2017-0692, The State of New Hampshire v. Jeffrey R. Keenan

disputed. On January 25, 2017, the New Hampshire Department of Safety The following facts have been gleaned from the record and are not

vehicle owned and registered to his son, we reverse. Because the defendant’s conviction was ba sed upon his lawful operation of a registration privileges were suspended, in violation of RSA 261:178 (2014). in the Circuit Court (Stephen, J.) for driving a motor vehicle while his vehicle DONOVAN, J. The defendant, Jeffrey R. Keenan, appeals his conviction

defendant. Ra n dall Baldwin Clark, of Hollis, on the brief and orally, for the

Woodcock, assistant attorney g eneral, orally), for the State. assistant attorney g eneral, on the memorandum of law, and Elizabeth C. Gordon J. MacDonald, attorney general (Stephen D. Fuller, senior

No. 2017 - 0692 10th Circuit C ourt - Salem District Division

http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. release. The direct address of the court's home page is: Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 a.m. on the morning of their reported by E - mail at the following address: reporter@courts.state.nh. us. corrections may be made before the opinion goes to press. Errors may be Doe Drive, Concor d, New Hampshire 03301, of any editorial errors in order that requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New Hampshire, One Charles as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. Readers are NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule p. 2 22 as well 2

minimum liability requirements under RSA p. 2 264.” N.H. Admin. R., Saf - C 202.01(ah). to RSA 264:21 and RSA 259:9 that certifies that the policyholder is insured for New Hampshire’s An SR - 22 insurance certificate is a “uniform document filed by an insurance company pursuant 2 and, at any rate, is not relevant to this appeal. The basis for the suspension of the defendant’s operating privileges is not disclosed by the record 1

him. that he owned or controlled the vehicle he was driving when the officer stopped meaning of “cont rolled,” the defendant argued that the State failed to prove a person treats a vehicle as his own but does not legally own it. Based on this “controlled” does not mean “driven” but instead refers to circumstances where statute is synonymous with “driven.” The defendant countered that another person, in part, because the word “controlled” as it a ppears in the from driving any vehicle, regardless o f whether the vehicle is registered to argued that the statute prohibits any person with a suspended registration been suspended or revoked shal l be guilty of a misdemeanor.” The State vehicle owned or controlled by him upon any way after his registration has p. 2 261:178, which states: “any person who shall drive or permit to be driven a In their arguments at trial, the parties focused on the last clause of RSA

his registration was suspended constituted a violation of RSA p. 2 261:178. defendant’s act of driving a vehicle lawfully registered to another person while registered in his son’s name. Thus, the only dispute at trial was whether the suspended; and (3) the defendant was operating a vehicle, owned and properly of the motor vehicle stop; (2) at that time, the defendant’s registration remained defendant’s o perating privileges were restored and in good standing on the date At trial, the parties did not dispute the relevant facts — (1) the

registration privileges were suspended in violation of RSA p. 2 261:178. a summons to the defendant charging him with operating a vehicle while his subsequently identified as the defendant’s son. N onetheless, t he officer issued and learned that the vehicle was registered to Jake Keenan, who was was suspended. The officer also checked the registration number of the vehicle check on the defendan t’s license and learned that the defendant’s registration by the defendant was uninspected. During the stop, the officer ran a computer promptly stopped by a Salem p olice officer who observe d that the vehicle driven On August 31, the defendant pulled out of his driveway and was

omitted.) are hereby restored. Your registration remains suspended.” (C apitalization issued to the defendant explicitly stated that “All l icense/operating privileges As a result, DOS restored the defendant’s operating privileges. The notice DOS presented evidence of this coverage by way of an “SR - p. 2 22” cer tificate to DOS. 2 these two dates, the defendant purchased an operator insurance policy and suspended the defendant’s registration due to a lack of insurance. Between (DOS) suspended the defendant ’ s operating privileges. On January p. 3 31, DOS 1 3

who shall drive or permit to be driven a vehicle owned or controlled not be repeated or the owner has been acquitted, and any person of such vehicle until [the director] is satisfied that the offense will any of the provisions of this title . . . may suspend the registration permitting or has permitted the same to be driven in violation of evidence satisfactory to him that the owner of a vehicle is Suspension of Registration of Vehicle. The director, upon

which states: Accordingly, we consider all of the relevant language set forth in RSA 261:178, purpose, even if the parties do not address it. See Fogg, 170 N.H. at 2 p. 3 36. statute, we construe all parts of the statute together to effec tuate its overall the meaning of RSA 261:178 by focusing their inquiry on the last clause of the any vehicle. Although the parties and the trial court attempted to determine the statute prohibits any person with a suspended registration from driving interpretation of the statute. The State argues, as it did to the trial court, that “controlled” as a synonym for the term “drive,” which constitutes an illogical On appeal, the defend ant argues that the trial court erroneously treated

160 N.H. p. 3 342, 347 (2010). of construction when interpreting administrative rules. State v. Villeneu v e, results. State v. Fogg, 170 N.H. 234, 236 (2017). We apply the same principles a statute together to effectuate its overall purpose and avoid absurd or unjust the context of the overall statutory scheme, i d. at 335, and construe all parts of absurd or illogical result. Id. at 334 - 35. We interpret statutory provisions in presume that th e legislature would not pass an act that would lead to an will consider legislative history and examine the statute ’ s overall objective and to the words used. Id. When statutory language is ambiguous, however, we in the statute, and where possible, we ascribe the plain and ordin ary meanings whole. Id. When construing its meaning, we first examine the language f ound legislature's intent as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a (2015). In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiters of the law, which we review de novo. S TIHL, Inc. v. State of N.H., 168 N.H. 332, 334 statutory interpretation. The interpretation of a statute presents a question of Resolving the purely legal issue now before us requires that we engage in

upon an erroneous interpretation of RSA 261:178. appeals his conviction arguing solely that the trial court rested its decision “driving any vehicle until he gets that straightened out.” The defendant trial court concluded that the “legislative intent” was to prohibit him from personally rather than to a specific vehicle. Based on this determination, the registration suspension and determined that the suspension was tied to him guilty. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court reviewed t he defendant’s him, on a way, after his registration was suspended” and entered a finding of The trial court found that the defendant “drove a vehicle controlled by p. 4 4

vehicle code. “control” is not defined by RS A chapter 261 or anywhere e lse in the motor distinct from either the ownership or the operation of a vehicle. But, the term Thus, the term “controlled” in RSA 261:178 refers to conduct separate and provisions and, whenever possible, we give effect to every word of a statute.”). presume that the legislature does not waste words or enact redundant See N.C. v. N.H. Bd. o f Psychologists, 169 N.H. 361, 366 (2016) (“We also include, or disregard or conflate language that the legislature saw fit to include. what the legislature might have said, add language that the legi slature did no t we interpret legislative intent from the statute as written, we will not consider these terms as they apply to the prohib ition the statute criminalizes. Because or “own” fails to recognize that the l egislature speci fically sought to distinguish More significantly, equating the term “control led” with the term s “drive”

logical or just. suspensions and revocations). We do not find that these results are either 263:53 to : 6 p. 4 4 - b (2014 & Supp. 2017) (stat utes governing driver’s licenses two privileges are distinct and are governed by separate statutes. See RSA with a suspension of his or her driving privileges, despite the fact that these interpretation equate s the suspension of an individual’s registration privileges properly registered, and insured by a car rental agency. Indeed, this prohibit this same individual from renting and operating a vehicle owned, registered, an d insured by his employer. The State’s interpretation would also whose registration has been suspended from driving a vehicle owned, properly T he State’s inte rpretation of RSA 261:178 would prohibit an individual

the interpretation proffered by the State to be illogical. insured, regardless of whether the vehicle is ow ned by that individual. We find prohibit an individual from driving a vehicle that is properly registered and with the term “drive,” as the State did in its argument to the trial court, would that have been suspended, and n ot to the driver. To equate the term “control” suspended],” RSA 261:178, logically applies only to the vehicle registrations “a vehicle owned or controlled by [a person whose registration has been the fina l clause, which criminalizes the act of driving or permitting to be driven immediately preceding language. RSA 261:178 (emphasis added). Accordingly, specifically references the suspension of “the registration of such vehicle” in its While t he parties focus on the final clause of RSA 261:178, the statute

N.H. at 236. statutory scheme and construe all parts of the statute together. See Fogg, 170 and unambiguous interpretation when we consider the overall purpose of the T he statute is not a model of clarity, but its terms are susceptible to a plain

revoked shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. by him upon any way after his registration has been suspended or p. 5 5

or control. We disagree. because these drivers could lawfully operate any vehicle he or she did not own non - owner insurance would effectively circumvent the registration requirement who have had their registration privileges suspended, to drive after purchasing R., Saf - C 20 7.08. The State maintains that permitting so - called “risk y drivers,” operating privileges, but not the driver’s registration privileges. N.H. Admin. made,” such that the purchase of non - owner’ s coverage can restore a driver’s driver’s operating or registration privileges “shall be based on the type of filing (2014); RSA 2 p. 5 59:9 (2014); N.H. Admin. R., Saf - C 207.06. Restoration of a insured for New Hamps hire’s minimum liability requirements. See RSA 264:21 company’s issuance of an SR - 22 certificate establishing that the policyholder is “owner” or “non - owner” insurance which is evinced by the insurance operation and registration privileges, can be secured by the purchase of P roof of financial responsibility, and the restoration of a driver’s

related offenses or has caused an accident. be required whe n, for example, a driver has been convicted of certain traffic enumerated in RSA 264: 2 and : 3 (2014), proof of financial responsibility may N.E. Tele phone, 13 p. 5 5 N.H. 223, 224 (1991). Yet, in certain circumstances that a motor vehicle be insured prior to the operation of the vehicle. Coltey v. N.H. 48 9, 49 2 (2003) (quotation omitted). New Hampshire does not require their negligence.” Progressive N. Ins. Co. v. Enterp rise Rent - A - Car Co., 149 not to compel, motor vehicle operators to provide security to persons injured by Accidents and Financial Responsibility Act, which is “intended to induce, but examined in conjunction wi th RSA chapter 264 (2014 & Supp. 2017), the The State ar gues, however, that the statute’s general purposes should be

previously noted. and the statute’s overall purpose without producing the unjust results we have consistent with the leg islature’s reference to “such vehicle” within RSA 2 p. 6 61:178 controlled by him” which has a suspended registration. This interpretation is any person from driving or permitting to be driven “a vehicle owned or Given the overall purpose of this statute, the legislature intended to prohibit use, would “control” a motor vehicle as that t erm is used in RSA 261:178. third party, yet still exercises authority over it by determining or managing its example, an individual who leases or purchases a vehicle and registers it to a exercising power and authority over it by managing or d irecting its use. For individual can control a motor vehicle, without operating or owning it, by and common usage of the term “control” to RSA 261:178 establishes that an International Dictionary 496 (unabridged ed. 2002). Applying this approved manage; directing or restraining domination.” Webster’s Third New Dictionary defines “control,” in relevant part, as “power or authority to guide or Pelham, 167 N.H. 180, 18 p. 5 5 (2014). Webster’s Third N ew International using the dictionary for guidance. See K.L.N. Construction Co. v. Town of When a term is not defined in a statute, we look to its common usage 6

certificate establishing his purchase of owner insuranc e. or controlled because all active registrations would have been suspended until he filed an SR - 22 could not have registered another vehicle in his name or operated another vehicle that he owned We note that, by virtue of New Hampshire Administrative Rule Saf - C 207.08, the defenda nt here 3

privileges, however, because the motor vehicle code authorizes the director to application to that portion of the motor vehicle code regulating operating controlled by him or her. T he legislature did not expand the statute’s driver’s license, from operating the properly registered vehicle owned or RSA 2 p. 6 61:178 would not prohibit the person, assuming he or she holds a valid consequence of the initial registration suspension. Under these circumstances, suspend the registration of other vehicles owned by that person as a suspend the registration of that vehicle, see RSA 266:5 (2014), but may not example, if a motor vehicle has not been properly inspected, the director may registration of fewer than all vehicles owned or controlled by a person. For In fact, there may be circumstances in which the director suspends the

title.” RSA 2 p. 6 61:178 (emphasis added). its owner has permitted it to be driven “in violation of any provision of this 261:178 authorizes the director to suspend the regis tration of a vehicle when statute’s reach to the Accidents and Financial Responsibility Act, because RSA has a suspended registration. The legislature did not intend to limit the interpretation of RSA 261:17 8 a s prohibiting the operation of a vehicle which vehicle code].” RSA 261:178. These purposes are entirely consistent with our permitting that vehicle “to be driven in violation of any provision of [the motor for the operation of their vehicle s whe n the owner has permitted or is vehicle, as well as a policy of inducing motor vehicle owners to provide security requiring high - risk drivers to provide security for their operation of a motor RSA chapter 264 and DOS regulations establish an overall objective of

them. individual from restoring his or her operating privileges or thereafter e mploying or DOS regulations suggest s or implies that a suspended registration bars an vehicle upon securing non - owner coverage, n othing in either RSA chapter 2 p. 6 64 Thus, while an individual with a suspended reg istration cannot register a ny specific vehicle is required before an individual’s registration can be restored. 261:1 p. 7 78, this regulation specifies that evidence of insurance coverage on a the director.” N.H. Admin. R., Saf - C 207.08 (emphasis added). As with RSA 3 suspended until evidence of owner coverage on any such vehicle is filed with registration of a vehicle shall not be permitted and active registration shall be regulations further provide that “where non - owner’s coverage is filed, proof of financial responsibility to operate a vehicle. Id. The applicable can have his or her operating privileges restored once that individual produ ces is required. See N.H. Admin. R., Saf - C 207.06. As in this case, an individual either owner or non - owner insurance whenever proof of financial responsibility D OS regulations explicitly permit New Hampshire drivers to purchase 7

concurred. LYNN, C.J., and HICKS, BASSETT, and HANTZ MARCONI, JJ.,

barring the def endant’s operating privileges. interpreting RSA 261:1 p. 7 78 and the suspension of the defendant’s registration as For the foregoing reasons, we find that the trial court erred by

privilege by virtue of the imposition of a suspension as to the other. to interpret this statutory scheme as automatically imposing a penalty o n one statutory provisions governing two distinct privileges, we find it unreasonable violations and conduct. See RSA 263:56 (2014). In light of these separate suspend an individual’s operating privileges for specifically enumerated