2012-402, In re Cody C.

The juvenile, Cody C., appeals a decision of the 6th Circuit

brief, for the juvenile. Christopher M. Johnson, chief appellate defender, of Concord, on the to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address: general, on the brief), for the State.

editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New

well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as otherwise covered by RSA 169-B:4, III. Because his case does not involve an

p. 2 paragraph III” in paragraph V limits paragraph V’s application to cases The juvenile argues that the legislature’s use of “[n]otwithstanding

after the minor had attained the age of 16 years.”

to 2 years following the completion of any appeal if the petition was filed State, “the court may retain jurisdiction over the minor for a period of up RSA 169-B:4, III provides, in pertinent part, that, at the request of the

retain jurisdiction under this subparagraph . . . .

has filed a motion with the court requesting that the court minor’s seventeenth birthday and for whom the department (c) Who is subject to the jurisdiction of the court prior to the

offenses; or

adjudicatory hearings which alleged misdemeanor or felony occasions and adjudicated delinquent in 4 separate (b) Who has been petitioned to the court on 4 or more

(a) Who has been found to have committed a violent crime as

court may retain jurisdiction over any minor:

We review the trial court’s statutory interpretation de novo. In re Kirsten

of treatment services is necessary to rehabilitate the minor, the court finds that there is a high probability that continued provision safety of the minor, any other person, or the community, or the

to include. Id.

and convincing evidence that closing the case would endanger the

cases otherwise covered by RSA 169-B:4, III.” We disagree. contends that the plain language of paragraph V “renders it applicable only in RSA 169-B:4, V to retain jurisdiction until his eighteenth birthday. He legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit

considered as a whole. Id. When examining the language of the statute, we

Notwithstanding paragraph III, when the court finds by clear

RSA 169-B:4, V provides, in pertinent part:

On appeal, the juvenile argues that the trial court erred in relying upon legislative intent from the statute as written and will not consider what the ascribe the plain and ordinary meaning to the words used. Id. We interpret

final arbiters of the legislature’s intent as expressed in the words of the statute P., 158 N.H. 158, 160 (2008). In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the physical development of each minor coming within the provisions of this

p. 3 would not serve “[t]o encourage the wholesome moral, mental, emotional, and

and rehabilitation.” RSA 169-B:1, II (2002). Moreover, such an interpretation who has committed delinquent acts with counseling, supervision, treatment and appreciate the personal consequences of such acts, and provide a minor

delinquent acts committed by the minor, encourage the minor to understand

paragraph IV. See id. at 752-53.

interest,” to “promote the minor’s acceptance of personal responsibility for not by paragraph V. Id. at 752. In dicta, we stated that the “application” of chapter 169-B, which is, “[c]onsistent with the protection of the public B:4, V (a), (b). Such an interpretation would contravene the purpose of RSA

over her. In re Juvenile 2003-248, 150 N.H. at 751. We held that “if a court most at-risk minors, i.e., those minors who have been found to have committed would severely limit the ability of trial courts to retain jurisdiction over the Were we to interpret RSA 169-B:4, V as suggested by the juvenile, we

The juvenile argues that in In re Juvenile 2003-248, 150 N.H. 751 reviewing it only in the narrow context of a case that was governed by

“Notwithstanding” means, in relevant part, “in spite of.” Webster’s Third

paragraph II, closure of the case is controlled exclusively by paragraph IV” and statute); State v. Payne, 115 N.H. 595, 596, 598 (1975) (holding that penalty violent crimes or who have been repeatedly adjudicated delinquent, RSA 169-

under paragraph IV to revoke her consent to the court’s continued jurisdiction other statutes. See King v. Sununu, 126 N.H. 302, 306-07 (1985) (holding that

We were not construing paragraph V for all purposes, but rather were paragraph V is limited to circumstances involving paragraph III. Id. at 753.

jurisdiction under paragraph III is unavailable. retains jurisdiction over a case pursuant to a juvenile’s consent under clause ensures the applicability of paragraph V, even when extended expressed legislature’s intent that statute “take precedence” over a conflicting

over a juvenile under paragraph V after the juvenile had exercised her rights interpretation is consistent with how we have interpreted “notwithstanding” in issue in that case was whether the trial court properly retained jurisdiction (2004), we adopted his interpretation of paragraph V. He is mistaken. The

LXII (quotation omitted)). of Title LXII” prevented the fines provided for therein from being limited by Title provision of reckless operation statute stating “notwithstanding the provisions

paragraph V does not apply. The State counters that the “notwithstanding” “notwithstanding” in statute dealing with distribution of sweepstakes revenue appeal and is not covered by RSA 169-B:4, III, the juvenile concludes that

paragraph V apply regardless of whether paragraph III is also applicable. This the word “notwithstanding” in RSA 169-B: p. 4 4, V, the legislature intended that New International Dictionary 1545 (unabridged ed. 2002). Thus, by utilizing 4

as a guide for interpreting criminal statutes where the legislature failed to

statute in his favor. We have previously noted that “[t]he rule of lenity serves

ambiguous. See id. at 239- p. 4 40. here because the “notwithstanding” clause in RSA 169-B:4, V is not

Affirmed. The juvenile argues that the rule of lenity requires us to construe the of jurisdiction over the juvenile until his eighteenth birthday. (2002). We, therefore, reject the juvenile’s argument.

that RSA 169-B: p. 4 4, V is a criminal statute, the rule of lenity would not apply

DALIANIS, C.J., and HICKS, CONBOY and LYNN, JJ., concurred.

Therefore, for all the above reasons, we uphold the trial court’s retention and rehabilitative resources which such minor needs . . . .” RSA 169-B:1, I chapter, by providing the protection, care, treatment, counselling, supervision,

(quotation and brackets omitted) (emphasis added). Even if we were to assume articulate its intent unambiguously.” In re Alex C., 161 N.H. 231, 239 (2010)