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2013-0263, Nathalie Hurley v. Craig Hurley
Dame & Lucas, PLLC, of Gilford (Allen J. Lucas on the brief), for the
Nathalie Hurley, self-represented party, filed no brief.
Opinion Issued: December 20, 2013 Submitted: November 14, 2013
CRAIG HURLEY reciprocal messages, the exchanges became heated, and the plaintiff testified
not to tell their child. During the course of approximately fifteen subsequent v.
NATHALIE HURLEY
to the plaintiff telling her that his grandmother had just died, but asking her
No. 2013-263 9th Circuit Court – Manchester Family Division
divorced since 2008. On December 9, 2012, the defendant sent a text message The following facts are drawn from the record. The parties have been
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THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
insufficient to support the court’s findings. We reverse.
Circuit – Manchester Family Division (Emery, J.) granting a domestic violence
page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 (2002 & Supp. 2013) (amended 2013). He argues that the evidence was final order of protection to the plaintiff, Nathalie Hurley. See RSA 173-B:5
CONBOY, J.
The defendant, Craig Hurley, appeals an order of the 9th
defendant.
to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address:
editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New
well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as law. Walker v. Walker, 158 N.H. 602, 608 (2009). We accord considerable
trial court unless they are lacking in evidentiary support or tainted by error of
evidence claims as a matter of law and uphold the findings and rulings of the credible present threat to the plaintiff’s safety. We review sufficiency of the 2 court’s findings that he (1) committed criminal threatening and (2) posed a
the past. She further testified that he did not threaten to “tinker” with her car or contest the defendant’s testimony that he had never threatened or abused her in The plaintiff’s testimony focused upon only the one message. She did not
with a purpose to terrorize her. the defendant committed criminal threatening, see RSA 631:4, I (2007), and evidence, that the defendant threatened to commit a crime or sent the message we conclude that the plaintiff failed to establish, by a preponderance of the Morabito, 153 N.H. 302, 305 (2006). Given the particular circumstances here, against the person of another, (3) with a purpose to terrorize any person. State v. The defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the of criminal threatening: (1) a defendant must threaten to commit a crime, (2) not constitute criminal threatening. RSA 631:4, I(d) sets forth the three elements the defendant’s single text message – “Wish you would die in a fiery crash” – did We conclude, based upon all the facts and circumstances of this case, that
Maher, 161 N.H. 742, 745 (2011). threat requires “more than a generalized fear for personal safety.” Knight v. constitutes “a credible present threat to the [plaintiff’s] safety.” A credible present prior to this one text message, the court found that, by sending the message, enumerated criminal acts, including criminal threatening, when such conduct among others, a “former sexual or intimate partner” of one or more certain B:1, I (Supp. 2013), means “the commission or attempted commission” by, “abuse” by a preponderance of the evidence. “Abuse,” as defined in RSA 173– RSA 173-B:5, I, predicat es relief for domestic violence upon a showing of subject to extension. This appeal followed. order of protection restricting certain of the defendant’s activities for one year, favorable to the plaintiff. Id. weight to be given testimony. Id. We view the evidence in the light most see RSA 173-B:5, I, because the defendant “has worked on [the] plaintiff’s car weight to the trial court’s judgments on the credibility of witnesses and the
Although the defendant had never threatened or abused the plaintiff
following day.
[and] know[s] where she live[s].” The court issued a domestic violence final
that such conduct constituted a credible present threat to the plaintiff’s safety,
fiery crash.” She filed her petition for a domestic violence protective order the that, in his final text, the defendant wrote, “Whatever. Wish you would die in a 3
DALIANIS, C.J., and HICKS, LYNN and BASSETT, JJ., concurred.
message was to terrorize her, rather than merely to express transitory anger. Cf. “wish” amounted to a threat to commit a crime or that his purpose in sending the conclude that the plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence that the defendant’s Reversed. Although the defendant’s “wish” may well be regarded as reprehensible, we See RSA 17 3-B:5, I. entering a domestic violence final order of protection against the defendant. statute. See RSA 173–B:1, I. We conclude, therefore, that the court erred in the evidence was insufficient to establish “abuse” within the meaning of the purpose was to terrorize, not merely to express transitory anger). Accordingly, defendant’s statements allowed reasonable jury to conclude that defendant’s State v. Fuller, 147 N.H. 210, 214 (2001) (finding that events leading up to
did, but I did, because . . . everything was all built up inside of me.” of his grandmother’s death. The defendant testified, “I shouldn’t have said what I culmination of a lengthy exchange, which began with him informing the plaintiff to start a fire. The evidence established that the defendant’s message was the