2012-576, Steven P. Dichiara, Jr. v. Sanborn Regional High School & a.

The plaintiff, Stephen P. Dichiara, Jr., appeals an order of the

Charles P. Bauer on the brief, and Ms. Elliot orally), for the defendants. Gallagher, Callahan & Gartrell, P.C., of Concord (Samantha D. Elliot and

the brief and orally), for the plaintiff. Donahue, Tucker & Ciandella, PLLC, of Exeter (Christopher T. Hilson on to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address:

editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New

well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as premises. RSA 507-B:2. The plaintiff does not challenge, however, the trial

p. 2 by fault attributable to it,” regardless of any connection to a motor vehicle or

507-B:2, a governmental unit is liable for bodily injuries “caused by its fault or motor vehicle or premises. Essentially, the plaintiff maintains that, under RSA out of the municipality’s ownership, occupation, maintenance or operation of a

507-B:2 when it ruled that a municipality is only liable for negligence arising

On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the trial court misinterpreted RSA

This appeal followed. that the plaintiff’s injury did not arise out of the operation of the premises.

maintenance or operation of all motor vehicles, and all premises.” The parties

maintenance or operation of all motor vehicles, and all premises,” and finding

fault or by fault attributable to it, arising out of ownership, occupation, to recover for bodily injury, personal injury or property damage caused by its states that “[a] governmental unit may be held liable for damages in an action

governmental units to those “arising out of ownership, occupation, ruling that the plain language of RSA 507-B:2 limits negligence claims against The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants,

by other statute.” One such exception to RSA 507-B:5 is RSA 507-B:2, which

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Big League Entm’t v. Brox the affidavits and other evidence, and all inferences properly drawn from them, In reviewing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, we consider damage except as provided by this chapter or as is provided or may be provided unit[s]” for “any action to recover for bodily injury, personal injury or property 2 GOVERNMENTAL UNITS.” RSA 507-B:5 provides immunity to “governmental

that they were entitled to statutory immunity under RSA chapter 507-B. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing, among other things, part of both defendants, and respondeat superior liability of the School District.

RSA chapter 507-B is entitled “BODILY INJURY ACTIONS AGAINST

as a matter of law, we will affirm the grant of summary judgment. Id. We

The plaintiff filed an action in superior court, alleging negligence on the

occupation, maintenance or operation of the premises.

review the trial court’s application of the law to the facts de novo. Id.

genuine issue of material fact, and if the moving party is entitled to judgment Indus., 149 N.H. 480, 482 (2003). If our review of that evidence discloses no

substantial injury to the plaintiff’s arm. court’s ruling that his injuries do not arise out of the defendants’ ownership, drill, the plaintiff and the other participating player collided, causing

seated position and attempt to gain control of a loose basketball. During the participated in a “loose ball” drill, which requires two players to rise from a applications of RSA 507-B:2. See Chatman, 163 N.H. at 323 (reading RSA p. 3 motor vehicle or premises. This reading is consistent with our prior governmental unit’s ownership, occupation, maintenance, or operation of a

for fault-based claims only when there is a nexus between the claim and the

Under a plain reading of the statute, RSA 507-B:2 provides an exception

507-B:5 for all negligence actions. premises. Such an interpretation would provide a blanket exception to RSA

to the ownership, occupation, maintenance or operation of motor vehicles or

governmental unit’s fault or fault attributable to it, regardless of a connection interpretation, RSA 507-B:2 would allow recovery for damages caused by a to find that the latter phrase does not modify the former. Under the plaintiff’s

Merrill v. Manchester, 114 N.H. 722, 730 (1974), we abrogated municipal

maintenance or operation of all motor vehicles, and all premises,” requires us

The purpose of RSA chapter 507-B supports our interpretation. In

premises” is consistent with our plain language interpretation.

or by fault attributable to it” and “arising out of ownership, occupation, recover for bodily injury, personal injury or property damage caused by its fault without citation, that the presence of a comma between the phrases “action to

ownership, occupation, maintenance or operation of all motor vehicles, and all

absent a connection to a motor vehicle or premises. The plaintiff argues,

damage caused by its fault or by fault attributable to it” and “arising out of the phrases “action to recover for bodily injury, personal injury or property Further, the sentence structure, including the presence of the comma between

fault-based actions for bodily injury, personal injury or property damage

507–B:2 as requiring action to arise out of the operation of a motor vehicle).

interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo. See The plaintiff urges us to interpret RSA 507-B:2 to permit recovery in

not see fit to include. Id.

modification. Dalton Hydro v. Town of Dalton, 153 N.H. 75, 78 (2005). We will

a whole. Id. We first examine the language of the statute, and, where possible,

ignores principles of statutory construction and leads to an absurd result. The

neither consider what the legislature might have said nor add words that it did

language of the statute is clear on its face, its meaning is not subject to agree that the School District meets the definition of “governmental unit,” see we ascribe the plain and ordinary meanings to the words used. Id. When the

intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of the statute considered as Kenison v. Dubois, 152 N.H. 448, 451 (2005). We are the final arbiter of the

The plaintiff argues that the trial court’s interpretation of RSA 507-B:2

RSA 507-B:1, I, and that the plaintiff’s action is one for “bodily injury.” from the negligent operation of a vehicle by an employee.

p. 4 be liable to a bystander for negligent infliction of emotional distress arising under RSA 507-B:2. For example, in a proper case, a governmental unit could are circumstances under which a plaintiff could recover for a personal injury

injury actions are unlikely to involve a nexus with a premises or vehicle, there

have a nexus with a premises or vehicle. We disagree. While most personal an exception for personal injury actions because those types of actions do not The plaintiff argues that, under our interpretation, RSA 507-B:2 cannot provide

“property damage.” The term “personal injury” shall not include “bodily injury” or

libel, slander, or defamation.

organization as a result of false eviction, malicious prosecution, (b) Any injury to intangible property sustained by any

discrimination; and

public policy or the laws of New Hampshire, or both,

injury, mental anguish, shock, and, except when against the right of private occupancy, wrongful entry or eviction, mental material, invasion of an individual’s right of privacy, invasion of the

publication or utterance of other defamatory or disparaging

imprisonment, malicious prosecution, libel, slander, or the including but not limited to, false arrest, detention or (a) Any injury to the feelings or reputation of a natural person,

injury” as:

superfluous, as the plaintiff asserts. RSA 507-B:1, III defines “[p]ersonal does not render the legislature’s inclusion of the term “personal injury” property damage caused by its fault or by fault attributable to it,” RSA 507-B:2,

as modifying the phrase “action to recover for bodily injury, personal injury or

occupation, maintenance or operation of all motor vehicles, and all premises” an absurd result. Interpreting the phrase “arising out of ownership, Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, this interpretation does not lead to

liability.

Cannata v. Town of Deerfield, 132 N.H. 235, 243 (1989). In light of the

governmental units to liability.” Id. As we have previously noted, RSA chapter

decision in Merrill by enacting RSA chapter 507-B. City of Dover v. Imperial immunity, subject to certain exceptions. The legislature responded to our

legislature’s intent, we will not interpret RSA 507-B:2 as expanding municipal

507-B “seems designed to limit municipal liability arising from tort suits.”

intended to define in a comprehensive manner the exposure of local Cas. & Indem. Co., 133 N.H. 109, 114 (1990). The new legislation “was p. 5 5

premises. unit’s ownership, occupation, maintenance, or operation of a motor vehicle or

p. 5 507-B:5 only when there is a nexus between the injury and a governmental Accordingly, we conclude that RSA 507-B:2 provides an exception to RSA

DALIANIS, C.J., and CONBOY, LYNN and BASSETT, JJ., concurred.