2011-701, In the Matter of Susan J. Regan and Steven S. Regan

Hamblett & Kerrigan, P.A.

No. 2011-701 9th Circuit – Manchester Family Division

part, reverse in part, and remand.

see amounts reduced his monthly income below the statutory self-support reserve, minor daughter’s uninsured medical expenses even though paying these

Gawryl MacAllister & O’Connor

page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. daughter at a police station, rather than at the parties’ homes. We affirm in a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home RSA 458-C:3, IV(b) (2004); and (2) required him to exchange custody of his reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00

declined to modify his obligations to carry life insurance and pay half of his Circuit – Manchester Family Division (Emery, J.) that, among other things: (1) order recommended by a Marital Master (Lemire, M.) and approved by the 9th DALIANIS, C.J. The respondent, Steven S. Regan (father), appeals an

and orally), for the respondent.

to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address: orally), for the petitioner.

editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New

well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as unless they are unsupported by the evidence or legally erroneous. In the

p. 2 On appeal, we will affirm the findings and rulings of the trial court

father appealed.

place at a police station. After unsuccessfully moving for reconsideration, the

see obligation using the child support guidelines. RSA 458-C:7, I(a) (Supp. 2011); “substantial change of circumstances” and it recalculated his child support

court also granted the mother’s motion that future custody exchanges take declined to reduce the amount of life insurance he was obliged to carry. The obligation to pay for half of his daughter’s orthodontic expenses, and similarly

The trial court found that the father’s reduction in income constituted a

reducing his child support obligation, it found “no basis to modify” the father’s

Although the court found that the father’s reduction in income required

youngest child. orthodontic expenses that the couple expected to incur on behalf of their full child support obligation; (2) life insurance premiums; and (3) his half of

income equal to the $1,044 self-support reserve. child support obligation by $3.13, which allowed him to retain a monthly base

IV(b). Thus, to comply with the statute, the court reduced the father’s monthly

possibility of commissions) had dropped from $30,000 per year to $24,000 per obligation. He alleged that, since the divorce, his base pay (subject to the The father objected and also moved to reduce his child support court’s exercise of discretion was unsustainable. Id. modification order only if it clearly appears from the evidence that the trial Matter of Cole & Ford, 156 N.H. 609, 610 (2007). We will set aside a

income below the statutory self-support reserve, in violation of RSA 458-C:3, per month. Payment of this amount, however, would have reduced the father’s court found that the father’s new support obligation should have been $359.13

had complicated exchanges. station, arguing that this arrangement would resolve misunderstandings that Among other things, she requested that exchanges of custody occur at a police In March 2011, the mother moved to modify the parties’ parenting plan.

supported and the ratio of the father’s gross income to the mother’s, the trial RSA ch. 458-C (Supp. 2011). Based upon the number of children to be

medical expenses. support order also required each to pay half of the children’s uninsured

that each would carry life insurance for their children’s benefit. Their uniform daughters. When the parties divorced, they agreed in a permanent stipulation its bright-line limitations do not apply to such awards. See

p. 3 the child support guidelines, the self-support reserve’s terms make clear that

(Emphasis added.) See

support order.

although income is a proper consideration for support orders not governed by child support guidelines in RSA chapter 458-C. RSA 458-C:3, IV(b). Thus, scope of the self-support reserve’s protection to orders made pursuant to the

shall be no less than [fifty dollars,] the amount of a minimum reserve and that parent’s adjusted gross income, but in any event shall be presumed to be the difference between the self-support

reserve but payment of the order as calculated under this chapter The language “as calculated under this chapter” effectively limits the If the obligor parent’s gross income is greater than the self-support

a whole. In the Matter of Coderre & Coderre of the legislature’s intent as expressed in the words of the statute considered as

reserve, the obligor parent’s share of the total support obligation

legislature did not include. Id

Under RSA 458-C:3, IV(b): RSA 458-C:2, V (defining “[m]inimum support order”).

other relevant portions of the child support guidelines. We are the final arbiter To address these arguments, we must construe RSA 458-C:3, IV(b) and divorce decree, we review the decree de unsustainable exercise of discretion given his limited income.

would reduce the obligor parent’s income below the self-support

not consider what the legislature might have said or add words that the reserve statute. See

as expressed in the language of the stipulation. Id. Georgakilas, 157 N.H. 662, 664 (2008). We consider the intent of the parties

approved and ordered in their divorce decree. In interpreting the meaning of a and orthodontic treatment, or, alternatively, that its order constitutes an the parties’ arguments also requires us to interpret their permanent stipulation context of the overall statutory scheme and not in isolation. Id. Addressing

interpret legislative intent from the statute as written, and, therefore, we will insurance for their benefit, the father relies primarily upon the self-support, 148 N.H. 401, 403 (2002). We to pay half of the children’s uninsured medical expenses and maintain life In arguing that the trial court erred by declining to modify his obligation

RSA 458-C:3, IV(b) by ordering him to pay additional amounts for insurance support reserve. See id. The father argues that the trial court either violated support obligations that reduce a parent’s income below a statutory self-

I. Effect of Statutory Self-Support Reserve p. 4 RSA 458-C:2, IV-a; see

constitute child support for purposes of calculating the self-support reserve. We conclude that payments for “medical costs not covered by insurance”

by its terms, does not govern them.

458-C:3, IV(b). If the payments are not child support, then RSA 458-C:3, IV(b), obligation,” and govern its calculation, its treatment under the child support reduced his monthly income below the self-support reserve in violation of RSA payments are child support, then the father’s total child support obligation

A. Orthodontic Expenses 4

maintain life insurance for his daughters’ benefit. Coderre

The amendments create a new obligation, the “[m]edical support child support under RSA chapter 458-C. calculated “under [the child support] chapter.” RSA 458-C:3, IV(b). If the

See

medical expenses. In the Matter of Coderre & Coderre (2004) that the court make determinations and findings relative to uninsured

facts of this case, we uphold the trial court’s order requiring the father to

orthodontic treatment at issue, are not part of the general obligation to provide Laws 2007, ch. 227. insurance premiums, we must first determine whether these payments are reserve requires vacating the orders to pay orthodontic expenses and life statute. In In the Matter of Coderre & Coderre amended both this statute and the child support guidelines generally. See As a result, to determine whether preservation of the father’s self-support daughter’s anticipated orthodontic expenses violates the self-support reserve Laws 2005, 273:1, :20. Then in 2007, the legislature significantly 2005, the legislature recodified that statute as RSA 461-A:14, IX (Supp. 2011). We turn first to the father’s argument that ordering him to pay half of his

child support guideline calculations and a requirement in RSA 458:17, IX

relied upon the absence of uninsured medical expenses from

life insurance premiums does not constitute child support, and based upon the violation of RSA 458-C:3, IV(b). The parties agree, however, that payment of such expenses would reduce his income below the self-support reserve in that uninsured medical expenses, a category that the parties agree includes the

order requiring the father to pay orthodontic expenses because payment of

plain language forecloses his argument. RSA 458-C:3, IV(b) extends to “non-child support obligations,” the statute’s not be used to pay alimony). Therefore, to the extent the father argues that

reasonable needs,” but not establishing a specific minimum income that may I(b) (2004) (making alimony available only when the obligor is able to “meet cash obligation is suspended and does not accrue. Id

p. 5 obliged to pay cash support begins to provide insurance, however, that parent’s medical support obligation amount.” RSA 461-A:14, IX(c). Once a parent establish a cash medical support obligation . . . equal to the reasonable

not available or accessible, as the statute defines those terms, “the court shall

insurance for the child.” RSA 461-A:14, IX(b). If private health insurance is guidelines, then the court “shall order the parent, or parents, to provide such “reasonable medical support obligation” calculated under the child support

that private health insurance is available to the parties based upon the

support obligation. See 5 makes the payment, the deduction necessarily reduces a parent’s general child of this deduction varies depending upon whether the obligor or obligee parent

courts should allocate the medical support obligation. If the court determines

unjust or inappropriate, using the criteria set forth in RSA 458-C:5.” Id the presiding officer on the record, that the presumptive amount would be different amount, however, “based on a written or a specific finding, made by

child support guidelines. RSA 458-C:2, I(e), :3, II(c). Although the overall value

circumstances, as the court deems appropriate.” RSA 461-A:14, IX(e). excess of the reasonable medical support obligation amount, in such other payment of uninsured medical expenses,” Laws 2005, 273:1, now set forth how permits the court to order an “additional medical support obligation . . . in only “determination[s] and findings relative to health insurance and the. A final provision Finally, amendments to RSA 461-A:14, IX, which previously required

percent of each parent’s gross income. RSA 458-C:3, V. The court may order a

from the paying parent’s gross income before applying certain provisions of the “Amounts actually paid” for the medical support obligation are deducted

obligations. covered by insurance,” the very costs that In the Matter of Coderre & Coderre

presumptive amount of a “reasonable medical support obligation” is four amount each parent should pay toward the medical support obligation. The Additional amendments to the child support guidelines govern the

458-C:5 is also the statute that governs changes to other child support RSA 458-C:2, IV-a. This amendment effectively brings “medical costs not. RSA

chapter. 148 N.H. at 404, noted did not appear in RSA chapter 458-C, within that

including payment for the cost of premiums, co-payments, and deductibles.” dependent child and/or pay . . . for medical costs not covered by insurance, obligation of either or both parents to provide health insurance coverage for a C:2, IV-a; see Laws 2007, ch. 227. “‘Medical support obligation’ means the guidelines, and the manner in which expenditures are to be made. RSA 458former statute. Ingersoll v. Williams

p. 6 child-related expenses, no statutory standard existed for determining how

[a] former statute,” but the legislature nonetheless failed to expressly repeal the

findings and determinations regarding insurance and uninsured expenses, see of divorced parents. Under the previous regime, courts were required to make comprehensive scheme to govern the payment of medical expenses for children Thus, while a comprehensive statutory scheme governed awards of other

definitions and formulae” in the child support guidelines. In the Matter of evidence demonstrates that the purpose of [a] [new] statute was to supersede

tuition, see stood in contrast to other child-related expenses, such as private school

The amendments demonstrate the legislature’s intent to establish a Barrett & Coyne, 150 N.H. at 524.

the amendments without any deference to our holding in In the Matter of N.H. at 406, which were – and still are – governed by the “complex scheme of Repeal by implication occurs when “the natural weight of all competent “former” statute for us to find impliedly repealed. As a result, we now interpret extracurricular activity expenses, see In the Matter of Coderre & Coderre, 148 As to repeal by implication, that doctrine has no application in this case. In the Matter of Barrett & Coyne, 150 N.H. 520, 524 (2004), and

Laws 2005, 273:1, but lacked legislative direction as to how to do so. This

has been impliedly repealed. Board of Selectmen v. Planning Bd.

Coderre & Coderre.

the 2005 recodification of one of the statutes we relied upon in In the Matter of that case have all been amended. Thus, there exist only “new” statutes, and no in In the Matter of Coderre & Coderre, because the statutes we construed in amendments, not the legislature’s opinion of our construction prior to them. construction reconciling the amendments we construe today with our holding 150, 152-53 (1978). Here, however, we are not obliged to seek a reasonable

statutes taken together can be found,” we will not hold that the former statute repeal by implication is disfavored, “[i]f any reasonable construction of the two some approval of In the Matter of Coderre & Coderre

As an initial matter, we reject the mother’s arguments that, based upon

medical expenses in the child support guidelines and RSA 461-A:14, IX. in that case. Our task today is to determine the meaning of these legislature comprehensively amended all of the statutes relevant to our holding construed in the opinion, in 2007, two years after the recodification, the

holding. As to the 2005 recodification, even if the legislature demonstrated we must in some measure defer to In the Matter of Coderre & Coderre ’s Coderre & Coderre, 148 N.H. at 404, and the doctrine of repeal by implication,

have changed. As a result, we must review the new treatment of uninsured Thus, the statutes we interpreted in In the Matter of Coderre & Coderre such as extracurricular activities, see p. 7 child support obligation embraces a broad range of child-related expenses,

from the medical support obligation. Instead, we conclude that, just as the

certain uninsured medical expenses, like the orthodontic treatments at issue,

expenses. We, therefore, decline to construe the amendments to exclude interpretation providing predictability in the payment of uninsured medical In short, the amendments’ language and structure favor a comprehensive

“medical cost not covered by insurance,” all presuppose some insurance

insurance from the medical support obligation. State v. Beauchemin by the specific words,” requires excluding medical expenses unrelated to

in the same statute as the general child support formula. See presumptive amount a parent should pay for a child’s medical support appears The mother argues that the principle of ejusdem its medical support amendments. For example, the provision that dictates the 7

“premiums, co-payments, and deductibles,” which follow the general words

are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those enumerated

458-C:2, IV-a. C:2, IV-a. Indeed, the legislature mirrored the child support regime throughout medical costs not covered by insurance. suggesting that a broad range of medical expenses fall within the term. RSA coverage,” but also to pay for “medical costs not covered by insurance,”

654, 658 (2011) (quotation omitted). She maintains that the specific words adjustment of the general child support obligation. See, 161 N.H.

would not affect his obligation to pay child support. See that “where specific words in a statute follow general ones, the general words

aspects of child support to what could be termed “medical support.” RSA 458- N.H. at 406, so too the medical support obligation embraces a broad range of bring the same uniformity and predictability that already existed in other obligation includes not only the obligation “to provide health insurance In the Matter of Coderre & Coderre, 148 The legislature apparently created the “[m]edical support obligation” to

presumptive medical support amount is the same provision that governs

obligation for his children’s uninsured medical expenses, and the payments

they be comprehensive. Most obviously, the definition of the medical support The amendments’ substance also demonstrates the legislature’s intent that

Similarly, the provision upon which a court must rely when deviating from the

nonetheless subject to unlimited liability for uninsured medical costs. support obligation was calculated to the penny under the guidelines, was

can be expensive,” and the guidelines provided no offset). Coderre & Coderre, 148 N.H. at 405 (noting that “uninsured medical expenses

which parents should direct such payments. As a result, a parent whose child much a parent should pay for medical support of a child or the services to p. 8 See

modification. p. 8 See

deductible would entitle her to a deduction under the child support guidelines. child support obligation because the amount actually paid for the insurance Indeed, the parent with the high-deductible insurance would reduce her overall

accordance with RSA 458-C:3, V – ought to remain the same absent some expenses, this amount – or a deviation from this amount established in parent’s gross income. RSA 458-C:5. Regardless of any unexpected medical

terms of their insurance policies rather than upon the nature of the expense.

presumptively reasonable medical support obligation is four percent of each

deduct the procedure’s cost from their child support obligations turns upon the support obligation to co-payments and deductibles, whether the parents could would shoulder the entire cost. But, under a construction limiting the medical

obligation whenever children incur medical expenses. We disagree. A absurd result because it will require recalculation of the child support The mother also argues that the interpretation we adopt today creates an

Under both policies, to obtain the necessary treatment, one or both parents

child support obligation.

more than the procedure costs. The other policy does not cover the procedure.

that our construction of the statute will require continual recalculation of the expenses governed by RSA 458-C:7). Thus, we reject the mother’s argument justification. 160 N.H. 82, 84 (2010) (modifying obligation to pay uninsured medical

RSA 458-C:7; see also In the Matter of Zikmanis & Peabody, are insured, but under different policies. Under one policy, the deductible is

For example, suppose two children require the same medical procedure. Both essentially identical expenses, which we believe the legislature did not intend.

obligation, and we decline to employ ejusdem

the same amount for the same procedure differently without any apparent unaffected. Thus, the mother’s interpretation would treat two parents paying parent whose insurance simply did not cover the procedure would be RSA 458-C:2, I(e), IV-a, :3, II(b). By contrast, the support obligation of the

other than co-payments and deductibles results in different treatment of

comprehensively address medical expenses under the medical support

different legislative purpose in view of the objectives to be obtained.” Id will not be used in a restricted sense if the act as a whole demonstrates a

Ejusdem

Moreover, construing the statute to exclude uninsured medical expenses

(quotation omitted). Here, the statutory scheme demonstrates an intent to

final nor exclusive and is always subject to the qualification that general words State v. Beckert, 144 N.H. 315, 319 (1999) (quotations omitted). It is “neither

generis is “a constructionary crutch,” not a “judicial ukase.”

obligation to include only insurance-related expenses. We disagree. coverage. RSA 458-C:2, IV-a. Therefore, she construes the medical support the father’s argument fails. Indeed, the trial court here did consider the

p. 9 obligor’s ability to pay when ordering payment of non-child-support expenses,

Even if we assume that the trial court has an obligation to investigate an

reduced a parent’s income to the self-support reserve.

additional non-child-support obligations once child support payments have

however, that the policy underlying the statute counsels against imposing does not govern these obligations. RSA 458-C:3, IV(b). The father argues, discussed, we assume without deciding that the self-support reserve statute

insurance are not “child support,” and, therefore, for reasons already

The parties agree that their stipulated obligations to provide life

exercised its discretion by declining to do so.

modification and focus upon the father’s argument that it unsustainably

assume without deciding that the trial court had discretion to make such a

trial court lacked authority to modify the parties’ stipulation. Instead, we As an initial matter, we need not address the mother’s argument that the

carry life insurance.

necessarily reduce his income below the self-support reserve. See

unsustainably exercised its discretion by declining to modify his obligation to 9 income has already been reduced to the self-support reserve, the trial court his premium payments by $75 each month. He argues that, because his

guidelines. As a result, payment of such expenses by the father would

his required insurance coverage be reduced by $500,000, which would reduce

permit deductions for uninsured medical expenses under the child support For all of these reasons, we conclude that the statutory amendments

amend the relevant statutes. See

life insurance with their children as beneficiaries. The father requested that court-approved permanent stipulation required each to maintain $800,000 in his obligation to carry life insurance for his children’s benefit. The parties’ The father next argues that the trial court erred by declining to modify

support guidelines in light of them.

legislature did not intend the amendments to have this effect, it is free to

B. Life Insurance Division’s forms and decline to alter our statutory interpretation of the child medical support obligation. We are not bound, however, by the Family In re Alex C., 161 N.H. 231, 241 (2010). uninsured medical expenses to each parent in addition to a space for the fixed payments, failed to comply with RSA 458-C:3, IV(b). Of course, if the C:3, IV(b). Therefore, the trial court’s order, insofar as it required such

Order” form provides a space for the court to allocate a percentage of Finally, the mother argues that the Family Division’s “Uniform Support relies upon In the Matter of Plaisted & Plaisted

p. 10 court unsustainably exercised its discretion by considering these assets. He enabling him to sustain a budget well in excess of his monthly income, the trial To this analysis the father responds that, even if he possessed assets

burden the father’s ability to support himself.

discretion in finding that a $75 monthly insurance payment would not unduly additional income. As a result, the trial court sustainably exercised its reduced to the self-support reserve, that it did not conclude that he had

based upon the trial court’s finding that the father’s monthly income was

reason to rely upon the plain language of the child support guidelines as we did

concluded that he had assets supplementing his gross income. We assume, $4,000 budget shortfall each month, the trial court could reasonably have could result in the liquidation of assets awarded in a property settlement. In enabled him to earn commissions. Given the father’s ability to maintain a consideration when equitably adjusting support awards under RSA 458-C:5 stipulation to provide life insurance is not child support; therefore, we have no

In In the Matter of Plaisted & Plaisted are an improper consideration when awarding child support. In the Matter of support obligation. We disagree.

division requirements. See

was also evidence that in addition to his base salary, the father’s pay structure assets. We also explained that permitting a court to take assets into None of these concerns applies here. First, the parties agree that their

Plaisted & Plaisted, 149 N.H. at 526.

support adjustments based upon assets required us to conclude that assets the court cannot consider assets when upholding a stipulation’s non-child- plain language of the child support guidelines and the practical effect of child

transform child support into property division, thus circumventing the property the Matter of Plaisted & Plaisted, 149 N.H. at 526. This could effectively

month but made only $2,000 and had “only a small credit card debt.” There calculations under the child support guidelines are based upon income, not court summarized the mother’s argument that the father spent $6,000 per, 149 N.H. at 525, we noted that required access to funds other than his reported income. Specifically, the trial

because assets are an improper consideration when calculating child support, considering assets when awarding child support. The father argues that, in which we held that the child support guidelines prohibit a court from

account and implied that the ratio between his monthly income and expenses

order, the trial court noted that the father had $170,000 in a retirement court made “all subsidiary findings necessary to support its decision”). In its Donahue Trust, 157 N.H. 502, 508 (2008) (noting that we assume the trial father could afford the $75 a month he sought to avoid. See Smith v. Lillian V. father’s ability to pay his insurance premiums and evidently concluded that the p. 11 II. Custody Exchanges

discretion. the father could afford to provide life insurance was a sustainable exercise of

Therefore, the trial court’s consideration of the account when determining that

the father’s retirement account and, thus, did not violate RSA 511:2, XIX. attachment. This argument’s obvious flaw is that the trial court never attached insurance because RSA 511:2, XIX (2010) exempts this account from

authority to order him to use the assets in his retirement account to pay for life

see

Finally, the father argues in his reply brief that the trial court had no

permissible method to secure child support payments after the obligor’s death,

parenting rights and responsibilities, our role is limited to determining whether

from this obligation. Although some courts analyze an order to carry life insurance as a the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion in not relieving the father

constitutes an unsustainable exercise of discretion. 11

daughter at a police station. When reviewing a trial court’s decision on

the children’s minority. Under these circumstances, we do not conclude that

base pay, requiring him to continue carrying this amount of insurance

discretion by requiring the parties to exchange custody of their youngest The father next argues that the trial court unsustainably exercised its

makes clear that both parties are to provide $800,000 in life insurance during insurance is for the benefit of the minor children. Thus, the parties’ agreement the time his children reach majority. He argues that, given his reduction in construction into the stipulation. It does, however, expressly state that the life is obliged to carry is more than ten times the total child support he will pay by support payments.” He contends that the $800,000 in insurance coverage he

the reasoning of In the Matter of Plaisted & Plaisted

insurance constituting security for child support and we decline to read such a Georgakilas, 157 N.H. at 664. The stipulation makes no reference to life ordinarily intended to act as security for an obligor’s expected future stream of whether it was the parties’ actual purpose. See In the Matter of Georgakilas & here is not whether this is a permissible purpose for such an obligation, but Bosem v. Bosem, 279 So. 2d 863, 865-66 (Fla. 1973), the relevant inquiry

their assets as a source of life insurance payments. Therefore, we do not apply

The father next argues that an agreement to provide life insurance “is

stipulation provided in the record suggests that the parties intended to exclude parties’ stipulation does no such thing. Indeed, nothing in the portion of the evinced a plain intent to separate child support from property division, the that we interpreted in In the Matter of Plaisted & Plaisted, 149 N.H. at 525-26, in In the Matter of Plaisted & Plaisted. Moreover, while the statutory schemes p. 12 Affirmed in part; reversed in

interest – was a sustainable exercise of discretion.

frequent late exchanges – and, therefore, would be in the daughter’s best structured environment might end the tensions that apparently surrounded culminated in a physical altercation. The trial court’s conclusion that a more

an argument between the mother and her then-ten-year-old daughter that

exchanges had never occurred on time. On one occasion, this tardiness caused

years in which the couple had made exchanges at the father’s home, the example, the mother told the investigating social worker that, during the three contained evidence of other conflicts surrounding custody exchanges. For

interest. The trial court noted that it had reviewed DCYF’s report, which

making custody exchanges at a police station was in the daughter’s best contends, the record nonetheless supports the trial court’s determination that Even if there was no “conflict between the parties” as the father

exercise of discretion. argues that moving the exchanges to the police station was an unsustainable related only to a conflict between the mother and the daughter. As a result, he

that there was conflict between the parties because the DCYF investigation

emotional well-being.” The father argues that the record contained no evidence

subjected to conflict between the parties during exchanges is detrimental to her interest, the trial court found that “[f]or [the daughter] to continue to be In finding that a new location for exchanges was in the daughter’s best

HICKS, CONBOY and LYNN, JJ., concurred. .

exchanges to the police station might mitigate this problem. family had struggled with making timely exchanges and concluded that moving assaulted her following a custody exchange. An investigation revealed that the

with the family after the youngest daughter alleged that her mother had

Youth and Families (DCYF) social worker. The social worker became involved to comply with the recommendation of a New Hampshire Division for Children, The mother requested that the location of exchanges be changed in order

court’s determination if it could reasonably have been made. Id. sustain the discretionary judgment made, and we will not disturb the trial We consider only whether the record establishes an objective basis sufficient to discretion. In the Matter of Kurowski & Kurowski, 161 N.H. 578, 585 (2011). it clearly appears that the trial court engaged in an unsustainable exercise of