2011-647, In re C.M. & a.

Wiggin & Nourie, P.A.

No. 2011-647 Sullivan Vivek S. Sankaran

, of Newport (Michael Shklar, attorney general (Jeanne P. Herrick

brief, for the National Association of Counsel for Children, as amicus curiae.

the brief), for the American Bar Association, as amicus reporter@courts.state.nh.us curiae. brief), and American Bar Association, of Chicago, Illinois (William T. Robinson III on Nutter McClennen & Fish LLP, of Boston, Massachusetts (Heather B. Repicky on the

THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE and orally), for New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families. Michael A. Delaney, attorney, on the brief

Berry on the brief), for Larry M. and Sonia M. to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address: the brief and orally), and New Hampshire Legal Assistance, of Manchester (Elliott Elliott, Jasper, Auten, Shklar, & Wellman-Ally on

Opinion Issued: June 29, 2012

editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New

page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home

well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as children were neglected and determined that the ex undertake certain measures before the children might be safely returned to them. p. 2 found that “reasonable cause exist[ed] to believe,” RSA 169-C:15, I (2002), that the We accept the facts as presented in the interlocutory transfer statement. See

maintaining legal custody of the children with DCYF and directing the parents to On April 15, the parents appeared at a preliminary hearing at which the court hearing was held, at which both parents were represented by appointed counsel. See and continued the order granting legal custody to DCYF. On June 13, a dispositional appointment of counsel. , of Bedford (Kysa Crusco, of Raymond (Laura J. Brevitz

each of the parents. See

RSA 169-C:19 (2002 & Supp. 2011). Subsequently, the court issued an order

Following the hearing, the court found that both parents had neglected the children counsel in every such proceeding, the facts of a particular case may require the represented by appointed counsel. See RSA 169-C:18 (2002 & Supp. 2011). An adjudicatory hearing was held on May 12, at which the parents were Division, pursuant to an ex of their two minor children, C.M. and A.M. Two days earlier, the Newport Family RSA 169-C:10, II(a) (2002) (amended 2011). the New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) sought custody the children to DCYF should continue. The court appointed counsel to represent

intimidating behaviors by the father. supervision and by exposing them to domestic violence in the form of threatening and neglecting their children by failing to provide a safe and sanitary home and adequate abuse?” We conclude that while due process does not require the appointment of DCYF. See the State seeks to take custody of a minor child based on allegations of neglect or RSA 169-C:6 (2002 & Supp. 2011). DCYF alleged that the parents were Constitution require the appointment of counsel for an indigent parent from whom parte petition, had granted custody of the children to

(the parents) were served with petitions pursuant to RSA 169-C:7 (2002), by which In re Kotey M., 158 N.H. 358, 359 (2009). On April 14, 2011, Larry M. and Sonia M.

Constitution (Part I, Articles 2 and 15) or the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal the following question: “Does the Due Process Clause of the New Hampshire from the Superior Court (Tucker, J.). See Sup. Ct. R. 9. The trial court transferred HICKS, J. This case is before us on an interlocutory transfer without ruling

amicus curiae. Law Offices of Laura J. Brevitz on the brief), as

Coalition for a Civil Right to Counsel, as amicus curiae. Justice Center, of Baltimore, Maryland (John Pollock on the brief), for the National Crusco Law Office PLLC on the brief), and Public would entail. In re Brittany S. p. 3 administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirements

essential, and inherent” within the meaning of this article. In re Guardianship of obtaining happiness.” N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 2. Parental rights are “natural, 3

, 148 N.H. 237 government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and

acquiring, possessing, and protecting, property; and, in a word, of seeking and United States Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge counsel in a given proceeding, we employ the three-prong test articulated by the (2002), “this Court must rule that Part I, Article 2 of the New Hampshire Constitution In determining whether the State Constitution requires the appointment of At the outset, the parents argue that based upon In re Shelby R.

the care, custody, and control of their children.” Id, 147 N.H. 489, 491 (2002); Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.

value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the We address this question first under the State Constitution, State v. Ball erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable balances: (1) the private interest affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an process of law. State v. Veale Kotey M. the land.” N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 15. The phrase “law of the land” means due, 158 N.H. at 361; State v. Hall, 154 N.H. 180, 182 (2006). This test inherent rights – among which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty; deprived of his life, liberty, or estate, but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). In re Part I, Article 2 provides in part: “All men have certain natural, essential, and

2006-360, 155 N.H. 93, 95 (2007). are the final arbiter of our constitution’s due process requirements. In re Father Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning N.H. 226, 231 (1983), and cite federal opinions for guidance only. Id. at 232-33. We

property, immunities, or privileges, put out of the protection of the law, exiled or Part I, Article 15 provides in part: “No subject shall be . . . deprived of his Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.

States Supreme Court has recognized that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Nicholas P. neglected his or her child. See, 162 N.H. 199, 203 (2011) (quotation omitted). “Similarly, the United

mandated under Part I, Articles 2 and 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution and the counsel for indigent parents in child abuse or neglect proceedings is constitutionally filed a motion to continue court-appointed counsel, asserting that appointment of

the statutory right to counsel for an indigent parent alleged to have abused or Effective July 1, 2011, the legislature amended RSA 169-C:10, II(a), abolishing

for August. See RSA 169-C:28 (2002). Each parent filed an appeal to superior court and a de novo hearing was scheduled or parent aides. See

p. 4 parents in therapy or medical treatment, and assistance of homemakers

conditions including supervision of parents by DCYF, participation of orders that permit the child to remain with the parents subject to the court has made a finding of abuse or neglect, the court may issue

parent’s right to raise and care for his or her child. For example, where

[u]ndoubtedly, the provisions of RSA chapter 169-C have an [e]ffect on a

relationship,” and,

parent alleged to have abused or neglected his or her child is the parent-child

protected by the State Constitution. See the right to raise and care for one’s children is a fundamental liberty interest

relative. See RSA 169-C:19, III. As the State acknowledges in its brief, “[t]he primary private interest of a legal custody of the child . . . be temporarily transferred to DCYF or a

deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection.” Lassiter v. management of his or her children is an important interest that undeniably warrants As to the private interest of the parents, we have consistently recognized that “that a parent’s desire for and right to the companionship, care, custody, and

Court. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). interest “is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized” by the Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (quotation omitted). This

(quotation omitted). Likewise, the United States Supreme Court has determined employ the three-prong balancing test set forth above. as a sanction more severe than imprisonment.” In re Baby K. Accordingly, we address the transferred question as an issue of first impression and, 143 N.H. at 205 the meaning of the State Constitution,” and “[t]he loss of one’s children can be viewed 744-45 (2002). “[P]arental rights are natural, essential, and inherent rights within N.H. 713, 716 (1978), reversed on other grounds by In re Craig T., 147 N.H. 739, N.H. at 491; Petition of Kerry D., 144 N.H. 146, 149 (1999); State v. Robert H., 118 In the Matter of Jeffrey G. & Janette P., 153 N.H. 200, 203 (2006); Brittany S., 147

however, to apply that opinion as controlling precedent on the question before us. As

(recognizing that plurality opinion of state supreme court is not precedential). W.C.A.B. (Green Const. Co.), 687 A.2d 428, 430 n.2 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997) plurality opinion of United States Supreme Court is not binding); Williams v. Com’rs of Mobile Cty., Ala., 872 F.2d 1563, 1569 n.8 (11th Cir. 1989) (noting that (Duggan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see Foster v. Bd. of Sch. plurality of an appellate court has no precedential value. Shelby R., 148 N.H. at 248

take custody of their children pursuant to RSA Chapter 169-C.” We decline, requires the appointment of counsel for indigent parents when the State seeks to court’s orders are subject to regular review, see

p. 5 procedural protections that reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation in that: the

complications of a jury trial.” The State also argues that the statute provides their case “free from the distraction created by members of the public and the proceedings are held in a closed courtroom without a jury, the parents can present

are not burdened by difficult questions of evidentiary law, and because the

The State argues that because the rules of evidence do not apply, the parents

deprivation that the lack of technical rules of evidence might provide.” State’s claim of abuse and neglect “neutralizes any mitigation of the risk of erroneous

of erroneous deprivation in that the common use of hearsay evidence to support the

parents contend that the absence of the technical rules of evidence elevates the risk understand and confute expert medical and psychiatric testimony. In addition, the low preponderance of the evidence standard and because few parents are equipped to

of an erroneous deprivation of their protected liberty interest because of the relatively

founded, it must hold an adjudicatory hearing. See have been made, if the trial court finds reasonable cause that the allegations are procedures set forth in the statute for the initial adjudicatory hearing create the risk abused or neglected,” RSA 169-C:15, IV (2002). The parents argue that without appointed counsel to represent them, the possible consequences to parental rights should the court find that the child is must determine at the preliminary hearing that each parent “understands the

Pursuant to RSA chapter 169-C, when allegations of child abuse or neglect

jury. RSA 169-C:14 (Supp. 2011), :18. http://www.courts.state.nh.us/forms/nhjb-2192-df.pdf (07/01/2011); and the court and their possible consequences, see Form NHJB-2192-DF, available at examine adverse witnesses.” Id 2011); the parents are provided with a notice explaining the nature of the hearings “have the right to present evidence and witnesses on their own behalf and to cross- RSA 169-C:22 (2002), :24 (Supp.

thereby depriving the parents of the right to the care and custody of their children. erroneous result in a child abuse or neglect proceeding under RSA chapter 169-C, C:12 (2002). The proceedings are held in a closed courtroom before a judge without a

and any other evidence in support of the petition. RSA 169-C:18, III. The parents

examine whether the absence of counsel impermissibly increases the risk of an evidence and may admit evidence that it considers relevant and material. RSA 169-

an erroneous deprivation of this protected liberty interest, “and the probable value, if 2011). At an adjudicatory hearing, the petitioner must present witnesses to testify

N.H. 50, 53 (1998) (quotation omitted). In the context of the issue before us, we

liberty interest, we next consider whether the procedures at issue create the risk of Given that it is undisputed that the private interest affected is a fundamental proceeding, see

p. 6 The trial court may not terminate parental rights in an abuse or neglect

avoid removal of children from the family.” RSA 169-C:2, I(c).

must “[p]rovide assistance to parents to deal with and correct problems in order to

RSA 169-C:2, II(b). To comply with the provisions of RSA chapter 169-C, the State

will plainly better the child.

present evidence, and cross-examine adverse witnesses. See

it can be clearly shown that a change in custody and control for his welfare or the interests of the public safety and when

abuse or neglect is provided a full hearing with an opportunity to call witnesses, Under the procedures contained in RSA chapter 169-C, a parent charged with

safety of the child is in danger or when it is clearly necessary and separating the child from his parents only when the

efforts to rehabilitate the parents proved unsuccessful); Matter of Perry a family environment by preserving the unity of the family 6

every hearing precedes or results in a decision to terminate parental rights).

taught parenting skills; permanent removal was not even considered until extensive keeping a child in contact with his home community and in

statute also requires that the trial court determine whether each parent understands relationship”); State in Interest of C.V. v. T.V. “decree does not necessarily pave the path to a termination of the parent-child RSA 169-C:18, III. The

result is by no means a foregone conclusion. See

See a necessary step in a juvenile court neglect proceeding is of little moment” as not 287, 292 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (“the fact that an adjudicative hearing is the first and

1986) (State sought temporary custody of the child only until the parents could be intended to achieve the purposes of, 499 So. 2d 159, 162 (La. Ct. App. parental ties are not permanently severed. The provisions of RSA chapter 169-C are 635 N.E.2d 1144, 1148 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (entry of a child in need of services

step in a process that may ultimately result in termination of parental rights, such a jurisdictions have similarly concluded, while an abuse or neglect proceeding is a first a reasonable doubt and indigent parents have a right to court-appointed counsel. permanent and is subject to review,” In re Father 2006-360, 155 N.H. at 97. As other

RSA 169-C:24-a (Supp. 2011), and its “dispositional order is not

the deficiencies that formed the basis for the initial petition may be rectified and the

is to permanently sever the parent-child relationship, the standard of proof is beyond separate purposes. In proceedings to terminate parental rights, the purpose of which neglect proceedings and termination of parental rights proceedings have distinct and

Unlike in proceedings to terminate parental rights, in abuse or neglect proceedings abuse or neglect proceedings is to reunify the family. See RSA 169-C:2 (2002). RSA 170-C:10 (2002); In re Baby K., 143 N.H. at 205. The overriding goal of

with a proceeding to terminate parental rights under RSA chapter 170-C. Abuse or We underscore that a child abuse or neglect proceeding is not synonymous neglect of children.

p. 7 (d) Take such action as may be necessary to prevent abuse or

in order to avoid removal of children from the family.

(c) Provide assistance to parents to deal with and correct problems

(b) Preserve the unity of the family whenever possible.

secured for the child.” Id from the control of his parents, guardian or custodian, adequate care shall be control that will promote the child’s best interest; and, if the child should be removed

individuals, to: with private agencies and organizations, citizens’ groups, and concerned

shall receive, preferably in his own home, the care, emotional security, guidance and

would entail.” Preisendorfer administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirements seeks to coordinate efforts by state and local authorities, in cooperation government’s interest, considering the function involved and the fiscal and

Pursuant to the statute, “[e]ach child coming within the provisions of this chapter involved in the adjudication of child abuse or neglect cases.” RSA 169-C:2, I. endangered and to establish a judicial framework to protect the rights of all parties held before a judge without a jury actually reduces court is not bound by the technical rules of evidence and that the proceedings are

The third prong of the due process analysis takes into account “the. The statute and relevant. In re Gina D.

was enacted “to provide protection to children whose life, health or welfare is

standard in neglect or abuse proceedings, evidence nevertheless must be material in the care and custody of his or her children. prevent the risk of an erroneous deprivation of a parent’s fundamental liberty interest conclude that the procedures set forth in RSA chapter 169-C are facially sufficient to N.H. at 97; understands the consequences to parental rights. RSA 169-C:15, IV; see Brittany S., 147 N.H. at 493. We adhere to our prior decisions and an erroneous deprivation of his or her liberty interest. In re Father 2006-360, 155

Contrary to the parents’ argument that the statutory procedures increase the

(07/01/2011) (notice to accused parent). Although there is a relaxed evidentiary NHJB-2192-DF, available at http://www.courts.state.nh.us/forms/nhjb-2192-df.pdf

abused or neglected and each parent is required to sign a statement that he or she the possible consequences to parental rights should the court find that the child is the first instance by the trial court. See

p. 8 reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation should be made on a case-by-case basis in 169-C, a determination of whether appointed counsel is necessary to adequately be appointed for indigent parents in every proceeding brought under RSA chapter

here.” Lassiter Accordingly, we conclude that while due process does not require that counsel

“it is hardly significant enough to overcome private interests as important as those

determinative difference in the outcome.” understand or challenge such testimony . . . the presence of counsel could make a

to abuse or neglect proceedings.” While the State’s fiscal concern may be legitimate, of the other expenses the State incurs in protecting the interest of children subjected million dollars on appointed counsel and that that “expense must be viewed in light “[p]arents involved in such cases are likely people who are not equipped to

State represents that in fiscal years 2010 and 2011, it expended more than one example, present complicated legal issues or require expert testimony, and given that process. As the State acknowledges, there may be abuse or neglect cases that, for may require the appointment of counsel to adequately protect a parent’s right to due

however, when it comes to the fiscal burden associated with appointed counsel. The interest in a proceeding that produces fair results. The State’s interest diverges, interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship. The State also shares an We agree with the State that the facts and circumstances of a particular case

indigent parents have a per For these reasons we conclude that, on balance, due process does not require that

the State in its role as parens erroneously deprived of the care and custody of his or her child. In addition, because (Fla. 1980) (counsel will always be required for parents where permanent termination

of family reunification, the State shares with the parents a desire for a correct result.

embodied in the statute prevent the risk that an uncounseled parent will be

169-C:2, II(c). proceedings under RSA chapter 169-C. constitutional and other rights of the parties and assures them a fair hearing.” RSA se right to appointed counsel in abuse or neglect

interest of children and providing reasonable services to assist with the statutory goal

appointment of counsel. As set forth above, however, the procedural protections To summarize, the fundamental nature of the parents’ interest favors the

, 452 U.S. at 28.

of this chapter are executed and enforced and which recognize and enforce the

Id

carried out . . . [t]o provide effective judicial procedures through which the provisions . The chapter is to “be liberally construed to the end that its purpose may be

children placed in alternative care. (e) Provide protection, treatment and rehabilitation, as needed, to p. 9 In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services

extends well beyond Lassiter

disagreeing with the dissenting opinion. Clause. The dissent would create a right under the State Constitution that

deprivation of his or her rights as a parent. See physical liberty.” Id

Hicks’s decision, but write separately to address more fully my reasons for State Constitution beyond that recognized under the Federal Due Process I would not expand the right to counsel in non-criminal cases under our

proceedings – those where the parent is not exposed to a permanent right to appointed counsel in the absence of at least a potential deprivation of proceedings – the kind at issue in Lassiter – and to abuse or neglect se right, but it also would apply that right both to parental rights termination forth in Mathews v. Eldridge because not only does the dissent envision a per should be decided on a case-by-case basis by, first, balancing the factors set the Court explained that whether due process demanded appointed counsel LYNN, J., concurring specially. I concur in the result reached in Justice

only when, if he loses, he may be deprived of his physical liberty.” Lassiter 33. is a presumption that “an indigent litigant has a right to appointed counsel proceeding. The Court, drawing upon its prior case law, concluded that there proceedings fundamentally unfair is a due process violation established. Id. at demonstrates that the absence of counsel in a particular case renders the R e m a n d e d. at 31. Only where the result of this analysis

the net result of that calculation “against the presumption that there is no

452 U.S. at 26-27. While recognizing that parental rights are very important,

appointed counsel for an indigent parent in a parental rights termination the United States Supreme Court held that there is no automatic right to

The Federal Constitution offers no greater protection than the State

Matter of Perry LYNN, J., concurred specially; CONBOY, J., dissented.

Federal Constitution as we do under the State Constitution. (1993); Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31-32. Thus, we reach the same result under the

requires court-appointed counsel in a neglect proceeding).

, 385 N.W.2d at 292-93 (case-by-case analysis whether due process

parental custody, the right to counsel should be determined on a case-by-case basis); of custody might result, but where there is no threat of permanent termination of p. 10 Cf State bear the cost of providing him with an attorney at the revocation hearing?

supporting his children. Does such a person have a right to insist that the

effectively preclude him from maintaining employment, and in turn from the parent loses his driver’s license, it is not difficult to imagine that this could non-existent, who is facing an administrative license revocation proceeding. If

proceeding rather than, as here, one initiated by the State, the fact that the

residing in northern New Hampshire, where public transportation is virtually of an abuse or neglect petition. Take a case as simple as that of a parent

residential time with her child? While this may be thought of as a private

practical matter, may have as devastating an effect on this right as the bringing importance, it is easy to envision other governmental actions that, as a the interest of a parent in raising a child is unquestionably of fundamental

represented opponent bent on preventing her from having any substantial liability). Or what of an indigent parent in a divorce proceeding who is facing a the licensee, but hearing need not take the form of a full hearing on question of

proceedings, it is hard to conceive of appropriate limiting principles. Although

nothing to interfere with that

pre-suspension hearing involve probable cause determination as to the fault of

criminal law context because, once such a right is recognized in civil an appointment, I would not extend the right to appointed counsel beyond the Except in the individual case where fundamental fairness requires such

the instant abuse or neglect proceedings – the legislature in fact has done

the suspension of a State-granted driver’s license, due process requires that . Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539-40 (1971) (holding that, in the context of

is, the parents do not simply claim the right to be represented by counsel in

the judicial function. It is not difficult to understand why the Lassiter

words, the parents claim the right to an economic entitlement. State provide them with this service at the expense of the taxpayers. In other

not simply procedural, but also has a significant substantive component. That factors in resolving that case: The right at issue in that case, and this one, is may have been unwilling to rely solely on the Mathews procedural due process

In my view, the dissent’s position raises concerns that go to the heart of

proceeding). N.H. 422, 426-27 (1974) (no per se right to appointed counsel in civil contempt hearing to determine one’s status as a habitual offender); Duval v. Duval, 114 child); State v. Cook, 125 N.H. 452, 459-60 (1984) (no per se right to counsel at right to counsel in proceeding by parent to terminate guardianship over minor collateral proceeding); In re Brittany S., 147 N.H. 489, 493 (2002) (no per se (2006) (no per se right to counsel for criminal defendant seeking new trial in that may result in incarceration. See State v. Hall, 154 N.H. 180, 184-85 confines of direct criminal proceedings in which the accused is facing charges Lassiter, has not found a per se right to counsel to exist outside the strict dissent’s position is at odds with our prior case law, which, consistent with p. 11 Clause so as to strike down legislation adopted by a

still further substantive content into the Due Process

the Court should be extremely reluctant to breathe Executive and the Judiciary in the 1930’s and 1940’s, the Clause disappeared in the conflict between the

underpinning for the broad, substantive application of

anticipation of the Framers, and that much of the major judicial gloss on its terms, as well as on the construction of the Due Process Clause represents a

design of the Constitution. Realizing that the present

or no cognizable roots in the language or even the deals with judge-made constitutional law having little vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it

The Judiciary, including this Court, is the most

that were nowhere specified in those amendments. See Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as protecting property and contract rights interpreted the broad and general language of the Due Process Clauses of the the political branches of government. Cf State to provide an ever increasing array of services exempt from the control of repository of unelaborated collectivism under which courts can require the score, the words of Justice White bear repeating: provide and pay for an “adequate” education for school age children). On this Hampshire Constitution the existence of a constitutional right to have the state

the advantages of that freedom.”). But an entitlement to such [government] funds as may be necessary to realize all protection against unwarranted government interference . . ., it does not confer

In the early part of the last century, the United States Supreme Court

legislature within a system of unrestrained laissez-faire, neither are they a

142 N.H. 462, 472-73 (1997) (divining within Part II, Article 83 of the New

18 (1980) (“Although the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause affords

State pay for the services of an attorney to represent her? Protection Clause). Is the parent in this hypothetical entitled to insist that the Process Clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions do not cabin the West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937). But just as the Due of property rights was the only economic system our Constitution allowed. See corrected the notion that full-bore capitalism absent any significant regulation to bring due process into play. Cf New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Eventually, in the New Deal era, the Court

enforcement of privately created racially restrictive covenants violates Equal Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (holding that granting judicial (1972) (applying constitutional due process analysis to State replevin actions);

deprivation of custody is implemented could be deemed sufficient State action court – an arm of the State – is the instrumentality through which the chapter 169-C, I respectfully dissent.

p. 12 indigent parents in State-initiated proceedings brought pursuant to RSA

the New Hampshire Constitution require the appointment of counsel for this right. Because I conclude that the due process protections afforded under New Hampshire apparently has become the only state in the country to abolish

neglect proceedings may well represent enlightened public policy. See

statutory right to counsel for indigent parents in abuse or neglect proceedings,

Providing counsel at State expense to indigent parents facing abuse or

CONBOY, J.