2012-392, State of New Hampshire v. Bradford Dalton

The defendant, Bradford Dalton, was convicted of driving

and orally, for the defendant. Thomas Barnard, assistant appellate defender, of Concord, on the brief

attorney general, on the brief and orally), for the State.

to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address:

editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New

well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as clearly erroneous, and we review its legal conclusions de novo. State v. p. 2 the trial court’s factual findings unless they lack support in the record or are When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we accept

initial justification for the stop. registration, and garage inspection report were all reasonably related to the sticker. The State counters that the officer’s request for the driver’s license,

motor vehicle stop after realizing that the vehicle displayed an inspection

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution by continuing the

Part I, Article 19 of the New Hampshire Constitution and the Fourth and On appeal, the defendant argues that the officer violated his rights under

court found the defendant guilty. This appeal followed.

apparent from the sticker.” Based upon the State’s offer of proof, the trial problem because the commencement date of the 60 day period is not readily [the defendant] was still within the 60 day window to repair the emissions

“permitted to request the inspection station’s paperwork to determine whether unreasonable seizures. N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 19. “A warrantless seizure is

stop. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the officer was Part I, Article 19 of the State Constitution protects citizens from Before trial, the defendant moved to suppress evidence derived from the

third offense.

person has sixty days within which to correct the emissions problem. See id. When an individual is issued a transparent inspection sticker, that

124 N.H. 226, 231-33 (1983). Constitution and rely on federal law only to aid in our analysis. State v. Ball, coming from the vehicle. The defendant was subsequently charged with DUI – Schultz, 164 N.H. 217, 221 (2012). We first address the issues under the State

indicating that it was issued in May.

emissions system portion. See RSA 266:59-b, V (Supp. 2012). Such with the defendant, the officer smelled a moderate odor of an alcoholic beverage for his license, registration, and the inspection paperwork. While speaking sticker was issued and, therefore, whether it was valid, he asked the defendant

inspection took place, but do not denote the year. The sticker had a number 5,

had passed the safety portion of the mandatory inspection, but had failed the

Because the officer could not determine the year in which the inspection See RSA 266:1, II (Supp. 2012). Consequently, the officer activated his blue have a New Hampshire Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) inspection sticker.

inspection stickers contain a number indicating the month in which the

displayed a transparent DMV temporary inspection sticker, indicating that it making contact with the defendant, the officer noticed that the vehicle lights and stopped the vehicle, which was being driven by the defendant. Upon the transparent inspection sticker. We find these cases to be inapposite. For

requirements are being observed.” Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 658

assertion that the officer was not permitted to inquire further once he observed

justification for the stop,” it was not improper. Id.

operating a vehicle that may be involved in illegal activity.” State v. Glaude, fundamental nature of the stop.” State v. McKinnon-Andrews, 151 N.H. 19, 25

operation, and hence that licensing, registration, and vehicle inspection stopped the defendant to determine whether the vehicle displayed a valid are permitted to operate motor vehicles, that these vehicles are fit for safe “States have a vital interest in ensuring that only those qualified to do so The defendant cites several cases from other jurisdictions to support his

registration, and inspection paperwork was “reasonably related to the initial 1 p. 3 31 N.H. 218, 222 (1988).

defendant and informing him that he was free to leave. See, e.g., United States name and vehicle registration when first addressing a driver stopped for officer could take no further action beyond explaining the mistake to the which a detained motorist would not reasonably perceive as altering the every police officer employs more routinely than that of requesting the driver’s inspection sticker, reasonable suspicion was dispelled and, therefore, the (1979). “There are few, if any, standard operating procedures which nearly

to determine merely whether the vehicle displayed an inspection sticker; he stop. Here, as the trial court concluded, the officer did not stop the defendant We disagree with the defendant’s characterization of the scope of the State v. Bell, 164 N.H. 452, 454 (2012) (quotation omitted). Moreover, “[a]n person stopped has been, is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity.” (2004) (quotation omitted). Since his request for the defendant’s license,

inspection sticker, he was permitted to “engag[e] in facially innocuous dialog inspection sticker. Rather, he asserts that upon observing the transparent officer could not determine whether the transparent sticker was a valid inspection sticker, as required by statute. See RSA 266:1, II. Because the

v. Jenkins, 452 F. p. 3 3d 207, 213 (2d Cir. 2006). taken together with rational inferences from those facts – that the particular

upon the officer’s mistaken perception that the vehicle did not display an The defendant does not challenge the propriety of the initial stop based per se unreasonable unless it falls within a recognized exception to the warrant

to effectuate its purpose.” State v. Smith, 154 N.H. 11 p. 3 3, 116 (2006). investigatory stop must be narrowly tailored and last no longer than necessary

officer must have a reasonable suspicion – based on specific, articulable facts (1968). “[I]n order for a police officer to undertake an investigatory stop, the issue here is that for investigatory stops. See Terry v. Ohio, p. 3 392 U.S. 1, 21 requirement.” State v. Licks, 154 N.H. 491, 492-93 (2006). The exception at did not see any inspection sticker. Thus, we need not decide today whether the

p. 4 Affirmed.

transparent inspection sticker; the officer stopped the defendant because he

disagree. Here, the officer did not stop the defendant because he saw a sticker, could be pulled over at any time during that 60-day period.” We diagnostic emissions portion, and who is thus issued a clear, 60-day inspection

credentials of the driver and the vehicle, and then issuing a citation or a vehicle to stop, explaining to the driver the reason for the stop, verifying the Constitution.

The Federal Constitution provides no greater protection than the State

HICKS, CONBOY, LYNN and BASSETT, JJ., concurred.

vehicle passes the safety portion of the inspection but fails the on-board

“The bare essentials of a ‘routine traffic stop’ consist of causing the same result under the Federal Constitution as we do under the State

and was not an unconstitutional continuation of the motor vehicle stop. the defendant’s license, registration, and inspection paperwork was “routine” occurred here. We, therefore, conclude that the officer’s conduct in requesting Amendment § 9.3(c), at 507 (5th ed. 2012) (emphasis added). Nothing more warning.” 4 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure, A Treatise on the Fourth The defendant argues that if we affirm this case, then “any person whose

police may stop any vehicle displaying a transparent inspection sticker.

temporary tag. Diaz, 850 So. 2d at 436. Upon approaching the car, the officer

questioning of the driver was unlawful. Id. at 561-62 (quotation omitted).

and had not expired. Id. Because the officer no longer had an “objectively satisfied merely by his observation of the transparent inspection sticker. for the stop, to check whether the vehicle was properly inspected, was not information was improper. Id. at 438-39. Here, however, the officer’s purpose the stop was satisfied and the continued detention of the driver and request for Id. at 437. Once the officer determined the validity of the tag, the purpose for example, in United States v. McSwain, 29 F.3d 558 (10th Cir. 1994), an officer was able to read the date and was satisfied that the temporary tag was valid.

defendant because he was unable to read the expiration date on the vehicle’s Similarly, in State v. Diaz, 850 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 2003), an officer stopped the

reasonable articulable suspicion” that a traffic violation had occurred, his

Before reaching the vehicle, however, the officer saw that the sticker was valid sticker appeared to be covered with reflective tape. McSwain, 29 F.3d at 560. stopped a vehicle because the expiration date on the temporary registration