2016-0259 and 2016-0629, In the Matter of Emily Sanborn and Timothy E. Sanborn

the final divorce decree provided that “[e]ach party shall be responsible for his decree in March 2011. Our mandate issued on April 21, 2011. Section 6 of issued in 2009. The respondent app ealed, and we affirmed the trial court’s The relevant fac ts are as follows. The parties’ final divorce decree was

in part. erred by denying his request for attorney’ s fees. We reverse in part and affirm RSA 415:18, XVI (2015). The respondent cross - appeals, arguing that the court continuation coverage under the petitioner’s dental insurance plan pursuant to argues that the court erred by ordering that the respondent i s entitled to (Foley, J.) ruling upon the respondent’s post - divorce motions. The petitioner and the respondent, Timothy E. Sanborn, appeal orders of the Circuit Court LYNN, J. In these consolidated appeals, the petitioner, Emily Sanborn,

Timothy E. Sanborn, self - represented party, by brief.

brief), for the petitioner. Springer Law Office, PLLC, of Portsmouth (Jonathan S. Springer on the

2016 - 0629 No s. 2016 - 0259 7th Circuit C ourt - Rochester Family Division

http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. release. The direct address of the court's home page is: Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 a.m. on the morning of their reported by E - mail at the following address: reporter@courts.state.nh. us. corrections may be made before the opinion goes to press. Errors may be Doe Drive, Concor d, New Hampshire 03301, of any editorial errors in order that requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New Hampshire, One Charles as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. Readers are NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule p. 2 22 as well 2

older and loses coverage because of the . . . divorce,” coverage shall continue which provides that “[w]hen the . . . divorced spouse . . . is 55 years of ag e or April p. 2 2014, he was entitled to coverage pursuant to RSA 415:18, XVI(c)(5), argued that, because he turned 55 during the period of coverage that ended in administrator for Breed’s Hill at the time that his co verage ended. He further her responsibility to notify him because he claimed that she was the plan “offered continuation of coverage” before April 2014. He contended that it was dental insurance coverage. He further contended that he should have been XVI, the petitioner had the responsibility to notify him of the expiration of the dental insurance coverage. He argued that, pursuant to RSA 415:18, VII - b and At some point in late 2015, the respondent sought a further ruling on

insurance through this employment starting October 1, p. 2 2015. petitioner started new employment on August 24, 2015, and received dental dental coverage was no longer effective as of the end of August 2015. The through Aetna. In April 2015, the petitioner left that employment, and her employment with the third - party insurance agency, including dental coverage On May 1, 2014, the petitioner received new insurance coverages through her petitio ner received the same dental insurance benefits through April 30, 2014. acquired Breed’s Hill, and Breed’s Hill was thereafter effectively defunct. The Insurance Group (Principal). In March 2014, a third - party insurance agency 2014. Through this employment, s he received dental insurance from Principal Insurance Agency (Breed’s Hill) from September 1, 2006 th rough March 1, The petitioner was employed as the plan administrator for Breed’s Hill

offers the group dental insurance as a benefit. petitioner] is employed at the same employer and the employer April p. 2 20, 2014. This obligation shall continue only so long as [the coverage period which continuance coverage period will expire on her employment, as a dependent for the three year continuation k ept on [the petitioner’s] group dental insurance policy, through expenses. Regarding dental insurance, [the respondent] shall be insurance and his or her own uninsur ed medical and dental Each party shall be responsible for his or her own health

relevant part: amending section 6 of the divorce decree, per the parties’ agreement, to read, in to April p. 2 20, 2014. Subsequently, the Circuit Court (Ashley, J.) issued an order continuation of dental insurance coverage for the respondent from April 2011 agreed that the decree should be amended to allow for three years of year continuation coverage period,” retroactive to April 2011. Th e petitioner allow him to be put on the petitioner’s dental plan “as a dependent for the 3 In December 2012, the respondent moved to amend the divorce decree to

and dental expenses.” or her own health and dental insurance and his or her own uninsured medical p. 3 3

proposed orders, or will otherwise be the responsibility of the” petitioner. The the respondent was without dental insurance] should be addressed in the ordered that “[a]ny unpaid dental care expenses falling within [the period when coverage for the period when he was without dental insurance.” It further amending the [divorce] decree, if necessary, to supply [the respondent] with of their divorce.” The court stated that it would “accept proposed orders continuation coverage when she removes him from her group plan as a result as a dependent or former spouse, for a period of time long enough to trigger The court ordered the petitioner to add the respondent “to her insurance

eligibility for coverage under RSA 415:18, XVI(c)(5). See RSA 415:18, XVI(e) (1). would have triggered Principal’s obligation to notify the respondent of his for notifying Principal of the respondent’s loss of coverage, which, in turn, the petitioner “was still the pl an administrator” and, t hus, she was responsible court found that, at the time that the respondent lost coverage in April 2014, notice from the plan administrator or employer of the loss of coverage.” The the individual of the right to con tinue coverage within p. 3 30 days of receiving to RSA 415:18, XVI(f)(5). Under RSA 415:18, XVI(f)(5), “[t]he carrier shall notify found that he was entitled to notification of termination of coverage pursuant Because the re spondent was eligible for continuation coverage, the court

XVI(c)(5). the respondent was eligible for continuation coverage under RSA 415:18, respondent’s interpretation “better reflect [ed] legislative intent” and, therefore, interpretation s of RSA 415:18, XVI(c)(5) appeared to be reasonable, the under RSA 415:18, VII - b (2015). It then ruled that, although both parties’ continuation coverage governed by RSA 415:18, XVI rather than coverage respondent obtained pursuant to the 201 p. 3 3 amendment to the divorce decree as trial court ruled in favor of the respondent. The court treated the coverage the Following a hearing on offers of proof presented through counsel, the

the time the divorce d ecree became final. not entitled to coverage under RSA 415:18, XVI(c)(5) beca use he was not 55 at Principal, and not to her. In addition, she contended that the respondent is the expiration of coverage in April 2014 was attributable to the carrier, Nonetheless, she maintained that any burden to notify the respondent prior to under her plan because she was no longer employed by the “same employer.” amended divorce decree, the respondent was no longer entitled to benefits acquired by the third - party insurance agency and, therefore, pursuant to the employment with Breed’s Hill ended on March 1, 2014, when Breed’s Hill was to which he was entitled under RSA 415:18. She further argued that her The petit ioner countered that the respondent received all of the coverage

Medicare.” participation in another employer - based group plan or becomes eligible for under RSA p. 4 415:18, XVI “until such time as the spouse becomes eligible for 4

p. 4 415:18, VII - b “never arose.” We agree. pursuant to the language of the original divorce decree, coverage under RSA coverage. ’” The petitioner contends that thi s was correct. She maintains that, amended decree refers to the coverage during this p eriod as ‘continuation April 20, 2014 was governed by [RSA 415:18,] VII - b, and because the [2013] [had] explicitly a rgued that the coverage period retroactive to 2011 and ending 415:1 8, XVI, rather than RSA 415:18, VII - b (2015), “[b]ecause neither party coverage arising during this period as continuation coverage governed by RSA of the 2013 amendment to the divorce decree. T he trial court treated the We begin by examining the coverage the respondent obtained a s a result

Zorn, 158 N.H. at p. 4 438. might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include. intent from the statute as written and will not consider what the legislature Gen., 169 N.H. 509, 522 (2016) (quotation omitted). We interpret l egislative history only if the statutory language is ambiguous.” Reid v. N.H. Attorney first look to the plain meaning of the words used and will consider legislative Zorn v. Demetri, 158 N.H. 437, 438 (2009). “When interpreting a statute, we Th e interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo. Resolution of this issue requires us to engage in statutory interpretation.

to the divorce decree. section XVI, which she asserts he received as a result of the 2013 amendment in this case, the respondent was entitled only to continuation coverage under “continuation coverage” provided for by RSA p. 4 415:18, XVI. She maintains that, divorce:” (1) coverage provided for under RSA 415:18, VII - b; and (2) the 415:18 provides two terms of dental insurance coverage following a decree of dental insurance coverage under RSA 415:18, XVI. She contends that “RSA trial court erred by finding that the respondent was eligible for contin ued We first address the petitioner’ s appeal. T he petitioner argues that the

I. Petitioner ’s Appeal

therefore, we have considered the respondent’s supplemental brief. the respondent’s motion to accept and deny the petitioner’s motion to strike; respondent filed a separate motion to accept the supplemental brief. We grant c apitalization omitted.) Following submission of the case o n the briefs, the brief” and the petitioner has moved to strike that brief. (Bolding and We note that the respondent has filed a “supplemental dental appeal

award. This appeal and cross - appeal followed. respondent subsequent ly sought attorney’s fees, which the court decli ned to p. 5 5

. . . .

procedures described in this section. this section. Coverage shall be provided in accordance with the resident of New Hampshire to obtain continuation coverage under that allows each subscriber or member on the policy who is a for delivery in this state or any other state shall contain a provision that affects a resident of New Hampshire that is de livered or issued coverage under the plan. Any group policy of health insurance expense coverage where the policyholder is the school, loses and/or surgical expense benefits, except student major medical maintenance organization that provides medical, hospital, dental, individual covered by a plan of group health insurance or a health (a) Carriers shall provide continuation of coverage when an

RSA 41 p. 5 5:18, XVI provides, in pertinent part:

interpretation of a court order is a question of l aw, which we review de novo.”). XVI. See In the Matter of Salesky & Salesky, 1 p. 5 57 N.H. 698, 702 (2008) (“The the 2013 amendment to the divorce decree was coverage under RSA 415:18, conclude, therefore, that t he coverage the respondent obtained as a result of continuation coverage under RSA 415:18, XVI. See RSA 415:18, XVI(a). We result, pursuant to RSA 415:18, XVI(a), the respondent had the right to paragraph VII - b as of the date of that decree. See RSA 415:18, VII - b(a). As a the original divorce decree, the respondent was no t e ligible for coverage under uninsured medical and dental expenses.” Thus, pursuant to the language of responsible for his or her own health and dental insurance and his or her own Here, the original divorce decree provided that “[e]ach party shall be

(Emphasis added.)

otherwise. eligibility shall not be required if the decre e expressly provides or examination, as if said decree had not been issued. Such eligible dependent under said policy, without additional premium and remain eligible for group benefits as a family member or dependent under said policy prior to the date of the decree shall be policy, the former spouse who is a family member or el igible spouse is a member of a group accident and health insurance (a) Upon a final decree of divorce or legal separation, if one

resident of New Hampshire shall contain the following provisions: Any group accident and health insurance policy covering a

RSA 41 p. 5 5:18, VII - b provides, in relevant part: p. 6 6

and/or surgical expense benefits . . . loses coverage unde r the plan.” Under health maintenance organization that provides medical, hospital, dental, coverage when an individual covered by a plan of group health insurance or a Under RSA 415:18, XV I(a), “[c]arriers shall provide continuation of

coverage that he is entitled to under the statute. We agree. decree retroactive from April 2011 to April 2014, he has received all of the he received that coverage pursuant to the 2013 amendment to the divorce of continuation coverage under RSA 415:18, XVI. She contends that, because The petitioner argues that the respondent was entitled to only one period

becomes eligible for Medicare. participation in another employer - based group plan or section until suc h time as the spouse becomes eligible for the covered employee, coverage shall continue subject to this coverage because of the death, divorce, or legal separation of separated spouse is 55 years of age or older and loses (5) When the surviving spouse, divorced spouse, or legally

. . ..

group health insurance plan for one of the following reasons: period of 3 p. 6 6 months if any individual loses coverage under a (e), coverage shall continue subject to this section for a (4) Thirty - six month period — Subject to subparagraph

. . . .

(c) Periods of coverage shall be as follows: p. 7 7

with or together with,’ ‘added to or linked’ and ‘as well as.’” (ellips is omitted)). Portsmouth, 154 N.H. 390, 392 (2006) (“The word ‘and’ is defined as ‘along divorce.” RSA 415:18, XVI(c)(5) (emphasis added); see Boyle v. City of must be “55 years of age or older and lose[] coverage because of the . . . Moreover, to obtain coverage under subparagraph (c)(5), the individual

coverage once the 36 - month period has expired. See RSA 415:18, XVI(c)(4). suggest s that an individual is entitled to an additional period of continuation 415:18, XVI(c). N othing in the statutory language of subparagraph (c)(4) periods depending upon the reason that an individual loses coverage. See RSA We interpret 415:18, XV I (c) as providing separate and discrete coverage

415:18, XVI(c) (5). This was error. the respondent was entitled to an additional period of coverage under RSA court found that, following the expiration of the three - year period of coverage, pursuant to the 2013 amendment to the divorce decree. Nonetheless, t he trial It is undisputed that the respondent obtained three years of coverage

See RSA 415:18, XVI(c)(4). respondent was entitled to continuation coverage for a period of three years. all findings necessary to support its decree.” (quotation omitted)). Thus, the (200 p. 7 7) (“[I]n the absence of specific findings, a court is presumed to have made subparagraph (c)(4). See In the Matter of Costa & Costa, 156 N.H. 323, 331 presume that the respondent’s initial period of coverage was under with an extended coverage period under subp aragraph (c)(5). We, therefore, ruled t hat, read together, subparagraphs (c)(4) and (5) provide the respondent respondent’s appeal of the parties ’ divorce action. In addition, the trial court m onth, period beginning on the date we issued the mandate on the amendment provide d the respo ndent with coverage for a three - year, i.e., 36 - XVI(c) as a result of the 2013 amendment to the divorce decree. However, the specified what period of coverage the r espondent obtained under RSA 415:18, Here, neither the amended divorce decree, nor the trial court ’s order

Medicare.” RSA 415:18, XVI(c)(5). for participation in another employer - based group plan or be comes eligible for continue subject to this section until such time as the spouse becomes eligible older and loses coverage because of the . . . divorce,” then coverage “shall subparagraph (c)(5), “[w]hen the . . . divorced spouse . . . is 55 years of age or period of 36 months.” RSA 415:18, XVI(c)(4)(B). On the other hand, under insurance plan” by reason of divorce, he or she is entitled to coverag e “for a subparagraph (c)(4), if an individual loses coverage “under a group health must provide when an individual loses coverage. As relevant here, u nder RSA 415:18, XVI(c) mandates the “[p]eriods of coverage” that a carrier

the individual’s coverage under the group plan ceased.” RSA 415:1 p. 8 8, XVI(b). subparagraph (b), “[t]he effective date of continuation coverage shall be the date 8

arguments. In light of our decision, we need not address the petitioner’s remaining

insurance costs. respondent to her insurance and to pay for certain of the respondent’s We, therefore, reverse the trial court’s order requiring the petitioner to add the ruling that he was entitled to extended coverage under subparagraph (c)(5). pursuant to subparagraph (c)(4), we conclude that the trial court erred by continuation coverage under RSA 415:1 p. 8 8, XVI, and he received that cover age Accordingly, because the respondent was entitled to only one period of

circumstances, we decline to address this argument. remand th is case to the trial cou rt to address this issue. In these this issue was presented to the trial court, nor has he requested that we The respondent has not provided this court with a record demonstrating that disputes that the parties reached “any agreement regarding dental insurance.” reached an agreement regarding his dental insurance coverage. The petitioner properly before us because, after she filed her notice of appeal, the parties The respondent further suggests that the petitioner’ s appeal is not

inapplicable in this case. that decree, there is no such conflict. RSA 415:1 p. 8 8, VII - b(h) is therefore respondent ineligible for coverage under RSA 415:18, VII - b as of the date of Here, however, because the language of the original divo rce decree rendered the an individual is eligible for group coverage under RSA 415:18, VII - b or XVI. We interpret this provision as applying when there is a conflict as to whether

apply unless the decree expressly provides otherwise. provisions that confer greater rights on the former spouse shall upon a final decree of nullity, divorce or legal separation, the and RSA 415:1 p. 8 8, XVI with respect to eligibility for group coverage [t]o the extent that t here is a conflict between [RSA 415:18, VII - b]

of coverage under RSA 415:1 p. 8 8, XVI(c)(5). RSA 415:18, VII - b(h) provides that that the trial court did not err by finding that he is entitled to a second period The respondent cites RSA 415:18, VII - b(h) in support of his argument

eligible for coverage under RSA 415:1 p. 8 8, XVI(c)(5). not 55 at the time that he lost coverage because of the divorce, he was not the 2013 amendment to the divorce decree. Thus, because the respondent was decree. He later turned 55 during the three - year period of coverage provided by April 21, 2011, the date our mandate issued on his appeal of the divorce In this case, the respondent initially lost coverage because of the divorce on p. 9 9

DALIANIS, C.J.