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2014-0126, JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA v. Heilan Grimes
foreclosure on a mortgage. The property is “restricted property” as defined in pla intiff acquired the property in question on May 27, 2011, as the result of a The trial court found and the record supports the following facts. The
We affirm. condition constitute d “other good cause” for purposes of terminating a tenancy. property owner’s desire to market, sell and/or convey property in a vacant sole issue on appeal is whether, under RSA 540:2, II(e) (Supp. 2014), a Whitney Street in Nashua to the plaintiff, JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA. The Court (Ryan, J.) granting a writ of possession for property located at 54 HICKS, J. The defendant, Heilan Grimes, appeals an order of the Circuit
brief), for the defendant. Gawryl, MacAllister & O ’ Connor, of Nashua (Jared O ’ Connor on the
brief), for the plaintiff. Orlans Moran, PLLC, of Waltham, M assachusetts (David J. Rhein on the
Opinion Issued: April 7, 2015 Submitted: November 12, 2014
HEILAN GRIMES
v.
JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, NA
No. 2014 - 126 9th Circuit Court - Nashua District Division
_________________ __________
THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 to press. Errors may be reported by E - mail at the following address: editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as :3 ed on the action or inaction of the
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tenant, members of his family, or guests. reason and need not be bas includes, but is not limited to, any legitimate business or economic V. “Other good cause” as set forth in paragraph II(e) of this section
. . ..
(e) Other good cause
. . ..
f or one of the following reasons: quit the premises in accordance with RSA 540 and 5, but only tenancy by giving to the tenant or occupant a notice in writing to II. The lessor or owner of restricted property may terminate any
RSA 540:2, entitled “Termination of Tenancy,” provides, in pertinent part:
advanced by the entire statutory scheme. Id. the legislature ’ s intent in enacting them, and in light of th e policy sought to be v. Whittey, 149 N.H. 463, 467 (2003). Our goal is to apply statutes in light of ambiguous, however, we consider legislative history to aid our analysis. State Econ omy v. Sch. Admin. Unit # 25, 151 N.H. 612, 614 (2004). If a statute is further indication of legislative intent. Bedford Chapter - Citizens for a Sound language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, we need not look beyond it for ascribe the plain and ordinary meanings to the words used. Id. If the We first examine the language found in the statute, and, whe n possible, we whole. Great Traditions Home Builders v. O ’ Connor, 157 N.H. 387, 388 (2008). the legislature ’ s intent as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a 540:2, II(e). In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of The issue before us is the meaning of “other good cause” under RSA
plaintiff. demonstrate that good cause does not encompass the reaso n proffered by the good cause” is ambiguous and that prior case law, as well as l egislative intent, On appeal, the defendant argues that the statutory language of “other
“other good cause.” stated reason for eviction was sufficient to fall within the statutory definition of eviction. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, finding t he plaintiff’s condition.” The defendant disputed that “other good cause” existed for her premises . . . desires to market, sell and/or convey the property in a vacant the reason for eviction as being for “other good c ause,” in that “the owner of the defendant 90 days to vacate the property. In that notice, the plaintiff stated with a “Notice to Quit/Evict Notice” pursuant to RSA 540:2, giving the RSA 540:1 - a, II (2014). On July 25, 201 3, the plaintiff served the defendant 3
DALIANIS, C.J.
, and CONBOY, LYNN, and BASSETT, JJ., concurred.
Affirme d.
conveying the building in a vacant condition satisfies RSA 540:2, II(e). and find that evicting the defendant for the purpose of marketing, selling, or eviction satisfies the statute. Accordingly, we uphold the trial court’s ruling we hold, under these circumstances, that the plaintiff’s stated reason for I n the a bsen ce of evidence of selective eviction or other acts of bad faith,
same position. Instead, the plaintiff seeks to sell the property free of tenants. the plaintiff does not seek to replace one tenant with another tenant in the economic or business advantage.” AIMCO, 152 N.H. at 591. Here, however, being evicted does not. . . provide the landlord of restricted property with any tenant who will pay the same rent and occupy the same p remises as the tenant because “[r] eplacing one tenant upon the expiration of a lease with another held that the mere expiration of a lease did not constitute “other good cause,” 152 N.H. 587 (2005), upon which the defendant heavily relies. In AIMCO we Notably, t hese facts differ from those in AIMCO Properties v. Dziewisz,
was neither arbitrary nor ill - motivated. See N. H. S. Jour. 157. does not contest. Under these circumstances, we are satisfied that the eviction brief that the property was sold to a third party, a fact which the defendant the property free and clear of tenants. W e note that the plaintiff states in its plaintiff acquired the property by foreclosure and expressed the desire to sell the unit at a higher rental)”). We a ccept this rationale here because t he tenancy (such as sale of the property, renovation of the unit, or desire to lease is not limited to. . . [a] business or economic reason for termination of the “‘[o]ther good cause’ for termination of tenancy by the owner may include, but § 982. 310 (2014) (stating, in section entitled “Owner termination of tenancy,” tenants may constitute a legitimate economic reason. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. have recognized that t he desire of a landlord to sell restricted property free of economic reason under the circumstances of this case. Other jurisdictions and/or convey the property in a vacant condition” — constitute s a legitimate The plaintiff’s stated reason for eviction — a desi re to “market, sell
from arbitrarily and/or ill motivated evictions.” N.H.S. Jour. 157 (1985). evict tenants for any good reason and at the same time protect[ing] tenants 1985, 249:2. It was described as “giv[ing] . . . greater flexibility to landlords to its face. Id. RSA 540:2, II was adopted i n 1985 as part of House Bill 95. Laws (2005). As we stated in AIMCO, the term “other good cause” is ambiguous on plain lan guage of RSA 540:2, II. AIMCO Prop s. v. Dziewisz, 152 N.H. 587 constitutes “other good cause” canno t be determined by merely looking to the Wh ether a desire to market or convey property in a vacant condition
RSA 540:2, II(e), V.