2011-224, State of New Hampshire v. Christina Smith

The defendant, Christina Smith, appeals her conviction

for the defendant. Stephen T. Jeffco, P.A. on the brief),

general, on the brief), for the State.

to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address:

editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New

well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as p. 2 State v. Joyce factual findings unless they lack support in the record or are clearly erroneous. When reviewing a trial co urt’s order on a motion to suppress, we accept its

road configurations.” physically impossible to take a right-hand turn or proceed straight due to the control device warning motorists of the left-turn only lane and where it is

she was in “a left-hand only turn lane, where there is already present a traffic

motion to suppress because she was not required to use a turn signal when On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying her

stopped her. The trial court denied her motion and found her guilty.

reasonable, articulable suspicion that she had committed a crime when he

result of her seizure. She argued that the arresting officer did not have a The defendant filed a motion to suppress all evidence acquired as a

under arrest.

sobriety tests, Martinelli determined that she was impaired and placed her beverage [came] from her as she spoke.” After the defendant failed several field seemed bloodshot and watery, her speech was slurred and “an odor of alcoholic

When Martinelli stopped the defendant, he observed that her eyes

turn lane without using her turn signal. See seized. The officer stopped the defendant after she made a turn from a left-hand suspicion that the defendant was engaged in criminal activity when she was 2 In this case, the sole issue is whether the arresting officer had reasonable

criminal activity. Id suspicion that the defendant was, had been or was about to be engaged in second, we determine whether, at that time, the officer possessed a reasonable RSA 265:45 did not apply. vehicles . . . in need of protection whose movements would have been affected,” that, given her position in a left-turn-only lane and the absence of any “other travelled. observed any erratic operation in the short distance that the defendant RSA 265:45 (2004). She argues

conduct a two-step inquiry: first, we determine when the defendant was seized; of law de novo. Id. To determine whether an officer conducted a lawful stop, we

, 159 N.H. 440, 444 (2009). We review the trial court’s conclusions

without using a turn signal. At trial, Martinelli conceded that he had not

Washington Street. After stopping at the flashing red light, she turned left located in the left-hand turn lane at the intersection of Central Avenue and of Central Avenue southbound and came to a stop at the flashing red light

parking area on Central Avenue and proceed south. She shifted to the left side in his cruiser when he observed the defendant back her vehicle out of a decline to create an exception that the legislature did not see fit to include. See p. 3 provides no exception to this requirement, and, absent legislative direction, we a vehicle at an intersection without giving an appropriate signal. The statute The last sentence of RSA 265:45, I, specifically provides that no person shall turn

of other vehicles approaching from the rear.

disabled vehicle, or flashed as a courtesy or “do pass” signal to drivers position and shall not be flashed on one side only on a parked or indicate an intention to turn, change lanes, or start from a parked

IV. The signals provided for in RSA 265:46, II, shall be used to

opportunity to give such signal. to the driver of any vehicle immediately to the rear when there is

without first giving an appropriate signal in the manner provided herein

vehicle before turning.

given continuously during not less than the last 100 feet traveled by the

the manner hereinafter provided. person shall so turn any vehicle without giving an appropriate signal in

and until such movement can be made with reasonable safety. No

require that we address the issue squarely presented in this criminal case – that we agree with the State that Sullivan and Caldwell, two civil cases, did not other vehicles, it is not applicable. We find her argument unpersuasive. Rather, purpose of the statute is to prevent motor vehicle collisions and in the absence of Caldwell v. Drew, 109 N.H. 91, 94 (1965), in support of her argument that the The defendant cites Sullivan v. LeBlanc, 100 N.H. 311, 314 (1956), and

id. at 474.

vehicle from a direct course or move right or left upon a roadway unless turn a vehicle to enter a private road or driveway, or otherwise turn a is in proper position upon the roadway as required in RSA 265:42, or

that the legislature did not see fit to include. Id

the plain and ordinary meaning to the words used. State v. Stowe

RSA 265:45 provides:

will neither consider what the legislature might have said nor add language 464, 474 (2011). We interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and

determine the meaning of a statute, we first examine its language and ascribe To resolve this issue we must construe the language of RSA 265:45 p. 4 . To .

HICKS, CONBOY and LYNN, JJ p. 4 ., concurred.

A f f i r m e d

or absence of other vehicles p. 4 . use a turn signal regardless of road configuration, traffic signals or the presence is, whether the driver of a motor vehicle who is preparing to make a turn must