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2012-135, In the Matter of S. Rebecca Carmody and Craig T. Carmody

Law Office of Joshua L. Gordon, of Concord (Joshua L. Gordon on the that he had relinquished pursuant to the order. The plaintiff stated that she On November 9, 2011, the defendant requested the return of the firearms

Opinion Issued: March 13, 2013 Submitted: January 10, 2013

IN THE MATTER OF S. REBECCA CARMODY AND CRAIG T. CARMODY

order. signed by the defendant and the plaintiff, S. Rebecca Carmody, to withdraw the possession. On May 12, 2005, the Superior Court approved an agreement

No. 2012-135 9th Circuit Court - Manchester Family Division

order was issued that required the defendant to relinquish all firearms in his

___________________________

THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

supported by the record. On January 3, 2005, a domestic violence temporary The following facts are drawn from the trial court’s order or are otherwise BASSETT, J. The defendant,

by a domestic violence temporary order. See RSA 173-B:5, X (2002). We S. Rebecca Carmody, self-represented party, filed no brief.

page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00

reverse and remand.

for the return of firearms that he had relinquished six years earlier as required 9th Circuit Court - Manchester Family Division (Emery, J.) denying his request

Craig T. Carmody, appeals an order of the

to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address: brief), for the defendant.

editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New

well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as B:5, X. We review the trial court’s interpretation of a statute de novo. In the

The defendant argues that the trial court erred in construing RSA 173-

was denied, and this appeal followed.

expiration of the protective order. The defendant’s motion for reconsideration

language in RSA 173-B:5, X(a) provides that a defendant may request the

motion” as the defendant filed his request more than six years after the protection.” The court concluded that it had “no choice but to deny the applying within 15 days prior to the expiration of the court’s order of

court’s order of protection for the return of his firearms. Rather, the express not limit the defendant to applying within fifteen days of the expiration of the (Emphasis added.) We agree with the defendant that RSA 173-B:5, X(a) does

court ruled that the language of RSA 173-B:5, X “limited the defendant to

2

order. requires a defendant to apply within fifteen days of the order’s expiration or schedule a hearing no later than 15 days after the expiration of the order was in effect. Upon receipt of such a motion, the court shall

Following the hearing, the court denied the defendant’s motion. The the defendant may request, by motion to the court, the return of Within 15 days prior to the expiration of the protective orders, Chief’s] care, custody, and control.”

mandatory.” (quotation omitted)). Nothing in the language of the statute in statutes the word ‘may’ is permissive only, and the word ‘shall’ is weapons held by the law enforcement agency while the protective order. See Appeal of Rowan, 142 N.H. 67, 71 (1997) (“It is the general rule that return of firearms within fifteen days prior to the expiration of a protective

inquired whether counsel could “do something to try [to] get them out of [the RSA 173-B:5, X(a) states, in pertinent part:

any and all firearms and ammunition and specified deadly

Department had contacted him regarding the defendant’s firearms and counsel for the defendant stated that the Chief of the Greenfield Police have said nor add words that it did not see fit to include. Id. at 485. Record.” On December 12, 2011, the court conducted a hearing during which subject to modification. Id. We will neither consider what the legislature might Id. When the language of a statute is clear on its face, its meaning is not where possible, we ascribe the plain and ordinary meanings to the words used. considered as a whole. Id. We first examine the language of the statute, and, arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of the statute Matter of McArdle & McArdle, 162 N.H. 482, 484 (2011). We are the final

stating “there are [no] firearm disqualifiers on [the defendant’s] Criminal had no objection. The New Hampshire State Police sent a facsimile to the court 3

Reversed and remanded.

misconstrued RSA 17 3-B:5, we reverse and remand. forgo the return of his firearms. Accordingly, because the trial court

DALIANIS, C.J.

, and HICKS, CONBOY, and LYNN, JJ., concurred.

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