2014-0200, State of New Hampshire v. Jeffrey Maxfield

recklessly damaged another’s property at Parker’s Motel in Lincoln. A justice of 2014). The complaint alleged that on December 14, the defendant had criminal mischief, a c lass A misdemeanor offense. See RSA 634:2 (Supp. police prepared a complaint charging the defendant, Jeffrey Maxfield, with The following facts are not in dispute. On December 21, 2011, Lincoln

the statute of limitations. We reverse and remand. dismissed a crimina l mischief charge on the ground that it was time - barred by LYNN, J. The State appeals an order of the Circuit Court (Rappa, J.) that

brief and orally, for the defendant. Christopher M. Johnson, chief appellate d efender, of Concord, on the

general, on the brief and orally), for the State. Joseph A. Foster, attorney general (Lisa L. Wolford, assistant attorney

No. 2014 - 200 2 Circuit C ourt - Plymouth District Division nd

page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh. us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 to press. Errors may be reported by E - mail at the following address: editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concor d, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule p. 2 22 as 2

advanced by the statutory scheme.” Id. interpret statutory language in light of the policy or purpose sought to be a whole.” Id. “This enables us to better discern the legislature’ s intent and to words and phrases in isolation, but rather within the context of the statute as and avoid an absurd or unjust result.” Id. “Moreover, we do not consider Id. “We construe all parts of a statute together to effectuate its overall purpose might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include.” intent f rom the statute as written and will not consider what the legislature according to its plain and ordinary meaning.” Id. “We interpret legislative to the language of the statute itself, and, if possible, construe that language expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole.” Id. “We first look interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislat ure as Appeal of Local Gov’t Ctr., 165 N.H. 790, 804 ( p. 2 2014). “In matters of statutory “Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which we review de novo.” To res olve this issue, we must engage in statutory interpretation.

the limitations period.” the warrant be executed no later than a reasonable time after the expiration of up on the issuance of an arrest warrant to toll the statute of limitations, “that defendant asks us to construe RSA 6 p. 2 25:8, V as re quiring, when the State relies statute is “literal,” it “is ultimately not reasonable.” For this reason, the time. The defendant responds that although the State’s interpretation of the an inquiry into whether the warrant was executed in a reasonable amount of commenced on the day when a warrant . . . is issued,” and does not provide for language of RSA 625:8, V (Supp. 2014) states merely that “[a] prosecution is th e trial court erred in applying a reasonableness standard because the plain applied to the defendant’s criminal misc hief charge was not violated and that On appeal, the State argues that the one - year period of limitations that

commencement of the adversarial proceeding.” T his appeal followed. delay of eighteen months between the com mencement of prosecution and the reconsider, the trial court stated that it “was unreasonable for there to be a defendant’s second m otion to dismiss. In denying the State’s motion to RSA 6 p. 2 25:8, I(c) (Supp. 2014). On December 5, 2013, the trial court granted the one - year statute of limitations applicable to misdemeanor level offenses. See filed a second motion to dismiss, arguing that the charge was barred by the motion to reconsider, which the court likewise denied. The defendant then trial court denied this motion on November 6, 2013. The defendant filed a fairness under both the New Hampshire and United States Constitutions. The arrest violated his rights to a speedy trial, due process, and fundamental arguing that the delay between the issuan ce of the arrest warrant and his On September 19, 2013, the defendant moved to dismiss the charge,

August 9, three days after the defendant’s arrest. arrested until August 6, p. 2 201 p. 3 3. The State filed the complaint in court on the peace issued a n arrest warrant one week later, but the defendant was not 3

one - year statute of limitations was not violated in this case b ecause the time 2011, when the warrant was issued. Thus, we agree with the State that the the date that prosecution commenced against t he defendant — December 21, upon a plain reading of the statute, then, the limitations period was tolled on “[d] uring any time when a prosecution is pending.” RSA 625:8, VI(b). Based Next, paragraph VI(b) states that the period of limitations does not run

execution. court with license to inquire into the reasonableness of the warrant’s executed within a reasonable time, nor does the language provide the trial language of paragraph V requires that a warrant issued under RSA 625:8 be on December 21, 2011, the date the warrant was issued. N othing in the plain 625:8, V. In this case, the prosecution against the defendant was commenced when an indictment is returned; or ( p. 3 3) when an information is filed. RSA earliest of the following dates: (1) when a war rant or other process is issued; (2) I, IV. Paragraph V makes clear that “[a] prosecution is commenced” on the day after all the elements of the alleged offense had occurred. See RSA 625:8, defendant’s criminal mischief ch arge began to run on December 15, 2011, the U nder the plain language of the statute, the on e - year limitations period for the

the accused in this state based on the same conduct. (b) Du ring any time when a prosecution is pending against

abode or work within this state; or absent from the state or has no reasonably ascertained place of (a) During any time when the accused is continuously

VI. The period of limitations does not run:

filed, whichever is the earliest. other process is issued, an indictment returned, or an i nformation V. A prosecution is commenced on the day when a warrant or

have occurred . . . . IV. Time begins to run on the day after all elements of an offense

. . . .

(c) For a misdemeanor, one year;

. . . .

subject to the following periods of limitations: I. Except as otherwise provided in this section, prosecutions are

RSA 625:8 provides, in relevant part, that: p. 4 4

temporal gap between the protections afforded by the statute of limitations and plain language construction of RSA 625:8 creates the potential for an indefinite We also reject the defendant’s second absurdity argument, i.e., that our

would have expired. defendant, wh o may not be arrested until after the limitations period otherwise occurrences likewise toll the statute of limitations without providing notice to a indictment or the filing in court of a sealed complaint or information. These de feats the purpose of the statute of limitation s than does the return of a secret warrant, would have been the expiration of the limitations period, no more receive notice of the charge ag ainst him prior to what, in the absence of the 323 (1971) (quotation omitted). T he fact that the defendant here did not investigat e suspected criminal activity.” United State s v. Marion, p. 4 404 U.S. 307, distant past”; and “encouraging law enforcement officials promptly to “minimiz [ing] the danger of official punishment because of acts in the far themselves against charges when the basic facts may have become obscured”; addition to notice, including: “protect[ing] individuals from having to defend promptness. However, a statute of limitations serve s many other functions in through the issuance of an arrest warrant that is not executed with reasonable certain conduct — and that this purpose is defeated when the statute is tolled defendant of when he or she is no longer at risk of being held accountable for s tatute of limitations serves a singular purpose — to provide notice to a circumvented. This argument is based upon the incorrect premise that a First, we reject the defendant’s argument that the spirit of the statute was absurd result s follow from a literal interpretation of the statute of limitations. State v. Breest, 167 N.H. 210, 212 - 13 (2014). W e are no t persuaded that such language of the statute if a plain reading would compel an absurd result. See Because our statute is clear on its face, we will only look beyond the

N.H. 570, 581 (2011). in this case until the complaint was filed in court. See State v. Brooks, 162 of the protection offer ed by the speedy trial doctrine, which did not commence closing of the protection afforded by the statute of limitations and the opening reading allows for the passage of an indefinite period of time between the and thus circumv ents the spirit of the act. A nd s econd, he claims that this reading does not satisfy the notice function essential to a statute of limitations, specific argument s to support this assertion. F irst, he contends that a literal the plain language of RSA 625:8 produce s an absurd result. He advances two The defendant asserts, however, that an interpretation based solely upon

standard into the statute. N.H at 80 p. 4 4, w e hold that the trial court erred by reading a reasonableness that the legisla ture did not see fit to include, s ee Appeal of Local Gov’t Ct r., 16 p. 5 5 plain and unambiguous, and because we will not add language to a statute tolled was approximately one week. Because the language of RSA 625:8 is period between when the statute of limitations began to run and when it wa s 5

words used.” State v. Warren, 147 N.H. p. 5 567, 568 (2002) (quotation omitted). the statute, and where possible, we ascribe the plain and ordinary meanings t o construing the meaning of a statute, we first examine the language found in novo.” State v. Breest, 167 N.H. 210, 212 (2014) (quotation omitted). “When “The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we review de

dissent. reasonableness of the delay in executing an arrest warrant, I respectfully err by interpreting RSA 62 p. 5 5:8, V (2007) to require an inquiry into the CONBOY, J., dissenting. Because I conclude that the trial court did not

dissented. DALIANIS, C.J., and HICKS and BASSETT, JJ., concurred; CONBOY, J.,

this opinion. dismissing the complaint and remand for further proceedings consistent with For the reasons stated above, we reverse the order of the trial c ourt

amended accordingly. legislature therefore may wish to consider whether RSA 62 p. 5 5:8 should be position appears to have much to commend it as a m atter of public policy. T he dictated by a plain reading of the statute, we observe t h at t he defendant’s obtaining of a warrant for the arrest o f the defendant. Although our holding is h as taken certain actions t o commence a prosecution, one of which is the (2005), that trumps the protecti on ag ainst stale prosecutions when the State administering and receiving justice,” State v. Knickerbocker, 153 N.H. 467, 474 assessment “of the relative i nterests of the State and the defendant in circumst ances. Rather, as written, RSA 625:8, V plainly reflects a legislative does not purport to protect ag ainst stale prosecutions under any and all prosecutio n s. The problem with this ar g ument is that the statute of limitations policy of the statute of limita t ions to afford a defendant protection ag ainst stale would in corporate into RS A 625:8, V, the terms o f that statute conflict with the The dissent asserts that, without the reasonableness requirem ent it

legislative history or to look to other jurisdictions to interpret its language. results, we decline the defendant’s invitation to c onsider the s tatute’s we are not persuaded that a literal interpretation would produce absurd defendant may res u lt in a denial of due process” (quotation omitted)). Because delay between the time of an offense and the arrest or indictment of a State v. Varagianis, 128 N.H. 22 p. 6 6, 228 (1986) (recognizing that “an arbitrary against overly stale prosecutions in situations where such a gap may exist. See law under the State and Federal Constitutions provides adequate protection for absurd results inasmuch as a criminal defendant’s right to due process of those afforded by the constitutional right to a speedy trial. We find no potential 6

relative interests of the State and the defendant in administering and receiving omitted). Thus, statutes of limitation “represent legislative assessments of official punishment because of acts in the far - distant past.” Id. (quotation have become obscured by the passage of time and to minimize the danger of from having to defend themselves against charges when the basic facts may (1971) (quotation omitted). “Such a limitation is designed to protect individuals punish by criminal sanctions.” United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 323 of time following the occurrence of those acts the legislature has decided to limitatio ns is to limit exposure to criminal prosecution to a certain fixed period United States Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he purpose of a statute of defending himself against charges of long completed misconduct”). As the limitation “are designed primarily to protect the accused from the burden of 530 (19 p. 6 61) (construing prior version of statute and explai ning that statutes of v. Philibotte, 123 N.H. 240, 244 (1983); see also State v. Morey, 103 N.H. 529, primary safeguard against the initiation of overly stale criminal charges.” State We have previously recognized that “statutes of limitation provide the

purpose of the statute. statutory time periods in RSA p. 6 625:8, I, meaningless and contrave nes the than 19 months later. In my view, the State’s interpretation renders the State reasons that it is immat erial that the warrant was not served until more limitations period for misdemeanors did not expire in this case. Thus, the period began to run, see RSA 625:8, IV, the State argues that the one - year VI(b). Because prosecution was commenced only one week after the limitations commencement of prosecution tolled the limitations period. See RSA 625:8, V, the arrest warrant was issued on December 21, 2011, and that the The State contends that prosecution of this case was commenced when

indictment returned, or an information is filed, whichever is the earliest.” commenced on the day when a warrant or other process is issued, an state based on the same conduct.” RSA p. 6 625:8, V provides: “A prosecution is “[d]uring any time when a prosecution is pending against the accused in this However, under RSA 625:8, VI(b) (2007), the limitations period is tolled after all elements of an offense have occurred.” RSA 625:8, IV (2007). subject to a one - year limitations period. This “[t]ime begins to run on the day RSA 625:8, I(c) (2007) provides that prosecution for a misdemeanor is

(200 p. 7 7). “according to the fair import of [its] terms and to promote justice.” RSA p. 6 625:3 (quotation and citation omitted). Finally, we construe the Criminal Code purpose.” Asmussen v. Comm’r, N.H. Dep’t of Safety, 145 N.H. 578, 586 (2000) and will not apply a construction that nullifies, to an appreciable extent, that omitted). “We will construe statutes so as to effectuate their evident purpose Crow Corp. v. Tow n of New Ipswich, 157 N.H. 344, 346 (2008) (quotation provision, not in isolation, but together with all associated sections.” Green “We interpret a statute to lead to a reasonable result and review a particular 7

the alleged offense.” However, the trial court did not allow the State to departments, and even lived with the alleged victim for a period of time after worked in the area at a local restaurant; he had contact with local police affirmative steps to avoid arrest. He lived in the area the whole time; he Here, the trial court found that the defendant “took no conscious or

Legislature, it will be rejected.” (qu otation omitted)). (“If a literal construction of a statute does violence to the apparent policy of the otherwise expire. See State ex rel Fortin v. Harris, 109 N.H. 394, 395 (1969) executed within a reasona ble amount of time after the limitations period would hold that it requires that an arrest warrant issued under RSA 625:8, V be function.”). Accordingly, in light of the evident purpose of the statute, I would def ense in a criminal case since statutes of limitation already perform that guard against the mere possibility that pre - accusation delays will prejudice the at 323 (“There is . . . no need to press the Sixth Amendment into service to vitiation of the purpose behind the statute of limitations. Cf. Marion, 404 U.S. due process claim could be made in an extreme case is no a nswer to the process protections afforded by the State and Federal Constitutions. That a potential for stale prosecutions cannot be justified by the availability of due Moreover, I agree with the def endant that, in these circumstances, the

does nothing to protect against stale prosecutions. underlying the statute. Allowing the State unlimited time to serve a warrant limitations period has otherwise expired – runs counter to the legislative intent an arrest warrant – regardless of when the warrant is serv ed after the provision allowing for tolling of the limitations period based upon issuance of its purpose. See Green C row Corp., 15 p. 7 7 N.H. at 346. In my view, the statutory we must also interpret it so as to lead to a reasonable result that comports with construction. We must interpret a statute according to its plain meaning, but omitted). This case illustrates the tension between two principles of statutory become obscured by the pas sage of time.” Marion, 404 U.S. at 323 (quotations individuals “to defend themselves against charges when the facts may have official punishment because of acts in the far - distant past” and requiring the prosecution of stale criminal charges, thereby increasing “the danger of disregards the intended purpose of the statute. This interpretation allows for statutory period would otherwise expire. The State’s literal interpretation limitations period, the warrant may be executed well beyond the time when the interpretation, as long as an arrest warrant is issu ed within the applicable language of RSA 625:8 does not provide for such an inquiry. Under the State’s the warrant was executed within a reasonable time period because the plain The State contends that the trial court erred by inquiring as to whether

be construed liberally in favor of the accused.” Morey, 103 N.H. at 530. harmony with the obvious intent and purpose of the law, these statutes are to ellipsis omitted). “Although they are to be accorded a rational meaning in justice.” State v. Knickerbocker, 152 N.H. 46 p. 7 7, 474 (2005) (quotation and p. 8 8

For these reasons, I respe ctfully dissent.

opportunity to demonstrate that the delay in this case was reasonable. dismissal of the charge and remand for a hearing to provide the State with the warrant was not unreasonable). Therefore, I would vacate the trial court’s but once defendant does so, burden shifts to State to prove delay in executi ng affirmative defense, burden rests on defendant to prove elements of defense, Ct. 2011) (explaining that, because expiration of limitations period is an warrant was reasonable. Cf. State v. Woodtke, 2 5 A.3d 699, 704 (Conn. App. demonstrate that the more than 19 - month delay in executing the arrest