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2011-801, State of New Hampshire v. Daniel Matton
relevant to their credibility. We affirm. instruction that the prior convictions of several of the State’s witnesses were mutual combat instruction on the c lass B felony charge; and (2) a “special” jury argues that the T rial C ourt (Wageling, J.) erred when it refused to give: (1) a prisoner as a c lass B felony. See RSA 642:9, IV (Supp. 2012). On appeal, h e guilty on two charges: assault by a prisoner as a c lass A felony and assault by a CONBOY, J. After a jury trial, t he defendant, Daniel Matton, was found
brief and orally, for the defendant. David M. Rothstein, deputy chief appellate defender, of Concord, on the
attorney general, on the brief and orally), for the State. Michael A. Delaney, attorney general (Stephen G. LaBonte, assistant
Opinion Issued: May 14, 2013 Argued: November 28, 2012
DANIEL MATTON
v.
THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
No. 2011 - 801 Strafford
___________________________
THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh. us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 to press. Errors may be reported by E - mail at the following address: editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concor d, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as 2
is a class B felony if it is “simple assault as defined under RSA 631: 2 - a unless [it assault as defined under RSA 63 1:1 or RSA 631:2.” RSA 642:9, IV. The offense State prove s that the defendant committed a “first degree or second degree defendant’s status as a prisoner, the offense is classified as a c lass A felony if the victim; the second alleged that he caus ed bodily injury to the victim. Given the 642:9, IV. The first charge alleged that he caus ed serious bodily injury to the the record reflects that the State indicted the defendant on two charges. See RSA instructi on. Although we have not been provided with a copy of the indictments, The defendant first argues that he was entitled to a mutual combat
issues of law in the case. Id. element of the offense and reverse only if the instructions did not fairly cover the determine wheth er the instructions adequately and accurately explain ed each would have understood them and in light of all the evidence in the case. Id. We interpreting the disputed instructions in their entirety, as a reasonable juror t o the case. Id. When reviewing a charge, we evaluate allegations of error by explain to the jury, in clear and intelligible language, the rules of law applicable Davidson, 163 N.H. 46 2, 472 (2012). The purpose of the trial court’s charge is to decision on these issues to determine whether it is sustainable. State v. an instruction, is within the sound discretion of the trial court; we review its Whether to give a requested jury instruction, and the scope and wording of
followed. credibility. The jury found the defendant guilty on both charges and this appeal convictions of the inmate witnesses could be considere d to assess their instruction; and ( 2) an instruction that advised the jury that the prior felony The trial court denied defense counsel’s request s for: (1) a mutual combat jury inmates at the Strafford County House of Corrections at the time of the assault. felony. Three of the witnesses who testified at trial for the State had been as a class A felony, and one count of assault by a prisoner, charged as a class B The defendant was indicted on one count of assault by a prisoner, charged
the brain. bleeding within the temporal horns of the brain and within the left frontal area of fractured jaw, a right temporal bone fracture, bilateral subdural hematomas and the Wentworth - Dou glas s Hospital, where he was diagnosed as suffering from a head against a steel table as he fell. Horrigan was subsequently transported to became louder. Matton punched Horrigan in the jaw. Horrigan fell, and hit his H orrigan and Matton argued as they proceeded back to the ir cell. T he argument approached Horrigan and accused him of damaging his personal property. was playing cards with two other inmates, Cullen and Chase, when Matton of Corrections. His cell mate was Michael Horrigan. On May 31, 2009, Horrigan giving rise to the charges, Matton was incarcerat ed at the Strafford County House The jury could have found the following facts. At the time of the incident 3
failed to establish an unsustainable exercise of the court’s discretion. See id. instruction on the class B felony charge prejudiced his case, and therefore he has defendant has failed to establish that the trial court’s denial of a mutual combat the trial court’s remarks at the sentencing hearing, we conclude that the offenses as alternative charges. Having reviewed the record before us, including restrict me from doing that.” Thus, the trial court apparently viewed the charged double jeopardy provisions either federally or through the state’s analysis would will not sentence him separately on each of these offenses. I believe that the same one hit and both parties agree to that, I feel that in terms of sentencing, I subsumed into the Class A felony. . . . [S] ince both injuries were the result of the charges ends up being subsumed into the other, that is the Class B felony discussion with counsel, indicated that it was my sense. . . th at one of these that the trial court stated at the sentencing hearing: “I, after some brief acquitted, he might receive a lesser sentence on his c lass A conviction. We note error, he would be entitled to a retrial on the c lass B felony charge because if have considered and rejected the defendant’s argument that if we were to find or unreasonable to the prejudice of his case). In reaching this conclusion, we sustainable, defendant must demonstrate that the ruling was clearly untenable Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296 (2001) (to establish that trial court ruling is not and the defendant did not receive a sentence for that offense. See State v. felony. A mutual combat instruction is relevant only to the c lass B felony charge the instruction. The trial court s entenced the defendant on only the c lass A that he has failed to establish that he was prejudiced by the court’s failure to give support a mutual combat instruction o n the c lass B felony charge, we conclude Even if we assume that the defendant presented sufficient evidence to
and forth with him.” defendant; (4) “stood within an [arm’s] length of him”; and (5) “argued loudly back agreed to follow the defendant back to an area near their cell; ( 3) faced the derogatory comment about the defendant’s girlfriend in front of other inmates; (2) entered into by mutual consent. He cites evidence that the victim: (1) made a The defendant argues that he presented sufficient evidence of a fight
the denial of a requested jury instruction. Id. instruction. Id. Absent an unsustainable exercise of discretion, we will affirm the defendant’s assertion that the evidence supports his requested jury more than a minutia or scintilla of evidence. Id. We review the record in light of of that defense. State v. S oto, 162 N.H. 708, 71 3 (2011). “Some evidence” means instruction only if there was some evidence to support a rational finding in favor The defendant was enti tled to the requested mutual combat jury
misdemeanor.” Id. is] committed in a fight entered into by mutual consent, in which case it is a 4
testimony to believe, you should consider both the direct and the In deciding which witnesses to believe and how much of their or animosity towards other people in the c ase. witness ’ s prior statement; whether the witness had any friendship or inconsistent with the other evidence in this case, or with that or probable; whether what the witness said seemed unreasonable telling the truth; whether what the witness said seemed reasonable outcome of the case; whether the witness has any reason for not while testifying; whether the witness has an interest in the worthy of belief; the appearance and the demeanor of the witness witness appeared to be candid; whether the witness appeared I suggest you consider a number of factors: Whether the believe, you should use your common sense and judgment. have to accept the testimony as true. In deciding which witness to witness has taken an oath to tell the truth does not mean that you resolve the conflict and decide what the truth is. Simply because a If there ’ s any conflict between the witnesses, then you must believe. credibility of the witnesses; that is, it ’ s up to you to decide whom to the Defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, you must consider the In deciding whether the State has proven the charge against
the following general credibility instruction s at the beginning of the trial. prior conv ictions to ass ess the credibility of the State’s wit n esses, the court gave Although the trial court did not give an instruc tion specific to the use of
would understand how to evaluate th e witness conviction evidence. in its final charge required the requested specific instruction so that the jury c ontends that the court’s failure to give a general witness credibility instr uction could consider the witnesses’ prior convictions to assess the ir credibility. He however, that the trial court erred in failing to specifically instruct the jury that it convictions pursuant to New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 609 (a). He argues, The defendant concedes that the witnesses were impeached with the ir
Lewis also testified about their prior convictions. treatment on the pending charges in exchange for his testimony. Chase and investigation in this case. He also admitted that he had asked for favorable pending against him for burglary and drug possession at the time of the and Lewis. Cullen testified about a prior conviction and that there were charges At trial, t he State presented testimony from three inmates, Cullen, Chase,
in s truc tions in their entirety. See Davidson, 163 N.H. at 472. relevant to their credibility.” In considering this claim of error, w e review the a special jury instruction that [the inmate] witnesses’ prior convictions were The defendant also argues that the trial court erred “when it refused to give 5
witness’s credibility. Compare State v. Hebert, 1 58 N.H. 306, 313 (2009) of a witness, other than the defendant, may be considered in assessing that would require that a trial court instruct a jury that evidence of the convictions Consistent with our established practice, we decline to adopt a rule that
should be given. Id. judge is in the b est posi tion t o determine whether a particular instruction v. Knight, 161 N.H. 338, 343 (2011). As we have long recognized, t he trial rule requiring that specific instructions be given when informants testify. State We have previously expressed our reluctance to establish a categorical
prejudice against the Defendant. informant ’ s own self - interest in the outcome of the case or by agreement the informant has struck with the State or by the whether the testimony of an informant has been affected by the any weight it should be given. In particular, you must consider scrutinized by you with great care and caution in decidin g what if However, it is also true that the testimony of an informant must be establishes the Defendant ’ s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. enough for itself -- in itself for a conviction if you find that it jurors feel it deserves. The testimony of an informant may b e evidence, considered by you and given such weight as you the witnesses. The testimony of such a person may be received in Under the law, the State has the right to use informants as difficulties with law than would otherwise be the case. informant with a more favorable disposition of the informant ’ s own or drop charges against the informant or otherwise provide the some consideration, such as an agreement by the State to reduce provides information or evidence against someone else in return for heard the testimony of an informant. An informant is someone who more caution than the testimony of other witnesses. You have The testimony of some witnesses must be considered with
instruction s. It did, however, give t he following instruction s: At the close of trial, t he trial court did not repeat th ese general
It’s entirely up to you. to say; or you can accept some of it and you can reject some of it. what a witness has t o say; you can reject all of what a witness has and give it the weight you think it deserves. You can accept all of In short, you should consider the testimony of each witness ordinary citizens or police officers. credibility of all witnesses, whether or not they happen to be the witness. You should consider these factors in decidi ng the circumstantial – I ’ m sorry, the direct and the cross - examination of 6
DALIANIS, C.J.
, and HICKS, LYNN and BASSETT, JJ., concurred.
Affirmed.
in its final charge does not warrant reversal. conclude that the trial court’s failure to include witness credibility instructions preliminary instructions, which included instructions on witness credibility, we trial court in this case, however, provided the jury with written copies of its including witness credibility instructions, in its final oral charge. Bec ause the instructions, it should provide the jury with all necessary instructions, jury instructions on witness credibility, along with other preliminary Finally, w e caution that although a trial court may provide preliminary
defendant. give such a limiting instruction, it is not required when the witness is not the prior convictions were relevant to their credibility. Although a trial court may not err when it declined to give a spec ifi c jury instruction that the witnesses’ entirety the instructions given by the trial court, we conclude that the court did witness.” Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 31 6 (1974). Having reviewed in their evidence of a prior crime is thus a general attack on the credibility of the trustworthy citizen to be truthful in his testimony. The introduction of the witness ’ character is such that he would be less likely than the average B y so doing the cross - examiner intends to afford the jury a basis to infer that witness is to introduce evidence of a prior criminal conviction of that witness. the United States Supreme Court has observed, “One way of discrediting the conceive of another purpose for which the convictions might be admitted. As waives his right to such instruction on the record). Indeed, it is difficult to impeachment purposes pursuant to Rule 609(a) unless defendant expressly court must give limiting instruction when it admits such evidence for (because evidence of prior conviction is inherently prejudicial to defendant, trial