2009-309, In the Matter of Theodore J. Goodlander and Elizabeth M. Tamposi

Douglas, Leonard & Garvey, P.C.

No. 2009-309

Hillsborough-southern judicial district

divorce decree issued by the Superior Court (Nicolosi CONBOY, J. The petitioner, Theodore J. Goodlander, appeals the final

Brennan, Caron, Lenehan & Iacopino

parties’ non-trust assets; (5) awarding Tamposi 1.6 million dollars from the sale legal standard to calculate alimony; (4) awarding a near equal division of the Trust Code (UTC), see RSA ch. 564-B (2007 & Supp. 2010); (3) using the wrong family trusts is not marital property; (2) retroactively applying the Uniform divorce trust income that Tamposi may receive as a beneficiary of certain marital property. He argues that the trial court erred by: (1) finding that postalimony from the respondent, Elizabeth M. Tamposi, and a percentage of the

respondent. Brennan and Jaye L. Rancourt on the brief, and Mr. Brennan orally), for the THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

the brief and orally), for the petitioner.

page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address: editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as receiving distributions from the EMT Trust since 1995. p. 2 in health and reasonable comfort.” Tamposi and her children have been the trustee considers necessary for [a beneficiary’s] education and maintenance income and principal of the [sub-]trust and in such proportions among them as Trust, has a trustee with the discretion to pay “such amounts from the net Under the terms of the SAT Trust, each sub-trust, including the EMT

(collectively, the EMT Trust). parties’ children became the beneficiaries of the Elizabeth Tamposi sub-trusts beneficiary.” Upon Samuel Tamposi, Sr.’s death in 1995, Tamposi and the or control by any creditor or spouse (or divorced former spouse) of the or principal to be made to or for any beneficiary, shall be free from interference Trust states that “[t]he interest of each beneficiary, and all payments of income governed by the terms of, the SAT Trust. A spendthrift provision of the SAT each sibling and his or her issue, to be funded by distributions from, and issue in this case is the SAT Trust. Sub-trusts were created for the benefit of consist primarily of real estate or entities that own and manage real estate. At Trust. The trusts’ assets are worth approximately 72 million dollars and amendments (SAT Trust); and the Samuel A. Tamposi, Sr. 1994 Irrevocable comprehensive estate plan: the Samuel A. Tamposi, Sr. 1992 Trust, with That same year, Samuel Tamposi, Sr., established two trusts as part of a

home. other than some consulting work, has not since been employed outside the Washington D.C. In 1992, she ended her service in Washington D.C. and, in 1989 to serve as the Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs in interest. Meanwhile, Tamposi left her position in the Tamposi family business share in SCC, while he maintained a twenty-five to thirty percent ownership I. Facts transferred to SCC. Goodlander gave each of the parties’ children a ten percent company. Ownership of the assets of Cab Tech, including all patents, was later manufacturing company, and Kristiania Corp. (Kristiania), a real estate holding Computer Corporation (SCC), a publicly traded computer marketing and course of the marriage, Goodlander formed two additional companies, Storage computer industry and was the owner of Cab Tech, Inc. (Cab Tech). During the Samuel Tamposi, Sr., and her five siblings. Goodlander worked in the marriage, Tamposi worked for the Tamposi family business with her father, January 25, 1982. Together they have three adult children. Prior to the The following facts are drawn from the record. The parties married on

and remand. children to intervene in the divorce action. We affirm in part, vacate in part, of a family trust’s interest in the Boston Red Sox; and (6) allowing his adult to be paid by the trustee of the EMT Trust to him directly. Goodlander appeals p. 3 therefore awarded $50,000 per year in alimony to meet his “most basic needs,” food, shelter and medical needs” of her former spouse. Goodlander was accommodate an award of alimony unless it was to provide for “the most basic UTC, Tamposi could not force a distribution from the EMT Trust to As to alimony, the trial court concluded that under the provisions of the

has no right to any distribution from the SAT Trusts or the EMT Trust.” remainder, or beneficial interest. Other than the alimony that is awarded, he court found that “Mr. Goodlander has no right to the corpus of the trusts, the of this trust, any distribution is ‘a mere expectancy.’” As a result, the trial Trust] are not a property interest subject to division, because under the terms that “future distributions or the anticipated stream of income [from the EMT the non-trust assets. With respect to the EMT Trust, the trial court concluded home, as well as 49% of the non-trust assets. Goodlander was awarded 51% of In its final decree, the trial court awarded Tamposi the parties’ Gilford

irreconcilable differences. 2009, following a six-day hearing, a divorce was granted on the basis of interests, they withdrew their petition on the first day of trial. On January 21, originally intervened in this case in an attempt to protect their financial divorce, citing irreconcilable differences. Although the parties’ children In 2006, the parties separated and on May 16, 2007, Goodlander filed for

attempt to salvage the company. purpose. This money was lent to Kristiania, which lent it to SCC, in a failed account with the use of a power of attorney granted to him for an unrelated custodian. He also secretly withdrew $80,000 from Tamposi’s personal bank children’s custodial accounts, for which he served as fiduciary and sole secretly withdrew, over a period of years, approximately $898,480 from his In an attempt to maintain the financial solvency of SCC, Goodlander

2005, SCC stock had no value and was no longer publicly traded. including forfeiting his own salary. He has earned no income since 2003. By endeavors began to fail. Goodlander made efforts to revive his businesses, computer industry experienced a market decline and Goodlander’s business twenty years of the parties’ marriage. However, beginning in 2003, the

Goodlander enjoyed success in his business endeavors during the first

according to her ownership interest in these entities. $4,818,310. Income from the non-trust assets has been paid to Tamposi “non-trust assets.” The non-trust assets are valued at approximately estate entities during the course of the marriage, hereinafter referred to as the In addition, Tamposi acquired certain minority interests in other real of those assets.” In the Matter of Chamberlin & Chamberlin p. 4 distribution, and then exercises its discretion to make an equitable distribution 4 marital property under RSA 458:16-a, I, and thus subject to equitable “[T]he trial court first determines, as a matter of law, what assets are

constitutes more than a mere expectancy. not agree that Tamposi’s interest in any future distributions of the EMT Trust paramount in determining whether the trust assets are marital property, we do invade the trust corpus. See brackets omitted). While we agree that the parties’ interest in the trust is property subject to division under the statute, as Tamposi has no right to parties’ interest in the trust.” Chamberlin, 155 N.H. at 18 (quotation and Here, the parties do not dispute that the corpus of the SAT Trust is not marital marital interest subject to division is not the [trust corpus] itself but the property is held in the name of either or both parties.” RSA 458:16-a, I (2004). argument, Goodlander cites Chamberlin, in which we concluded that “the assets, real or personal, belonging to either or both parties, whether title to the vested right to future distributions from the EMT Trust. In support of his “[Marital] [p]roperty shall include all tangible and intangible property and her “education, maintenance in health and reasonable comfort,” she has a trustee is authorized to make distributions from the EMT Trust to Tamposi for B:5-505 (a)(2). Nevertheless, Goodlander argues that because an independent with other assets upon which the parties freely may draw.”); see also RSA 564would be incongruous to count such a trust as a marital asset, interchangeable nor the settlor’s creditors may invade the corpus of an irrevocable trust, it

II. Trust Distributions as Marital Property

rises only to the level of a “mere expectancy.” We disagree. property, our review is de concluding that Tamposi’s right to future distributions from the EMT Trust novo. challenges the ruling that future distributions of the EMT Trust are not marital receives through the EMT Trust. Therefore, he argues, the trial court erred in Trust and, therefore, he is entitled to a portion of the future distributions she reviewed for an unsustainable exercise of discretion.” Id. Because Goodlander novo to division. Specifically, he argues that Tamposi has a vested right in the SAT, while equitable divisions of property pursuant to RSA 458:16-a, II are (2007). “Trial court determinations under RSA 458:16-a, I, are reviewed de post-divorce distributions from the EMT Trust are not marital property subject Goodlander first argues that the trial court erred in finding that any, 155 N.H. 13, 16

in turn. the final divorce decree on several grounds. We address each of his arguments matter, [has] no control to compel distributions.” p. 5 the third party trustee to the EMT Trust was that Tamposi “as a practical McDonald, an expert on trusts and estates law, testified that the significance of trustee’s total authority and jurisdiction. Similarly, Attorney Joseph distributions by a trustee, and that any distributions are solely within the Samuel Tamposi, Jr. testified that beneficiaries have no authority to force

beneficiaries. again by the trustee’s discretion to distribute any sub-trust funds to the investment directors’ discretion in making distributions to the sub-trusts, and beneficiary is thus twice removed from access to the trust assets – first, by the other expenses necessary to meet the trust’s financial obligations. A has a fiduciary duty to all beneficiaries of the trust and must pay out taxes and maintenance in health and reasonable comfort,” bearing in mind that he or she distribute those funds to the trust beneficiaries for their “education and the investment directors, the trustee of each sub-trust has the discretion to approximately $50,000. Once funds have been distributed to the sub-trusts by sub-trusts once the balance of the “common account” of the SAT Trust reaches practice of the investment directors has been to distribute such funds to the generated from the SAT Trust assets are generally not reinvested; rather, the Testimony at the parties’ divorce hearing indicated that certain funds

directors. Trust, is funded by distributions made from the SAT Trust by the investment assets . . . included in the trust property.” Each sub-trust, including the EMT well as “full power and authority to direct the retention or sale of all other financing, refinancing and structuring of any and all real estate interests,” as The directors are given the powers of “management, control, handling, directors Samuel A. Tamposi, Jr. and Stephen A. Tamposi, Tamposi’s brothers. all assets of the SAT Trust are to be controlled and managed by investment 5 is not a fixed, certain and absolute right. The terms of the SAT Trust state that Here, Tamposi’s hope for a discretionary distribution from the EMT Trust

RSA 564-B:8-814(b).

property interest nor an enforceable right, but a mere expectancy. distribution decisions, then the beneficiary’s interest is neither a

a trust include a standard to guide the trustee in making the exercise of the trustee’s discretion, whether or not the terms of [I]f a distribution to or for the benefit of a beneficiary is subject to

of Goldman & Elliott, 151 N.H. 770, 774 (2005) (quotation omitted). depending on any contingency, but absolute, fixed and certain.” In the Matter “A perfect vested right can be no other than such as is not doubtful, or trust. See p. 6 trust distributions. Shelton owes a fiduciary duty to all beneficiaries of the This exchange does not support the proposition that Tamposi has control over

A. No, of course not.

to do whatever you want?

Q. So is it your testimony you have unfettered discretion

. . . .

such purposes from the other source.

and cash resources known to the trustee to be available for

reasonable comfort, taking into consideration the income

for their education and maintenance and health and

proportion among them, as the trustee considers necessary

the net income and principal of the trust, and in such trusts, it may be retained or distributed to the beneficiaries, in the

time, living, or any one or more of them, such amounts from proceeds from their sale. When cash is distributed to the subthe benefit of [Tamposi], and [Tamposi’s] issue, from time to A. . . . The trustee may, from time to time, pay to or for

RSA 564-B:8-810(a) (“A trustee shall keep adequate records of the the trust and distribute the trust property as a prudent person would . . . .”); interests.”); RSA 564-B:8-804 (“A trustee shall administer, invest, and manage distributing the trust property, giving due regard to the beneficiaries’ respective trustees that include income from investment assets as well as trustee shall act impartially in administering, investing, managing, and beneficiaries.”); RSA 564-B:8-803 (“If a trust has 2 or more beneficiaries, the trustee Julie Shelton: the trust and distribute the trust property solely in the interests of the Nevertheless, Goodlander makes much of the following testimony of EMT RSA 564-B:8-802 (“A trustee shall administer, invest and manage

directors. The investment directors make distributions to the

trustee to issue mandates to or superintend the investment principal and income is not a compelling argument for enabling the That the trust instrument grants the trustee authority to distribute

(Emphasis added.)

discretion of the trustee.

court, the probate court aptly noted: sub-trusts in connection with a separate action initiated by Tamposi in probate We further note that, in reviewing the language of the SAT Trust and its undisputed that she won the right, via litigation against the investment p. 7 indicate Tamposi may appoint herself as trustee. Further, while it is however, does not support this assertion. The trust instrument does not herself as trustee and to directly access the EMT Trust assets. The record, Goodlander asserts in passing that Tamposi has the right to appoint

not empowered to direct disbursement of EMT Trust funds for her benefit. beneficiaries possess a vested interest in future trust distributions. Tamposi is or to distribute funds for the benefit of the other beneficiaries, none of the trustee of the EMT Trust has the discretion to retain funds within the sub-trust Tamposi from the EMT Trust that her interest is not vested. Because the Here, it is precisely because there is no mandated financial benefit to

making distribution decisions.” Id whether or not the terms of a trust include a standard to guide the trustee in the benefit of Tamposi “is subject to the exercise of the trustee’s discretion, a “mere expectancy.” RSA 564-B:8-814(b). That is, any distribution to or for future distributions fits squarely within the definition provided by the UTC for funds to the beneficiaries, including Tamposi, any interest Tamposi has in 644-45. Because the trustee of the EMT Trust has the sole discretion to distribute interest may constitute a vested property right, subject to protection. Id. at was only under those limited circumstances that we concluded a beneficial Goodlander argues that under Tuttle v. New Hampshire Medical policyholders’ direct financial benefit.” Id. at 646 (emphasis added). Thus, it options for application of any excess surplus, both of which inure to the regulations, rather than conferring discretion, mandate one or both of two the petitioners did have such a vested right, we emphasized that “the JUA premiums collected by the JUA. Tuttle, 159 N.H. at 634. In concluding that certain administrative rules, they had a vested right in any excess surplus Association (JUA) alleged that pursuant to their contracts with the JUA and Tuttle distinguishable. In Tuttle, policyholders of the Joint Underwriting beneficial interest in the SAT Trust is equivalent to a vested right. We find Malpractice Joint Underwriting Assoc., 159 N.H. 627 (2010), Tamposi’s

enforceable right, but a mere expectancy.” Id. distributions of the EMT Trust “is neither a property interest nor an

disbursed by the investment directors. discretion to distribute to the beneficiaries, or retain in the sub-trusts, funds whatever she wants with funds from the trust, she nonetheless possesses trust.”). Thus, while the trustee does not have unfettered discretion to do reasonable steps to enforce claims of the trust and to defend claims against the administration of the trust.”); RSA 564-B:8-811 (“A trustee shall take p. 8 III. Retroactive Application of the UTC Language

EMT Trust funds. Thus, Tamposi may not simply appoint herself as trustee in order to access the

beneficiary.

punishment of offenses.” In Tuttle laws, therefore, should be made, either for the decision of civil causes, or the “[r]etrospective laws are highly injurious, oppressive, and unjust. No such Part I, Article 23 of the New Hampshire Constitution states that anyone related or subordinate to [Tamposi] or any other trustee, no beneficial interest in the trust estate, and it can’t be

[Tamposi’s descendants]. It’s got to be a so-called disinterested

September 9, 2008, is prohibited. UTC provisions to the SAT and EMT trusts, which were created before September 9, 2008. Thus, the question here is whether the application of the a successor trustee that is not [Tamposi] herself, [or] any of expectancy” language at issue, RSA 564-B:8-814(b), became effective But that trustee is restricted. [Tamposi’s] power is restricted to date.” RSA 564-B:11-1104(a)(1)-(2). The provision containing the “mere all judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced on or after its effective created before, on, or after its effective date,” and that “this chapter applies to Here, the UTC specifically states that “this chapter applies to all trusts

Tuttle, 159 N.H. at 641 (quotation omitted). As we have previously stated: transactions or considerations already past, must be deemed retrospective.” obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect to away or impairs vested rights, acquired under existing laws, or creates a new

injurious to him. See should not be applied retroactively in this case because its application is highly defines a distribution subject to a trustee’s discretion as a mere expectancy, Goodlander argues alternatively that the language of the UTC, which

and replace that trustee as well.

persuasive.

also gave her a very common power in trust documents to remove trustee and that’s where Julie [Shelton] came into the picture, and the trust, and that gave [Tamposi] the ability to appoint her own

settlement in 2006 which effectively revoked certain provisions of And then we had this dust up in the probate court followed by a

testimony of expert witness Attorney McDonald was as follows: directors, to appoint a trustee of her choice for the EMT Trust, the undisputed rule in this subsection does not apply:

p. 9 Goldman

(b) [U]nless the terms of the trust expressly indicate that a

of the repeal. then no relief can be granted on his demand after the effective date granted to him on the enforcement of a demand before such repeal, has a remedy to enforce his claim, and if final relief has not been upon which it is based is repealed, that particular person no longer

another. If, before a right becomes vested in a person, the law and purposes of the trust and the interests of the beneficiaries. enforcement of a demand, or a legal exemption from the demand of discretionary power in good faith and in accordance with the terms as “absolute,” “sole,” or “uncontrolled,” the trustee shall exercise a

become a title, legal or equitable, to the present or future an anticipation of the continuance of existing law; it must have trustee in the terms of the trust, including the use of such terms

be vested, a right must be more than a mere expectation based on (a) Notwithstanding the breadth of discretion granted to a 9

equivalent to a vested right. See lead us to conclude that Tamposi’s beneficial interest in the EMT Trust is Here, an analysis of the previous version of RSA 564-B:8-814 does not

existing law. Those rights are designated as vested rights, and to

RSA 564-B:8-814 read as follows: the words of the statute considered as a whole.” Kenison v. Dubois adoption of the “mere expectancy” language in 2008, the relevant portion of statute. “We are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in RSA 564-B:8-814 (2007). Prior to the 2008 enactment of RSA 564-B:8-814, we must look to the language of the prior In order to discern whether Goodlander had a vested right prior to the

Teachers, 158 N.H. at 456 (quotation omitted). add language that the legislature did not see fit to include.” Farmington statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or Hampstead, 157 N.H. 477, 483 (2008). “We interpret legislative intent from the plain and ordinary meaning to the words used.” Bennett v. Town of deprive a person of a property right theretofore acquired under 448, 451 (2005). “When examining the language of a statute, we ascribe the statutory or common, at its pleasure, but in so doing, it may not

substantive, vested rights. Id. at 772. application of a new law is prohibited only if it affects an individual’s

, 151 N.H. at 774 (quotation omitted). Therefore, retroactive

Constitutions, the Legislature may change existing laws, both

Unless otherwise inhibited by either the State or Federal distributions, or the right to force distributions for her own benefit. See p. 10 814(b) because the previous statute did not grant her legal title to future distributions was not vested prior to the 2008 enactment of RSA 564-B:8best interests of all the beneficiaries. Thus, Tamposi’s interest in future trust funds for the benefit of any one beneficiary, taking into account what is in the permitted the discretion to retain funds within the sub-trust or to distribute her benefit because, under the terms of the SAT Trust, the EMT trustee is above, Tamposi is not empowered to direct the funds from the EMT Trust for trustee has a fiduciary duty to all beneficiaries of the trust. However, as noted and maintenance in health and reasonable comfort,” bearing in mind that the discretion to distribute sub-trust funds to the beneficiaries for their “education the trust provide that a trustee, who is not also a beneficiary, has the terms of the trust and in the interests of the beneficiaries. Here, the terms of “uncontrolled,” nonetheless require a trustee to act in accordance with the terms for the discretionary power of a trustee, such as “absolute,” “sole,” and equivalent to a vested interest. Indeed, it merely indicates that commonly used This language gives no indication that a beneficial interest in a trust is

support that the trustee personally owes another person.

discretionary distributions to satisfy a legal obligation of

(2) a trustee may not exercise a power to make

(Supp. 2010). See based upon the UTC in contravention of the alimony provisions of RSA 458:19 Goodlander next argues that the trial court erred in determining alimony ascertainable standard; and IV. Alimony Standard 10 See the trial court did not err in retroactively applying the provisions of the UTC. substantive right to any future distributions of the EMT Trust. Accordingly, whose status is that of a non-beneficiary spouse, does not possess a vested, its application of the controlling law. right to the future distribution of funds from the EMT Trust, Goodlander, As we have determined that Tamposi, as a beneficiary, has no vested RSA 564:5-503 (b)(2). We hold that the trial court erred in

benefit may exercise the power only in accordance with an

RSA 564-B:8-814(b).

Goldman, 151 N.H. at 774.

discretionary distributions to or for the trustee’s personal

trustee of a trust that confers on the trustee a power to make

(1) A person other than a settlor who is a beneficiary and general rule. A spendthrift provision is unenforceable against:

p. 11 RSA 564-B:5-502(c). However, the UTC sets forth a limited exception to this

beneficiary. interest or a distribution by the trustee before its receipt by the [herein], a creditor or assignee of the beneficiary may not reach the

a valid spendthrift provision and, except as otherwise provided A beneficiary may not transfer an interest in a trust in violation of

general: The UTC’s provisions are applicable only to a limited, specified extent. In

consequences of the order. either party as defined in RSA 458:16-a, II(l); and the federal tax for future acquisition of capital assets and income; the fault of liabilities, and needs of each of the parties; the opportunity of each under RSA 458:16-a, vocational skills, employability, estate, occupation, amount and sources of income, the property awarded length of the marriage; the age, health, social or economic status, In determining the amount of alimony, the court shall consider the

RSA 458:19, I (Supp. 2010). RSA 458:19, IV(b) further provides:

meets reasonable needs . . . . through appropriate employment at a standard of living that

(c) The party in need is unable to be self-supporting

parties have become accustomed during the marriage; and alimony, taking into account the style of living to which the

reasonable needs while meeting those of the party seeking

(b) The party from whom alimony is sought is able to meet

the marriage; and

living to which the parties have become accustomed during

party’s reasonable needs, taking into account the style of

458:16-a [regarding property division], to provide for such both, including property apportioned in accordance with RSA

(a) The party in need lacks sufficient income, property, or

alimony . . . [if] the court finds that: make orders for the payment of alimony to the party in need of Upon motion of either party for alimony payments, the court shall

provides: RSA 458:19 sets forth the standards for an award of alimony. It containing a spendthrift provision. See p. 12 the amount of alimony that may be paid from funds of an irrevocable trust RSA 458:19 is the standard for determining alimony, while the UTC restricts this assertion and conclude that a plain reading of the statutes evinces that expressly or by implication, the provisions of RSA 458:19. We disagree with basic needs” provision, it must have concluded that it repealed, either Goodlander argues that for the trial court to have applied the UTC “most

RSA 564-B:5-504(c)(2).

spouse.

basic food, shelter, and medical needs of the spouse or former expressly specifies the alimony amount attributable to the most only for and to the extent that the judgment or court order standard or not abused the discretion and with respect to alimony,

benefit of the beneficiary had the trustee complied with the the trustee would have been required to distribute to or for the

to support himself in even a modest lifestyle, which is not what the parties equitable under the circumstances but not more than the amount of alimony was appropriate because “Mr. Goodlander has no funds with which available to him for support.” In so finding, the trial court found that an award found Goodlander was “entitled to alimony based on the current income to Tamposi. Notwithstanding the property division, however, the trial court the income-generating non-trust assets, to offset the award of the marital home Moreover, as between the parties, Goodlander was awarded fifty-one percent of since 2003 and that Tamposi has not been steadily employed since 1992. Here, it is undisputed that Goodlander has generated no steady income

the trustee to pay to the . . . former spouse such amount as is distribution or has abused a discretion . . . the court shall direct To the extent a trustee has not complied with a standard of

RSA 564-B:5-503(b)(2). The UTC further states:

standard set forth in RSA 458:19. a trust beneficiary's former spouse who has been awarded alimony under the receipt by the beneficiary. Thus, the UTC protects, but only to a limited extent, beneficiary’s interest would not be reachable by that former spouse prior to allows access to a trust’s funds to meet a former spouse’s basic needs, a trust provisions are therefore not conflicting; but for the UTC’s limited exception that

and medical needs of the spouse or former spouse . . . . the alimony amount attributable to the most basic food, shelter

the extent that such judgment or court order expressly specifies court order against the beneficiary for alimony but only for and to

a beneficiary’s spouse or former spouse who has a judgment or p. 13 In Lawlor V. Division of Assets Outside the Trusts 13

course of the marriage. Hampers, 154 N.H. at 278. In dividing the parties’ makes a distribution to the beneficiary. See trust worth an estimated 15 million dollars, which he created during the this argument, Goodlander cites Lawlor & Lawlor Tamposi has in the EMT Trust that cannot be assigned to him. In support of distribution to meet his or her most basic needs regardless of whether a trustee expectancy. Similarly, in Hampers, the husband had power over a revocable the provisions of the UTC, a former spouse is entitled to seek a trust interest in any future distributions from the EMT Trust is only a mere assets and awarded him all of the parties’ non-trust assets to offset the interest contingent on Tamposi’s receipt of trust distributions. This was error. Under parties’ marital assets. Lawlor account Tamposi’s interest in the EMT Trust when dividing the non-trust, 123 N.H. at 165-66. As noted above, Tamposi’s only as to his “most basic needs,” and then made payment of that amount Goodlander further argues that the trial court should have taken into deceased parent’s will was properly considered by the trial court in dividing the findings as to Goodlander’s reasonable needs, the trial court made findings, the husband’s vested, though undistributed, legacy under a 458:19, as well as Tamposi’s ability to meet those needs. Rather than making conduct the requisite analysis of Goodlander’s “reasonable needs” under RSA both Lawlor and Hampers distinguishable. attributable to Goodlander’s most basic needs, it erred in failing to first properly considered by the trial court in dividing the marital property. We find While the trial court expressly specified the amount of alimony it found that assets outside of the marital property that are held by one party are the Matter of Hampers & Hampers, 154 N.H. 275 (2006), for the proposition

opinion. remand to the trial court to determine an award of alimony consistent with this B:5-504(c)(2). Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s alimony order and Trust trustee shall pay to him directly.” RSA 564-B:5-503(b)(2); RSA 564receives from the EMT Trusts up to $50,000 per calendar year, which the EMT needs’ . . . . Ms. Tamposi shall pay him fifty percent of any distribution she Goodlander is awarded $50,000 per year in alimony to meet his ‘most basic meet his “most basic needs.” Specifically, the trial court determined, “Mr. upon Tamposi receiving distributions from the EMT Trust, and then only to Nevertheless, the trial court awarded Goodlander alimony contingent

distributions from the EMT Trusts.” enjoyed during the marriage,” while Tamposi “has benefited from some p. 14 VI. Red Sox Sale Proceeds

proceeds allocated to the EMT Trust were earmarked for attorney’s fees. the sale of the Boston Red Sox shares, and at least twenty-five percent of the Trust. Trustee Julie Shelton initiated litigation on behalf of the trust to force undisputed testimony at trial was that these proceeds are an asset of the EMT which the trial court enjoined until issuance of the final decree. The unsustainably exercised its discretion in dividing the marital assets. uneven split.” On the record before us, we do not find that the trial court proceeds amounted to approximately 1.6 million dollars, the distribution of Court does not conclude the source of [the non-trust] assets warrants an shares held by the trust in the Boston Red Sox. The EMT Trust’s portion of the trial court specifically stated that “considered in context of all the evidence, the In January 2008 the investment directors of the SAT Trust sold certain Whether the assets owned by Tamposi were gifts, inherited or earned, the

its interest in the Boston Red Sox. We disagree. by gift from Ms. Tamposi’s father.” We find no error. take into account Tamposi’s share of the proceeds from the SAT Trust’s sale of only a 51/49% formula because [the trial court] thought the bulk of them came Goodlander further argues that the trial court erred in failing to properly Goodlander asserts the trial judge erred in dividing the non-trust assets “in Tamposi’s non-trust assets were neither given to her nor inherited. Thus, from her father.” He notes that several witnesses testified that a number of non-trust assets were acquired by Tamposi “primarily by gift or inheritance We note that Goodlander challenges the trial court’s finding that the

See accounts . . . [,] an essentially equal division [of the marital property] is fair.” remaining debts related to the funds taken from the children’s custodial future distributions from the EMT Trust, and concluded that “but for the Here, the trial court properly refused to take into account potential

the trial court’s decision absent an unsustainable exercise of discretion.” Id parties’ assets. property distribution in fashioning a final divorce decree, we will not overturn the trial court erred in declining to award Goodlander the entirety of the “As we afford trial courts broad discretion in determining matters of RSA 564-B:8-814(b). Given all the circumstances, we do not conclude that

presented, they will stand.” Id. (quotation omitted). 285. “If the court’s findings can reasonably be made on the evidence

in the trust, which was plainly more than a mere expectancy. Id. at 285-86. marital assets, the trial court properly took into account the husband’s interest been prevented from intervening because they had an alternative, adequate p. 15 Finally, to the extent Goodlander argues that the children should have

unsustainably exercise its discretion in allowing the children’s intervention. dispute. Under all the circumstances, we conclude the trial court did not children’s discovery requests were minimal and directly related to the issues in children’s limited intervention in the case. The record reflects that the We are also unconvinced that Goodlander was financially harmed by the

Stapleford prevented from intervening in the first instance based upon our holding in on the first day of trial, Goodlander argues that they should have been 15 Although the children were permitted to withdraw from the proceeding

not indeed be sacrificed were the court to deny the privilege.” In the Matter of the trial and his interest must be direct and apparent; such as would suffer if to any parenting issues. “A person who seeks to intervene in a case must have a right involved in protecting their direct financial interests, and not to interject their opinions as proceedings. Moreover, the Goodlander children intervened for the purpose of and the third reached the age of majority during the pendency of the however, two of the children were adults when the divorce action was initiated minors do not enjoy the same legal rights as do adults. Id. at 263. Here, concluded that the minor children were not entitled to intervene because VII. Children As Intervenors intervene in order to participate in the parenting plan. Id. at 262. We

. In Stapleford, the divorcing parties’ minor children attempted to

debt owed to them by Goodlander. intervened to ensure that the court would take into account the significant children to intervene in the parties’ divorce. We find no error. would directly affect their financial interests. Additionally, the children Finally, Goodlander argues that the trial court erred by allowing the children are also beneficiaries of the EMT Trust, any such award to Goodlander to an award of some portion of trust funds distributed to Tamposi. As the interests in the EMT Trust in light of Goodlander’s assertions that he is entitled the parties’ children originally intervened for the purpose of protecting their Stapleford & Stapleford, 156 N.H. 260, 263 (2007) (quotation omitted). Here,

proceeds in its distribution of the marital assets. Tamposi. Accordingly, the trial court properly excluded the Red Sox sale trial court did not err in declining to impute assets of the EMT Trust to Because Tamposi has no right to force distributions from the EMT Trust, the from the EMT Trust constitutes a mere expectancy. See RSA 564-B:8-814(b). As discussed above, the beneficiaries’ interests in future distributions p. 16 16

RSA 490:3, concurred. DUGGAN, J., concurred; HORTON, J., retired, specially assigned under

on appeal that were not presented in the lower court.” (quotation omitted)). (2006) (“This court has consistently held that we will not consider issues raised decline to address it. See LaMontagne Builders v. Brooks, 154 N.H. 252, 258 remedy at law, this argument was not properly preserved and we therefore