2014-0812, In the Matter of Holly Doherty and William Doherty

alimony and child support to be paid by Husband. the stipulation, they agreed upon, among other things, the amount of monthly which was incorporated into the divorce decree that the trial court approved; in They had two minor children at that time. They entered into a stipulation, The relevant facts are as follows. T he parties divorced in January 2010.

part, and remand. appeal. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part, reve rse in part, vacate in alimony obligations. Husband and the petitioner, Holly Doherty (Wife), both William Doherty (Husband), filed a petition to modify his child support and (Luneau, M., approved by LeFrancois, J.) issued orders after the respondent, BASSETT, J. The 10th Circuit Court – Brentwood Family Division

orally), for the respondent. Shaheen & Gordon, P.A., of Manchester (Jared O ’ Connor on the brief and

on the brief and orally), for the petitioner. Primmer Piper Eggleston & Cramer PC, of Manchester (Doreen F. Connor

No. 2014 - 0812 10th Circuit Court - Brentwood Family Division

page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh. us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 to press. Errors may be reported by E - mail at the following address: editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concor d, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule p. 2 22 as 2

of alimony was justified. Given the change in the parties’ incomes and been a “substantial and unforeseen change in circumstances,” a modificati on support guidelines. The trial court further determined that, because there had Husband to pay $968 per month in child support pursuant to the child income, the trial court concluded that it would be “fair and equitable” for After deciding to includ e the foster care payments in Wife’s current

reside [d] in her household.” $5,700 that she received “as a care provider for [two] disabled adults who comprise d approximately $3,600 in employment income and approximately time of the hearing in p. 2 2014, the trial court found that her monthly income employment income was approximately $17,500 per month. However, a t the obligat ion s, the tri al court found that, at the time of the parties’ divorce, Wife’s When deciding whether to modify Husband’s child support and alimony

month. alimony would be increased so as to maintain a total payment of $5,000 per continue for 15 years, and that if the child support obligation was reduced, alimony, for a monthly total of $5,000. They further agreed that alimony would Wife approximately $3,400 in child support and approximately $1,600 in In their stipulation, the parties agreed that, each month, Husband would pay Turning to Wife’s first argument, we provide the following background.

A. Foster Care Payments

tainted by error of law. Id. rulings of the trial court unless they are lacking in eviden tiary supp ort or Canaway & Canaway, 161 N.H. p. 2 286, 289 (2010). We sustain the findings and obligation absent an unsustainable exercise of discretio n.” In the Matter of litigation costs. “We will uphold an order on a motion to modify a support lacked jurisdiction to enforce the parties’ agreement to share equally in certain ongoing alimony obligation; and (3) con cluding that it, a family division court, Husband’s child support and alimony obligations; (2) terminating Husband’s payments that she received in her gross income for the purpose of modifying Wife argues that the trial court erred by: (1) including foster care

I. Wife’s Appeal

arrearages that he owed. child support and alimony obligations and determined the amount of the subject of this appeal; in the orders, the trial court modified Husband’s Following a hearing in August p. 2 2014, the trial co urt issued the orders that are asserted that Husband had significant child support and alimony arrearages. alimony obligations. Thereafter, Wife filed a motion for contempt, in which she Husband filed a petitio n seeking a modification of his child support and In July 2014, after one of the parties’ children had reached ma jority, p. 3 3

458 - C:2, IV as “aid to the permanently and totally disable d.” We disagree. that she received are excluded from the definition of “gross income” under RSA RSA 458 - C:2, IV (e mphase s added). Wife asserts that the foster care payments

assi stance received from a county or town). supplemental security income, food stamps, and general dependent children, aid to the permanently and totally disabled, (except public assistance programs, including aid to families with wages, salary,. . . and payments from other government programs all income from any source,. . . including, but not limited to,

“G r oss income” is defined, in relevant part, as:

statutes in the context of the overall statutory scheme and not in isolation. Id. have said or add words that the legislature did not include. Id. We interpret from the statute as written, and we will not consider what the legislature might Hampers & Hampers, 166 N.H. 422, 4 p. 3 33 (2014). We interpret legislative intent expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole. In the M atter of 164 N.H. 301, 303 (2012). We are the final arbiter of the legislature’s intent as and, therefore, our review is de novo. See In the Matter of Woolsey & Woolsey, Resolving this issue req uires us to engage in statutory interpretation,

income” under New Hamps hire law. treatment of these payments has no bearing on whether they constitute “gross under RSA 458 - C:2, IV. Additionally, he asserts that the federal tax code’s properly included in Wife’s income because they constituted “gross income” other jurisdictions. Husband counters that the foster care payments w ere IV (2004), the definition of income under the federal tax code, and cases from argument, she relies upon the definition of “gross income” under RSA 458 - C:2, purposes of modifying Husband’s child support obligations. In making this care,” those funds should not have been included in her gross income for the received were “use[d] to clothe, feed and shelter the disabled adults in her On appeal, Wife argues that, because the foster care payments that she

the [opposing party].”). prior to the date that notice of the petition for modification has been given to RSA p. 4 458 - C:7, II (2004) (“Any child support modification shall not be effective sought enforcement of Husband’s child support and a limony obligations. See that Wife filed an objection to Husband’s petition for modification, in which she Both of these modifications were made retroactive to July 14, 2014 — the date the trial court decided to term inate Husband’s ongoing alimony obligation. inability to pay alimony in addition to child support and arrearage payments, expenses, a reduction in Wife’s monthly mortgage payment, and Husband’s 4

payments in her “gr oss income.” that definition, we conclude that the trial court properly included those Wife has not demonstrated that the foster care payments are excluded from the Matter of LaRocque & LaRocque, 16 p. 4 4 N.H. 148, 153 (2012), and because Accordingly, given the broad statutory definition of “gross income,” see In

RSA p. 4 458 - C:2, IV. See id. would otherwise fall within one of the other exceptions to “gross income” under program [],” constituted “general assistance received from a county or town,” or cannot conclude that the payments derived from a “public ass istance sufficient to decide issues on appeal). G iven the state of the record, we also that it is the burden of the appealing party to provide this court with a record disabled.” See Bean v. Red Oak Prop. Mgmt., 151 N.H. 248, 250 (2004) (noting “gross income” under RSA 458 - C:2, IV as “aid to the permanently and totally we cannot concl ude that those payments can be excluded from the definition of eligibility for such aid. See RSA 167:6, VI; see also RSA 167:3 - j. Accordingly, that the adults in her care met all of the statutory requirements to establish permanently and totally disabled program; additionally, there is no evidence that the payments that she received were actually made under the aid to t he the foster care payments. Thus, on the record before us, there is no evidence Here, Wife has not provided us with a record concerning the origins of

Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services). “is one of various public assistance programs administered by” the New 63 p. 4 4 (2007) (noting that the aid to the permanently and totally disabled program aid to the permanently and totally disabled); Petition of Kilton, 156 N.H. 632, See also RSA 167:3 - j (2014) (concerning minimum duration of impairment for

needy blind, or aid to families with dependent children. receive such aid while receiving old age assistance, aid to the Self Support, and subsidies. . .. No person shall be eligible to including Impairment Related Work Expenses, Plans to Achie ve Security Act shall apply, including all work incentive provisions standards for “substantial gainful activity” as used in the Social acc ordance with RSA 167:3 - j. In determining disability, the and until the department adopts a 12 - month standard in required duration of the impairment shall be p. 4 48 months, unless regulations adopted under such act, except that the minimum the federal Social Security Act, Titles II and XVI and the inclusive; is a resident of the state; and is disable d as defined in disabled who is between the ages of 18 and 64 years of age [A] person shall be eligible for aid to the permanently and totally

RSA 167:6, VI (201 p. 4 4) states, in pertinent part, that: p. 5 5

reconsideration, Wife filed a motion in which she asserted that one of the two Before the trial court issued its order on the parties’ motions for

points. incurred relating to the care of the f oster adults. We agree with Wife on both in her care was removed from her home; and (2) deduct expenses that she the reduction in the payment s that she received when one of the foster adults Wife next asserts that the trial court erred by failing to: (1) account for

B. Reducing Gross Income

the Matter of Thayer and Thayer, 146 N.H. 342, 347 (2001). address it because it was not adequately developed for appellate review, s ee In including the “amount and sources of income” of each party), we decline to (2004) (listing factors for trial courts to consider when determining alimony, treated differently than income for alimony purposes, see RSA 4 p. 5 58:19, IV additional argument that “gross income” for child support purposes should be Finally, to the extent that Wife attempts to assert a distinct and

Moore, 166 N.H. at p. 5 567 - 68. of income in other states’ statutes does not control our analysis. See Maves & Wife’s gross income; the t reatment of foster care payments under the definition under that statute, the foster care payments in this case should be included in Our task here is to interpret our child support statute and determine whether, (sam e); Bryant v. Bryant, 218 S.W.3d 565, 569 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007) (same). Matter of Paternity of M.L.B., 633 N.E.2d 1028, 1029 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) because, although received by parent, payments were children’s income); that foster care payments were properly excluded from parent’s gross income e.g., In re Marriage of Dunkle, 194 P.3d 462, 466 (Colo. App. 2008) (concluding parent of children should be excluded from the foster parent’s income. See, jurisdictions that have held that foster care payments received by a foster Moreover, we are not persuaded by Wife’s reliance upon cases from other

statutes.” Hampers, 1 p. 6 66 N.H. at 43 p. 5 5 (quotation omitted). support guidelines differ from the objectives of the fede ral income taxation N.H. 700, 704 (2006) (same). “This is so because the objectives of the child Moore, 166 N.H. 564, 569 (2014) (same); In the Matter of State & Taylor, 153 166 N.H. at 434 (quotation omitted); see also, e.g., In the Matter of Maves & interpretation of gross income under the child support guidelines.” Hampers, “federal income taxation statutes def ine ‘income’ is of little relevance to our care payments.”). We disagree. W e have repeatedly stated that how the received by a foster care provider during the taxable year as qualified foster See 26 U.S.C. § 131(a) (2012) (“Gross income shall not include amounts they sh ould also be excluded from her gross income under RSA 458 - C:2, IV. excluded from her gross income for tax purposes under the federal tax code, Nevertheless, Wife asserts that, because the foster care payments are 6

change in circumstances between the parties” has been her decrease in in c ircumstances.” Wife claims that the “only substantial and unforeseen alimony obligation because there was not a “substantial or unforeseen change 524 (1999), Wife next argues that the trial court erred by revisiting Husband’s Relying primarily upon our decision in Laflamme v. Laflamme, 144 N.H.

C. Modification of Alimony

of child support obligation). court’s determination of party’s gross income and remanding for recalculation In the Matter of Albert & McRae, 155 N.H. 259, 2 p. 6 65 (2007) (vacating trial obligation, we also remand for the tr ial court to recalculate that obligation. See in part, upon that figure when deciding to modify Husband’s child support determination of Wife’s gross income figure, and because the trial court relied, income (q uotations omitted)). Because we are vacating the trial court’s “actually incurred and paid” and “reasonable and necessary” for producing “self - employment income” under RSA 458 – C:2, IV, business expenses must be 164 N.H. at 307 (holding that, to be deductible for purposes of determining and paid to care for the foster adult who remained in h er home. See Woolsey, payment s the reasonable and necessary expenses that Wife actually incurred foster care payment s that remained available to Wife, after deducting from th e gross income, and remand for the trial court to determine the extent of the Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s determination of Wife’s monthly

“available” to Wife should not have been included in her gross income. expenses”). Thus, any portion of the foster care payment s that w ere not in RSA 458 - C:2, IV “presupposes the deduction of legitimate b usiness actual ability to pay” and concluding that the term “sel f - employment income” “calculating a parent’s ability to pay child support necessitates determining an support. See id. at 434; see also Wools ey, 1 p. 6 64 N.H. at 306 (explaining that RSA 458 - C:2 means the total amount available to parents for paying child foster adult remaining in her care. As we have explained, “gross income” under reasonable and necessary expenditures that she incurred in providing for the from her monthly foster care payment s, and, thus, from her gross income, the Moreover, we agree with Wife that the trial court should have deducted

account for that reduction was, therefore, error. the basis of present income.” (quotation omitted)). The trial court’s failure to 1 p. 6 66 N.H. at 442 (“It is undisputed that child support should be determined on been adjusted to reflect th e reduction in foster care payments. Cf. Hampers, Under these circu mstances, we conclude that Wife’s gross income should have payment reduction, the trial court never addressed the reduced payment s. approximately $5, p. 7 700 to $2,400. Although Husband did not dispute the the foster care payment s that she received each month w ere reduced from foster adults that she cared for no longer resided in her home, and, therefore, 7

a nd expenses at the time of the [f] inal [h] earing.” that “[t] he parties . . . could not have anticipated the changes to their incomes finances were anticipated or foreseeable. In fact, the tri al court explicitly found there is nothing in the record that suggests that the changes to the parties’ parties at the time of the divorce decree, see Laflamme, 144 N.H. at 528, here, defendant’s retirement and t he sale of his assets were anticipated by the Moreover, unlike Laflamme, in which the trial court found that both the

approximately $4,600. Husband’s monthly income was approximately $ p. 7 7, 3 00, and his expenses were approximately $3,600, and her monthly expenses were approximately $11,300; petition for modification, Wife’s monthly employment income was By contrast, the trial court found that at the time of the final hearing on the approximately $7,700, and his monthly expenses were approximately $10,100. expenses totaled approximately $16,300; Husband’s monthly income was monthly employment income was approximately $17,500, and her monthly part ies). The trial court found that at the time of the divorce decree, Wife’s (observing that trial court must inquire into changed circumstances of both significantly since the divorce decree. See Canaway, 161 N.H. at 290 observed in its order, the parties’ incomes and expenses had changed Laflamme is readily distinguisha ble. First, as the trial court here

sufficient to warrant modification of [the] alimony award.” Id. changes did not “rise to the level of a substantial change in circumstances change in circumstances following the divorce decree, we concluded that those divorce decree. Id. at 528 - 29. Accordingly, although there may have been a defendant’s retirement were both foreseeable and anticipated at the time of the appeal, we reversed the trial court’s decision because the sale of assets and the income to pay alimony due to his retirement. Laflamme, 1 44 N.H. at 528. On based upon a finding that the defendant had sold assets and no longer had In Laflamme, the trial court modified the defendant’s alimony obligation

alimony award.” Canaway, 161 N.H. at 289 (quotation omitted). a substantial change in circumstances sufficient to warrant modification of an anticipated and foreseeable at the time of the decree cannot rise to the level of 655 (2005) (quotation omitted). “Changes to a party’s condition that are both terms of the stipulation,” In the Matter of Arvenitis & Arvenitis, 152 N.H. 65 3, “must take into account all of the circumstances of the parties, including the “must inquire into the changed circumstances of both parties,” id. at 290, and Canaway, 161 N.H. at 289 (quotation and brackets omitted). The trial court award, making the current alimony amou nt either improper or unfair.” show that a substantial change in circumstances has arisen since the initial As we have stated, “[t]he party requesting an alimony modification must

Husband’s alimony obligation. monthly income, which, she argues, is not sufficient to justify reexamining p. 8 8

stated that “[a]ny post - Decree debt to the firm the parties hired in the Decree,” and that no part of the debt existed at that time. The trial court only “the part of the debt that was incurred as of the date of the Divorce parties’ agreement to divide such legal fees, it concluded that it could enforce and ongoing boundary lawsuit. Although the trial court acknowledged the judgments/settlements requiring them to compensate any party” in a separate responsible for payment of any and all legal fees incurred and/or stipulation. The disputed provision states that the parties would be “equally concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to enforce a p rovision in the parties’ Wife next argues that the trial court, a family division court, erred by

D. Jurisdiction of Trial Court

redetermination of whether and to what extent ongoing alimony is warranted. alimony obligation, we also vacate the alimony award and remand fo r that gross income figure when deciding to eliminate Husband’s ongoing for child support purposes, and because the trial court relied, in part, upon arrearages. Because we are vacating f or redetermination of Wife’s gross income income or the trial court’s reliance upon Husband’s inability to pay certain alimony is unsupportable because of either the dramati c decrease in Wife’s We, howe ver, need not address whether the trial court’s order eliminating

arrearages as a reason to terminate alimony. erroneously cited Husband’s inability to pay his child support and alimony than elimination — of alimony, and she also argues that the trial court Wife, the significant d ecrease in her income supported continuation — rather that discretion by eliminating Husband’s alimony obligation. According to to revisit and potentially modify the alimony award, it unsustainably exercised Nonetheless, W ife asserts that, even if the trial court had the discretion

discretion by revisiting Husband’s alimony obligation. mortgage payment s, we conclude that the trial court sustainably exercised its the terms of the parties’ stipulation, and the reduction in Wife ’s monthly unanticipated and unforeseeable significant ch anges in the parties’ finances, Accordingly, in light of the trial court’s finding that there had been

reduced from approximately $5,700 to $3,100. payments; according to the trial court, her monthly mortgage payments were terms of her mortgage, which had the effect of reducing her monthly mortgage reduction in the mortgage obligation.” Wife concedes that she modified the “the parties [would] re - evaluate the support obligations considering the “successful in reducing the monthly mortgage payment” on the marital home, parties, including terms of stipulations). T he parties agreed that, if Wife was N.H. at 655 (explaining that court must take into account all circumstances of Husband’s alimony obligation under certain circumstances. See Arvenitis, 152 Furthermore, the parties’ stipulation contemplated reconsideration of p. 9 9

modification, t he trial court explained that, because it did not receive a return In determining July 14 t o be the effective date of the alimony

See Figlioli v. R.J. Moreau Co s., 151 N.H. 618, 622 (2005). obligation, we will address this issue because it is likely to arise up on remand. we have vacated the trial court’s decision to eliminat e his ongoing alimony modify his alimony obligation to a date earlier than July 14, 2014. Although Husband first argues that the trial court erred by failing to retroactively

A. Retroactive Alimony Modification

II. Husband’s Cross - Appeal

remand. concluded otherwise, we reverse this aspect of the trial court’s order and the marital estate.” Id. at 1 p. 9 95. Because the trial court, a family division court, marital debt that the family division can properly consider when distributing that these anticipated litigation expenses fall “within the broad category of associated with th e ongoing boundary suit. Thus, as in Maldini, we conclude liability, here, the part ies’ agreement encompassed yet - to - be - assessed expenses Like the side agreement in Ma ldini that addressed yet - to - be - assessed tax

agreement.” Id. at 1 p. 9 96. court — remains the proper forum for addressing issues arising from the family division has exclusive jurisdiction, that court — and not the superior that the side agreement at issue concerned marital property, over which the distributing the marital estate.” Id. at 195. We further explained that “[g]iven category of marital debt that the family division can properly consider when 194 - 96. We explained that “such unpaid tax liability falls within the broad division had jurisdiction to interpret and enforce that side agreement. Id. at 168 N.H. at 193 (quotation omitted). On appeal, we concluded that the family mediation that allocated certain “yet - to - be - assessed tax liabilities.” Maldini, In Maldini, the parties entered into a “side agreement” during their divorce Our decision in Maldini v. Maldini, 168 N.H. 191 (2015), is instructive.

agree with Wife. afterward,” because it has no “legal authority to assign post - div orce debt.” We dividing the assets and debts of the parties as of the date of divorce, but not the trial court “correctly held that its jurisdiction extends only as far as properly consider when distributing the marit al estate. Husband counters that because such litigation costs were part of the marital debt that it could agreement to share the legal fees associated with the ongoing boundary lawsuit Wife asserts that the trial court had jurisdiction to enforce the parties’

another forum.” [boundary] lawsuit needs to be addressed in the context of the lawsuit, or in p. 10 10

decision in Birmingham effectively import ed into retroactive alimony Regardless of any ambiguity in the phrase “similarly limited,” our

change once the monthly mortgage payments were reduced. We disagree. he claims, provided Wife with actual notice that his alimony obligation would modification of alimony to the d ate of the parties’ stipulation in 20 p. 10 10, which, Husband asserts, the trial court had the authority to grant a retroactive notice in the context of retroactive child support modification. Therefore, not ice in the context of retroactive alimony modification is “broader” than limited” in Birmingham instead of “identically” limited, Husband contends that modification. See id. Nonetheless, because we used the phrase “similarly earlier than the date Wife received notice of Husband’s petition for case had no authority to grant a retroactive modi fication of alimony to a date Thus, based upon Birmingham, we conclude that the trial court in this

(emphasis added). alimony beyond the date of notice to the adverse party is similarly limited.” Id. conclude that the trial court’s authority to gr ant a retroactive modification of interpretation of the statutes governing the modification of alimony lead us to notice to the adverse party,” we determined that “our case law and our authority to grant a retroactive modification of alimony beyond the date of that “[t]here is no analogous statute that expressly limits the trial court’s petitioner.” Id. at 58 (quotations and brackets omitted). Although we observed discretion to modify any child support order beyond the date of notice to the trial court correctly ruled that, pursu ant to RSA 458 - C:7, II, it had no review of case law and statutes concerning child support and alimony, “the that the trial court did not err. Id. at 57 - 58. We explained that, after our modification petition. Birmingham, 154 N.H. a t 57. We, however, concluded retroactive to a date before the petitioner received notice of the respondent’s court erroneously denied his request to modify child support and alimony (2006), is controlli ng. In Birmingham, the respondent argued that the trial Our decision in In the Matter of Birmingham & Birmingham, 154 N.H. 51

We disagree. the trial court had the ability to modify his alimony to a date prior to July 14. the same li mitation does not apply to alimony modifications. T hus, he argues, alimony differs from child support and each is governed by different statutes, for modification was provided to Wife. However, he argues that, because child support obligation prior to July 14 — the date that notice of the petition pursuant to RSA 458 - C:7, II, the trial court cannot retroactively modify his modification has been given to the [opposing party].”). H usband concedes that, modification shall not be effective prior to the date that notice of the petition for receipt of Husband’s petition. See RSA 458 - C:7, II (“Any child support 14 — the date that Wife fil ed an objection to the petition, thus evidencing the earliest date to which it could retroactively modif y the obligations was July of service of Husband’s petition for modification of child support and alimony, p. 11 11

review. According to Wife, we should review this matter under our As a threshold matter, the parties dispute the applicable standard of

evidence was presented” (quotations omitted)). the province of the trial court to accept or reject, in whole or in part, whatever measure the persuasiveness and credibility of evid ence” and that it “lies within ruled differently,” and recognizing that the trier of fact “is in the best position to that “we do not reweigh the evidence to determine whether we would have finding. See In re Guardianship of E.L., 154 N.H. 292, 296 (2006) (explaining documentary evidence that she submitted, we should defer to the trial court’s she asserts that, because the trial court’s finding is supported by the that our task is not to reweigh the evidence present ed to the trial court, and trial court found the records that she submitted to be “credible.” She argues affirm the trial court’s determination of child support arrear age s because the included bank deposit receipts. In response, Wife contends that we should “ignored” the allegedly more accurate records that he submitted, which Husband, when the trial court adopted Wife’s arrearage amount, it erroneously supported by the documentary evidence presented at the hearing. According to On appeal, Husband argues that the trial court’s decision is not

approximately $73,1 00 in child support arrear age s. concluded that Wife’s documents were “credible,” and that Husband owed After reviewing the documents provided by the parties, the trial court however, purported to demonstrate an arrear age of appr oximately $47,4 00. arrear ages amounted to approximately $73,1 00. Husband’s documents, and July 2014. According to Wife’s records, Husband’s child support Husband agreed to pay approximately $3,400 per month in child support — had paid and still owed between the date of the parties’ stipulation — in which records purporting to demonstrate the amount of child support that Husband arrearages. At the hearing on the petition to modify, each party submitted not support the trial court’s determination of the amount of his child support Husband next argues that the evidence presented to the trial court did

B. Child Support Arrearages

2014. that Wife receiv ed notice of Husband’s petition for modification — July 14, retroactively modify Husband’s alimony obligation to a date prior to the date Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly ruled that it could not Ichiban Japanese Steakhouse v. Rocheleau, 167 N.H. 138, 143 (2014). we assume that our holding in Birmingham c onforms to legislative intent. See legislature has not amended those statutes, see RSA 458:14, :32 (2004). Thus, court’s authority to grant a retroactive modification of alimony, id., the Birmingham we invited the legislature t o clarify the statutes governing the trial child support modifications. See id. We also observe that, although in modifications the same notice requirements that are applicable to retroactive p. 12 12

DALIANIS, C.J.