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2014-0579, JMJ Properties, LLC v. Town of Auburn
76:14 (2012) does not apply under the circumstances in this case; and (2) the property. JMJ argues that the trial court erred when it concluded that: (1) RSA supplemental 2012 property tax bills based upon the market value of the use assessment because of a July 2011 change in use, was authorized to issue Town, after learning in 2012 that JMJ’s property no longer qualified for current motion for summary judgment filed by JMJ. The trial court ruled that the judgment filed by the respondent, the Town of Auburn, and denying the cro ss order of the Superior Court (Delker, J.) granting the motion for summary BASSETT, J. The petitioner, JMJ Properties, LLC (JMJ), appeal s an
the brief), for the respondent. Wadleigh, Starr & Peters, PLLC, of Manchester (Jennifer L. St. Hilaire on
brief), for the petitioner. Bussiere & Bussiere, P.A., of Manchester (Emile R. Bussiere, Jr. on the
Opinion Issued: August 11, 2015 Submitted: March 31, 2015
TOWN OF AUBURN
v.
JMJ PROPERTIES, LLC
No. 2014 - 579 Rockingham
___________________________
THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh. us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 to press. Errors may be reported by E - mail at the following address: editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concor d, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as 2
“undervalued property, as calculated by the assessing authority, has not under RSA 76:14 for property that had been undervalued because at 141 - 44 (concluding that municipality could not issue supplemental tax bill 143 N.H. 140 (1998), do not apply to this case. See Pheasant Lane, 143 N.H. also ruled that RSA 76:14 and Pheasant Lane Realty Trust v. City of Nashua, statutory authority granted in RSA 79 - A:7.” See RSA 79 - A: 7. The trial court . . . based on the ad valorem value were pro perly issued pursuant to the been issued,” and, therefore, “the supplemental tax bills issued by the Town Town to tax the land at its full ad valorem value only after the LUCT bill ha[d] The trial court concl uded that RSA 79 - A:7 “specifically authoriz[ed] [the]
same issue. bills. JMJ objected, and filed a cross - motion for summary judgment on that asserting that it had the authority under RSA 76:14 to issue supplemental tax property.” The Town filed a motion for summary judgment on the first issue, ( 2) the Town’s “assessment was higher than the fair market value of the JMJ property had not “escaped taxation” for that tax year, see RSA 76:14; and because it had alrea dy issued tax bill s for the 2012 tax year, and, therefore, the that: (1) under RSA 76:14, the Town could not issue supplemental tax bil ls JMJ appea led the Town’s decision to the superior c ourt. JMJ assert ed
individual lots. The Town denied the request to abate the supplemental tax bills on the to issue supplemental tax bills only when property has “escaped taxation”). valuation of each lot was excessive. See RSA 76: 14 (permitting municipalities the supplemental tax bills in violation of RSA 76:14, and that the market JMJ requested an abatement, arguing that the Town impr operly issued
year beginning on April 1, 2012. individual lots, which reflected the market value of each lot for the entire tax tax bill for the entire parcel. It then issued supplemental tax bills for the parcel was still in current use as of April 1, 2012, the Town “abated” th e 2012 issued the 2012 tax bill based upon the incorrect understanding that the Tax (LUCT) bill for the entire subdivision. Additionally, because the Town the summer of 2012. I n December 2012, the Town issued a Land Use Change RSA 79 - A:7, I. T he Town, however, did not learn about the change in use until parcel changed to a use that did not qualify for current use assessment. See construction of a road in the subdivision. Accordingly, at that time, the entire current use status for the 2011 and 2012 tax year s. In July 2011, JMJ began subdivision in Auburn. The Town taxed the entire parcel based upon its The material facts are not in dispute. JMJ owns an 18 - lot cluster
under these circumstances, w e affirm. we hold that RSA 79 - A:7 authorizes the Town to issue supplemental tax bills supplemental tax bills in December 2012 based upon market value. Because Town had the authority pursuant to RSA 79 - A:7 (Supp. 2014) to issue 3
Sugar Hill v. Town of Sugar Hill, 164 N.H. 36, 38 - 39 (2012). Our goal is to the overall statutory scheme an d not in isolation. Henderson Holdings at to include. Id. at 341 - 42. Furthermore, we interpret statutes in the context of legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit legislative inte nt from the statute as written and will not consider what the ascribe the plain and ordin ary meanings to the words used. Id. We interpret considered as a whole. Id. We first examine the language of the statute and arbiters of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a sta tute 321, 341 (2014). On questions of statutory interpretation, we are the final We review matters of statutory interpretation de novo. Eby v. State, 166 N.H. Resolution of this issue requires us to engage in statutory interpretation.
we will address the issue on t he merits. See id. because this case involves an issue important to municipalities and taxpayers, that can be answered without further development of the factual record, and authoriz ed the Town to issue supplemental tax bills presents a question of law the trial court. Nonetheless, because the issue of whether RSA 79 - A:7 court. Id. Here, JMJ did not challenge the application of RSA 79 - A:7 before P reservation is a limitation on the parties to an appeal and not the reviewing Comm’n, 166 N.H. 374, 377 (2014). This rule, however, is not absolute. Id. were not timel y raised before the trial court. Camire v. Gunstock Area not preserved for our review. Ordinarily, we will not review arguments that issue the supplemental tax bills. The Town contends that this argument was the Town to wait until the beginning of the new tax year — April 1, 2013 — to 2012 tax year based upon the property’s market value, rather than requiring allowed the Town to issue supplemental tax bills in December 2012 for the JMJ argues that the trial court erred when it found that RSA 79 - A:7
v. Cricklewood on the Bellamy Trust, 147 N.H. 7 33, 736 (2002). application of the law to the facts. Crickl ewood on the Be llamy Condo. Assoc. set of undisputed facts, we need only review, de novo, t he trial court’ s If, as i n this case, the parties filed cross - motions for summary judgmen t on a then we will affirm the grant of summary judgment.” Id. (quotation omitted). material fact and if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, 282 (2013). “If our review of that evidence discloses no genuine issue of matter of law. Granite State Mgmt. & Res. v. City of Concord, 165 N.H. 277, exists, we determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a its capacity as the nonmoving party and, if no genuine issue of material fact judgment, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to each party in In reviewing the trial court’ s rulings on cross - motions for summary
valuation issue had been resolved by agreement. This appeal followed. trial. Shortly thereafter, the parties advised the court that the market partial summary judgment, denied JMJ’s cross - motion, and set the case for escaped taxation”). Accordingl y, the trial court granted the Town’s motion for 4
(unabridged ed. 2002). If the legislature had intended that municipalities be “from then on.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2372 comports with the plain and ordinary meaning of “therea fter”: “after that” or in use, regardless of when the LUCT bill is issued. This interpretation because the market value assessment is authorized at the time of the change trial court’s ultimate determination; however, it is unnecessarily limited The interpretation of “thereafter” advanced by the Town supports the
assessment s of the lots. We conclude that the trial court did not err. issue supplemental tax bill s in December 2012 based upon market value issuance of the LUCT bill in late 2 012, RSA 79 - A:7 aut horized the Town to when it concluded that, given the change in use in 2011 and the Town’s Consequently, t he narrow question before us is whether the trial court erred to property owners and contravene the purpose of the statutory scheme. LUCT bill to tax properties based upon market values would result in a windfall municipalities to wait un til the tax year that begins after the issuance of the means anytime after the LUCT bill is issued. T he Town c ontends that requiring April 1, 2013. The Town counters that “thereafter” as used in RSA 79 - A:7, II(f) year after the issuance of the LUCT bill, which, in this case, means on or after based up on the market value of each lot until after the beginning of the tax JMJ argues that the Town could not issue tax bills for the individual lots
property is located “at the time of the c hange in use.” RSA 79 - A:7, II. A:7, I. The LUCT is “due and payable” to the municipality in which the changed to a use which does not qualify for current use assessment.” RSA 79 current use values . . . shall be subject to a land use change tax when it is “L and which has been classified as open space land and assessed at
and true value.” RS A 75:1 (2012) (amended 2013, 201 4). taxed based upon its “market value,” which is defined as “the property’s full II(f). RSA 75:1, in turn, requires that property that is not in current use be cu rrent use assessment shall be taxed at its full RSA 75:1 value.” RSA 79 - A:7, “[t]hereafter, the land which has changed to a use which does not qualify for values until a change in land use occurs.” The statute also provides that, space land and assessed at current use values shall be assessed at current use 79 - A:5 (2012). Pursuant to RSA 79 - A:7, I - a, “[l]and which i s classified as open taxed at its current use, rather than at its highest and best use.” Id.; see RSA (quotations omitted). “To effectuate this purpose, open space land may be open space usage.” Appeal of Town of Charlestown, 166 N.H. 498, 500 (2014) the loss of open space due to property taxation at values inco mpatible with the public interest to encourage the preservation of open space and to prevent & Supp. 2014). The statute “reflects the legislat ure’s determination that it is in RSA chapter 79 - A governs current use taxation. See RSA ch. 79 - A (2012
the policy sought to be advanced by the entire statutory scheme. Id. at 39. apply statutes in light of the legislature’s intent in enacting them and in light of 5
DALIANIS, C.J.
, and HICKS, CONBOY, and LYNN, JJ., concurred.
Affirmed.
issuance of supplemental tax bills was authorized under RSA 76:14. of the Town, we need not address th e Town’s alternative argument that its Because w e affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor
issuance of supplemental tax bills in December 2012. entire statutory scheme, we hold that RSA 79 - A:7 authorized the Town’s Accordingly, given the plain language of RSA 79 - A:7 and the purpose of the taxed the parcel based upon its “full RSA 7 5:1 value.” RSA 79 - A:7, II (c), (f). assessment. The reafter, the Town issued a LUCT bill in December 2012, and it 2012 tax year — the entire parcel no longer qualified for current use 2011. Further, there is no dispute that on April 1, 2012 — the beginning of the entire parcel owned by JMJ no longer qualified for current use status as of July Here, it is undis puted that, because of the construction of the road, the
tax burden to other taxpayers in the municipality. contravene the statute’s purpose, and improperly and unfairly shift the 2012 change in current use status at the time it issued the 2012 tax bill would individual lots merely because the Tow n was not aware of the property’s paying 2012 property taxes based upon the “full and true value” of the change in land use occurs.” RSA 79 - A:7, I - a. Therefore, to allow JMJ to avoid statute specifi es that land shall be assessed at current use values only “until a value of the land once it is no longer in current use.” Id. at 118. I ndeed, the entitle the landowner or developer to a reduced assessment of the full and true (200 5) (quotation omitted). “[T] hat the land was once in current use does not current use.” Woodview Dev. Corp. v. Town of Pelham, 152 N.H. 114, 116 reducing property taxes on land that the taxpayer enrolls as open space land in of the current use statute is to encourage the preservation of open space, by embodied by the entire statutory scheme relating to cur rent use. “The purpose Our interpretation of RSA 79 - A:7, II(f) is also consistent with the policy
bill. See RSA 79 - A:7. municipality learns that the change in use occurred, or when it issues a LUCT authorized at the time of the change in use, regardless of when the N.H. at 342. Therefore, we conclude that a market value assessment is language to the statute that the legislature did not see fit to include. Eby, 166 in use and the taxation of property based upon market value. We will not add used “thereafter” without reference to any required interval between the change have included language to that effect. See RSA 7 5:1. Rather, the legislature until the tax year after the issuance of the LUCT bill, as JMJ contends, it could barred from issuing tax bills based upon “the property’s full and true value”