2008-0945, State of New Hampshire v. Michael Addison (Capital Murder – Proportionality Review)

influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor, and that the capit al murder, conclud ing that his sentence was not imposed under the sentenced to death. We subsequently affirmed the defendant’s conviction for of the 2006 capital murder of Manchester Police Officer Michael Briggs and PER CURIAM. In 2008, t he defendant, Michael Addison, was convicted

orally, for the defendant. Johnson, chief appellate defender, of Concord, on the brief, and Mr. Rothstein David M. Rothstein, deputy director public defender, and Christopher M.

and Mr. Strelzin orally), for the State. attorney general, and John J. Kennedy, assistant attorney general, on the brief, Joseph A. Foster, attorney general (Jeffe r y A. Strelzin, senior assistant

No. 2008 - 945 Hillsborough - northern judici al district

page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 to press. Errors may be reported by E - mail at the following address: editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule p. 2 22 as 2

circumstances of the crime and the character and background of the case within which the jury considered the particular characteristics found by the jury establish the unique footprint of aggravating factors, a nd any mitigating factors). These case (the nature and circumstances of the capital murder, the particular facts underlying the substantive characteristics of the of death and life imprisonment verdicts. Rather, we will review the case and each case in the invent ory, or a calculation of the number the aggravating and mitigating factors between the defendant’s defendant’s case. This process is not limited to a comparison of not impose a death sentence in capital murder cases similar to the excessive or disproportionate; that is, whether juries generally do emerges demonstrating that the defendant’s death sentence is I n doing so, we will determine whether a germane jury pattern

“considering both the crime and the defendant.” Id. at 77 p. 2 2 (quotation omitted). under which we would examine each case in the inventory of similar cases comparative proportionality review, w e ad opted a precedent - seeking approach, imprisonment without possibility of parole. Id. at 769. As to the mechanics of predicate aggravating factors; and the penalty i mposed was either death or life kind of capital murder; a separate sentencing hearing occurred; the jury found cases” as limited to those cases in which the defendant committed the same W e construed the procedural and substantive boundaries of “similar

defendant.” Id. imposed by juries in similar cases, considering both the crime and the is arbitrary and capricious, or wanton and freakish, in relation to penalties func tion serves to ensure that defendants will not incur a death sentence that Proportionality Framework, 160 N.H. at 761. “T his appellate monitoring demonstrate that juries generally do not impose death in similar cases.” from, or substantially out of line with, a pattern of jury verdicts which hel d that “a death penalty is ‘excessive or disp roportionate’ if it is aberrant jurisprudential background and the specific language of RSA 630:5, XI(c), we proportionali ty review under RSA 630:5, XI(c). A fter reviewing the relevant Framework), w e set forth the parameters and mechanics of comparative In State v. Addison, 160 N.H. 73 p. 2 2 (2010) (hereinafter, Proportionality

accordingly, affirm hi s sentence of death. defendant’s sentence is neither excessive nor disproportionate and, the crime and th e d efendant.” RSA 6 p. 3 30:5, XI (c). We conclude that the or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both are required by statute to address “[w] hether the sentence of death is excessive see RSA 630:5, X - XII ( p. 2 20 07). At this final stage of our mandatory review, we circumstances. State v. Addison (Capital Murder), 165 N.H. 381, 412 (2013); evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s findings of aggravating 3 novo. Id. at 775. Neither party bears the burden of proof. Id. We conduct our Comparative proportionality review is a question of law that we decide de

Id. (quotation omitted). penalty imposed in this case is “aberratio nal . . . with respect to similar cases.” (quotation omitted). Rather, the question before us is whether the death imposed and, absent such an affirmative showing, to reverse the sentence.” Id. quantitatively differ ent from all other cases in which the death penalty was not the court must affirmatively be shown, on such a scale, to have been omitted). “Nor [is] that review considered to require that the capital case before absent such rough equivalence, to reverse the sentence.” Id. at 761 (quotation moral blameworthiness, roughly equivalent to all other capital cases and, determine whether the capital case before [us] in some way [is], on a scale of U.S. 15 p. 3 3, 206 (1976)). Our task under proportionality review “[is] not to Proportionality Framework, 160 N.H. at 744 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428

suffer a sentence of death.” assure that no defendant convicted under such circumstances will certain kind of murder case, the appellate review procedures when juries generally do not impose the death sentence in a sentenced to die by the action of an aberrant jury. If a time comes substantially eliminates the possibility that a person will be the death penalty. In particular, the proportionality review “serves as a check against the random or arbitrary imposition of

Our mandatory appellate review rather, is a creature of statute. See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. p. 3 37, 45 - 46 (1984). Com parative proportionality review is not a constitutional mandate, but,

accomplice, and conspiracy to commit capital murder). capital murder in the course of kidnapping, first degree murder as an 275 - 76 (2012) (defendant convicted of capital murder involving solicitation, included in the inventory of s imilar cases. See State v. Brooks, 164 N.H. 272, acting in the line of duty, the capital murder case of State v. Brooks is not defendant in any comparison case must have killed a law enforcement officer extent such c omparison would be meaningful.” Id. at 779. Because the that we would consider published opinions from out - of - state cases “to the legislature adopt ed the current death penalty statute in 1977, we concluded been convicted of a capital crime and sentenced to death in this state since the this case is complicated by the practical reality that no other de fendant has Noting that our ability to conduct comparative proportionality review in

Id. (citation omitted).

penalty or life imprisonment without possibility of parole. the particular defendant to decid e whether to impose the death p. 4 4 determine whether a pattern of verdicts demonstrate s that the defendant’s capital murder, the aggravating factors, and any mitigating factors,” and 160 N.H. at 772. Rather, we consider “the nature and circumstances of the number of death and life imprisonment verdict s.” Proportionality Framework, the defendant’s case and each case in the inventory, or a calculation of the not limited to a comparison of the aggravating and mitigating factors between As we have stated, the process of conducting proportiona lity review “is

background and charact er of the defendant.” asserts that taking into account mitigating evidence “goes directly to the considering both the crime and the defendant.” RSA 630:5, XI(c). The State excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, statutory mandate that we determine “[w] hether the sentence of death is analysis should be rejected” because doing so would be contrary to the “[t]he defendant’s effort to jettison m itigation evidence from the proportionality either published opinions or other sources.” The State disagrees, arguing that evidence presented in the majority of out - of - state capital murder cases from that i t is “not po ssible to consistently obtain the details of the mitigation different categories of mitigating factors and either a life or death sentence, and sufficient information to permit this court to assess the correlation between mitigating evidence.” He argues that comparing mitigating factors requires information, nor newspaper articles, typically include detailed summaries of “[n]either the published opinions that serve as the Court’s primary sources for to “reassess the use of mitigating evidence as a comparative tool” because Regarding mitigating factors in comparison cases, the defendant asks us

proportionality review. information that they are meaningful for purposes of comparative Lexis legal databases, to the extent that such opinions contain sufficient and will consider unpublished opinions accessible on either the Westlaw or in conducting a comparative proportionality review.” We agree with the parties precedence, the underlying facts recounted in the opinion are no less valua ble decision that has not been designated for publication may not carry legal sources other than published out - of - state opinions,” asserting that “[w]hile a The State “does not categorically reject the notion th at this Court might look to unpublished opinions should not be excluded from the comparison universe. suggests that, if we have enough information to conduct a comparison, analysis” approach. As to the published decision limitation, the defendant mitiga t ing factors in comparison cases; and (3) the rejection of the “quantitative only cases which resulted in a published opinion; (2) the r eliance upon Proportionality Framework decision, includ ing: (1) the limitation on reviewing The defendant a sserts that we should reassess three areas of the

below. Framework decision, with additional modification and clarification as explained review in accordance with the analysis adopted in the Proportionality p. 5 5 specific manner by ‘considering both the crime and the defendant, ’” and that XI(c) anticipates that we conduct comparative proportionality review in a fact defendant.” Id. at 771. We re affirm t hat “[t]he plain language of RSA 630:5, the individual circumstances of the particular murder and the particular reviewing a death sentence imposed under a process that accounts for all of actually obscure, or at least unnecessarily complicate, the appellate task of wi thin each category.” Id. In doing so, we noted that such a method “may frequency with which the death penalty is or is not imposed for capital crimes categories based upon certain aggravating and mitigating factors to assess the proportionality review that “involves isolating capital murder cases into Id. at 770. We specifically declined to adopt a method of comparative frequency with which the death penalty is imposed in certain circumstances.” leading to the imposition, or non - imposition, of the death penalty, and the statistical analysis “which seeks to mathematically quantify the various factors W e have rejected employing a qua n t it ative, frequency method involving

cases or the defendant’s case.” rejected because it “fails to establish any unique footprint of the comparison adopted in Proportionality Framework, and that hi s approach should be stands in di rect contrast” to the qualitative, precedent - seeking approach we “statistical, mathematical approach to comparative proportionality review defendants were sentenced to death.” The State argues that the defendant’s were sentenced to life, and is an outlier when compared to cases in which asserts that “[h]is case bears the characteristics of those in which defendants presence or absence of the identified factors. In this manner, the defendant impose life or death sentences in approximately 3 p. 5 50 cases, depending upon the value to each factor to determine the frequency with which juries tended to enforcement officer acting in the line of duty,” and he assigns a numerical “tended to appear in capital murder cases in which the defendant killed a law The defendant provides a spreadsheet that identifies 13 factors that he argues culpability factors to distinguish cas es similar to those used in [other] states.” recurrence of factors common to cases in the universe, and the use of calculations using culpability factors in light of the size of the universe, the quantitativ e methodology. He asserts that we should employ “simple frequency “quantitative analysis” approach, and he proposes a combined qualitative and The defendant also argues that we should reassess our rejection of the

meaningless to our review. the absence of such factors does not render an otherwise “similar case” 7 74. Although we recognize that mitigating factors do not exist in every case, that crime and the character and background of that defendant.” Id. at 773, the deathworthiness of a particular defendant in light of the circumstances of in the comparison case inventory, because “[i]t is left to the jury to determine number and nature of aggravating factors, and any mitigating factors” involved Proportionality Framework that “[c]aution is warranted when considering the death sentence is excessive or disproport ionate. Id. at 7 p. 6 61. We noted in 6 armed robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery (7 - Eleven Store) (2006); (6) felon in Mexicano Restaurant) (2006); (4) felo n in possession (El Mexicano Restaurant) (2006); ( p. 5 5) behavior”: (1) false imprisonment (2003); (2) probation violation (2003); (3) armed robbery (El with a dangerous weapon (knife and shod foot) (1997), and nine “other serious criminal firearm without a permit (1996); and (3) armed robbery and two counts of assault and battery commit a crime (1996); (2) assault with intent to kill, assault and battery, and possession of a included three “other serious acts of violence”: (1) assault and battery and threatening to preventing a lawful arrest. The jury found 13 non - statutory aggravating factors. These and (2) the defendant murdered Officer Michael Briggs for the purpose of avoiding or purpos ely inflicted serious bodily injury that resulted in the death of Officer Michael Briggs; In this case, the jury found the following statutory aggravating factors: (1) the defendant 

jury not to have imposed the death penalty.”  mitigating factors. . ., it would have been an aberration for the defendant’s factors proven at trial, the facts of the murder i tself, and the lack of compelling cases, t he State argues that, “[t] aking into account. . . all the aggravating enforcement officer acting in the line of duty. Comparing this case with those “intentionally or knowingl y,” or “purposely or knowingly,” killing a law jurisdictions in which a defendant can be charged with capital murder for t he State identifies a comparison universe of 10 cases drawn from four “indicate that [this court] did not intend to limit the universe to a single case,” Recognizing that “the language and tenor” of Proportionality Framework

of - state cases for purposes of comparative proportionality review. Id. at 779. beyond this first death penalty case of its kind,” it is ne cessary to consider out determined that until “New Hampshire’s death penalty jurisprudence develops particular crime committed by a particular defendant,” we, nonetheless, values regarding whet her the punishment of death is appropriate for a preferable because “[l]ocal jury verdicts best express contemporary community observ ed in Proportionality Framework that in - state case comparison is review obligation until another similar in - state case ar i se s. Although we imposed in similar cases,” and would leave us unable to fulfill ou r appellate the language of RSA p. 6 630:5, XI(c), which requires that we consider the “penalty defendant disagrees, arguing that a “one - case universe” approach is contrary to similar cases and his sentence cannot be held to be disproportion ate. The is the first sentence subject to comparative proportionality review, there are no murder conviction.” Thus, t he State asserts, because the defendant’s sentence requires a knowing mental state to be proven as a prerequisite for a capital Hampshire appears to be the only jurisdiction whose capital murder statute include only the defendant’s case in the comparison universe because “New t he State cont ends that Proportionality Framework could be interpreted to Turning to the parameters of “similar cases,” we note at the outset that

engage in when deciding whether to impose the death penalty.” Id. at p. 7 770. with the individualized sentencing considerations that juries are required to the precedent - seeking approach to comparative proportionality r eview “accords rooms

defendant was exposed to crime, violence, drug dealing and drug abuse during his adolescence. defendant was left in the care of many different persons during his childhood; and (16) the not receive the nurturing necessary for healthy development d uring his childhood; (15) the psychological counseling recommended by mental health professionals; (14) the defendant did with one - on - one instruction; (13) when he was a young child, the defendant did not receive the the defendant was able to perform better and maintain his behavior when placed in class behavior including acts of violence; (11) the defendant was in special education programs; (12) (10) during th e defendant’s childhood, he witnessed family members engaged in criminal during the defendant’s childhood, family members engaged in substance abuse in the home; in his early childhood despite contrary instructions from the Department of Social Services; (9) drug abuser and engaged in criminal co nduct; (8) the defendant was left alone with his mother mother was physically abusive to him during his childhood; ( p. 7 7) the defendant’s father was a violence, substance abuse, and mentally unstable behavior in his presence; (6) the defendant’s pregnancy with him; (5) during the defendant’s childhood, his mother engaged in acts of neglected her prenatal care, and engaged in violence and drug and alcohol abuse during her causing additional harm; (4) the defendant’s mother had a history of psychiatric problems, planning or premeditation; (3) the defendant surrendered without resist ance and without be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole; (2) the murder did not involve substantial fou nd 16 mitigating factors: (1) if not sentenced to death, the defendant would automatically addition, the jury found the victim impact evidence non - statutory aggravating factor. The jury possession (capital murder) (2006); and (9) reckless conduct (disposing of firearm) (2006). In conspiracy to commit crimina l threatening (345 Edward J. Roy Drive) (2006); (8) felon in possession (7 - Eleven Store) (2006); (7) accomplice to reckless conduct with a firearm and

purposeful conduct: (200 p. 7 7). The statute provides three variants of the aggravating factor requiring c ommitting the capital murder. See RSA 630:1 (Supp. 201 4),:5, I - II, IV, VII aggravating factors, one of which is that the defendant a cted purposely whe n of seven specific circumstances, and that the State has proved two statutory guilty of capital murder for knowingly causing the death of another under one unanimous jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt both that the defendant is Hampshire law, a defendant is not eligible for a death sentence unless a significance of the death penalty cases relied upon by the State. U nder New We are not persuaded by t he defendant’s attempt t o negate the

sentence is comparatively disproportionate. purposely kill a police officer they were all sentenced to life imprisonment, his statutory aggravating factor, and because in cases in which defendants did not because the State alleged, but the jury did not find, “purpose to kill” as a comparative proportionality review.” He argues, among other things, that State are not “so uniquely similar as to justify only their inclusion in finding of a purpose to kill,” and the statutes in the jurisdictions chosen by the an officer,” no jury imposed a death sentence “after specifically rejecting a State’s pool was clearly found to have committed a merely knowing murder of flawed because, among other reasons, “no death - sentenced defendant in the The defendant asserts that the State’s case selection methodology is p. 8 8 fit the parameters laid out in Proportionality Framework. Tho se cases provide the ca ses relied upon by the State generally represent those that most closely We have reviewed all the cases cited by the parties, and w e conclude that

the schemes in other comparison states.” account “the differences between the statutory scheme in New Hampshire and statutory requirement for death eligibility are not “similar” and fail to take into and, therefore, the cases cited by the defendant in which purpose to kill is a 630:5, VII(a), it “need not prove that the defendant purposely killed the victim” purpos eful conduct as to the statutory aggravating factors set forth in RSA Proportionality Framework. The State also asserts that because it proved most similar to his own in accordance with the criteria set forth” in defendant makes no attempt to narrow his pool to those cases [ ] which are meaningful review inefficient and therefore, n ot meaningful,” and that “[t]he argues that “the sheer number of cases included in the defendant’s pool makes defendants killed law enforcement officers acting in the line of duty. The State approximately 350 cases from more than 25 out - of - state jurisdictions in which those sentenced to life.” T he defendant identifies a comparison universe of jury verdicts that purport to distinguish defendants sentenced to death from that “[i]t has identified no patterns or defining characteristics across a series of The defendant also asserts that the State’s case analysis is flawed and

proportionality review. does not draw a meaningful distinction for purposes of our comparative Off icer Briggs. See i d. W e, therefore, conclude that the defendant ’s argument would create a grave risk of death to another and that resulted in the death of Briggs, and that the defendant purposely engaged in conduct that he knew purposely inflicted serious bodily injury that resulted in the death of Officer omitted). However, the jury unanimously found both that the defendant defendant purposely killed Officer Briggs. Addison, 165 N.H. at 65 p. 8 8 (quotation RSA 630:5, VII(a). In this case, the jury rejected as “not proven,” that the

(3) purposely engaged in conduct which:

the death of the victim; (2) purposely inflicted serious bodily injury which resulted in

(1) purposely killed the victim;

(a) The defendant: p. 9 9

concurred. DALIANIS, C.J., and HICKS, CONBOY, LYNN, and BASSETT, JJ.,

630:5, X II(a). 630:5, XI(c). Accordingly, t he defendant’s sentence of death is affirmed. RSA imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.” RSA defendant in this case is not “excessive or disproportionate to the penalty similar cases. Id. at 761. We hold that t he death sentence imp osed upon the duty. Rather, the cases reveal “a pattern of jury verdicts” imposing death in rarely imposed for the murder of a law enforcement officer acting in the line of r eview of the cases does not support a finding that the death penalty is only symmetrical with the penalty imposed in all other similar cases. Id. Our death sentence, not to search for proof that a defendant’s sentence is perfectly Framework, 160 N.H. at 7 74. However, our function is to identify an aberrant of the comparison cases are identical to the case before us. Proportionality Because “[u]ltimately, no two capital murder defendants are alike,” none

to this opinion. 25, 20 p. 10 10) (death). A brief description of these cases is set forth in the Appendix (death); Will v. Thaler, No. H - 07 - CV - 1000, 2010 WL 217 p. 9 9680 (S.D. Tex. May Cir. 2010) (death); Garza v. Thaler, 909 F. Supp. 2d 578 (W.D. Tex. 2012) v. Simon, 737 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1999) (death); Williams v. Thaler, 602 F.3d 291 (5th (Ind. 2005) (death); Ritchie v. State, 809 N.E.2d 258 (Ind. 2004) (death); State Jeter v. State, 888 N.E.2d 1257 (Ind. 2008) (life); Pruitt v. State, 834 N.E.2d 90 (death), cert. denied (2013); Dickens v. State, 754 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. 2001) (life); P.3d 196 (Ariz. 2008) (en banc) (death); State v. Rose, 297 P.3d 906 (Ariz.) b oth the crime and the defendant,” RSA 630:5, XI(c). See State v. Cruz, 181 sentence in capital murder cases similar to the defendant’ s case, “considering murder to allow us to determine whether juries generally impose a death sufficient information about the nature and circumstances of the capital 10

foot. pursuing him on duty officer was range when the on officer at close shooting a police

(Ind. 2013) without pa role for custody. State, 997 N.E.2d 56 imprisonment pointed a gun at another person’s face, and engaged in fights while in 2001); Dickens v. sentenced to life out o f custody, and that he had previously “pistol whipped” a person, 754 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. defendant history of attempted flight from police and history of violence both in and Dickens v. State, 16 - year - old In a post - conviction proceeding, the court noted that defendant had prior

defendant’s arrest. duties and defendant knew or should have known the victim was a police close range during was an on - duty police offi cer killed in the course of performing his official police officer at committed the offense while on probation for a felony offense; (4) victim

denied (2013) for shooting a expectation of the receipt of anything of a pecuniary value; (3) defendant P.3d 906 (Ariz.), cert. sentenced to death convicted of a serious offense; (2) defendant committed the offense in State v. Rose, 297 Defendant Jury found four aggravating circumstances: (1) defendant p reviously

foot. dysfunctional family; deprivation of necessary nurturing and love from during a chase on substantial duress; unforeseeability that the acts would cause death; him at close range conduct; impaired capacity to conform his conduct to the law; unusual and officer by shooting factors included: impaired capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his

(en banc) for killing a police knew or should have known that the victim was a police officer. Mitigating P.3d 196 (Ariz. 2008) sentenced to death killed in the cour se of performing his official duties and that defendant State v. Cruz, 181 Defendant Aggravating evidence included that victim was an on - duty police officer Source(s) Basic Facts Brief Description

a traffic stop. (4) defendant previously was convicted of another murder. Defendant clos e range during punishment or confinement for another offense committed by defendant; police officer at wa s committed for the purpose of escaping detection, apprehension, trial, for shooting a defendant was engaged in flight after committing burglary; (3) the murder

A.2d 1 (N.J. 1999) sentenced to death during the performance of his official duties; (2) victim was murdered while State v. Simon, 737 Defendant Aggravating evidence included: (1) defendant murdered a police officer

foot. diagnosis of Attention Deficit Disorder, psychiatric hospitalization at the

706 (Ind. 2007) during a chase on Mitigating evidence included the defendant’s difficulties in school, a State, 875 N.E.2d police officer was on probation after receiving a sentence for the commission of a felony. 2004); Ritchie v. for shooting a police officer, and at the time the murder was committed the defendant N.E.2d 258 (Ind. sentenced to death acting in the course of duty, the defendant knew that the victim was a Ritchie v. State, 809 Defendant Aggravati ng factors included that the victim was a law enforcement officer

a traffic stop.

899 (Ind. 2009) close range during and ingestion of kerosene and gasoline at a young age. State, 903 N.E.2d police officer at childhood including physical and verbal abuse by his fath er, head trauma, 2005); Pruitt v. for shooting a including claims of mental retardation, mental illness, a dysfunctional N.E.2d 90 (Ind. sentenced to death killed in the course of his duties. The defendant presented evidence Pruitt v. State, 834 Defendant Aggravating evi dence included that victim was a law enforcement officer

tried to flee. range as defendant officer at close shooting a police

Appendix, Exhibit 3 without parole for 2008); State’s imprisonment depress ed, narcissistic, paranoid, and addicted to marijuana. N.E.2d p. 12 1257 (Ind. sentenced to life acting in the course of duty. Defendant presented evidence that he was Jeter v. State, 888 Defendant Aggravating evidence included that the victim was a law enforcement officer 12

App. April 21, 2004) 3093238 (Tex. Crim. and evidence that he had an unstable family background. 74,306, 2004 WL foot. he would not likely commit violence in a structured prison environment Will v. State, No. during a chase on incarcerated awaiting trial for murder. Defendant pre sented evidence that Tex. May 25, 20 10); police officer on community supervision, and three disciplinary rule violations while WL 2179680 (S.D. for shooting a vehicle, an aggravated robbery conviction committed while defendant was H - 07 - CV - 1000, 2010 sentenced to death conviction for eva ding arrest, a felony conviction for unauthorized use of a Will v. Thaler, No. Defendant State presented evidence of defendant’s criminal history of a misdemeanor

on foot. following a chase defendant’s arrest drug use in defendant’s presence, and his father’s fatal overdose. during the and physical abuse by his father, his father’s incarcerations, his father’s service weapon Defendant presented evidence of h is troubled upbringing including verbal with the officer’s a weapon, driving under the influence, and possession of marijuana. head at close range from custody, theft, resisting arrest, criminal mischief, unlawful carrying of police officer in the possession of stolen property including a pistol and ammunition, escape

(W.D. Tex. 20 p. 12 12) for shooting a possession of three knives and a screwdriver on school propert y, F. Supp. 2d 578 sentenced to death both as a juvenile and an adult including burglary, motor vehicle theft, Garza v. Thaler, 909 Defendant State presented evidence of 25 prior crimes committed by the defendant

arrest. Navy, and was able to hold a job after his discharge. order to avoid by school officials as emotionally disturbed, he serve d honorably in the close range in support, he showed a low IQ when tested in high school, he was diagnosed police officer at murder. The defendant presented evidence including that he had family

Cir. 2010) for shooting a including a robbery - shooting using the same gun as that used in the 602 F.3d 291 (5th sentenced to death stole a car at gunpoint, defendant committed several previous robberies, Williams v. Thaler, Defendant State presented evidence that several days before the shooting defendant