2013-0885, City of Keene v. James Cleaveland & a.

brief), for New Hampshire Civil Liberties Union, as amicus curiae. New Hampshire Civil Liberties Union, of Concord (Gilles R. Bissonnette on the Nixon Peabody LLP, of Manchester (Anthony J. Gal dieri on the brief), and

Respondent Pete Eyre, for himself, filed no brief.

Bernard a/k/a Ian Freem an, and Graham Colson. and orally), for respondent s James Cleaveland, Garrett Ean, Kate Ager, Ian Backus, Meyer & Branch, LLP, of Manchester (Jon Meyer on the brief

Robert J. Dietel on the brief, and Mr. Bauer orally), for the petitioner. Gallagher, Callahan & Gartrell, P.C., of Concord (Charles P. Bauer and

No. 2013 - 885 Cheshire

page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 to press. Errors may be reported by E - mail at the following address: editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule p. 2 22 as 2

relief, alleging tortious interference with contractual relations and civil In p. 2 2013, the City petition ed f or preliminary and permanent injunctive

respondents’ activities to the city attorney. activities, complained to the Keene police department, and reported the The PEOs testified that they repeatedly asked the respondents to stop their not a criminal act, and that parking tickets are a “t hreat against [the] people.” activities to protest parking enforcement because they believe that parking is waiting outside restrooms. The respondents testified that they engage in these PEOs to quit their jobs; and waited for the PEOs during their breaks, including “racist,” and “b***h”; criticized the PEOs for issuing tickets; encouraged the from a close proximity; called the PEOs names such as “f*****g thief,” “coward,” saved you from the king’s tariff!” T he respondents also: videotaped the PEOs card on the vehicle’s windshield that reads: “Your meter expired! However, we respondents as a “save.” When the respondents “save” a vehicle, they leave a meter before a PEO could issue a ticket, a process referred to by the closely behind the PEOs, identifying expired parking meters and fil ling the enforcement in Keene. O n an almost daily basis, t he respondents followed tickets. I n December p. 2 2012, t he respondents began protesting parking foot and in marked vehicles, monitoring parking meters and issuing parking parking laws and regulations in Keene. The PEOs patrol downtown Keene on at the evidentiary hearing. The City employs PEOs to enforce motor vehicle The follo wing facts are drawn from the City’s pleadings, or were adduced

and remand. preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. We affirm in part, vacate in part, U.S. CONST. amend. I. The trial court also denied the City’s petition for clai ms wer e barred by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. evidentiary hearing, the trial court dismissed the action, ruling that the City’s money into expired parking meters before a parking ticket wa s issued. After an through downtown Keene, videotaping them, criticizing their work, and putting behind the City’s parking enforcement officers (PEOs) on their da ily patrols Ian Freeman, Graham Colson, and Pete Eyre, because they followed close ly respondents, James Cleaveland, Garrett Ean, Kate Ager, Ian Bernard a/k/a for preliminary and permanent injunct ive relief. The City filed suit against the contractual relations, negligence, and civil conspiracy, and denying its request Superior Court (Kissinger, J.) dismissing its claims of tortious interference with BASSETT, J. The petitioner, the City of Keene, appeals an order of the

on the brief and orally) as amicus curiae. New Hampshire Municipal Association, of Concord (Stephen C. Buckley, p. 3 3

opinion. as having implicitly granted the City’s motion to amend and briefly address this claim in this identifies civil conspiracy as one of the claims filed against the respondents, we construe the order motion to amend at the time of the evidentiary hearing. However, because the trial court order to add a claim of civil conspiracy. It appears that the tri al court had not ruled on the City’s interference with contractual relations. In July 201 p. 3 3, the City filed a motion to amend its petition The City’s original petition for injunctive relief, filed in May 2013, alleged only tortious 1

anxiety and made them feel harassed. One PEO testified that he was the respondents — sometimes only a foot away from them — caused the PEOs respondents’ motion to dismiss. The PEOs testified that the close proximity of argument on both the City’s petition for preliminary injunctive relief and the The trial court held a three - day evidentiary hearing and heard legal

factual allegations as those set forth in the City’s petition for injunctive relief. contractual relations and negligence. These claims were based up on the same sustained by the City because of the respondents’ tortious interfe rence with respondents, requesting a jury trial and seeking money damages for injuries Shortly thereafter, the City filed a separate civil complaint against the

8, 22. Hampshire Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amen d. I; N.H. CONST. pt. I, arts. as their right to government accountability under Part I, Article 8 of the New Constitution and Part I, Article 22 of the New Hampshire Constitution, as well violated the ir right to free speech under the First Amendment of the Federal petition failed to state a claim for tortious interfere nce, and that the claim The respondents filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the City’s

while the PEOs are performing their duties. establishing a safety zone betwe en the PEOs and [the] Respondents interfering with, harassing, and intimidating the PEOs by [the City] seeks only to prevent Respondents from taunting, a comfortable remove or otherwise to express their opinion; rather, exercising their constitutional rights to video record the PEOs from [The City] does not seek an Order to prevent Respondents from

The petition contained the following statement: Keene.” The City did not seek to prevent the respondents from filling meters. is on duty performing his or her employment d uties as required by the City of with any PEO” within, “a safety zone of fifty (50) feet of any PEO while that PEO or control” from “coming within,” “video recording” within, or “communicating the “Respondents, or anyone under their direction, supervision, employment, creating a hostile work environment for the PEOs. The City sought to enjoin ongoing efforts to prevent them from performing their official duties, thus City’s contractual relations with the PEOs by engaging in persistent and respondents, acting individually and in concert, tortiously interfe red with the conspiracy to commit tortious interference. The City asserted that the 1 p. 4 4

reasonable distanc e back.” See Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir. discourse,” and “get their message out” as long as they did so from “a court that the y had constitutionally protected rights to “videotape,” “have restrict the content of the respondents’ speech, and acknowledged to the trial that the Court deem s appropriate.” The City emphasized that it did not seek to distance between two parking meters — or “any other reasonable injunction order a “safety zone” around an on - duty PEO of 15 feet — approximately the hearing, the City again narrowed its reque sted relief, asking the trial court to engag[ing] in the behavior” alleged. (Emphasis added.) Next, a t the close of the it was seeking to prohibit the respondents from being “in their proximity and the respondents from merely “being withi n the proximity of the officers”; rather, zone” around the PEOs. The City explained that it was not seeking to enjoin blocking, [and] intimidating or harassing” conduct within a 30 - foot “safety enga ging in “touching, taunting, obstructing, detaining, hindering, impeding, PEO, it modified its request, asking that the respondents be prohibited from that would bar the respondents “from coming within” 50 feet of any on - duty injunctive relief. First, rather than seeking the originally requested injunction During the course of the hearing, the City narrowed its request for

filling meters. their activities, and that videotaping required closer proximity to the PEOs than th at distances between five and fifteen feet away from the PEOs were “ideal” for respondents to raise their voices to be heard. The respondents also asserted the public, and might c reate an antagonistic environment by requiring the “considerable infringement” on the respondents’ ability to get their message to injunction requiring the respondents to stay away fro m the PEOs would be a Several of the respondents testified as well. Cleaveland stated that an

asserted could result in pedestrian injuries or vehicle collisions. streets, and that the respondents “dart[ ] across” the street, which the City specifically, that the respondents distract the PEOs as they drive on city quitting her job. The City also offered testimony about the risk to public safety: changed her work schedule to avoid the respondents, and has considered to remove one of the respondents’ cards from a car windshield. S he has on one occasion, one of the respondents grabbed her wrist when she attempted not feel safe when the respondents follow her at work. She also testified that, followed her in and out of city buildings on her breaks, testified that she does A third, who complained that the respondents waited outside her car and she is unable to do her job because she is “trying to avoid [the respondents].” anticipation” of “waiti ng for [the respondents] to show up,” and claimed that testified that she is “tense and uptight all the time” because of the “awful and [his] time off,” and he felt he was “backed into a corner.” Another PEO h arassment and intimidation [had] started to boil over into [his] personal life would bump into him. He ultimately resigned because “the constant same time, and that they followed him so closely that if he turned around, they sometimes followed on his patrols by two or three of the respondents at the p. 5 5

protected right to videotape the PEOs, it argues that the respondents’ actions constitutionally protecte d, and that the respondents have a constitutionally the City acknowledges on appeal that the content of the respondents’ speech is City’s tortious interference, civil conspiracy, and negligence claims. Although The City first argues that the trial court erred when it dismissed the

appeal followed. was warranted “[g]iven the dismissal of the tortious interference claim.” This injunctive relief, reasoning that neither a temporary nor permanent injunction (Quotations and cit ations omitted.) The court also denied the City’ s request for

expression. or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a particular risk that the jury will find liability on the basis of the juror s’ tastes “improper.” Such a subjective standard creates an unreasonable exists depends on whether a jury finds the Re spondents’ conduct right to free speech. . . . [W]hether a tortious interference claim unreasonably prevent the Respondents [ ] from exercising their

activities, imposing liability for tortious interference would: impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on th e respondents’ protections.” The trial court observed that, although the City could lawfully Keene does not subject their speech and expressive conduct to lesser people disagree with the Respo ndents as to the role of parking enforcement in the videotaping of government officials, and noted that “[m]erely because many Amendment protects “sharing common views,” “peaceful pamphleteering,” and Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1219. The trial court explained that the First therefore, were “entitled to special protection” under the First Amendment. traditional public forum — the streets and sidewalks of Keene — and, expressive activities involved a matter of public concern and occurred in a court analyzed the respondents’ actions and concluded that their speech and Relying up on Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 121 p. 5 5 - 19 (2011), the trial

under the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution.” infringement [up]on the Respondents’ right to free speech and expression this issue as the enforcement of [the tortious interference claim] is an under t hese circumstances, the trial court concluded that it “need not reach expressing skepticism as to the viability of the City’s tortious interference claim The trial court granted the respondents’ motion to dismiss. After

interfering with the PEOs ’ ability to perform their jobs. sought to restrict only those aspects of the respondents’ conduct that were place . . . fits comfortably within [First Amendment] principles.”). The City 2011) (“The filming of government officials engaged i n their duties in a public p. 6 6

state - law tort is not necessarily unprotected speech,” and, as the United States state tort suits . . . .” Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1215. “[S] peech constituting a mak e no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech’ — can serve as a defense in “The Free Speech Clause of t he First Amendment — ‘Congress shall

respondents’ r ight to free speech under the First Amendment. tortious interference based upon their alleged activities would infringe up on the because we agree with the trial cou rt that holding the respondents liable for interference claim can exist under the circumstances present in this case the government. However, we need not decide whether a viable tortious a torti ous interference claim can exist when private citizens engage in protest of I nitial ly, we note that we share the trial court’s skepticism as to whether

sufficient to outweigh the harm that his conduct is designed to produce.”). interest and the social interest in allowing the freedom claimed by him are (19 p. 6 65) (“The issue is whe ther in the given circumstances [the defendant’s] (quotation omitted); see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 cm t. c at 10 interest of greater public import than is the social interest invaded.” Id. not improper when the interference in contractual relations fosters a social Inc. v. Wells, 839 F.2d 155, 159 (3 d Cir. 1988) (quotation omitted). “Action is character of the defendant’s conduct.” B rownsville Golden Age Nursing Home, alleged conduct is “improper” requires an “inquiry into the mental and moral Aeronautics, 152 N.H. 30, 40 - 41 (2005) (emphases omitted). Whether the pla intiff was damaged by such interference.” Hughes v. N.H. Div. of intentionally and improperly interfered with this relationship; and (4) the third party; (2) the defendant knew of this relationship; (3) the defendant plaintiff must show that: “(1) the plaintiff had an economic relationship with a To establish liability for tortious interference with contra ctual relations, a

address the parties’ arguments under the Federal Constitution. not address the respondents’ arguments under the State Constitution, we first respondents’ activities w ere protected under the Federal Constitution and did Ball, 124 N.H. 22 p. 6 6, 231 - 33 (1983), b ecause the trial court ruled that the Constitution and rely on federal law only to aid in our analysis, see State v. Although we normally address constitutional questions first under the State trial court’s analysis de novo. State v. Bailey, 166 N.H. 53 p. 7 7, 540 (2014). argument s present a question of constitutional law; therefore, we review the First Amendmen t to allow the City’s civil claims to proceed to a jury. These respondents counter that the trial court correctly ruled that it would violate the unconstitutionally burdening the respondents’ right to free speech. The asserts, therefore, that a jury may impose tort liability without of political expression,” and, t herefore, not constitutionally p rotected. The City contends that this conduct is “significantly harassing behavior under the guise constitute “improper” interference with the PEOs’ employment duties. The City lurking outside bathrooms, yelling loudly, and filming from close proximity” — — “following closely, chasing, running after, approaching quickly from behind, 7

“challenged conduct” — has a tortious impact on the PEOs, and it would not challenge, and which, for the purpose of clarity, we will refer to as the that t his particular conduct — the lawfulness of which it continues to proximity” — are not protected by the First Amendment. The City contends behind, lurking outside bathrooms, yelling loudly, and filming from close conduct — “following closely, chasing, running after, approaching quickl y from T he City nonetheless asserts that specific aspects of the respondents’

at 1219. “cannot be restricted simply because it is upsetting or arouses contempt.” Id. Indeed, the Supreme Court has concluded that the conten t of protected speech the issues they highlight . . . are matters of public import.” Id. at 121 p. 7 7. derogatory fashion — may “fall short of refined social or political commen tary, aspects of the respondents’ s peech — such as referring to the PEOs in a involves challenging “the political authority of the City.” Although certain regulate parking — plainly relates to issues o f public concern because it PEOs for enforcing parking regulations and questioning the City’s authority to of Keene. As the trial court observed, the respondents’ speech — criticizing the activities take place in a traditional public forum — the sidewalks and streets because it relates to a matter of public concern, and that the respondents’ the content of the respondents’ speech is protected by the First Amendment On appeal, the City does not challenge the trial court’s conclusion s that

said, where it was said, and how it was said.” Id. necessary to evaluate all the circumstances of the speec h, including what was considering content, form, and context, no factor is dispositive, and it is revealed by the whole record.” Id. at 1216 (quotations omitted). “In requires us to exami ne the content, form, and context of that speech, as government.” Id. “Deciding whether speech is of public or private concer n concerning public affairs is more than self - expression; it is the essence of self protection.” Id. at 1215 (qu otation omitted). “That is because speech on matters of public concern “is at the hear t of the First Amendm ent’s political, social, or other concern to the community . . . .” Id. at 1216. Speech public concern when it can be fairly considered as relating to any matter of place in a traditional public forum. Id. at 1215. “Speech deals with matters of circumstances of the case,” including whether the challenged activities take whether the “speech is of public or private concern, as determined by al l the Whether speech is constitutionally protecte d requires an analysis of

violent funeral protestors). emotional distress, intrusion upon seclusion, and civil conspiracy against non - 1220 (holding that First Amendment bars claims of intentional infliction of First Amendment bars certain state tort claims. See Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at Access Television, 111 F.3d 1395, 1401 n.2 ( p. 8 8th Cir. 199 p. 7 7). That is why the because the speech is defined as a state - law tort.” Coplin v. Fairfield Public Supreme Court has made clear, “states may not regulate speech merely 8

to tort liability. Claiborne Hardware Co., 45 p. 8 8 U.S. at 933. protesters’ non - violent activity was constitutionally protected and not subject protection,” because violence did not “color[ ] the entire collective effort,” the held that although violent conduct “is beyond the pale of constitutio nal communication need not m eet standards of acceptability”). The Court further offensive to them” because “so long as the means are peaceful, the (1971) (allowing organization to hand out leaflets about “practices [that] were at 933; see also Org anization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 threats of social ostracism cannot provide the basis for a damages award.” Id. at 916. The Sup reme Court concluded that the “use of speeches, marches, and establishments. Id. at 894. Some of the protesters committed violent acts. Id. potential black customers to discourage them from patronizing the boycotted in a pattern of “intimidation, threats, social ostracism, [and] vilification” of organized a boycott of their businesses. Id. at 889 - 91. The protesters engaged tortious interference claim made in this case — after civil rights activists for malicious interference with their businesses — a tort analogous to the In Claiborne Hardware Co., a group of merchants sought damages in tort

lawsuit.” (quotation omitted)). are fragile enough without adding the additional threat of destr uction by Claiborne Hardware Co., 45 p. 8 8 U.S. at 93 1 - 32 (“The rights of political association public import.” Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1215 - 16 (quotations omitted); cf. public issues,” and “pose the risk of a reac tion of self - censorship on matters of engaging in protected activity may undermine “the free and robust debate of First Amendment is implicated because the mere threat of tort liability for nonviolent, protecte d activity.” Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. at 918. The violent conduct, it may not award compensation for the consequences of “[w]hile the State legitimately may impose damages for the consequences of improper interference even when exercised by way of a boycott.”). Further, Cir. 1980) (“[T] he right to petition is of such importance that it is not an also State of Mo. v. Nat. Organization for Women, 620 F.2d 1301, 1317 (8th change, even if that protest activity causes economic harm. See id. at 916; see engage in public protest for the purpose of influencing societal or governmental (1982). For instance, the First Amendment protects the right of individuals to to damages liability.” NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 - 17 by the First Amendment imposes restraints on the grounds that may give rise As the Supreme Court has observed, “the presence of activity protected

verbal acts from tort liability. We agree with the respondents. “absent acts of significant violence,” the First Amendment protects their non protection,” and, therefore, are insulated from tort liability. They assert that, did not involve speech [are] expressive conduct entitled to First Amendment challenged conduct. The respondents counter that “[e]ven those activities that for the trial court to pote ntially subject the responde nts to tort liability for the violate the First Amendment either for a jury to adjudicate the City’s claims, or p. 9 9

First Amendment rights than a narrowly tailored injunction targeting specific City responds that a municipal ordinance would “run a greater risk of chilling requested injunctive r elief would violate their First Amendment rights. The or any civil or criminal law. The respondents further contend that the the City has not pleaded that the challenged conduct violates a city ordinance tortious interference claim,” and that injunctive relief is not warranted because that the trial court properly denied an injunction “[g]iven the dismissal of the preserving public safety and protecting the PEOs. The respondents counter because of the impact of the challenged conduct up on the City’s interests in tortious interference claim, the trial court should ha ve issued an injunction injunction,” and, therefore, notwithstanding the trial court’s dismissal of the asserts that “[t]hese interests provide permissible grounds to grant an before it ruled on the City’s request for injunctive relief. The City further workplace for its employees — against the respondents’ right to free speech governmental interests” — preserving public safety and providing a safe that the trial court erred when it failed to balance the City’s “significant request for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. T he City contend s The City next argues that the trial court erred when it denied the City’s

negligence. tortious interference with contractual relations, civil conspiracy, and (2007). Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the City’s claims of sufficiently for our review. See Auger v. Town of Strafford, 156 N.H. 64, 68 City’s negligence claim. However, the City has failed to develop this argument T he City also argues that the trial c ourt erred when it dismissed the

Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1220. respondents are liable for conspiring to commit the very same tort. See that the First Amendment bars the City from pursuing its claim that the its claim for tortious interference w ith contractual relations, we also conclude Because we hold that the First Amendment bars the City from pursuing

that the tortious interference claim is also barred by the State Constitution. rights. Given this conclusion, we need not reach the respondents’ argument contractual relations claim would violate the respondents ’ First Amendment correctly determined that enforcing the City’s tortious interference with challenged conduct. Id. at p. 9 933. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court that the First Amendment shields the respondents from tort li ability for the embarrass others or coerce them into action.” Id. at 9 p. 10 10. We hold, therefore, conduct “does not lose its protected character . . . simply because it may challenged conduct involves viole nt conduct. See id. at 918. Moreover, persuade the PEOs to leave their positions. There is no allegation that the intended to draw attention to the City’s parking enforcement operations and to Here, the challenged conduct, like the respondents’ protected speech, is 10

PEOs “felt intimidated and harassed and have been unable to perform their job relations and civil conspiracy — the City also specifically alleged that: (1) the its petition for injunctive relief — tortious interference with contractual warranted. Al though the City expressly pleaded only two underlying claims in case prior to making its determination as to whether injunctive relief was Here, the trial court did not consider the factual circ umstances of the

Town of Atkinson, 164 N.H. at 66. unsustainable exercise of discretion, or clearly erroneo us findings of fact. court with regard to the issuance of an injunction absent an error of law, an p. 10 1008, 1011 (1981) (quotation omitted). We will uphold the decision of the trial litigants in the protection of their le gal rights.” Sands v. Stevens, 121 N.H. considerable discretion in determining whether equity should intervene to aid the division line between equity and law is not precise .. . courts have each case.” Exeter Realty Co. v. Buck, 104 N.H. 199, 200 (1962). “[B]ecause grant equitable relief “necessarily depends upon the factual circumstances in Atkinson v. Malborn Realty Trust, 164 N.H. 62, 66 (2012). The decision to consideration of the facts and established principles of equity.” Town of “It is within the trial court’s sound discretion to grant an inj unction after

659, 668 (2013). injunction issue before us. See Axenics, Inc. v. Turner Constr. Co., 164 N.H. question presented by the City in its notice of appeal fairly encompasses the parties’ right[] to protest governmental operations[.]” We co nclude that the substantial interference, harassment, and intimidation agai nst the private court erred in failing to balance the public employees’ right to work without Id. The City’s notice of appeal present ed the question of “whether the [trial]

therein. deemed to include every subsidiary question fairly comprised appeal document. The statement of a question presented will be shall be the same as the question previously set forth in the exactly as it was in the appeal document, the question presented While the statement of a question [in a brief] need not be worded

part: See Sup. Ct. R. 16(3)(b). Supreme Court Rule 16(3)(b) provides, in relevant appeal, and is accordin gly improper pursuant to Rule 16 [(3)] (b) of this Court.” injunctive relief was “not stated as a question presented in [the City’s] notice of issue of whether the trial court erred when it denied the City’s request for As a threshold matter, we address the respondents’ argument that the

injunctive relief without considering the particular circumstances of the case. underlying tortious interference claim, it denied the City’s request for whether the trial court erred when, solely because it had dismissed the misconduct by specific individuals.” The qu estion before us, therefore, is p. 11 11

s ufficient to warrant properly tailored injunctive relief. interests and factual circumstances asserted by the City in its petition are remand for the trial court to address the issue of whether the governmental vacate the trial court’s denial of the City’s request for i njunctive relief, and with a purpose to hinder or interfere with a public servant”). Accordingly, w e it unlawful to use “intimidation . . . or engage[ ] in any other unlawful conduct to enforce a valid public policy of [the] State”); cf. RSA 642:1, I (2007) (making (granting injunction “pursuant to the court’s authority to grant equitable relief asserted by the City. See Murray v. Lawson, 649 A.2d 1253, 1263 (N.J. 1994) an injunction should issue based upon the governmental and policy interests failed to consider the particular factual circumstances of the case and whether testimony of the PEOs at the hearing, we hold that the trial court erred when it the safety o f the PEOs, pedestrians, and the motoring public, and given the In light of the City’s allegations that the challenged conduct threatens

not shackled by rigid rules of procedure”). that court sitting in equity is “less hampered by technical difficulties” and “is case warrant equitable relief. See 27A Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 2 (2008) (stating court in undertak ing an inquiry as to whether the specific circumstances of the seeking injunctive relief is not fatal to its request; nor does it constrain the trial did not set forth its factua l allegations and legal theories as a separate count City of Manchester, 151 N.H. 30, 43 (2004) (quotation omitted). That the City take a liberal approach to the technical requirements of pleadings.” Porter v. precision, New Hampshire is a notice pleading jurisdiction, and, “[a]s such, we Although the City’s petition could perhaps have been drafted with more

relief without considering all the factual circumstances of the case. had dismissed the underlying tortious interference claim, it denied injunctive interference claim.” We hold that the trial court erred when, solely because it City’s request for injunctive relief “[g]iven the dismissal of the tortious “preserving public safety and order.” The trial court disagreed, and denied the governmental interests” in “providing a safe workplace fo r its employees” and claim is dismissed, it is entitled to equitable relief based upon its “significant The City has consistently argued that, even if the tortious interference

Respondent Cleaveland and a member of the public.” danger,” resulting, on one occasion, in a “physical altercation between [the] Respondents that place the PEOs, the public, and the Respondents in public, often creating hostile exchanges between members of the public and disregard for rules of the road”; and (5) the challeng ed conduct “agitates the danger, both by their distracting behavior and also as a result of their intimidating act;” (4) the respondents “place the PEOs and the public in surround indivi dual PEOs in groups of one, two, or more, an inherently the PEOs from doing their jobs”; (3) the respondents “frequently follow and duties”; (2) the respondents act “with the purpose and intention of preventing p. 12 12

DALIANIS, C.J.