2010-714, Raymond A. Cloutier & a. v. State of New Hampshire & a.

No. 2010-714 Strafford

, of Manchester (Ovide M. Lamontagne, attorney general (Anne M. Edwards, of Concord (Charles G. Douglas, III

of the New Hampshire Judicial Retirement Plan. page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. David M. Howe on the brief, and Mr. Douglas orally), for the Board of Trustees a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home Douglas, Leonard & Garvey, P.C. and reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00

brief, and Ms. Edwards orally), for the State. attorney general, and Laura E.B. Lombardi, assistant attorney general, on the Michael A. Delaney, associate

petitioners. and Joshua M. Wyatt on the brief, and Mr. Lamontagne orally), for the Devine, Millimet & Branch, P.A. to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address:

editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New

well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as p. 2 The Parties stipulate that only

mathematical calculations within the projections. As the stipulation provides,

disputed certain assumptions underlying the calculations, but not the

previous retirement statutes repealed by Laws 2003, 311:10. The parties

benefits under the plan enacted pursuant to RSA chapter 100-C and the projected payouts included several separate calculations, comparing retirement containing a chart with projected lifetime retirement payouts for Cloutier. The

In response to the trial court’s order, the parties filed a joint stipulation

subsequently filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Cloutier filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the superior court. The parties

effect when he was appointed to be a judge. The board denied his claim and

that he was entitled to benefits under the retirement statutes that were in allowance was erroneously calculated pursuant to RSA chapter 100-C, and Hampshire Judicial Retirement Plan (board) asserting that his retirement

the old plan; included in calculating and projecting retirement benefits under Cloutier submitted a written request to the Board of Trustees of the New a. Whether the 10% raise given by Laws 2003, 311:3 should be

judges. We refer to them collectively as the petitioners. In October 2008,

, of Concord, Theodore E. Comstock

The six intervenors are retired supreme, superior, probate, and district court in dispute and rule on the following questions of law . . . : The petitioner, Raymond A. Cloutier, is a retired probate court judge. the court may find that there are no genuine issues of material fact propriety of the following assumptions as a matter of law, so that

retirement statutes. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. are fair and accurate, and fully reserve the right to challenge the

2005, 177:96 should not be included in calculating benefits under the prior court’s ruling that salary raises provided for by Laws 2003, 311:3 and Laws Hampshire Constitution. The petitioner and intervenors cross-appeal the Hampshire Association of Counties, as amici

2011), the Judicial Retirement Plan, violates Part I, Article 23 of the New appeals the Superior Court’s (Brown, J.) ruling that RSA chapter 100-C (Supp. HORTON, J., retired, specially assigned under RSA 490:3. The State

Government Center, New Hampshire School Boards Association and New Betsy B. Miller, of Concord, on the joint brief, for New Hampshire Local David R. Connell, of Concord, and service and age requirements. See

p. 3 provided for retirement benefits to judges who retired after meeting specific

Prior to the enactment of RSA chapter 100-C, a series of statutes

effective annual salary” when calculating their retirement benefits.

the 2003 and 2005 salary raises are not properly included as “currently

The petitioners cross-appeal, arguing that the trial court erred in ruling that

met the service and age requirements for retirement as of January 1, 2005. whether RSA chapter 100-C is unconstitutional only as applied to judges who Hampshire Constitution; and (2) in the event the trial court’s ruling is upheld,

in ruling that RSA chapter 100-C violates Part I, Article 23 of the New

The State raises two issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred

followed.

calculating their benefits under the prior retirement statutes. This appeal

percent salary increases authorized in 2003 and 2005 should be included in however, rejected the petitioners’ assertion that the ten percent and one contract rights in violation of the New Hampshire Constitution. The trial court,

who accepted their positions before its enactment results in impairment of

petitioners, concluding that the application of RSA chapter 100-C to judges

Following a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment for the

meaning of Part I, Article 23 of the State Constitution.

Petitioner’s and Intervenors’ retirement benefits within the

to RSA chapter 100-C constitute a “substantial impairment” of d. Whether Laws 2003, chapter 311 and subsequent amendments

effect. petitioners were appointed to be judges, the prior retirement statutes were in retirement benefits as full-time justices of the district court”). When the

court judges from 1991 to present;

(“Full-time probate judges . . . shall be entitled to the same disability and

average [of] all legislative salary increases given to sitting probate inception (from January 1, 2005 forward), or, alternatively, the to sitting probate judges in the period since the new plan’s (1977) (repealed 2003) (district court); RSA 547:2-a (1997) (amended 2003) court); RSA 491:2 (1977) (repealed 2003) (superior court); RSA 502-A:6-a

appropriately determined by the average of salary increases given

c. Whether future legislative salary increases are more

the old plan;

included in calculating and projecting retirement benefits under b. Whether the 1.01% raise given by Laws 2005, 177:96 should be years of service may retire on a service retirement allowance equal

p. 4 IV. A member who is at least 60 years of age with at least 15

member has over 7 years. over the 45 percent level for each year of creditable service the

who is 70 years of age shall be granted an additional 10 percent

equal to 45 percent of the member’s final year’s salary. A member creditable service may retire on a service retirement allowance III. A member who is 70 years of age with 7 years of

equal to 75 percent of the member’s final year’s salary. creditable service may retire on a service retirement allowance II. A member who is at least 65 years of age with 10 years of

service retirement allowance . . . .

RSA chapter 100-C. See In 2003, the prior retirement statutes were repealed and replaced with

least 7 years of service and is 70 years of age may retire on a of creditable service and is at least 65 years of age, or who has at service and is at least 60 years of age, or who has at least 10 years

I. Any member who has at least 15 years of creditable

(repealed 2003); RSA 502-A:6-a, VI (repealed 2003). otherwise appropriated.” RSA 490:2, VI (repealed 2003); RSA 491:2, VI his warrant for the payment thereof out of any funds in the treasury not

plan is mandatory for any full-time supreme, superior, district or probate court

continually appropriated therefor” and that the “governor is authorized to draw

Under the new retirement statute, membership in the judicial retirement

“sum sufficient to pay any and all benefits or compensation . . . is hereby (repealed 2003); RSA 491:2, II (repealed 2003). The statutes provided that a which the judge was retired. RSA 502-A:6-a, III (repealed 2003); RSA 490:2, II

time service. January 1, 2005. Between 2006 and 2009, the petitioners retired from full-

determination as to the tax qualified status of the plan. See seventy-five percent of “the currently effective annual salary of the office” from

311:11. The parties have stipulated that RSA chapter 100-C took effect on

statute was delayed until the Internal Revenue Service made a favorable entitled to receive for the rest of his or her life an annual amount equal to Laws 2003, ch. 311. Implementation of the new attaining the age of sixty-five years having served for at least ten years, was age of seventy years having served as a judge for at least seven years, or upon

services rendered and to be rendered,” a judge who retired upon attaining the Under the prior retirement statutes, as “additional compensation for p. 5 See

upon the State Constitution, we need not engage in a separate federal analysis.

substantially altered by RSA chapter 100-C. Because the parties rely only not create contractual rights and, even if they did, those rights have not been Article 23 of the State Constitution because the prior retirement statutes did

facts de

the State and the judges. p. 5 See The new retirement plan is self-funding, relying upon contributions from The State argues that the trial court erred in finding a violation of Part I,

judgment. We review the trial court’s application of the law to the

RSA 100-C:5, I-VI. least ninety percent funded for the calendar year. RSA 100-C:17. the actuarial assumed rate of return approved by the board and the trust is at employee contributions to the plan pursuant to RSA 100-C:14. member’s final year’s salary shall not be required to make

judgment as a matter of law, we will affirm the grant of summary issue of material fact, and if the moving party is entitled to moving party. If our review of that evidence discloses no genuine 5

excess of $50,000 only if the plan’s annuity fund earns at a level greater than

VI. Any member attaining eligibility for 75 percent of the

properly drawn from them, in the light most favorable to the non-

RSA 100-C:17. The legislature may approve cost-of-living adjustments in than that amount with the approval of the legislature. RSA 100-C:13, III(g); State v. N. of the Border Tobacco, 162 N.H. 206, 212 (2011) (citations omitted). judges up to an aggregate amount of $50,000 per year, and to award more member’s final year’s salary. novo. allowance pursuant to this section exceed 75 percent of the

consider the affidavits and other evidence, and all inferences In reviewing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, we

Petition of Guardarramos-Cepeda, 154 N.H. 7, 9 (2006).

the board has the discretion to award cost-of-living adjustments to retired

V. Under no circumstance shall any service retirement

statute limits benefits to seventy-five percent of the judge’s final year’s salary,

year of continued service over 15 years. be granted an additional percent over the 70 percent level for each

has at least 15 years of service and is at least 60 years of age shall to 70 percent of the member’s final year’s salary. A member who p. 6 Id

purpose.

only if it is reasonable and necessary to serve an important public must be performed, and the law may pass constitutional muster police power and the rights protected by the contract clause[ ]

legislation substantially impairs the contract, a balancing of the

relationship, and whether the impairment is substantial. If the employee and the State is a question of first impression in New Hampshire. relationship, whether a change in law impairs that contractual has three components: whether there is a contractual State v. Fournier protections found in the contract clause of the United States Constitution.”

p. 6 Id

Whether a public retirement plan creates a contract between a public deliberate consideration. substantial impairment of a contractual relationship. This inquiry

reference existing contracts, “we have held that its proscription duplicates the

Part I, Article 23. Tuttle

contract.” Opinion of the Justices (Furlough) impairs a contract, or where a law abrogates an earlier statute that is itself a

will not be interfered with until the matter has received full and . (quotations, citations, ellipses and brackets omitted). threshold inquiry as to whether the legislation operates as a

punishment of offenses.” Although this provision does not specifically

under existing laws, . . . must be deemed retrospective” within the meaning of

23 [of the State Constitution] to offer equivalent protections where a law

operation under it of another department of the state government declared to be invalid except upon inescapable grounds; and the Contract Clause analysis in New Hampshire requires a coordinate branch of the government is presumed. It will not be therefore, should be made, either for the decision of civil causes, or the, 159 N.H. at 641 (quotation omitted). “Retrospective laws are highly injurious, oppressive, and unjust. No such laws, Part I, Article 23 of the New Hampshire Constitution provides: Accordingly, “every statute which takes away or impairs vested rights, acquired

understand article I, section 10 [of the federal constitution] and part I, article

, 158 N.H. 214, 221 (2009) (quotation omitted). “We therefore

burden of proof. The constitutionality of an act passed by the

. (quotations, citations and brackets omitted).

The party challenging a statute’s constitutionality bears the

N.H. 627, 640 (2010). review de novo. Tuttle v. N.H. Med. Malpractice Joint Underwriting Assoc., 159 Whether or not a statute is constitutional is a question of law, which we p. 7 Jeannont v. N.H. Personnel Comm’n

permanent State employee or continues in such employment. compensation and become vested at the time one becomes a These benefits are an integral part of the contemplated

on the State’s representations that it will provide such benefits.

employment or continues in employment with the State in reliance

in State employment, and an employee accepts an offer of which the State can attract qualified persons to enter and remain include . . . retirement . . . benefits. Such benefits are a means by 7

employee and his family.” Id Jeannont becomes a permanent State employee or continues in such employment,”

that “benefits are an integral

whisked away at the whim of the public employer.” Gilman

of the employee’s contemplated compensation. These benefits may

Kern, the Supreme Court of California reasoned that “public employment gives (Cal. 1947), and Bakenhus v. City of Seattle, 296 P.2d 536 (Wash. 1956). In

, 118 N.H. at 602, we cited Kern v. City of Long Beach, 179 P.2d 799 government service, the benefits are essentially created for the protection of the

permanent employee status. Designed to attract competent individuals into part of the contemplated compensation and become vested at the time one employee’s compensation and become vested upon the commencement of In support of the statement in Jeannont

employment. Benefits would serve as little inducement if they could be employees is “to induce competent persons to enter and remain in public employment). One of the primary purposes of providing benefits to public salary, but will include any other benefits that are an integral part when one becomes a governmental employee or continues in such [a]n employee’s compensation is not necessarily limited to his Cheshire, 126 N.H. 445, 448-49 (1985) (right to receive sick leave benefits vests

performed.” Id much entitled as he is to the wages paid him for the work he has actually 122 N.H. 614, 621 (1982). “These benefits constitute a substantial part of an and other related benefits.” State Employees’ Ass’n of N.H. v. Belknap County, System, “clearly entitles certain governmental employees to receive retirement also held that RSA chapter 100-A, establishing the New Hampshire Retirement

Regarding public employees, we have recognized that

compensation of an employee to which, under ordinary circumstances, he is as

. (quotation and ellipses omitted).

evolution of the now generally accepted theory that pensions are a part of the tort[u]ous, reflecting the increasing pressure placed upon the judiciary by the Va. 1981). “Development of the law on the question has been long and caused courts great difficulty.” Wagoner v. Gainer, 279 S.E.2d 636, 640 (W. “The nature of pension rights of a public employee is a question which has p. 8 Sylvestre

other financial activity.

has reached an age where it is too late to actively engage in any compensation is the only resource he has to rely upon when he until the age permitting retirement. Frequently, his retirement

between the State and the judges who entered into employment when the

judge to remain in office during the required period of time and

the weight of authority that these statutes created an implied-in-fact contract

surely is one of the significant considerations that induces the

RSA 502-A:6-a (repealed 2003). For the reasons set forth above, we agree with and to be rendered.” RSA 490:2 (repealed 2003); RSA 491:2 (repealed 2003); that judicial retirement pay was “additional compensation for services rendered pay, upon his retirement, a part of the salary allotted to his office it does anyone else; and a judge’s reliance upon the state’s offer to him part of his salary. Inflation affects retired judges the same as

In the case before us, the prior retirement statutes stated unequivocally

anticipating that upon retirement the state will continue to pay

and a vested contractual right accruing upon acceptance of employment. See, 214 N.W.2d at 666. have held that a judge’s pension rights are an integral element of compensation accept a position, often for a much smaller financial reward, in which he has been educated and is experienced in order to [A] judge gives up the right to continue in the only field of endeavor

Other state supreme courts that have been presented with this issue

receive the same when he has fulfilled the prescribed conditions.” Id pension plan is applicable contracts for a substantial pension and is entitled to the Minnesota Supreme Court explained: Michigan Judges Retirement Board, 143 N.W.2d 755, 757-58 (Mich. 1966). As 1976); p. 8 Sylvestre v. State, 214 N.W.2d 658, 664-65 (Minn. 1973); Campbell v. 1980); Miles v. Tenn. Consol. Retirement System, 548 S.W.2d 299, 304 (Tenn. 1985); Gainer, 279 S.E.2d at 643; Olson v. Cory, 636 P.2d 532, 535-36 (Cal. e.g., Board of Tr. of Pub. Emp. Ret. F. v. Hill, 472 N.E.2d 204, 208-09 (Ind. contractual obligation.” Kern, compensation, it cannot be destroyed, once it has vested, without impairing a earned. Since a pension right is an integral portion of contemplated

“more enlightened” view that “the employee who accepts a job to which a exists at that time. Bakenhus, 296 P.2d at 539. Rather, the court adopted the conditions are fulfilled, the employee’s rights must depend upon the law as it the view that since the right to receive a pension does not arise until all the In Bakenhus, the Supreme Court of Washington rejected as “insupportable”

Constitution, including the right to the payment of salary which has been rise to certain obligations which are protected by the contract clause of the so, the court relied upon Tuttle

p. 9 The trial court also found that the impairment is substantial. In doing

reflect subsequent increases in pay granted to those in active service.

petitioners had the right to expect that upon retirement their pension would

impairs the obligations entered into under the prior retirement statutes. The credit cards, car payments, and the like.” Id statutory benefit.” We agree with the trial court that RSA chapter 100-C “is clearly an impairment of the plaintiffs’ vested rights under the previous

committed themselves to personal long-term obligations such as mortgages, the amount the judge was being paid at the time of retirement, the new statute

leave. Id

pay for such essentials as food and housing. Many have undoubtedly we noted that “[t]he affected employees have surely relied on full paychecks to adjustments in judicial salaries, and because the new statute bases benefits on The trial court also relied upon Opinion of the Justices (Furlough) substantial impairment of the contract between the State and the employees, for the calculation of retirement benefits based upon the most recent The trial court found that because the prior retirement statutes allowed. at 628. In concluding that the legislation would constitute a would have required employees to take a certain number of unpaid days of and one-half hours per week. Furlough, 135 N.H. at 631. Proposed legislation and certain public employees established the basic workweek as thirty-seven (Furlough), the terms of a collective bargaining agreement between the State contract between the petitioners and the State. In Opinion of the Justices for certain income,” RSA chapter 100-C is a substantial impairment of the affects the “very heart of an employment contract: the promise of certain work N.H. at 634, and, quoting Furlough, concluded that because the impairment The court quoted language in Tuttle, 135

No. 89 v. Prince George’s County, Md., 608 F.3d 183 (4th Cir. 2010). court quoted was subsequently reversed. See Fraternal Order of Police Lodge See Tuttle, 159 N.H. at 650. In addition, the opinion from which the Tuttle the parties’ reliance was not at issue in Tuttle, the quoted language is dicta. language as the basis for finding substantial impairment in this case. Because 645 F. Supp. 2d 492, 510 (D. Md. 2009)). We hesitate, however, to adopt this (quoting Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 89 v. Prince George’s County, Md., can assume the impairment to be substantial.’” Tuttle, 159 N.H. at 649 abridged was one that induced the parties to contract in the first place, a court

disagree that these cases compel the conclusion reached by the trial court.

if so, whether the impairment is substantial. address whether RSA chapter 100-C impairs that contractual relationship and, there is a contractual relationship between the State and the petitioners, we

subject to attaining the age and service requirements. Because we hold that statutes were in effect, which vested when they were appointed to be judges p. 10 10

cases favorably cited in Jeannont Bakenhus In determining the issue of substantial impairment, we look again to the nature to the employee. See plan may be changed only if there is a corresponding change of a beneficial In Bakenhus Several other jurisdictions approve the view that, prior to retirement, a

should be accompanied by comparable new advantages). and adapt it to changing economic conditions.” Id allows the legislature the freedom necessary to improve the pension system effect to the reasonable expectations of the employee and at the same time

limited vesting of pension rights such that although the plan could be changed, Bills, 366 P.2d 581, 584 (Colo. 1961) (prior to eligibility to retire, there is entitled to receive the same when he has fulfilled the prescribed conditions.” reasonable pension.” Id, e.g., Police Pension and Relief Board of Denver v. not have a right to any fixed or definite benefits, but only to a substantial or

which he serves.” Kern. the specific terms of the legislation in effect during any particular period in changes in a pension plan which result in disadvantage to the employees vested contractual right to a pension but . . . this right is not rigidly fixed by court, “[t]his view, while it may not be flawless in a purely legalistic sense, gives the pension system flexible and maintaining its integrity.” Id. According to the rights “may be modified prior to retirement, but only for the purpose of keeping amount, terms and conditions of the benefits may be altered.” Id

, 296 P.2d at 540. The court reasoned that the employee’s pension

which a pension plan is applicable contracts for a substantial pension and is years between 1991 and 20 p. 10 10, there was no increase in judicial salaries. legislatively authorized. In fact, the parties have stipulated that in eight of the body may make modifications and changes in the system. The employee does, the court held that “the employee who accepts a job to year to year whether any upward modifications to judicial salaries will be

relation to the theory of a pension system and its successful operation, and commencement of payments and concluded that “an employee may acquire a 1978) (alterations of employees’ pension rights must bear some material Betts v. Bd. of Admin. of Pub. Emp. Ret. System, 582 P.2d 614, 617 (Cal.

holding that the employee “has a vested right to a pension but that the

statutory language is subject to the implied qualification that the governing work for a definite amount of compensation, there is no absolute certainty from, 179 P.2d at 803. The court reasoned that “[t]he

many of the affected workers and can only be considered substantial.” Id for certain income. Its impact would likely wreak havoc on the finances of modifications by the government in a pension system prior to the time for

contrast, unlike an employment contract that guarantees definite hours of

impairs the very heart of an employment contract: the promise of certain work was in this context that we concluded: “The bill under consideration here the prior retirement statutes because its only purpose was to compensate for

p. 11 The board further argues that the ten percent increase was not “salary” under

adjustment to judicial salaries equal to contributions required by the new plan. the prior retirement statutes and that the salary increase was a one-time percent increase is not included in determining retirement benefits pursuant to

argues that chapter 311 “clearly and unambiguously” provides that the ten

to make to the new plan. See

percent raise violates Part I, Article 23 of the State Constitution. The board petitioners’ benefits payable under the prior plan; and (3) excluding the ten not purport to exclude the salary increase from the calculation of the

contribution of ten percent of earnable compensation that judges are required the effective date of RSA chapter 100-C. The ten percent increase matched the position by ten percent. This increase became effective on January 1, 2005,

“currently effective salary” for sitting judges; (2) Laws 2003, chapter 311 did

Laws 2003, 311:3 amended RSA 491-A:1 to increase the salary of each judicial

the prior retirement statutes calculate benefits as seventy-five percent of the calculation of retirement benefits payable under the prior statutes because: (1) The petitioners argue that these increases should be included in the base

and 2005 in calculating their benefits under the prior retirement statutes.

excluded the ten percent and one percent salary increases authorized in 2003 correct for that effect. See The petitioners argue in their cross-appeal that the trial court incorrectly

benefits under the prior retirement statutes.

percent increase, in 2005 judicial salaries were increased by one percent to

offset by any compensating benefits under RSA chapter 100-C.

had to exclude the one percent increase from the calculation of retirement contractual right to a pension); Gainer because the 2005 pay raise was a technical correction of the 2003 raise, it also

Because the judges’ contribution to the new plan was also based upon the ten receiving benefits under the prior retirement statutes. See Laws 2003, 311:6. court to determine in the first instance whether the contractual impairment is expressly intended not to apply to judges who had already retired and were approach adopted by the trial court, we reverse and remand this issue for the RSA 100-C:14. This salary increase was benefits constitutes an impairment of contract). Because we reject the

modifications must be reasonable and not destroy or impair a vested

(taking away the right to receive compensation without any compensating advantages, i.e., substitute consideration); Sylvestre, 214 N.W.2d at 666 pension plan may be allowed if any disadvantages are counter-balanced by

and permit adjustments to accord with changing conditions, such benefits may be modified before a retirement to keep a pension system flexible Alarcon, 196 Cal. Rptr. 887, 892 (Ct. App. 1983) (while vested rights to pension nature without a corresponding change of a beneficial nature); In re Marriage of it could not be abolished nor could there be a substantial change of an adverse quantify the difference between the financial benefits to be expected under the

p. 12 calculations in the parties’ joint stipulation, it is not possible precisely to

C:13, III(g); RSA 100-C:17. As demonstrated by the variety of projected payout Trustees of the New Hampshire Judicial Retirement Plan (board), RSA 100salary,” RSA 100-C:5, II, subject to discretionary increases by the Board of

petitioners’ retirement benefits at “75 percent of the member’s final year’s

(1997) (repealed 2003). RSA chapter 100-C cuts that link and instead fixes the (1997) (repealed 2003); RSA 491:2, II (1997) (repealed 2003); RSA 502-A:6-a, III annual salary of the office from which [the judge] is retired . . . .” RSA 490:2, II

directly to salaries of sitting judges; namely, “3/4 of the currently effective

The prior retirement statutes tied the petitioners’ retirement benefits

purpose, an issue which the majority does not reach.

new statute is not reasonable and necessary to serve an important public

substantial impairment. I would also affirm the trial court’s finding that the

new law. For the reasons that follow, I would affirm the trial court’s finding of petitioners’ contract rights is offset by any compensating benefits under the further findings by the trial court as to whether the impairment of the

retirement statutes. However, I disagree that the case should be remanded for

177:96 should not be included in calculating benefits under the prior the salary adjustments provided for by Laws 2003, 311:3 and Laws 2005, petitioners and that RSA chapter 100-C impairs that contract. I also agree that

the prior retirement statutes created a contract between the State and the

490:3, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I agree with the majority that MANIAS, J., retired superior court justice, specially assigned under RSA

Affirmed in part; reversed in

.

statutes. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court on this issue. annual salary” for purposes of calculating benefits under the prior retirement plan. Therefore, these adjustments may not be characterized as “effective concurred in part and dissented in part. BEAN, JJ., retired superior court justices, specially assigned under RSA 490:3, court justice, specially assigned under RSA 490:3, concurred; MANIAS and

percent earnable compensation contribution required under the new retirement

FITZGERALD, J.