2012-920, In re Trevor G.

In this interlocutory appeal from an order of the 6th Circuit

brief and orally, for the juvenile. Christopher M. Johnson, chief appellate defender, of Concord, on the to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address: general, on the brief and orally), for the State.

editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New

well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as review is de novo. See Fournier, 158 N.H. at 445. In matters of statutory p. 2 Because the transferred question involves statutory interpretation, our

order denying the juvenile’s motion to dismiss.

We answer the question in the affirmative and reverse the trial court’s

prosecution because the dismissal was initiated by the juvenile?”

finding that this case is indistinguishable from In re Kirsten P., 158 N.H. 158

when the State re-filed a delinquency petition previously dismissed for lack of

On November 2, the court issued an order denying the juvenile’s motion, held within thirty days of arraignment for juveniles who are not detained. See prescribed in RSA 169-B:14, II, which requires that an adjudicatory hearing be

determined that the time limits set forth in RSA 169-B:14, II were not violated

been issued, they were never served. arguing that the adjudicatory hearing would not be held within the time limit originally scheduled adjudicatory hearing because, although subpoenas had transferred the following question to this court: “Did the trial court err when it The trial court granted the request for an interlocutory appeal and

said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include. Id.

ordinary meaning to the words used. Id. We interpret legislative intent from November 7. On October 18, the juvenile moved to dismiss the refiled petition, hearing, the State disclosed that the State’s witnesses were not present at the in the words of the statute considered as a whole. In re Kirsten P., 158 N.H. at arraigned on October 10 and an adjudicatory hearing was scheduled for On October 1, 2012, the State refiled the petition. The juvenile was

motion for reconsideration was denied.

the statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might have

160. When examining the language of the statute, we ascribe the plain and

The court held a hearing on the juvenile’s motion on October 30. At that interpretation, we are the final arbiters of the legislature’s intent as expressed

dismissal. Consequently, the State is not barred from re-filing.” The juvenile’s

hearing would be untimely. not move for reconsideration. arraignment on July 31 and, therefore, the scheduled November 7 adjudicatory juvenile’s motion and dismissed the case for lack of prosecution. The State did (2008). The court determined that, “[i]n both cases, the [juvenile] initiated the had prevented the witnesses from being present. The trial court granted the

adjudicatory hearing had to be measured from the date of his initial RSA 169-B:14, II (2002). The juvenile argued that the deadline for holding the later learned that there had been a good reason, such as an emergency, that State requested leave to file a motion for reconsideration in the event that it p. 3 In re Eric C., 124 N.H. at 224 (quotation omitted); see In re Juvenile 2007-150, the trial court erred in concluding that the State could refile the petition “after

delinquency,” which reflects the legislative concern for procedural due process. hearing before the expiration of the deadline.” As a result, he contends that pronouncement of a child’s right to the expeditious resolution of his alleged juvenile, we have interpreted the statutory time limits as “a legislative Recognizing the impact that delays in a court proceeding may have on a

the delay “by failing to present evidence and by failing to seek to reschedule the neither caused nor invited the delay. Rather, he argues that the State caused Here, the juvenile maintains that, although he moved to dismiss, he

cause.” RSA 169-B:14, II. juvenile” (quotation omitted)). an additional period not to exceed 14 calendar days,” “upon a showing of good adjudicatory hearings are mandatory. See, e.g., p. 3 In re Eric C., 124 N.H. at 223- unless such noncompliance is the result of delay caused or requested by the detained. The statute provides for within the time limits established by the statute, the court loses jurisdiction, “[a]n extension of these time limits . . . for RSA chapter 169-B, “[i]f the district court fails to hold an adjudicatory hearing added); see also State v. Justus, 140 N.H. 413, 416 (1995) (stating that, under within the statutory time limits.” In re Eric C., 124 N.H. at 223-24 (emphasis when, through no fault of the juvenile, an adjudicatory hearing is not held (emphasis added). As such, a “district court must dismiss a juvenile petition deemed to have waived the time limits.” In re Russell C., 120 N.H. at 268 result of a delay caused or requested by the juvenile, in which case he will be forfeit jurisdiction if not complied with, unless such noncompliance is the 24. These time limits “effectuate a substantive right requiring the court to

often stated, the time limits prescribed in RSA chapter 169-B for the holding of within 30 days of arraignment” when a juvenile, as in this case, has not been B:14 is analogous to an adult offender’s right to a speedy trial.”). As we have that has as its primary concern the welfare of the child. Id.; see also In re Eric 156 N.H. 800, 802 (2008) (“[T]he mandatory time limit set forth in RSA 169-

individual rights against the vicissitudes of unlimited discretion.” In re Kirsten

whenever possible.” In re Kirsten P., 158 N.H. at 160 (quotation omitted); see

“adjudicatory hearing[s] [in juvenile delinquency proceedings] shall be held . . . RSA chapter 169-B is part of a comprehensive juvenile justice system RSA 169-B:14, II serves to further that goal by prescribing that

P., 158 N.H. at 160 (quotation and brackets omitted).

the juvenile statutes is to create procedural safeguards sufficient to protect also In re Russell C., 120 N.H. 260, 266 (1980). “One of the principal goals of

rights, and encourages the use of rehabilitative and treatment resources C., 124 N.H. 222, 224 (1983). It “guarantees children their constitutional of a delay caused or requested by the juvenile” because, in such a case, the

p. 4 required to forfeit jurisdiction if noncompliance with the time limit “is the result

long been part of our interpretation of RSA 169-B:14, II: the court is not

juvenile, the effect of which prevented the hearing from occurring. See id. at

the first indictment must be included in the speedy trial calculation. In re

speedy trial, id. at 160, we distinguished the speedy trial principle set forth in 159, 161-62. Thus, our decision in that case implicated the exception that has mother waived timely service. Id. The State objected to dismissal of the the delay in holding the adjudicatory hearing was due to the motion filed by the brackets omitted). However, we found that this rationale did not apply because by the simple expedient of dismissing and reindicting.” Id. (quotation and was to prevent the government from “nullifying a defendant’s speedy trial rights Kirsten P, 158 N.H. at 161. We noted that the reasoning behind this principle We begin by reviewing In re Kirsten P. In that case, the juvenile moved the statute. Id. There was nothing to suggest that, absent the juvenile’s dismisses charges and subsequently reindicts, the time during the pendency of disagree. State v. Adams, 133 N.H. 818 (1991). When the government voluntarily

resolution of alleged delinquency is analogous to an adult offender’s right to a Id. at 162-63. Recognizing that the juvenile’s right to the expeditious both were apparently present at the arraignment, and despite the fact that her and restart the clock upon the juvenile’s arraignment on the second petition. circumstances presented in that case, to allow the State to refile the petition On appeal, we concluded that it was not improper, under the Relying upon In re Kirsten P., the State argues, and the trial court

held in a timely manner. Id. at 159-63. language and intent of RSA 169-B:14, II. motion, the adjudicatory hearing on the original petition would not have been

waiver of service was sufficient to satisfy the notice requirements set forth in that threatens the policy behind the time limits in RSA 169-B:14, II.” We State; rather, the record reflected that the State believed that the mother’s petition. Id. at 162. The juvenile did not allege bad faith on the part of the

mother and legal custodian had actual notice of the proceedings, since they mother and legal custodian despite the fact that it appeared that both her 158 N.H. at 159. She sought dismissal based upon improper service to her to dismiss the original petition sixteen days after arraignment. In re Kirsten P., deadline” because allowing the State to do so would run counter to the a dismissal for failure to present evidence within the adjudicatory hearing

“the dismissal and re-filing of the petition in this case were not of a character run again at the arraignment on the refiled petition. The State contends that juvenile’s motion, the thirty-day time limit for an adjudicatory hearing began to agreed, that because the original delinquency petition was dismissed upon the within the time limit. See In re Eric C., 124 N.H. at 224. p. 5 no fault of the juvenile” that the initial adjudicatory hearing was not held hearing to be delayed beyond the statutory time limit. Indeed, it was “through

hearing nor took any action that could properly be characterized as causing the

day extension under RSA 169-B:14, II. Cf. In re Juvenile 2007-150, 156 N.H. petition. The State did not request a continuance or that it be given a fourteen could not go forward with the hearing and did not object to dismissal of the juvenile’s motion, the juvenile neither waived his right to a timely adjudicatory reconsideration. Thus, although the original petition was dismissed upon the its witnesses from appearing at the hearing. The State did not move for

State could not go forward with the hearing. The State acknowledged that it protections at the core of RSA 169-B:14, II. See In re Kirsten P., 158 N.H. at reconsideration in the event that it later learned that good cause had prevented

hearing because none of the State’s witnesses was present and, therefore, the “unlimited discretion” upon the State, thereby undermining the due process In this case, the juvenile moved to dismiss at the original adjudicatory not appear). Rather, the only relief the State requested was leave to move for delay he has caused”). Unlike In re Kirsten P., to allow the statutory time limits set forth in RSA

limits. See In re Russell C., 120 N.H. at 268; cf. State v. Bernaby, 139 N.H.

163. The State argues that dismissal and refiling of the petition in this case

169-B:14, II to restart under the circumstances of this case would confer prosecutor requested a continuance when one of his subpoenaed witnesses did request for continuances because a “defendant cannot take advantage of a where adjudicatory hearing began within thirty days of arraignment but dismiss for failing to complete adjudicatory hearing within statutory time limit

whether the juvenile caused the delay and impliedly waived the statutory time

a speedy trial where delay was due, in part, to defendant’s waiver of right and at 802 (holding that trial court did not err in denying juvenile’s motion to

must depend upon the reason for the dismissal of the original petition – that is, B:14, II, as well as our reasoning in adult offender speedy trial cases, the result motion. Rather, consistent with our long-standing interpretation of RSA 169-

a successful motion by the juvenile.” In re Kirsten P., 158 N.H. at 162. This forth in RSA 169-B:14, II restarts when the original petition is dismissed upon

420, 423 (1995) (concluding that trial court did not deny defendant his right to

juvenile “will be deemed to have waived the time limits.” In re Russell C., 120

restart the clock whenever the original petition is dismissed upon the juvenile’s language cannot be read, however, as allowing the State to refile a petition and

principles . . . [we have adopted in criminal cases], . . . the statutory clock set the State’s position. We stated that “consistent with [the] speedy trial To be sure, In re Kirsten P. contains language that appears to support

N.H. at 2 p. 6 68. 6

the second petition. See id. at 225.

Accordingly, the trial court “forfeited jurisdiction” and should have dismissed

process, In re Eric C., 124 N.H. at 225, and we have said that the district court missing.” These mandatory time limits are rooted in the juvenile’s right to due

State did not request an extension of the time limit pursuant to the statute. thirty-day time limit, the delay was not attributable to the juvenile, and the

DALIANIS, C.J., and HICKS, LYNN and BASSETT, JJ., concurred.

Reversed. “dismissal was precipitated by the fact that the State’s witnesses were does not serve to threaten the policy behind the statutory time limits because

Here, the original adjudicatory hearing was not held within the mandatory adjudicatory hearing is not held within the statutory time limits, id. at 223-24. must dismiss a juvenile petition when, through no fault of the juvenile, an