2012-252, Appeal of City of Nashua

Law Offices of Sylvia F. Brewster, PLLC, of Portsmouth (Sylvia F.

an elderly exemption for tax year 2011. The application listed total assets, not Opinion Issued: April 12, 2013 record. On April 11, 2011, the taxpayer filed an application with the City for Submitted: January 16, 2013

(New Hampshire Board of Tax and Land Appeals)

No. 2012-252 Board of Tax and Land Appeals

The following facts were found by the BTLA or are supported in the

72:39-a (2012) for the tax year 2011. We reverse. Marijane Kennedy (taxpayer), is entitled to an “elderly exemption” under RSA

page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 Hampshire Board of Tax and Land Appeals (BTLA) ruling that the taxpayer, HICKS, J. The City of Nashua (City) appeals a decision of the New

Local Government Center, as amicus curiae. Carynne Christine Fillmore, of Concord, by brief, for the New Hampshire

brief), for the City of Nashua. Office of Corporation Counsel, of Nashua (Stephen M. Bennett on the

to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address: Brewster on the brief), for the taxpayer.

editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New

well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as p. 2 “Our standard for review of BTLA decisions is statutory.” Appeal of

. . .

Pennelli v. Town of Pelham, 148 N.H. 365, 366 (2002) (quotations and citations

The BTLA agreed, and the City appealed. at “net assets,” thereby bringing her “net assets” below the prescribed limit. subtracted from her total assets (excluding the value of her residence) to arrive be advanced by the entire statutory scheme. person applying therefor: I. No exemption shall be allowed under RSA 72:39-b unless the

encumbrances,” RSA 72:39-a, I(c), the amount of her equity loan should be understand the statutory language in light of the policy sought to

provides in pertinent part:

be set aside.” Appeal of Wilson, 161 N.H. at 661 (quotation and brackets if we find that the BTLA misapprehended or misapplied the law, its order will interpretation of a statute is to be decided ultimately by this court. Therefore, statutory definition of “net assets” deducts the value of “good faith discern the legislature’s intent, and therefore better able to The taxpayer appealed to the BTLA. She contended that because the consider the statute as a whole. In so doing, we are better able to The statute at issue, entitled “Conditions for Elderly Exemption,” we do not merely look at isolated words or phrases, but instead we

legislative intent of the statute.” Id. (ellipsis omitted).

[us], that such order is unjust or unreasonable.” RSA 541:13. “The

taxpayer’s net assets exceeded $125,000. ordinary meaning of the words used. As we examine the language,

settled principle that a tax exemption is construed to give full effect to the omitted). Moreover, our construction of tax statutes is “guided by the well-

law, unless [we are] satisfied, by a clear preponderance of the evidence before

taxpayer’s residence. The City denied the exemption on the ground that the language of the statute itself. We first look to the plain and taxpayer’s net assets must not exceed $125,000, excluding the value of the The starting point in any statutory interpretation case is the of $42,000. To qualify for the elderly exemption under the City’s ordinance, the

omitted). “We review the BTLA’s statutory interpretation de novo.” Id. at 662.

aside or vacate “the order or decision appealed from . . . except for errors of Wilson, 161 N.H. 659, 661 (2011); see RSA 541:13 (2007). We will not set

existence of an equity loan secured by the taxpayer’s residence in the amount including the value of her residence, of $145,724.19. It also noted the did not see fit to include.” Appeal of Wilson, 161 N.H. at 662.

p. 3 consider what the legislature might have said or add language the legislature

that “[w]e interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and will not Thus, the taxpayer implicitly invokes the standard of statutory construction legislature could have added language to modify the term “value,” but did not.

encumbrance; it refers only to the value of the residence.” She argues that the

the first sentence of RSA 72:39-a, I(c) “contains no reference to any it are excluded from the calculation of net assets. The taxpayer counters that both the market value of the residence and the amount of any encumbrance on

value of the residence and any encumbrances on that residence.” Therefore,

“value” in the first sentence of RSA 72:39-a, I(c) “includes both the market that “clarifies” the calculation of net assets. The City argues that the term its plain language and that, in any event, there is “no formal legislative history”

Both parties contend that the statute’s meaning can be discerned from

RSA 72:39-a.

nonresidential purposes.

unattached structures used or intended for commercial or other

live. “Residence” shall exclude attached dwelling units and was properly interpreted by the BTLA: “As observed by the BTLA, the meaning exclusion of any other places where the person may temporarily home, and which the person in good faith regards as home to the

The final term relied upon by the taxpayer is “net,” which she contends unattached garage or woodshed, which is the person’s principal pool of assets, it would have done so. It did not. type of encumbrance which could be deducted from the “adjusted”

means the housing unit, and related structures such as an minus the value of any good faith encumbrances. “Residence” type of encumbrance. If the legislature had wanted to limit the assets” means the value of all assets, tangible and intangible,

the “adjusted pool” of assets created by the first sentence[, i.e. all

good faith encumbrances, without regard to the type of asset or the residential lot size specified in the local zoning ordinance. . . . “Net assets except for the taxpayer’s residence,] is further reduced by all

arguing that under the second quoted sentence of RSA 72:39-a, I(c), The taxpayer also relies upon the legislature’s use of the term “all,”

is located up to the greater of 2 acres or the minimum single family value of the person’s actual residence and the land upon which it by the city or town for purposes of RSA 72:39-b, excluding the

(c) Owns net assets not in excess of the amount determined the first taxpayer would qualify for the elderly exemption and the

p. 4 encumbrance on her residence. Yet, under the City’s approach, who has reported assets of $145,000 and a $40,000 mortgage terms of having resources to pay property taxes) than a taxpayer

assets net of all encumbrances that may lessen their value. See Black’s Law

no mortgage on her residence is certainly better off financially (in

the language the legislature did use. The legislature chose to value taxpayers’ interpretation of RSA 72:39-a, I(c), however, rests upon the plain meaning of availability of taxpayer assets and the uses to which they should be put.” Our

For example, a taxpayer who has reported assets of $120,000 with

hypothetical posited by the BTLA:

taxpayer’s argument that “[t]he statute is silent on the subject of the

intended such a result. In support of this assertion, the taxpayer quotes a

however, whether the posited assumption is true or false. We accept the liquidate assets in order to pay property obligations.” We need not determine, argument . . . [or] suggests that a taxpayer should have to sell or mortgage or

assets is unfair and unequal as applied” and that the legislature could not have Finally, the taxpayer argues that “[t]he City’s approach to calculating net

taxpayer assets to pay property taxes. Nothing in the statute supports such an

residence.

except for the taxpayer’s residence, the encumbrances that lessen the value of assumption that the legislature was primarily concerned with the availability of the question before us. Rather, we agree with the amicus curiae that the term

Black’s Law Dictionary 607 (9th ed. 2009). We conclude that the plain that “adjusted pool” of assets do not include encumbrances on the excluded

assets created by the first sentence of RSA 72:39-a, I(c) consists of all assets The taxpayer argues that this interpretation “rests upon the false Dictionary, supra. Because, as the taxpayer argues, the “adjusted pool” of We are not persuaded that any of the terms emphasized above resolves a, I(c), no encumbrance on that residence is deducted in that calculation. and deductions, distinguishable from a ‘gross’ amount.”

some other right and that may lessen its value, such as a lien or mortgage.”

asset in the net asset calculation pursuant to the first sentence of RSA 72:39agree with the City that because the taxpayer’s residence is not counted as an definition of the adjective ‘net’ which signifies something free from all charges includable assets net of any encumbrances on those assets. We therefore which it assigned to the term ‘net assets’ is supported by the dictionary meaning of RSA 72:39-a, I(c) is that net assets means the value of all

“encumbrance” to mean “[a] claim or liability that is attached to property or “encumbrance” is the linchpin to the analysis. Black’s Law Dictionary defines p. 5 5

amicus curiae point out, RSA 72:39-a does not account for unsecured debt at (in terms of having resources to pay property taxes).” As the City and the

consuming much of her monthly income, and “is certainly better off financially

Reversed.

property taxes than the one with minimum monthly credit card payments things being equal, the taxpayer with no unsecured debt is better able to pay as between two taxpayers with equal assets and equal income, and all other

interpretation of RSA 72:39-a, and, accordingly, reverse its decision. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the BTLA erred in its

DALIANIS, C.J.