at 365-66. The parties in Scott does not apply retroactively and, therefore, “does not mandate the trial court to divorced in Massachusetts in 1989.

Forcier, 152 N.H. at 466. require a parent to contribute to an adult child’s college expenses or other court from modifying a pre-amendment order regarding college expenses. 46 p. 3 3, 466 (2005). We have also held that the amendment does not prohibit a Ford, 156 N.H. 609, 612 (2007); In the Matter of Forcier & Mueller, 152 N.H. expenses under RSA 458:17, I (Supp. 2003) and RSA 458:20 (1992).” In the, e.g., Scott, 160 N.H. at 365; In the Matter of Cole & Since then, we have consistently reaffirmed that the amendment does not

N.H. at 61. Shortly after the 2004 amendment was enacted, we decided that it

legislature amended RSA 458:17 to provide that “[n]o child support order shall Matter of Donovan & Donovan, 152 N.H. 55, 61 (2005). However, in 2004, the

powers to order divorced parents to contribute to their children’s college At the time the parties divorced, the trial court had “‘broad discretionary’

college expenses.” or specific dollar amount, trial courts cannot issue new orders regarding setting an amount would not constitute a “new” order for the payment of

to the extent each party is financially able.” Accordingly, an order in this case

order. See parties’ stipulation was incorporated into the divorce decree, it became an to enforce,” and the court cannot issue a new order. However, when the

specifically states that they will “contribute to their children’s college education Father were ordered order the parties to contribute to their children’s college expenses – it expenses, see Scott, 160 N.H. at 356-57, the divorce decree in this case does trial court never ordered the parties to contribute to the daughter’s college

Donovan, 152 N.H. at 61; Cole, 156 N.H. at 612. While in Scott, the

our conclusion in Scott (emphasis added). He argues that in this case, “[t]here are no pre-200 p. 4 4 orders jurisdiction to issue a new order for payment of these expenses.” Id. at 366 however, Scott The Father emphasizes that in Scott we stated “the trial court [had] no

determined at a later date. This is a material difference. Under the Father’s understanding, the dispositive factor in Scott to contribute, leaving only the specific amount to be contribute to the parties in the future. Here, in contrast, the Mother and the responsibility for college expenses, it left the decision of whether to so jurisdiction to issue a new order for payment of these expenses.” Id anticipated that in the future the parents would discuss their financial contributing to such expenses in the future. While the order in Scott distinguished from merely ordering the parties to discuss the option of by each party. The father specifically relies upon the following language from parties to contribute some amount of their children’s college expenses, as Rather, Scott merely clarified that the pre-200 p. 4 4 order must explicitly order the

did not set forth a bright line rule requiring such an outcome.

amount” toward college expenses. Contrary to the Father’s arguments, that there was no court order setting a “set percentage of or a specific dollar specificity.” Similarly, the Father argues that Scott

expenses predating the . . . 200 p. 4 4 change in the law, . . . the trial court had no mother to consult with the father about the daughter’s college plans. Id a set percentage of or a specific dollar amount toward the daughter’s college contribution for the daughter’s college expenses; instead, it merely required the: “Because there is no order requiring [the father] to pay contribute $3,000 towards the son’s college expenses, it did not require any but does not set forth a specific dollar amount or percentage to be contributed to their children’s college education to the extent each party is financially able,” appeal because the parties’ divorce decree merely requires them to “contribute

issue in the parties’ divorce decree [is unenforceable because it] lacks Here, the trial court cited Scott for the proposition that “[t]he provision at

357.

(quotation omitted). While the 2003 court order required the father to discuss the financial responsibility” that each would bear. Id. at 3 p. 5 56 5

Reversed and remanded

DALIANIS, C.J.