2015-0108, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation v. Michelle Willette

court. We affirm. to its possessory action in both the superior court and the federal district the possessory action; and (2) Freddie Mac failed to obtain judgment pertaining erred in issuing the wr it of possession because: (1) it lacked jurisdiction over Corporation (Freddie Mac). On appeal, Willette argues that the district division a writ of possession in favor of the plaintiff, Federal Home Loan Mortgage decision of the 6th Circuit Court - Hooksett District Division (Spath, J.), issuing DALIANIS, C. J. The defendant, Michelle Willette (Willette), appeals a

defendant. Stephen W. Wight, of Lawrence, Massachusetts, by brief, for the

DiGiampaolo on the memorandum of law), for the plaintiff. Harmon Law Offices, P.C., of Newton Highlands, Massachusetts (Amie

No. 2015 - 0108 6th Circuit Court - Hooksett District Division

page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh. us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 to press. Errors may be reported by E - mail at the following address: editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concor d, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule p. 2 22 as 2

question the title to the demanded premises [s] he shall forthwith If the defendant shall plead a plea which may bring in

must follow when a defendant raises an issue of title. Id. RSA 540:17 states: RSA 540:17 and:18 ( p. 2 2007) set forth the procedures the district division

N.H. at p. 2 266. have jurisdiction to resolve issues of title or actions in equity.” Friedline, 166 chapter 540.” Id.; see RSA ch. 540 (2007 & Supp. 2015). However, “it does not district divi sion “has the power to entertain possessory actions under RSA with powers conferred upon it by statute.” Friedline, 166 N.H. at 266. The “T he district division of the circuit court is a court of limited jurisdiction

Id. (quotation omitted). phrases in isolation, but rather within the context of the statute as a whole.” to include.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Moreover, we do not consider words and legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit legi slative intent from the statute as written and will not consider what the to its plain and ordinary meaning.” Id. (quotation omitted). “We interpret language of the statute itself, and, if possible, construe that language according Eskeland, 166 N.H. 554, 558 ( p. 2 2014) (quotation omitted). “We first look to the as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole.” Petition of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature question, we need to engage in statutory interpretation.” Id. “In matters of review.” Friedline v. Roe, 166 N.H. 264, 266 (2014). “In order to answer this division had jurisdiction in this case is a question of law, subject to de novo the writ of possession. “The ultimate determination as to whether the district We first address w hether the district division had jurisdiction to issue

disagreed and issued the writ. This appeal followed. division lacked jurisdiction to issue a writ of possession. The district division me rits of its possessory action. At the hearing, Willette argued that the district Freddie Mac then requested a hearing in the district division on the

denied. motion in superior court for the issuance of a writ of possession, which was Mac’s motion to dismiss Willette’s title action. Afterward, Freddie Mac filed a court to the federal district court. The federal district court granted Freddie In April p. 2 2014, Freddie Mac removed the title action from the superior

action in superior court. filed the required recognizance with the district division and then filed a title district division seeking possession of the premises. After a hearing, Willette Pembroke. Freddie Mac subsequently filed a landlord and tenant writ in the Mac purchased, through a foreclosure sale, Willette’s real property located in The record establishes the following facts. In February p. 2 201 p. 3 3, Freddie 3

writ of possession in the superior court, but only in circumstances in which a interpretation, RSA 540:18 vests exclusive jurisdiction over the issuance of a jurisdiction over the possessory action to be extinguished. U nder Willette’s action is filed in superior court, the legislature intended the district division ’s proceedings shall be had before” the district division, means that, once a title W e are not pers uaded that the language in RSA 540:18, that “no further

her title action. We hold that they do not. legislature to deprive the district division of that jurisdiction once Willette filed procedures contained in RSA 540:17 and :18 indicate an intent by the chapte r 540. See Friedline, 166 N.H. at 266. Thus, the issue is whether the division ha d the jurisdiction to issue a writ of possession pursuant to RSA T here is no dispute that, before Willette filed her title action, the district

district d ivision had jurisdiction to resolve the issue of possession. possession, and once the federal district court dismissed Willette’s action, the action merely stayed the district division’s ability to act upon the writ of over Freddie Mac ’s possessory action. Freddie Mac argues that Willette’s title district division — means that the district division no longer had juris diction language in RSA 540:18 — “no further proceedings shall be had before” the by the district division and brought her title action in superior court, the Willette argues, however, that, after she filed the recognizance required

possessory proceedings in the district division may resume.” Id. Id. “If the defendant fails to enter [h er] action in the superior court, then the ordered by the cou rt, the possessory action in the district division is stayed.” is raised in the district division and the defendant files such recognizance as halt the possessory proceedings.” Id. at 267. However, “[w]hen the plea of title “T he filing of a plea of title in the district division does not immediately

See also Friedline, 166 N.H. at 266 - 67.

begun there. the superior court in the same manner as if it were originally [ci rcuit] court, but the action may be entered and prosecuted in recognizance no further proceedings s hall be had before the After the filing of such plea and the entry of such

RSA 540:18 states:

awarded against [h er]. pending the action, and the damages and costs which may be said court, and to pay all ren t then due or which shall become due the court at the next return day, and to prosecute [h er] action in the court shall order, to enter [her] action in the superior court for recognize to the plaintiff, with sufficient sureties, in such sum as p. 4 4

matter.” However, she has not provided, as part of the appellate record, a superior court “[e]njoin any further possessory action against [her] in this over the possessory action because, in her title action, she requested that the Willette also argues that the district division did not retain jurisdiction

transferred to the superior court with her title action. does not support Willette’s asser tion that Freddie Mac ’s possessory action was superior court agreed and denied Freddie Mac ’s motion. Therefore, the record possession . . . was not an issue to be adjudicated by [the superior] court.” The not ultimately tran sferred to the Superior Court” and “the issuance of a writ of Willette objected, specifically acknowledging that the possessory action “was writ of possession before seeking the same relief in the district division. dismissal, Freddie Mac filed in the superior court a motion for the issuance of a court order makes no mention of the possessory action. Further, a fter th e dismiss it. In its order dismissing Willette’s title action, the federal district court, Freddie Mac remov ed it to federal court and then successfully mov ed to consolidated with her title action. After Willette filed her action in the superior Mac’s possessory action was t ransferred to superior court or otherwise Additionally, there is no support for Willette’s assertion that Freddie

action in the superior court on t he defendant.” Friedline, 166 N.H. at 267. the action in superior court” but, rather, “places the burden to institute the which does not require “the district division... to transfer or otherwise enter (Emphasis added.) This was consistent with our interpretation of RSA 5 p. 4 40:17, action, she must do so as a new separate filing with [the] Superior Court.” in error, explaining that “if the defendant still wishes to file a plea of title subsequent order, t he district division clarified that it had granted the motion have the matter transferred to superior court, which the court granted. In a she first raised the issue of title in the district division, she filed a motion to Willette’s title action was not “transferred” to the superior court. When

argument misstates the record. to reach a final resolution of the case; including the issue of possession.” Her of record, the parties agreed to transfer the case to the Superior Court in order Willette next argues that the district division erred because “as a matter

prevent the district division from acting up on Freddie Mac ’s possessory action. that, in this case, af ter the title action was res olved, RSA p. 5 5 p. 4 40:18 did not this case, the federal district court following removal. Accordingly, we hold possessory action until the title action is resolved in the superior court or, as in rule up on the title action, which is beyond its jurisdiction, or proceed with the proceedings” language as serving to ensure that the district division does not so. See, e.g., RSA 502 - A:14, I (2010). Thus, we interpret th e “no further jurisdiction to a particular court under such circumstances it could have done plain language of the statute s. Had the legislature wanted to grant exclusive def endant files a title action. Such an interpretati on is not supported by the 5

HICKS, CONBOY, LYNN, and BASSETT, JJ., concurred.

further discussion. See Vogel v. Vogel, 137 N.H. 321, 322 (1 993). denied in superior court. We conclude that these arguments do not warrant district division after having its motion for issuance of a writ of possession improper “forum shopping” by re quest ing the writ of possession from the to removing the action to federal court; and (2) Freddie Mac engaged in judgment on the possessory action because it failed to obtain a judgment prior Finally, Willette argues that: (1) Freddie Mac waived its right to obtain

the record does not support. Therefore, we need not address it. possessory action was transferred to superior court, which as explained above, division. T his argument, however, relies up on Willette’s assumption that the “is fatal” to Freddie Mac ’s ability to obtain a writ of p ossession in the district Willette next argues that the federal court’s dismissal of her title action

jurisdiction over Freddie Mac ’s possessory action. Willette’s request for relief, standing alone, deprived the district division of superior court order granting her request, and we are not persuaded that