2016-0342, The State of New Hampshire v. Travis C. Paige

led p olice on a high - speed vehicle chase in Grafton County between Bethlehem The pertinent facts are as follows. On September 3, 2015, the defendant

RSA 625:9, IV(c) (2016). We affirm. class A misdemeanors and sentencing him accordingly. See RSA 631:3 (2016); Court (Bornstein, J.) concluding that his reckless conduct convictions were LYNN, J. The defendant, Travis C. Paige, appeals a ruling of the Superior

brief, for the defendant. Thomas Barnard, senior assistant appellate defender, of Concord, on the

g eneral, on the memorandum of law), for the State. Ann M. Rice, d eputy a ttorney g eneral (Sean P. Gill, assistant attorney

No. 2016 - 0342 Grafton

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weapon. The indictments alleged that the motor vehicle the defendant operated constituted the deadly 1

and that the court erred in sentencing him on those charges as though they misdemeanor reckless conduct convictions constituted cl ass B misdemeanors On appeal, the defenda nt argues that, pursuant to RSA 6 p. 2 25:9, IV (c), his

sentences. This appeal followed. that were concurrent with each other but consecutive to the stand committed reckless conduct convictions, it imposed suspended twelve - month sentences consecutive twelve - month terms of incarceration. For each of the misdemeanor resisting arrest and disobeying an officer, the court sentenced the defendant to conduct offenses carried class A misdemeanor penalties. For the charges of At sentencing, the trial court ruled that the lesser - included reckless

resisting arrest and disobeying an officer. misdemeanor reckless conduct. The jury also convicted the defendant of three felony reckless conduct charges, but convicted him of three counts of misdemeanor reckless conduct of fense. The jury acquitted the defendant of all and, over the State’s objection, on the elements of the lesser - included the trial court instructed the jury on the elements of felony reckless conduct The defendant was tried by jury in April p. 2 2016. In its jury instructions,

misdemeanor offenses as class A misdemeanor s. before the defendant’s arraignment that it was electing to prosecute both ( p. 2 2016). In accordance with RSA 625:9, IV(c) (2), t he State filed notice at or the other alleging that he resisted arrest. See RSA 265:4 (2014); RSA 642:2 two misdemeanor offenses, one alleging that he disobeyed a police officer, and RSA 625:11, V (2016). The defendant also was charged by informations with felony when a deadly weapon is used in the commission of the offense. See id.; unspecified misdemeanor. See RSA 631:3. However, it becomes a class B reckless conduct with a deadly weapon. Ordinarily, r eckless conduct is an 1 In November, the defendant was indicted on three counts of felony

morning. out of the car, which was smoking. The defendant was arrested the next to pursue the defendant, opting instead to help the defendant’s girlfriend get window and fled on foot into the woods. The police officer on scene chose not the passenger seat of the vehicle, the defenda nt climbed out of the driver’s side ditch. The vehicle came to rest on the passenger side. Leaving his girlfriend in control of the vehicle after passing through a covered bridge and crashed into a and nearly struck a cyclist a nd a minivan. Eventually, the defendant lost 100 miles per hour to evade police. T he defendant also disregarded stop signs and Bath. Throughout the chase, the defendant drove at speeds in excess of p. 3 3

IV, and we therefore have no occasion to consider that issue. defendant was convicted meet the criteria necessary to satisfy subp aragraph (c)(1) of RSA 625:9, The State does not argue that the misdemeanor reckl ess conduct offenses of which the 2

stating that its provisions “govern the classification of every offense.” RSA RSA 625:9 is entitled “Classification of Crimes.” Paragraph I begins by

Lukas, 164 N.H. 69 p. 3 3, 694 (2013). (2001) (quotation omitted). We employ a de novo standard of r eview. State v. and to avoid an absurd or unjust result.” State v. Burr, 147 N.H. 10 2, 104 625:3 (2016). Furthermore, we aim to “effectuate [the statute’s] overall purpose justice.” Czyzewski v. N.H. Dep’t of Safety, 165 N.H. 109, 111 (2013); see RSA construe them according to the fair import of their terms and to promote words used.” Id. “We do not strictly construe criminal statutes, but rather statute, and, when possible, asc ribe the plain and ordinary meanings to the v. Lathrop, 164 N.H. 468, 469 (2012). “We first examine the language of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole.” State matters of statuto ry interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the intent of the The defendant’s argument requires us to interpret RSA 625:9, IV. “In

misdemeanors. We disagree. required the trial court to treat his reckless conduct convictions as class B convictions. T he defendant maintains that the absence of such notice 2 offenses, the State would seek class A misdemeanor penalties for such de fendant was convicted of lesser - included misdemeanor reckless conduct provide notice in accordance with RSA 625:9, IV(c)(2) that, in the event the It is undisputed that at no time pr ior to arraignment did the State

RSA 490:26 - d. Such notice shall be on a form approved in accordance with misdemeanor penalties on or before the date of arraignment. (2) The state files a notice of intent to seek class A

“threat of violence” as defined in paragraph VII; or (1) An element of the offense involves an “act of violence” or

presumed to be a class B misdemeanor unless: misdemeanor without specification of the classification shall be Any crime designated within or outside this code as a

RSA 625:9, IV(c) provides:

that are charged as felony level offenses. applies to convictions for lesser - included unclassified misdemeanors of crimes text and the leg islative history of RSA 625:9, IV (c) i ndicate that the statute were class A misdemeanor offenses. Specifically, he cont ends that both the p. 4 4

required courts to treat unclassified misdemea nors as class A misdemeanors. the offense. Id. Prior to t he adoption of this statute, the C riminal C ode unclassified misdemeanor offense would face the prospect of incarceration for prosecutors to decide before arraignment whether a defendant charged with an defendants. Id. Rather, its purpose was to save the State money by forcing purpose was not to co nfer additional procedural or notice rights upon FN (Mar. 17, 2009). The legislative history of the statute makes clear that its enacted the statute in 2009. See Senate Comm. on Judiciary, Hr’g on SB 201 - 625:9, IV(c) would not serve the purpose intended by the legislature when it Furthermore, adoption of the defendant’s proposed construction of RSA

possible. defendant, would alternatively pursue the least severe misdemeanor penalties the State, focused up on securing class B felony convictions against the more form. In this case, for example, no reasonable person would assume that purpose and would simply result in the State “papering” the court file with one misdemeanor would elevate form over substance; it would serve no legitimate charged as a felony could ultima tely result in conviction for a lesser - included 625:9, IV(c)(2) in every case in which there is the possibility that an offense available. To force the State to ritualistically file a notice pursuant to RSA the alter native, the most serious lesser - included misdemeanor conviction a felony conviction on the charge, the State would always choose to pursue, in with a felony level offense, it is reasonable to presume that, if unable to secure redundant because, in cases in which the State has charged the defendant penalties it would seek would be for a class A misdemeanor. This w ould be charge that, should he or she be convicted of a lesser - included offense, the the statute, the State would be required to notify a defendant facing a felony intended. See Burr, 1 p. 4 47 N.H. at 104. Under the defendant’s construction of produce absurd and illogical results that the legislature could not have statute c ould support the defendant’s position, we reject it because it would Although we acknowledge that a strictly literal interpretation of the

explicitly in the text of the statute. except lesser - included offenses from subparagraph (c), it would have done so misdemeanors. He further asserts that, if the legislature had intended to conduct offenses, the trial court was required to treat those offenses as class B intent to seek class A misdemeanor penalties for the lesser - included reckless including all misdemeanors, and because the S tate did not file a notice of felonies. I n the defen dant’s vi ew, because the statute applies to every offense, misdemeanors that are lesser - included offenses of crimes originally charged as and structure of RSA 62 p. 5 5:9 supports his claim that subparagraph (c) applies to out in detail above. Id. at IV. T he defendant asserts that the overall language an individual,” and then in subparagraph (c) establish es the presumption set are either class A misdemeanors or class B misdemeanors when committed by misdemeanor or violation.” Id. at II. Paragraph IV states that “[m]isdemeanors 625:9, I. Paragraph II provides that “[e]very offense is either a felony, 5

DALIANIS, C.J.