2016-0350, Robert Carr & a. v. Town of New London

Commission, 108 N.H. 167, 169 (1967). The tax year begins on April 1. See RSA 74:1 (2012); RSA 76:2 (Supp. 2016); Gilford v. State Tax 1

property located at 29 Bo ulder Point Road in New London from April 1, 2014, 1 The pertine nt facts are as follows. During the 2014 tax year, Carr owned

pursuant to RSA 76:16 (Supp. 2016). We affirm. their appeal of the Town’s denial of their request for a property tax abatement petitioners, Robert Carr (Carr) and Raoul & Karen, LLC (Raoul & Karen), in order of the Superior Court (McNamara, J.) granting summary judgment to the LYNN, J. The respondent, the Town of New London (Town), appeals an

Courtney on the brief, and Mr. Mayer orally), for the respondent. Upton & Hatfield, LLP, of Concord (Barton L. Mayer and Michael P.

Katherine E. Hedges on the brief, and Mr. Hodes orally), for the petitioners. Hage Hodes, Professional Association, of Manchester (Jay L. Hodes and

No. 2016 - 0350 Merrimack

address of the court's home page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. available on the Internet by 9:00 a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct by E - mail at the following address: reporter@courts.state.nh. us. Opinions are corrections may be made before the opinion goes to press. Errors may be reported Doe Drive, Concor d, New Hampshire 03301, of any editorial errors in order that requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New Hampshire, One Charles formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. Readers are NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule p. 2 22 as well as 2

The principals of Raoul & Karen, Ryan and Kelly Carr, are Carr’s children. p. 2 2

76: p. 2 21 p rovides the exclusive remedy to taxpayers seeking a batement based and both parties moved for summary judgment. The Town argued that RSA The petitioners appealed to the superior cour t pursuant to RSA 76:17,

application within the sixty - day deadline required by RSA 76: p. 2 21, III. manner, and the petitioners did not dispute that they d id not file their p e titioners filed their application for abatement under RSA 76:16 in a timely filed for proration under RSA 76:21. The Town did not dispute that the The Town denied the petitioners ’ application because they had not timely

them or by th eir predecessors.” cause shown, may abate any tax, including prior years ’ taxes, assessed by home’s destruction. RSA 76:16 states that “[s] electmen or assessors, for good tax abatement under RSA 76:16 in January p. 2 2015, about six months after the assessment under RSA 76:21. Rather, they petitioned the To wn for property T he petitioners did not apply for a proration of their property tax

76:16. officials to abate taxes for good cause shown pursuant to RSA VI. Nothing in this section shall limit the ability of the assessing

. . . .

paragraph I. officials in writing within 60 days of the event described in provided in paragraph I shall file an application with the assessing III. A per son ag grieved of a property tax for a building damaged as

. . . .

assessment for the building for the current tax year. able to be used . . . the assessing officials shall prorate the or natural disaster to the extent that it renders the building not I. Whenever a taxable building is damaged due to unin tended fire

conditions. See RSA 76: p. 2 21 (Supp. 2016). RSA 76:21 provides, in relevant part: provided for prorated tax assessments for buildings damaged under c ertain The year prior to the house’s destruction, a statute came into effect that

year. of the p. 2 2014 tax year. The Town assessed t he house at $688,000 for that tax the house’s destruction, the petitioners could not use it for 272 of the p. 3 365 days on July 1, 2014, leaving only a few outbuildings on the property. As a result of T he house on the property was struck by lightning and burned to the ground to December 20, 2014, at which time he sold the property to Raoul & Karen. 2 3

plain and ordinary meanings to the words used.” Id. “Furthermore, we as a whole.” Id. “We first examine the language of the statute and a scribe the arbiters of legislative intent as expressed in the words of the statute considered N.H. p. 3 36, 38 (2012). “In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final review is de novo. Henderson Holdings at Sugar Hill v. Town of Sugar Hill, 164 Because r esolution of this issue requires statutory interpretation, our

Hood, 127 N.H. at 825. elderly persons because the taxpayer’s birthday occurred after April 1. See which we held that a taxpayer was not eligible for a pro perty tax exemption for support for its view, the Town cites Appeal of Hood, 127 N.H. 824 (1986), in provided for by RSA 76:21, not “good cause” abatements under RSA 76:16. As single exception to this rule is the prorated assessment for damaged buildings obligations set as of that date.” See RSA 74:1, 76:2. The Town argues that the date during the tax year that alter a property ’s value “do not alter the tax conducted as of April 1 under RSA 74:1 and 76:2, events occurring after that The Town first asserts that, because property tax assessments are

these arguments below. nature, cannot be in derogation of established principles of law. We address granting of the abatement, which the Town c haracterizes as equitable in trial court’s order violates the preemption doctrine; and (5) the trial court’ s relief under RSA 76:16 for fire - or natural disaster - related building loss; (4) the abate taxes for good cause shown under RSA 76:16; ( p. 3 3) RSA 76:21 forecloses preserves, but does not alter, the existing authority of asse ssing officials to tax year may result in an abatement of that assessment; (2) RSA 76:21, VI date of assessment of property is April 1, and no subsequent event during the On appeal, the Town argues t hat the trial court erred because: (1) the

followed. favor of the petitioners on their request for a tax abatement. This appeal concluded that they had. Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment in petitioners had shown “good cause” for abatement under RSA 76:16, and apply for abatement under RSA 76:16.” The court then evaluated whether the petitioners ’ favor, and ruled that the statute did “not limit taxpayers’ ability to as their single ave nue for relief. The court thus construed RSA 76:21 in the or hi story of the statute that evin ced an intent to limit taxpayers to RSA 76:21 76:21 and found that language ambiguous. It found noth ing in the language fire - related building loss, the trial court looked to the plain la nguage of RSA To determine whether RSA 76:21 preclude s application of RSA 76:16 for

made under RSA 76:16 instead of RSA 76:21. and that their application should not have been denied solely because it was asserted that RSA 76:21 states that relief under RSA 76:16 remains available, upon property damage caused by fire or natural disaster. The petitioners p. 4 4

a batement for good cause under 76:16.” To support its argument, the Town case and that fire - related building loss has “never provided a basis for disproportionate as sessment. T he Town argues that this has always been the and that “good cause” encompasses only claims for inability to pay or authority of assessing officials to abate taxes for “good cause” under RSA 76:16 The Town next contends that RSA 76:21, VI only “preserves” the existing

(200 p. 4 4). which it lays down,” GGP Steeplegate v. City of Concord, 150 N.H. 683, 686 should be “construed liberally, in advancement of the rule of remedial justice Ansara v. City of Nashua, 118 N.H. 879, 880 (1978), and that RSA 76:16 remembered that tax abatement proceedi ngs are equitable in nature, see does not. T he efficacy of such a conclusion is further undermined when it is conclusion that the former circumstance constitutes good cause, but the latter occurring after April 1. Certainly nothing in the text of the statute requires the should not defeat good cause for an abatement for destruction of property abatement based upon an inability to pay that arises after tha t date, then it “immutability” of the assessment after April 1 does not defeat good cause for an Briggs’ Petition, 29 N.H. 547, 550 (1854) (emphasis added). If the asserted pay taxes that arose from “the loss of property subsequent ly to its assessment.” prede cessor to RSA 76:16 permitted a “good cause” abatement for inability to More importantly, as early as 1854, we held that the statutory

76:16] to situations of disproportionate assessment and inability to pay.” Id. in Barksdale, neither have we ever “explicitly limited the application of [RSA inability to pay.” Barksdale, 136 N.H. at 515. However, as we also recognized [RSA 76: 16] abatement for anything other than disproportionate assessment or 136 N.H. 511 (1992), for the proposition that “this court has never affirmed an allow ed under RSA chapter 76. T he Town cites Barksdale v. Town of Epsom, that abatement s for changes to property that occurred after April 1 were assessments on damaged buildings under RSA 76:21” was added to RSA 76:2 According to the Town, it was only when the clause “except for prorated to RSA 76:16 because all tax obligatio ns are immutable after April 1. occurring after April 1 do not constitute “good cause” for abatement pursuant Town argues that this language necessitates the concl usion that dam ages inventory taken in April of that year.” RSA 76:2 (2012) (amended 2012). The shall be April 1 to March 31 and all property taxes shall be assessed on the Prior to its amendment in 2012, RSA 76:2 stated: “T he property tax year

Timber Co. v. N.H. Dep’t of Revenue Admin., 162 N.H. 98, 102 (2011). government and in favor of the taxpayer.” N.H. Resid ent Ltd. Partners of Lyme However, “[i] f a taxing statute is ambiguous, we construe it against the advanced by the entire statutory scheme.” Id. at 39 (quotation omitted). legislature ’ s intent i n enacting them and in light of the policy sought to be isolation.” Id. at 38 - 3 9. “Our goal is to apply statutes in light of the interpret statutes in the context of the overall statutory scheme and not in p. 5 5

virtue of the destruction of the home on their property. We also acknowledge III of the statute, the y would have been entitled to a proration thereunder by petitioners’ failure to comply with the sixty - day time limit imposed by section 76:21 plainly applies to the petitioners’ situation and that, were it not for the Henderson Holdings, 164 N.H. at 38. In so doing, we acknowledge that RSA fire - related building loss, we first look to the plain lan guage of RSA 76:21. See To determine whether RSA 76:21 precludes the application of RSA 76:16 for statutes.” Grand China, Inc. v. United Nat’l Ins. Co., 1 p. 5 56 N.H. 429, 431 (2007). will lead to reasonable results and e ffectuate the legislative purpose of the we construe them so that they do not contradict each other, and so that they “W hen interpreting two statutes that deal with a similar subject matter,

with the legislative history of RSA 76:21. “meaningless.” This inte rpretation, the Town contend s, is also inconsistent interpretation of RSA 76:16 renders RSA 76:21 superfluous and textually source of relief for such loss. It also asserts that the petitioners ’ expansive relief for fire - related building loss, RSA 7 6:16 does not provide an alternative The Town next argues that, because RSA 76:21 specifically governs tax

occurring after April 1 may constitute “good cause” under RSA 76:16. 137 N.H. 240, 246 (1993). Consequently, we hold that fire - related building loss considered in interpreting the statute. See Appeal of Milton School District, legislative interference, while not dispositive, is a relevant factor to be practices of officials charged with the administration of a statute without [RSA 76:16’s] proper application,” we have recognized that the long - standing claims that its own board of s electmen’s previous decisions are “not evidence of RSA 76:16 prior to the enactment of RSA 76:21. Although the Town now granted “good cause” abatement requests for fire - related building loss under properties affected by post - April 1 fire - related building loss. Indeed, t he Town dispute that some municipalities have granted “good cause” abatements for Past practice also undermines the Town’s argument. T he Town does not

resolutions. See id. at p. 5 551 - 54. provides selectmen a liberal tax abatement framework to promote equitable “poverty and inability to pay are good cause for the selectmen to abate taxes”; it 551 - 52, 5 53. Therefore, Briggs stands for more than its conclusion that “[o]ther misfortunes must furnish equally good cause for abatement.” Id. at only causes for which justice requires that taxes should be abated,” and N.H. at 551. We noted that “[i]llegality and irregularity are by no means the would be good cause for the selectmen to [abate th e property tax].” Briggs, 29 to provide abatements, stating that “[i]f justice requires an abatement, that disproportionality. In Briggs, we concluded that selectmen have broad power 136 N.H. at 515, neither is it strictly confined to financial inability or Although good cause under RSA 76:16 is not “boundless,” Barksdale,

above, however, neither of those cases support s the Town’s position. once again relies upon our decisions in Barksdale and Brigg s. As discussed p. 6 6

established by law” (quotation omitted)). that “equity has no power to change or unsettle [the] rights” th at are “clearly defined and considering equitable principles. Cf. Hedges v. Dixon C ounty, 150 U.S. 182, 192 (1893) (stating court’s order could not violate the preemption doctrine. Nor did it act in “derogation” of the law by supplemental source of relief, there is no conflict between it and RSA 7 p. 6 6:21. Accordingly, the trial Our conclusion also resolves the Town’s final two arguments. Given that RSA 76:16 provides a 3

DALIANIS, C.J.