2012-195, State of New Hampshire v. Ryan Martin

The defendant, Ryan Martin, appeals a ruling of the Superior

orally, for the defendant. James B. Reis, assistant appellate defender, of Concord, on the brief and

general, on the brief and orally), for the State.

to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address:

editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New

well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as considered as a whole. Duquette v. Warden, N.H. State Prison, 154 N.H. 737, p. 2 arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute

651:2, V(a) (2007). In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final

service can provide under such conditions as the court may impose.” RSA

that such person is in need of the supervision and guidance that the probation unconditional discharge, or a fine.” Probation is available “if the court finds A misdemeanor may be sentenced to imprisonment, probation, conditional or 2 RSA 651:2, I (2007) provides: “A person convicted of a felony or a Class

. . . and remand for resentencing.” same charge.” Accordingly, he contends that we “must vacate the sentence

violates probation,” he could still be fined for violating probation because the protection of society and rehabilitation.” State v. Evans, 127 N.H. 501, 505 grant probation in order to achieve the goals of punishment, deterrence, Id. We disagreed, explaining that, although the imposition of the maximum incarceration eliminated any mechanism for enforcing the terms of probation.

has discretion under RSA 651:2 to sentence a defendant to both the maximum 16. We have subsequently cited Perkins for the proposition that “a trial court to impose a stand-committed prison sentence and a term of probation on the trial court could have, but did not, impose the maximum fine. See id. at 715- The defendant first argues that the trial court “lack[s] statutory authority

additional periods of incarceration for [the underlying] offense even if he II period of incarceration meant that “the defendant cannot be subjected to “has broad discretion to assign different sentences, suspend [a] sentence, or Our precedents interpreting RSA 651:2 establish that a sentencing court probation term, arguing that the imposition of the maximum term of State v. Perkins, 121 N.H. 713, 715 (1981). The defendant challenged the year – the statutory maximum – and placed him on probation for two years. example, the trial court sentenced the defendant to the State hospital for one suited to accomplish the constitutional objectives”). In State v. Perkins, for “options to adapt [a] sentence to a particular individual in the manner best (1985); cf. State v. Burroughs, 113 N.H. 21, 24 (1973) (recognizing need for

sentence.” The trial court disagreed, and this appeal ensued. “illegal . . . to impose a term of probation and a committed State prison release.” The defendant opposed the imposition of probation, arguing that it is v. Moran, 158 N.H. 318, 321 (2009); see RSA 625:3 (2007). them according to the fair import of their terms and to promote justice. State 740 (2007). We do not strictly construe criminal statutes, but rather construe

him to one to three years of imprisonment and two years of probation “upon was a class B felony under RSA 637:11, II(b) (2007). The trial court sentenced interpretation in light of the foregoing discussion.

p. 3 sentencing power as an enforcement mechanism,” Hancock, 156 N.H. at 304, RSA 651:2, IV(a) (2007). Because the trial court “retain[ed] a portion of its 3

mutually exclusive paths to rehabilitation of offenders, we reject such an the parole and probation statutes indicates the legislature’s intent to create To the extent that the defendant further suggests that a comparison of

felony is seven years imprisonment, RSA 651:2, II(b) (2007), and a $4,000 fine,

sentencing hearing. Id. at 558. the court did not err in imposing probation.

imprisonment and no fine. The maximum sentence available for a class B Here, the trial court sentenced the defendant to one to three years probation, or a combination of the three. Hancock, 156 N.H. at 303. In or term of imprisonment remain unimposed. imprisonment, so long as, and to the extent that, portions of the maximum fine Our more recent decision in Hancock confirms that, within limits, 303, it follows that the court may impose probation, in addition to a fine or maximum fine and term of imprisonment] if it also imposes probation,” id. at the next step in the original sentencing process” that began at the first Because a trial court “may not sentence a defendant to [the statutory in imposing incarceration for violating probation, the trial court merely “took portion of its p. 3 sentencing power as an enforcement mechanism.” Id. at 303-04. constituted an additional term of imprisonment without notice, reasoning that, explaining that, in order to impose probation, the trial court must “retain a probation. Id. at 302-03. We vacated the sentence under the plain error rule, the maximum term of imprisonment, the maximum fine, and two years of Hancock, the defendant was convicted of a class A misdemeanor and received

sentencing courts have statutory authority to impose incarceration, a fine,

also rejected the defendant’s argument that the sentence for violating probation balance of the maximum which could have been imposed originally.” Id. We courts to impose fines or imprisonment upon probation violation up to the term of imprisonment and probation.” State v. Hancock, 156 N.H. 301, 304 upheld the sentence on appeal, explaining that “[s]tatutory law authorizes incarceration for an additional two-and-a-half to five years. Id. at 557. We defendant violated probation and, as a result, the trial court sentenced him to sentence. Id. After serving the incarceration portion of his sentence, the 555, 556 (1989). The court’s sentencing order did not include a suspended correction and two years of probation upon release. State v. White, 131 N.H. had pleaded guilty to a class B felony, to twelve months in the house of Similarly, in State v. White, the trial court sentenced the defendant, who

(2007). review questions of constitutional law de novo. State v. Ortiz, 162 N.H. 585,

p. 4 interfering with and superseding the essential powers of another branch.” We

circumscribing the court’s power to suspend a sentence. The executive Powers Clause was meant to prevent – that of one branch of government argues that “[t]hese conflicts present the situation that the Separation of served by the erection of impenetrable barriers between the branches.” Id. need of supervision, while the court may come to a different conclusion. He

branches of government is an important part of its constitutional fabric.” State branch, such actions are unconstitutional.” Id. Further: “The separation of powers among the legislative, executive and judicial

separation of powers is violated only when one branch usurps an essential

judicial discretion in sentencing by imposing mandatory sentences or For example, the legislature may constrict the independent exercise of whenever possible, as the practical and efficient operation of government is not executive and legislative branches participate in the sentencing process. that scenario, he posits that the parole board may determine he is no longer in Although sentencing is an exclusively judicial function, the

of government defeat or materially impair the inherent functions of another power of another.” Merrill, 160 N.H. at 472. “When the actions of one branch

and executive prerogatives intersect.”). Accordingly, “[t]he doctrine of Cir. 1994) (“Criminal sentencing exists at a nexus where legislative, judicial (quotations omitted); see United States v. Einspahr, 35 F.3d 505, 507 (10th

the three branches of government, while distinct, must move in concert on parole, he would be subject to the terms of both parole and probation. In v. Merrill, 160 N.H. 467, 472 (2010). That said, “[w]e have recognized . . . that charge.” He points out, for example, the possibility that, should he be released a person to both a stand-committed prison term and probation on the same

596 (2011).

Powers Clause of the State Constitution. N.H. The defendant contends that “numerous conflicts arise when a court sentences Next, the defendant argues that his sentence violates the Separation of

union and amity. III that binds the whole fabric of the constitution in one indissoluble bond of government will admit, or as is consistent with that chain of connection separate from, and independent of, each other, as the nature of a free to wit, the legislative, executive, and judicial, ought to be kept as In the government of this state, the three essential powers thereof,

clause states:

constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.

revoke probation. See, e.g., State v. Lee, 564 S.E.2d 372, 374 (S.C. Ct. App. continuation of parole based upon the same set of facts that causes a judge to facts of this case, we conclude that the sentence imposed does not offend the defendant. The parole board, for example, may see fit to permit the

between the judicial and executive branches. Nonetheless, based upon the inconsistent interpretation and application of conditions placed on the

minimizes the risk of inconsistency, which may create unnecessary friction We recognize that because the two periods may overlap there is a risk of our review. Moreover, we conclude that this is the better practice because it court account for the fact that this issue has never before been presented for

branch, however, would retain the power to do so during the period of parole. incarceration. Presumably, the historic sentencing patterns of the superior probation, a function of the judiciary’s sentencing power. The executive

period of supervision is warranted, it can impose a longer maximum period of DALIANIS, C.J., and CONBOY, LYNN and BASSETT, JJ., concurred. branch would retain the power to supervise the defendant during the period of probation. Thus, in a case where the trial court concludes that a lengthy generally do not impose state prison sentences followed by periods of

revoke probation from legislative branch to executive branch). The judicial 2002). We note also that as a matter of practice our superior court judges functions would remain unimpaired. Cf. Klouda v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Dept.,

powers of another. See id. To the contrary, should the defendant term of probation constitute the usurpation by one branch of the essential

Id. (citations omitted).

imposed by the courts. 642 N.W.2d 255, 263 (Iowa 2002) (striking down statute transferring power to branch can offer sentencing recommendations and enforces sentences

parole, and the judicial branch, on probation, the branches’ respective simultaneously be subject to the authority of both the executive branch, on

In no sense does the imposition of both a term of imprisonment and a