2012-353, State of New Hampshire v. Allen R. Mercier

Ross approached a toll plaza in his police vehicle and observed a pickup truck, defendant’s motion to suppress. On February 7, 2011, State Trooper Brian The following facts are drawn from the trial court’s order denying the

defendant violated probation. We reverse and remand. (Supp. 2012). Based upon the evidence, the court also found that the 265:4 (2004), and driving while certified as a habitual offender, RSA 262:23 to his convictions in a jury - waived trial for disobeying a p olice officer, RSA Superior Court (Wageling, J.) denying his motion to suppress evidence that led HICKS, J. The defendant, Allen R. Mercier, appeals a decision of the

James P. Loring, of Portsmouth, on the brief, for the defendant.

memorandum of law), for the State. Michael A. Delaney, attorney general (Lisa L. Wolford, attorney, on the

No. 2012 - 353 Strafford

page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh. us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 to press. Errors may be reported by E - mail at the following address: editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concor d, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule p. 2 22 as 2

as a whole. Id. We first look to the language of the statute itself, and, if of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered 497, 499 ( p. 2 2012). In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter which is a question of law that we review de novo. State v. DiMaggio, 163 N.H. Resolving this issue requires that we engage in statutory interpretation,

glass is cra cked or broken. injury to persons by objects from external sources or by glass when the comparison with ordinary sheet glass or plate glass, the likelihood of glass so treated or combined with other materials as to reduce, in

“Safety glass” is defined in RSA p. 2 259:94 (2004) as:

is used in partitions, doors, windows, or windshields. January 1, 1936, unless it be equipped with safety glass wherever glass vehicle which shall have been manufactured or assembled on or after It shall be unlawful to. . . drive on any way in this state any motor

of RSA p. 2 266:58 (2004), which provides, in pertinent part: The State argues that the police had reasonable suspicion of a violation

suspicion existed. Id. at __, 58 A.3d at 668. the ultimate determination of whether, in view of those findings, reason able fact unless those findings are clearly erroneous. W e review de novo, however, court’ s ruling that the police conduct was justified, we defer to its findings of to support an arrest or citation. Id. at __, 58 A.3d at 668. I n reviewing the trial ( p. 2 2012). Reasonable suspicion may be less than the probable cause necessary engaged in criminal activity. State v. Bell, 164 N.H. __, __, 58 A.3d 665, 668 facts – that the particular person stop ped has been, is, or is about to be, specific, articulable facts taken together with ratio nal inferences from those investigatory stop, the officer must have a reasonable suspicion – based up on It is well settled that, i n order for a police officer to undertake an

federal l aw only to aid in our analysis, i d. at p. 2 233. State C onstitution, State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 22 6, 231 - 32 (1983), and rely up on its federal counterpart. We first address the d efendant’s arguments under the under Part I, A rticle 19 of the State Constitution a nd the Fourth A mendment of The defendant argues that his seizure violated h is constitutional rights

leading to the defendant’s arrest for the offenses cited above. Based up on his observations of the window, Ross pulled the vehicle over, into small pieces and had been covered with duct tape in the shape of an “X”. window was divided in to three panels. The right side panel was fragmented submitted during the hearing on the motion to suppress showed that the rear driven by the defendant, with a partially shattered rear win dow. Photographs p. 3 3

that the glass panel at issue was not “so treated or combined with other no longer safety glass, and t here is no reason evident in the record to believe panel of safety glass is cracked or otherwise damaged do es not mean that it is glass used in vehicles rather than its condition once installed. The fact that a glass” suggest that the legislature was concerned with the composition of the treated or combined with other materi als” and “ordinary sheet glass or plate 259:94; see Laws 19 p. 3 35, 72:1. The statute’s specific reference s to “glass so from external sources or by glass when the glass is cracked or broken.” RSA words of section 94 itself, “reduce . . . the likelihood of injury . . . by objects used” in automobiles, RSA 266:58, a requirement enacted in 1935 to, in the those two provisions require only the presence of safet y glass “wherever glass is impossib le to see through the window,” as the trial court concluded. Rather, operation of vehicles equipped with a rear windshield “damaged so badly it is 259:94, read together with RSA 266:58, does not by its plain terms prohibit the Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 768 (unabridged ed. 2002). RSA means simply that the vehicle must have been “suppl[ied]” with sa fety glass. with safety glass as defined by RSA 259:94. To be “equipped” in this context We agree with the defendant, however, that his vehicle was equipped

glass or external objects. serve its function of reducing the likelihood of injury from brok en or shattered meaning that a vehicle is not equipped with safety glass unless the glass can of the word [“equip”] assumes not merely a presence, but a usefulness,” RSA 266:58.” Similarly, t he State c ontends that “[t]he common understanding truck “was not equipped in a way that complies with the meaning and intent of ensure the safety of passengers and bystanders,” and that the defendant’s was impos sible.” The trial court concluded that RSA 266:58 “was intended to “severely fragmented into small pieces . . . that visibility through that window truck was not “equipped with safety glass” because the rear window was so vehicle. T he State argues, and the trial court agreed, that the defendant’s then there would have been no reasonable suspicion to stop t he defendant’s operation of a vehicle with glass partially shattered and covered with duct tape, truck in violation of that statute. Thus, if RSA 266:58 does not prohibit the We, therefore, expres s no opinion as to whether the defendant operated his view” of a roadway unless certain conditions are met, see RSA 265:95, III(b). material” affixed to “rear windows . . . which shall obstruct the driver’s clear violation of RSA 265:95, III (Supp. 2012), which prohibits “nontran sparent The State does not argue that the police had reasonable suspicion of a

at 500. statute in the context of the overall statutory scheme and not in isolation. Id. legislat ure did not see fit to include. Id. at p. 4 499 - 500. Moreover, we interpret a consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the Id. We interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and will not possible, construe that langu age according to its plain and ordinary meaning. 4

DALIANIS, C.J.