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2013-0424, State of New Hampshire v. Thomas A. Bulcroft

guilty by reason of insanity and committed him to New Hampshire Hospital for RSA 632:1 (1974) (repealed 1975). The trial court accepted his plea of not the defendant was charged with kidnapping and rape. See RSA 633:1 (1996); The following facts are drawn from the order of the trial court. In 1974,

reason of insanity. We affirm. records pertaining to a criminal case in which he was found not guilty by Superior Court (Smukler, J.) denying his petition to annul arrest and court BASSETT, J. Th e defendant, Thomas A. Bulcroft, appeals an order of the

Thomas A. Bulcroft, self - r epresented p arty, by brief.

general, on the brief), for the State. Joseph A. Foster, attorney general (Nicholas Cort, assistant attorney

Opinion Issued: August 22, 2014 Submitted: February 12, 2014

THOMAS A. BULCROFT

v.

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

No. 2013 - 424 Merrimack

___________________________

THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh. us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 to press. Errors may be reported by E - mail at the following address: editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concor d, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as 2

at a ny time in accordance with the provisions of this section. petition for annulment of the arrest record or court record, or both, guilty, or whose case was dismissed or not prosecuted, may Any person whose arrest has resulted in a finding of not

RSA 651:5, II provides:

justice. RSA 6 25:3 (2007). the Cri minal Code according to the fair import of their terms and to promote that would lead to an absurd or unjust result. Id. W e construe provisions of statutes so as to effectuate their evident purpose and to avoid an interpretation Doggett v. Town of North Hampton, 138 N.H. 744, 746 (1994). We construe isolation; rather, all parts of a statutory act must be construed together. Guay, 164 N.H. 696, 699 (2013). The words of a statute should not be read in or add language that th e l egislature did not include in the statute. State v. legislative intent and we do not consider what the l egislature might have said is plain and unambiguous, we need not look beyond it for further indication of and ordinary meanings to the words used. Id. When the language of a statute examine the language of the statute, and, where possible, we apply the plain expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole. Id. We first interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the intent of the l egislature as novo. State v. Mercier, 16 5 N.H. 83, 85 (2013). In matters of statutory The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we review de

issue of first impression. him to petition for annulment of his arrest and court records. This presents an insanity “is equivalent to an acquittal,” and, therefore, R SA 651:5, II permits On appeal, t he defendant argues that a fin ding of not guilty by reason of

annulled. See RSA 651:5, X(a) (Supp. 201 1). RSA 651:5, II, and, th erefore, the defendant i s not e ntitled to have his record by reason of insanity” i s not the s ame as a finding of “not guilty” for purposes of The trial court denied th e petition, concluding that a verdict of “not guilty

guilty by reason of insanity.” See RSA 651:5, II (Supp. 2013). annul the record of his arrest under RSA 651:5, II because he was found not memorandum of law filed in support of his petition states that he sought “to court and ask s that we review them as we consider the issue before us. The his appeal brief, he has a ppended to his brief several pl eading s filed in the trial of insanity. Although the defendant has not provide d a copy of his petition with arrest and indictment record annulled because he was found not guilty by reason On December 10, 2012, t he defendant filed a petition seeking to ha ve his

discharged from the hospital in 1979. life, unless or until earlier discharged by court order. The defendant was 3

defendant whose arrest ha s resulted in a finding of not guilty by reason of To construe a “finding of not guilty” as used in RSA 651:5, II, to include a

substantial risk of such injury or damage.”). offense involving bodily injury or serious damage to property of another, or person, w here the person has been found not guilty by reason of insanity of an property of another shall be presumed, subject to rebuttal by the acquitted bodily injury to himself or herself or another person o r serious damage to the convincing evidence that a per son’s release would create a substantial risk of in voluntary commitment. RSA 651:8 - b, IV (“The existence of clear and a nother by virtue of his condition, the court shall order the defendant’s has a mental illness and poses a substantial risk of bodily injury to himself or hearing, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant must be furnished to the court. RSA 651:8 - b, I II. If, at the conclusion of the to a psychiatric or psychological evaluation, and the result of that evaluation of insanity.” RSA 651:8 - b, II. Prior to the hearing, the defendant must submit be conducted “not later than 40 days following a verdict of not guilty by reason eligible for release pursuant to paragraph IV.” A hearing on commitment must shall be committed to the secure psychiatric unit until such time as he is found not guilty by reason of insanity at the time o f the offense charged, he would if acquitted in the usual sense). R SA 651:8 - b, I, provides: “I f a person is guilty by reason of insanity is not free to resume life in community as he or she (Supp. 201 3); Eastlack, 710 S.E.2d at 725 (observing that indivi d ual found not continues t o have restraints placed upon his or her liberty. See RSA 651:8 - b acquittal, a defendant who has been found not guilty by reason of insanity As the trial court noted, u nlike an individual whose arrest results in an

crime and, thus, does not directly concern guilt). evidence re butting an insanity defense does not concern an element of the 725 (Va. 2011); cf. State v. Marchand, 164 N.H. 26, 33 (2012) (stating that commission of the criminal act charged.” Eastlack v. Com., 710 S.E.2d 723, been acquitted in the sense that he has been determined to be innocent of the has been found ‘not guilty by reason of insanity’ of a criminal charge has not 673 (1999)). As the Virginia Supreme Court recently observed, “A person who part on other grounds by statute as recognized in State v. Blair, 143 N.H. 669, the acts alleged. Novosel v. Helgemoe, 118 N.H. 1 15, 122 (1978) (superseded in is one of confession and avoidance and admits that the defendant committed We have previously held that the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity

following reasons, we conclude that it did not. “resulted in a finding of not guilty” for the purposes of RSA 651:5, II. For the confine our analysis to whether his plea of not guilty by reason of insanity defendant does not argue that his case was dismissed or not prosecuted, we prosecuted. See State v. Skinner, 1 49 N.H. 102, 10 3 (2003). Because the finding of not guilty; or (2) an individual whose case was dismissed or not RSA 651:5, II applies to: (1) an individual whose arrest has resulted in a 4

Jennings, 130 S.W.3d 43 (Tenn. 2004) (holding for purposes of expungement to request ins truction on verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity); see State v. defendant did not receive effective assistance of counsel due to counsel’s failure Com. v. Gass, 523 A.2d 741, 744 (Pa. 1987) (quotation omitted) (hol ding

himself or others. his sanity and will not in the reasonable future be dangerous to certifies, and the court is satisfied, that such person has recovere d for the mentally ill until the superintendent of such hospital punishment. It means the accused will be confined in a hospital common ly understood meaning . . . . It means neither freedom nor But a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity has no such that he is subject to such punishment as the court may impose. that [the defendant] goes free and that a verdict of guilty means It is common knowledge that a verdict of not guilty means

defense.” As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has observed: based on insanity is “similar to an acquittal based on any other affirmative plea of not guilty by reason of insanity is an affirmative defense, an acquittal For this same reason, we reject the defendant’s argument that, because a

his libert y is subject to constraint, unlike a defendant who has been a cquitted. not guilty by reason o f insanity may not face traditional criminal p unishment, We are not persuaded by this reasoning. Although a defendant found

completely absolved of the crime and will not face punishment.” Id. at 43 7. concluded that “[a] defendant found [not guilty by reason of insanity] is failure of proof or establishment of an affirmative defense.” Id. The court conferred by any other not - guilty judgment, whether based on the State ’ s 43 8. “This absolution,” the court reasoned, “is exactly the same as that insanity” was to absolve the defendant of guilt for the charged crime. Id. at the court observed that the effect of a finding of “not guilty by reason of Court of Illinois in People v. Harrison, 877 N.E.2d 432 (Ill. 2007). In Harrison, The petitioner urges us to adopt the analysis applied by the Supreme

and do not contradict each other.” (quotation omitted)). possible, statutes should be construed so that they lead to reasonable results See, e.g., State v. Patters on, 1 4 5 N.H. 462, 465 (2000) (“Where reasonably individuals whose release would create a substantial risk of injury to others. this construction to nullify a process established to protect society from those requireme nts of RSA 651:8 - b. We decline the defendant’s invitation to apply annulment would render ineffectual the procedural and substantive interpretation advanced by the defendant and the petition were granted, the statutorily mandated commitment period. If we were to adopt the arrest and/or court records “at any tim e,” RSA 651:5, II, including during the insanity would allow such a defendant to file a petition to annul his or her 5

DALIANIS, C.J.

, and HICKS, CONBOY, and LYNN, JJ., concurred.

Af firmed.

decision of the trial court. arguments do not require further discussion. A ccordingly, we affirm the defendant is not entitled to annulment under RSA 6 51:5, II, his remaining conclude that, given the limited record before us and our conclusion that the To the extent that the defendant seeks review of other issues, we

at 69 9. will not add language that the legislature did not include. Se e Guay, 164 N.H. insanity. According ly, we decline to expand the scope of the statute, and we in RSA 6 51:5, II a specific reference to persons found not guilty by reason of of ‘not guilty by reason of insanity.’”). Notably, the l egislature did not include society understands and accepts, between a verdict of ‘not guilt y ’ and a verdict Bouwman, 328 N.W.2d 703, 705 (Minn. 1982) (“There is a distinction, which not guilty by reason of insanity of a sexually violent offense”); cf. State v. “C onvicted of a sexually violent offense” a person who has been “adjudicated system); RSA 135 - E:2, III (Supp. 2013) (including with in definition of (2013) (classifying case dispositions for purposes of criminal justice information by a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity. See, e.g., RSA 106 - K:1, V l egislature has distinguished between the disposition of cases by acquittal and We observe that, when address ing other criminal justice issues, the

purposes of Minnesota expungement statute). not guilty by reason of insanity is not a resolution “in favor of” defendant for Ambaye, 616 N.W. 2d 2 56, 259 (Minn. 2000) (concluding that jury verdict of charge dismissed or to have been found innocent of the charge); State v. person found not guilty by reason of insanity cannot be said to have had 1983) (construing S outh Carolina expungement statute and determining that a proceedings in the case); see also State v. Salmon, 306 S.E.2d 620, 621 (S. C. engage in charged criminal activity and does not necessarily end the legal of not guilty because NGI verdict does not indicate that defendant did not statute that verdict of not guilty by reas on of insanity (NGI) differs from verdict

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