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2017-0595, Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Town of Hanover

the construction of an Indoor Practice Facility (IPF). T he planning board application for site plan approval by the Town of Hanover ’s Planning Board for an order of the Superior Court (Bornstein, J.) upholding the denial of its DONOVAN, J. The plaintiff, the Trust ees of Dartmouth College, appeal s

Mark S. Derby on the brief, and Mr. Rayment orally), for the in tervenors. Cleveland, Waters and Bass, P.A., of Concord (David W. Rayment and

Town of Hanover, filed no brief.

(William C. Chapma n and Jeremy D. Eggleton on the brief), for the plaintiff. Glahn on the brief, and Mr. Felmly orally), and Orr & Reno, P.A., of Conc ord McLane Middleton, P.A., of Manchester (Bruce W. Felmly and Wilbur A.

Opinion Issued: November 6, 2018 Argued: June 27, 2018

TOWN OF HANOVER

v.

TRUSTEES OF DARTMOUT H COLLEGE

No. 2 017 - 0595 Grafton

___________________________

THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. release. The direct address of the court's home page is: Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 a.m. on the morning of their reported by E - mail at the following address: reporter@courts.state.nh. us. corrections may be made before the opinion goes to press. Errors may be Doe Drive, Concor d, New Hampshire 03301, of any editorial errors in order that requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New Hampshire, One Charles as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. Readers are NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as well 2

board’s consideration of Dartmouth’s site plan application. abutting SR - District became a focal point of the opposition to the IPF and the impacts, both real and potential, between the uses within the I - Distric t and the public safety, education, and recreation. Id. § 405.8(B). The interplay and within the SR - District by special exception, such as governmental uses for serve single - family homes. Id. § 405.8(A), (B). Additional uses are permitted exception, including agricultural and governmental uses that complement and [to] many New Engl and villages” along with other types of uses by special Hanover’ s SR - District provides for one - family residences that are “typical

(describing the method of calculating height of buildings in the I - District). maximum of 60 feet in height. Id. § 405.6(C)(3); see also HZ O § 505.1(B) ( 2) set back 150 feet or more from a residential zone may be, on aver age, a feet of a residential zone may not be more than 35 feet in height, and buildings zoning district boundary, id. § 405.6(C)(2), buildings constructed within 150 building within the I - District may be placed within 75 feet of a residential proximity to residential zoning districts. Id. § 405.6(C)(2), (3). For example, no and setback requirements for buildings within the I - District that are in close Ordinance (HZO) § 40 5.6(A), (B). The town enacted stringent height limitations accommodate warehouse and medical center uses. Town of Hanover Zoning for education al and recreation al purposes and large buildings that could of the institution, her e, the college — by permitting the development of facilities Hanover created the I - District as a “special district” to meet certain needs

district (SR - District). Tyler Road and Chase Road located in Hanover’s Single Residence zoning complex. The proposed site abuts a neighborhood of single - family homes on area known as the “sunken garden,” at the northeast corner of the athletic Dartmouth proposed building the I PF next to the Boss T ennis C enter on an as well as several outdoor athletic fields, tennis courts, and a large parking lot. indoor sports facilities — the Thompson Arena and the Boss Tennis Center — Zoning District (I - District). T he athletic complex include s two, similarly - sized, within the college’s 41 - acre athletic c omplex located in Hanover’s Institutional application seeking approval of the construction of a 69,860 square foot IPF from the certified record. In March 2016, Dartmouth submitted its site plan The followin g facts were found by the trial court or are otherwise evident

a rationale not supported by the record to affirm the board’s decision. upon subjective and personal feelings and the trial court unreasonably adopted record confirms that the board based its denial of Dartmouth’s application evidence does not reasonably support the trial court’s finding s. The certified defend the board’s decision (abutters). We reverse and remand because t he Hanover residents owning properties abutting the proposed site intervened to upheld the planning board’s decision f ollowing a hearing at which several three general considerations of Hanover’s site plan regulations. T he trial court denied approval of the application upon finding that it failed to comply with 3

sufficient evidence to rebut them. potential impacts and either modified its site plan to address these concerns or presented building. In response to these complaints, Dartmouth retained professionals to study these abut ters’ property values; and (4) the potential noise and sound pollution cr eated by the proposed system; (2) the building ’ s lack of architectural detail; ( 3) the negative impact the IPF posed to the including complaints with: (1) the project ’ s impact on the town’s storm water management relied upon by either the board or the trial court and, thus, are not pertinent to this appeal, The record reveals that the abutters’ opposition maintained numerous objections that were not 2 application. propriety of the recused board member’s participation in the opposition to the college’s the trial court or identify it i n the college’s notice of appeal. Thus, we do not opine on the issue with the trial court. We agree with the abutters. Dartmouth did not raise this issue with throughout the site pla n review process. The abutters counter that Dartmouth did not raise this decided to deny the application based upon the three general considerations that she advanced recused board member’ s influence on the board was apparent, given that the board ultimately e - mails and formal presentations to her fellow board members. The colleg e complains that the recusal, she represented the abutters and voiced her strong opposition to the project in letters, residence closely abuts the athletic complex. Dartmouth argues that, despite this member’s board member recus ed herself from the board’s deliberations on the applic ation because her the board’s decision by actively participating in the opposition to the college ’s site plan. Th is In its filings, Dartmouth alleges that the vice - chair of the planning board improperly influenced 1

agreed to comply with all 21 conditions. In December 2016, the board recommending the approval of the application with 21 conditions. Dartmouth application, Hanover’s planning board staff prepared a final memorandum In anticipation of the board’s final deliberation s on the college’s

would cast shadows on their residences. shadow study that purported to calculate the duration of time that the IPF shadow study. The abutters pr epared their own interpretation of the college’s 2 potential impact and presented its findings to the board by way of an animated shadows on their homes. In response, Dartmouth conducted a study of this bu ilding’s height would block an unreasonable amount of sunlight and cast the IPF would impose on their neighborhood, including a concern that the to - lot size ratio limitations, the abutters complained about the negative impacts ordinances regulating height restrictions, setback requirements and building - IPF would be fully compliant with the town’s zoning ordinances, including Although t he Hanover Zoning Administrator informed the board that the

line to lower the building’s height profile. to reduce light spill from the proposed building; and ( 3) adjust ing the IPF’s roof windows and adding the installation of automatic shades and window glazin g and preferences of the abutting neighbors; (2) modifying the size of the IPF’s (1) adding plantings of landscape screening in coordination with the requests its site plan application several times to address their concerns, by, inter alia: abutting the athletic complex vigorously opposed the IPF. Dartmouth revised 1 abutters who reside on Tyler and Chase Roads and own propert ies closely meetings, including two site visit s, during its consideration of the IPF. The Between April and De cember 2016, the board held no fewer than 16 4

planning board staff. prov ided the college complied with the conditions to approval recommended by the town’s assuming the college prevailed on appeal, agree to Dartmouth ’s request for the “builder’s remedy” The Town of Hanover did not participate in the appeal other than to defer to the abutters and, 3

decision, “to a considerable degree on its concerns about the project’s impacts valid. The trial court also ruled that the board did not err by basing its the board’s de cision, ruling that the regulations the board relied upon are applicable to the I - District. Nonetheless, t he trial court subsequ ently upheld application complied with t he requirements of Hanover ’s zoning ordinances The record of the hearing establishes that the parties did not dispute that the substantial briefing and arguments submitted by the college and the abutters. 3 The trial court held a one - hour hearing in August 2017 following

of the yea r. out the sun and shadow ing homes in the abutting neighborhood for 7 months pleasing, or attractive development of the town; and (3) is capable of blotting residential neighborhood; (2) fail s to provide for the harmonious, aesthetically maintained that the IPF: (1) is massive and out of character with the abutting T he abutters argued that the board’s decision was legal and reasonable and but deferred to the intervening abutters with respect to Dartmouth’s appeal. feelings, rather than objective and discernible standards. Hanover appeared that the board impermissibly based its decision on personal and subjecti ve C ONST. p t. I, a rt. 15; U.S. C ONST. amend. XIV. The college also maintained 67 4:44 (2016), or the New Hampshire and United States Constitutions. N.H. proper standards by which to review a site p lan application under either RSA the three regulations relied upon by the board are vague, ambiguous, and not Dartmouth appealed the board ’s decision to the trial court, arguing that

A 2h Site Plan Review Regulations). development of the town and its environs (As cited in Article IX 3) Does not relate to the harmonious and aesthetically pleasing

Review Regulations); and services and fiscal health (As cited in Article IX A 2c Site Plan 2) Negatively impacts the abutters, neighborhood and others, town

Article IX A 2b of the Site Plan Review Regulations); 1) Does not conform with the Hanover Master Plan (As cited in

site plan application: three reasons for its decision. In doing so, the board found that the college’s board vo ted 4 - 1 to deny the application and iss ued a notice that enumerated it would have on the adjacent neighborhood. Following deliberations, the things, the members’ feelings about the project’s scale and the aesthetic effect deliberated on the f inal site plan application and discussed, among other 5

(quotation omitted). before it.” Star Vector Corp. v. Town of Windham, 146 N.H. 490, 4 93 (2001) could have reached the same decision as the trial court based on the evidence review the trial court’s decision to determine whether “a reasonable person only if it is not supported by the evidence or is legally erroneous. See i d. We review is similarly limited. We will reverse a trial court ’ s decision on appeal evidence upon which i ts findings could have been reasonably based. Id. Our whether it agrees with a planning board ’ s findings, but rather whether there is the board ’ s decision was unreasonable. Id. The trial court determine s, not th e burden of persuading the trial court that, by the balance of probabilities, unreasonableness or an identified error of law. Id. The appealing party bears prima facie lawful and reasonable and cannot set aside its decision absent (2010). The trial court must treat the factual findings of the planning board as review is limited. Motorsports Holdings v. Town of Tamworth, 160 N.H. 9 5, 99 before it, that [the board’s] decision is unreasonable.” As such, t he trial court ’ s when the court is persuaded by the balance of pr obabilities, on the evidence may modify the decision brought up for review when there is an error of law or which provides that the trial court “may reverse or affirm, wholly or partly, or review of a planning board ’ s decision is governed by RSA 677:15, V (2016), We now turn to the applicable standard of review. The trial court ’ s

court’s determination that Dartmouth failed to meet the general considerations. pursuant to our deferential standard of review, the record supports the trial comply with the general considerations. The abutters also argue that, 481, 48 5 - 86 (1964), such that the “ordinary person” could understand and necessary “observable character,” see Town of Deering v. Tibbetts, 105 N.H. to Dartmouth’s application, the location of the proposed IPF provi ded the decision. The abutters respond by maintain ing that, in general and as applied supported by the evidence or the board’s deliberations, to affirm the board’s erroneously relied upon unsupported cla ims and adopted a rat ionale, not personal feelings and engaged in ad hoc decision - making, while the trial court violating its provisions); and (2) the board improperly based its decision o n certain, to enab le an average man after reading it to understand when he is 580 (1980) (ordinance must be framed in terms sufficiently clear, definite, and “average person” standard, see Town of Freedom v. Gillespie, 120 N.H. 576, establish clear standards necessary to assess the application under our deny the application because the general considerations are vague and fail to by relying upon general considerations of Hanover’s site plan regulations to On appeal, Dartmouth argues that: (1) the board and the trial court erred

homes.” IPF “would block an unreasonable amount of sunlight f rom reaching abutting decision was lawful and reasonabl y based upon a particular concern that the impermissibly re ly up on their personal feelings, and concluded that the board’s facility.” The trial cour t further ruled that the board members did not on the abutting homes, as opposed to the entire ‘neighborhood’ of the proposed 6

objectively both a negative impact upon abutters and inconsistent with the block a significant amount of s unlight from reaching abutting homes [which] is members could reasonably have concluded that the proposed facility would will be lost. ’” Based on this evidence, the trial cou rt found that “[b]oard days are shortest, ’ and in some cases, ‘ more than 10 [percent] of direct sunlight neighboring homes will lose a significant portion of the direct sunlight when quoted this report and expressly relie d upon its conclusion that “‘ residents of by the abutters in response to Dartmouth’s shadow study. The trial court board members during their deliberations and relied upon the report prepared As support for this finding, t he trial court cited certain statements made by block an unreasonable amount of sunlight from reaching the abutting homes.” that the board denied the application out of a concern that the IPF “would Article IX 2(c) and (h) of Hanover’s site plan regulations. The trial court found Dartmouth’s application failed to meet the general considerations set forth in Here, t he trial court ruled that the board reasonably concluded that

§ 30.09, at 437). the use is appropriate is a zoning question. ’” Id. (quoting Loughlin, supra does not feel that the proposed use is an appropriate use of the land. Whether the planning board the authority to deny a particular use simply because it review is, nonetheless, limited. Id. A planning board’s review “‘ does not give could readily grant or refuse a permit.” I d. (quotation omitted). Site plan in the ordinance a set of specific requirements upon which a building inspector expected of a planning board in cases where it would not be feasible to set forth purposes are accompl ished by subjecting the plan to the very expertise property owners or the general public.” Id. (quotation omitted). “These not involve danger or injury to the health, safety, or prosperity of abutting sites will be developed in a safe and attractive manner and in a way that will Zoning § 30.0 1, at 425 (20 0 0)). Site plan review is intended to ensure “that (quoting 15 P. Loughlin, New Hampshire Practice, Land Use Planning and problems. ’” Summa Humma E nter s. v. Town of Tilton, 151 N.H. 75, 78 (2004) which they are being constructed without causing drainage, traffic, or lighting ordin ance are ‘ constructed on a site in such a way that they fit into the area in “Site plan review is designed to insure that uses permitted by a zoning

obligations in conducting the site plan review process. merits of this argument, w e briefly review the planning board’s duties and application failed to meet th e general considerations. Before assessing the personal feelings, rather than objective or discernible facts, to find that t he planning board deci sion that was based upon ad hoc decision - making and supported by the evidence or the board’s deliberations; and (2) upheld a erroneous because the court: (1) relied upon factual claims and a rationale, no t college’s argument that the trial court ’s decision is unreasonable and legally Dartmouth’s second argument on appeal. Specifically, we will address the Bearing in mind the for e going standards of review, we consider 7

this issue later in this opinion. neighborhood from a loss of property values as a factor in his decision. We specifically address We recognize that board member Mayor also commented on his responsibility to protect the 4

board’s decision. Because t he record does not support the trial court ’s finding that are not supported by the record of the board’s deliberations to justify the of Hebron, 162 N.H. 488, 49 7 (2011), the court unreasonably relied upon facts upon personal opinions or “vague c oncerns,” see Ltd. Editions Props. v. Town acknowledged our prior rulings prohibiting planning board decisions based would deprive abutting homes of sunlight. Although the trial court finding s, the board did not deny Dartmouth’s application because the IPF The trial court misinterpreted the record because, c ontrary to its

the character.” of the building to the neighborhood and how those things, in turn, affects [sic] Criswell reasoned that “the crux of the matter has been the scale and proximity looms as an affront to the adjacent neighborhood,” and board member 4 member Ma yor concluded that the “building itself, in its location as proposed, reference shadows, shading, or any other objective criteria. Instead, board The remaining two board members who voted to deny the application did not

excessive ? And I don’t know how we can measure that. on top of the existing shad ing, will the building create, and is it many years to come. So the question is, how much more shading quite tall and will continue to grow, I hope, in some respects for probably already caused by the existing trees, which are already What we also have to recogn ize is that there is some shading

basis].” Board member Sims reasoned that: are not sufficiently developed on these topics. . . to deny the IPF [on that Rather, board member Carter acknowledged that “our own site plan regulations the se board members did not base their decision on any one of these factor s. “shading” as potential concerns with the IPF. B ut, the record also reflects that mentioned “general darkening,” “blocked views,” the “absence of light,” and transcript of the boa rd’s deliberations reveals that t wo board members reasoning in denying an application for a special use permit). Our review of the record to determine whether the board sufficiently apprised the applicant of its Cf. Motorsport Holdings, 160 N.H. at 103 - 04 (discussing review of certified by blocking “a significant amount of sunlight from reaching abutting homes.” plan due to a concern that th e IPF would negatively impact the neighborhood person would not have found, as the court did, that the board reject ed the site trial court’s findings or its conclusion. O n th e record before us, a reasonable T he record of the board’s deliberations, however, do es not support the

proposed facility.” har monious and aesthetically pleasing development of the environs of the 8

that the conclusions of the college ’s shadow study are conservatively drawn. trees located on the neighbor ing properties on Tyler Road. We thus find it reasonable to conclude We note that the college’s study did not include animations of shadowing created by the existing 6 residences. reasonably supported by the abutters’ study of potential shading on the five closest, abutting shadows or darkening of the abutting neighborhood, these findings and conclusions are not To the extent the trial court relied on the abutters’ report in making any findings with regard to 5

Cook v. Town of Sanbornton, 11 8 N.H. 668 (1978), the trial court could not Vannah v. Bedford, 111 N.H. 105, 112 (1971), overruled on other grounds by and reject the methodology or conclusions of the college’s expert study, see report to deny the application. While the board may have been free to question the board did not rely upon shadowing, darkening, or the abutters’ shadow Dartmouth’s shadow study. This argument, however, miss es the point because The abutters argue that the board was justified in not crediting

based upon objective facts, rather than vague and unsupported concerns. conclusions without considering whether the ir conclusions were reasonably Dartmouth’s expert shadow study and unreasonably adopted the abutters’ the abutters’ residences. Th e trial court ignored the findings reached by existing buildings and trees located within the athletic complex that bordered could be attributed to the IPF was heavily intertwined with t he shadows cast by darkening or shadowing. The college’s study concluded that any shading that 6 college’s property for height and foliage in an effort to accurately depict application. Dartmouth’s ani mat ed shadow study surveyed trees on the for not relying upon this potential impact as a rationale for denying the and board member Sims identified shading caused by existing trees as a basis “[t] he presence of foliage on the trees obscures the impact of the IPF shadows” that the abutters’ analysis of the college’s shadow study acknowledged that complex and the abutting properties. Notably, t he record includes evidence impact caused by the existing tree line within the bord er between the athletic Absent from the trial court’s analysis, however, is any recognition of the

the year.” 5 mostly afternoon sunlight from reaching certain homes during some months of the trial court gathered that “the facility would block up to over an hour of homes between September 21 and March 21. Based upon these conclusions, hours in a day during which the IPF would cast shadows on five abutting abutters’ analysis of the college’s shadow study that purported to calculate the conclusion. In its order, the trial court relied upon t he conclusions of the blocked sunlight and shading, the record does not reasonably support this board’ s deliberations reflect a concern with the IPF’s potential impact on Moreover, even if the trial c ourt could have reasonably found that the

homes, the trial court’s decision is erroneous. would block an unreasonable amount of sunlight from reaching abutting that the board rejected the application out of a particular concern that the IPF 9

aspect of the board’s decision because this issue was not considered by the trial court. the master plan, although the record suggests otherwise. Nonetheless, w e need not address this voted to deny approval of the application did not base their decision on a lack of conformity with statutes. Here, counsel for the abutters informed the trial court that the board memb ers who legislation had been implemented b y an action of the local legislative body pursuant to State reliance on limited growth recommendations in a master plan when no such limited growth In R ancourt v. Town of Barnstead, 12 9 N.H. 45, 48 - 49 (1986), we reject ed a planning board ’ s 7

N.H. at 4 97. Although the members o f a planning board are entitled to rely, in than the mere personal opinions of its members.” Ltd. Editions Props, 162 620 (1990). Moreover, a planning board’s decision “must be based upon more planni ng board. Lemm Development Corp. v. Town of Bartlett, 133 N.H. 618, of law for this court to decide and we are not bound by the interpretation of the The interpretation of a planning board’s regulations presents a question

by the board and considered by the trial court. We will similarly limit our review to the two general considerations relied upon the a pplication based upon its nonconformance with the Hanover Master Plan. 7 because the abutters implicitly conceded the il legality of the board’s denial of considerations, Article IX 2(c) and (h) of Hanover’s site plan regulations, board’s determination that the site plan failed to meet two of these general denied the college’s application. The trial court, however, only considered the upon three general considerations of Hanover’s site plan regulation when it consideration s. As we have previously noted, t he board’s n otice of a ction relied making in deciding that the application failed to meet Hanover’s general found that the board did not rely on personal feelings and ad hoc decision - We next turn to Dartmouth’s contention that t he trial court erroneously

it. have reached the same decision as the trial court based on the evidence before this manner. Accordingly, w e cannot conclude that a reasonable person could record to conclude that the IPF would negatively impact the abutting homes in deprive abutting homes of sunlight, or that there is sufficient support in the that the board denied the application out of a concern that the IPF would 573 - 7 4. Here, t he record fails to s upport either of the trial court’s conclusion s insufficient to refute the experts’ conclusions. Continental Paving, 158 N.H. at ex ception and the opposing lay opinions and general information were the applicant presented uncontroverted expert evidence in support of the reversal of the zoning board of adjustment ’s denial of a special ex ception where Litchfield, 158 N.H. 570 (200 9), for example, we upheld the trial court’s board’s decision under these circumstances. In Continental Paving v. Town of Our previous rulings do not support the trial court’s defere nce to the

was based upon vague and unsupported concerns and not objective facts. the abutters ’ analysis to deny the application; and (2) the abutters’ analysis conclusory opinions when the record reflects that: (1) the board did not rely on have reasonably ignored the college’s study and adopted the abutters’ 10

uses that complement and serve single - family homes. HZO § 405.8. T he uses allowed by special exception, including agricultural and governmental residences “as is typical [to] many New England villa ges,” with other types of at the very least, include both districts. The SR - District is zoned for one - family relationship to the harmonious and aesthetically pleasing development, must, I - District, as well as the SR - District, and a proper assessment of the project’s The environs to which this general consideration applies includes the

T he trial court and the board applied this consideration too narrowly. just to its relationship to the surroundings of the proposed site of the project. assessment of the proposal ’ s relationship to the surrounding districts and not and common usage of the term “environs” to Article IX 2(h) requires an International Dictionary 760 (unabridged ed. 2002). Applying the approved round a bout a city or other populated place.” Webster’s Third New “environs” as “the enclosing limits or boundaries” and “the suburbs or districts of the language. Id. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines regulations should be construed according to the common and approved usage Gilmanton, 155 N.H. 733, 735 (2007). Thus, the words and phrases of the general rules of statutory construction govern our review. See Doyle v. Town of When interpreting planning board regulations, which we do de novo, the

project.” impact on, and relationship with, abutting properties, or “the environs of the develo pment of the neighborhood, the town, and its environs, not just its explicitly require an assessment of the project’s impact and relationship to the relationship with the “‘environs’ of a project.” Yet, both general consideration s proposal’s effects on abutting properties,” a nd with respect to Article IX 2 (h), its that the board could properly “consider and give appropriate weight to a de termination that the IPF failed to meet Article IX 2(h). The trial court found consideration. T he trial court similarly erred by sustaining the board’s upholding the board’s decision that the application failed to s atisfy this general interpreted the evidence and misconstrued the board’s deliberations in by the board during its final deliberations. Thus, the trial court erroneously previously explained, this ruling is in consistent with the reason ing articulated significant amount of sunlight from reaching abutting homes.” However, a s we application failed to meet Article IX 2(c) because the IPF “would block a court rul ed that the board could have reasonably found that the s ite plan aesthetically pleasing development of the town and its environs.” T he trial the board to assess the “relationship of the project to the harmonious and failed to meet Article IX 2(h) of Hanover’s site plan regulations, which requires others, town services and fiscal health.” The board also found that the IPF 2(c) because the IPF “[n] egatively impacts the abutters, neighborhood and The board decided that Dartmouth’s application failed to meet Artic le IX

deny approval on an ad hoc basis because of vague concerns.” Id. part, on their own judgments and experiences, the board, as a whole, “may not 11

taking). Moreover, the added setback and height restrictions governing deprive an owner of the economically viable use of his land constitutes a 598 (1981) (arbitrary or unreasonable zoning restrictions that substantially as a condition to site plan approval); Burrows v. City of Keene, 121 N.H. 590, require applicant to grant to the city an easement over the applicant’s property of Laconia, 117 N.H. 235, 236 - 37 (1977) (ruling that planning board could not public use without proper compensation. See Robbins Auto Parts, Inc. v. City require a landowner to dedicate its own property as open space for essentially Nonetheless, a planning board cannot use the site plan review process to board’s deliberations evidences the board’s support for the abutters’ position. the college’s athletic complex and the ir neighborhood. The record of the development of the sunken garden to preserve the buffer of open space between athletic com plex. The record confirms that the abutters opposed any Dartmouth’s undeveloped, open fields, such as the sunken garden, within its Undoubtedly, the Tyler and Chase Road neighborhood has benefited from

the trial court’s decision. valid al ternative ground that was considered by the board and which supports at 230 (quotation omitted). Our review of the record, however, fails to identify a decision if there are valid alternative grounds to support it.” Quinlan, 136 N.H. court reaches the correct result, but on mistaken grounds, [we] will sustain the v. City of Dover, 136 N.H. 226 (1992), the abutters remind us that when “a trial the property values of the abutters’ residences. Citing our decision in Quinlan for the IPF, other than the sunken garden, and the project’s adverse impact on court’s decision, such as the college’s refusal to consider alterna tive location s neighborhood. They urge us to consider evidence allegedly supporting the trial “meaningful and harmonious transition” from the I - District to the Tyler Road change the nature, feel and atmosphere of the neighborhood” without a structure” that would constitute a “significant expansion” that “will certainly views enjoyed by the neighboring residences; and (2) is an “incongruous because: (1) the IPF represents a “dramatic and permanent change” to the open board’s finding s that the application failed to meet the general considerations, The abutters further contend that the trial court properly upheld the

contradicted by the applicable zoning regulation and is unreasonable. development of this neighborhood, or the town and its environs, is directly that t he IPF lacks conform ity or is not harmonious with the character and development of buildings like the IPF. See HZO § 4 0 5.6(B). Any conclusion athletic facilities within a z oning district that obviously permit s the character” of the neighborhood here includes t wo similarly - sized, indoor common. See Tibbetts, 105 N.H. at 483 - 84. In contrast, the “observable Deering sought to protect its well - defined, historic and harmonious town issue here differ from the circumstances we addressed in Tibbetts, where including warehouse s and other uses. Id. § 4 0 5.6(A), (B). Thus, t h e facts at permi ts the development of facilities for educational and recreational purposes, I - District is zoned to meet the needs of the institution, or the college, and 12

findings of non - compliance with the town’s site plan regulations. Id. at 174 - 75. neighboring elder care facility; and (2) the board’s decision included detailed negative sight, noise and pollution impacts the project imposed on a approval on the development of an additional landscape buffer to abate denial of a site plan application was reasonable when: (1) the board conditioned In Bayson, we upheld the trial court’s finding that the planning board’s

in Bay son, however, are inapposite to the facts in this case. for denial. Bayson Properties, 150 N.H. at 175 - 76. The circumstances at issue meet conditions necessary for planning board approval is a sustainable reason (2003), as support for the proposition that an applicant’s refusal or inability to The abutters rely upon Bayson Properties v. City of Lebanon, 150 N.H. 167 ground, reducing its height or otherwise pursuing less impactful alternatives. location within the athletic complex, sinking the building deeper into the the negative impacts of the IPF by, inter alia, placing the IPF on an alternative because the court reasonably concluded that Dartmouth refused to mitigate Finally, t he abutters argue that the trial court’s decision is sustainable

support such a conclusion. a basis for upholding the board’s decision, the evidence does not reasonably (1989). T hus, t o the extent that the trial court relied upon th is s ame factor as experience. See Condos East Corp. v. Town of Conway, 132 N.H. 431, 438 reliance upon this factor goes well beyond the board’s personal judgment and application because the IPF would negatively impact property values, its See Continental Paving, 158 N.H. at 574. If the board denied the college’s record fails to include evidence that would reasonably support such a finding. plan approval based upon the IPF’s negative impact on property values, the and retired or unidentified real estate agents. Even if the board denied site statements and conclusory estimates, without supporting data, from residents submitted by the abutters refuting this opinion consisted of anecdotal would not impact the property values of the abutting neighborhood. Evidence Dart mouth and prepared by a licensed appraiser who determined that the IPF denying the site plan application. T he record includes studies submitted by board members either rejected or did not mention this rational e as a basis for board member referenced property values as a factor in his decision, the other project’s potential impact on property values, the record shows that, while one To the extent that the abutters argue that the board relied upon the

that the IPF failed to meet either Article IX 2(c) or 2(h). environs. Accordingly, the trial court erred in upholding the boa rd’s finding the harmonious and aesthetically pleasing development of the town and its requirements, and maintain open space to satisfy a general consideration for prohibited fro m developing its property, in a manner consistent with the zoning record does not reasonably support a conclusion that Dartmouth should be for a harmonious transition between zones. See HZO § 405.6 (C) (2), (3). T he I - District develo pments that abut residential areas already address the concern 13

unsupported by the evidence or the applicable re gulations. hoc reasoning characterized by conclusory statements and personal feelings cannot logically be considered fact - finding. Rather, the board engaged in ad Holdings, 160 N.H. at 99, but the planning board’s deliberations in this case findings are considered prima facie lawful and reasonable, Motorsports neighborhood.” We recognize that, on appeal, a planning board’s factual itself, in its location as proposed, looms as an affront to the adjacent explaining his vote, b oard member Mayor concluded simply that the “building to the neighborhood and how those things, in turn, affec t[] the character.” In that, for him, “the crux of the matter [is] the scal e and proximity of the building zoning and site plan regulations. Nonetheless, board member Criswell stated no dispute that the application complies with all of the applicable and specific building’s aesthetics or its allegedly negative impacts on the environs. T here is height, characteristics governed by specific zoning ordinances, than the record reveals that the board was more concerned with the IPF’s scale and f eelings and ad hoc decision - making in denying the college’s application. This Dartmouth’s contention that the board unreasonably relied upon personal Our review of the record of the board’s deliberative session supports

Hanover’s site plan regulations. its site plan to address the concerns of the abutters and to comply with reasonably supports the trial court’s conclusion that the college refused to alter concerns of its neighbors. On this record, we cannot find that the evidence praised Dartmouth for the time and effort the college devoted to addressing the new facility. During its final deliberative session, boa rd members repeatedly location of the IPF was the most logical and feasible site to accommodate the board, Dartmouth repeatedly and reasonably explained why the proposed water discharges. In its application and its subsequent submissions to the abutting neighborhood with respect to sound, light, property values and storm multiple studies to determine and address the IPF’s potential impact s on the also establishes that the college repeatedly revised its site plan and performed board staff concluded that the application met all requirements. T he record regulations or zoning ordinances. Rather, the record reflects that the planning fails to include any detailed findings of non - compliance with specific s ite plan U nlike the circumstances reported in Bayson, the board’s decision her e

not impose any other conditions as a requirement for approval. board staff recommended as conditions to site plan approval, and the board did Dartmouth agreed to comply with all of the conditions the Hanover planning application on any condition that the college refused to meet. Rather, By contrast, in this case, the board did not condition approval of Dartmouth ’s vendors’ deliveries could not be realistically enforce d on private vendors. Id. meet that condition, and the applicant’s offer to reduce pollution by limiting its because an additional landscape buffer was necessary, the applicant refused to In that case, the trial court found that the board ’s decision was reasonabl e 14

mechanical process of determining conformity with specific zoning and site We do not suggest that site plan review should be reduced to the

appropriate use of the land” (quot ing Loughlin, supra § 30.09, at 437)). particular use simply because it does not feel that the propose d use is an at 78 (site plan review “does not give the planning board the authority to deny a application of general consideration s. See Summa Humma Enters., 151 N.H. with their own personal feelings and then justify their reasoning through the specific regulations and ordinances that control the site plan review process indoor sports facilities of similar sizes. A planning board cannot supersede the recreational facilities, see HZO § 405.6(A), (B), but curre ntly includes two within a “special district” that not only contemplates large warehouse and town and its environs, d espite the fact that the IPF constitute s a permitted use (3) not a harmonious or aesthetically pleasing fit with the development of the height restrictions imposed by its proximity to a residential neighborhood; and ne ighborhood, despite the project’s compliance with the unique setback and ordinances regulatin g a structure’s height and size; (2) too close to the abutting and imposing, despite the project’s compliance with Hanover’s I - District zoning Here, the planning board essentially decided that the IPF is: (1) too large

court’s decision to uphold the board’s denial of the application. record before us, conclude that the evidence reasonably supports the trial standard of review afforded to planning board decisions, we cannot, on the evidence supporting the trial court’s decision. Notwithstanding our deferential concerns). I n this case, the certified record fails to reveal any objective 451 (2008) (board may not deny approval on an ad hoc basis because of vague mem bers. Id.; s ee also Derry Senior Dev. v. Town of Hebron, 1 57 N.H. 488, decision must be based on more than the mere personal opinion of its approval. Condos East Corp., 132 N.H. at 438. Nonetheless, a board ’s own judgment and experience when acting upon applications for site plan It is well settled that a planning board is entitled to rely in part on its

(E mphas e s added.)

to reject the motion [for approval of the application]. aesthetically — an aesthetically pleasing development, so I will vote doesn’t meet the standard of being harmonious development and standard.. . . And I have come to the conclusion that I feel that it whether or not we think that this building, in fact, meets that and aesthetic [sic]. It comes to be a very personal judgment as to that will help us actually measure whether [the IPF is] harmonious [T]here’s no data point that can be constructed, in my thinking,

Dartmouth’s application did not meet the general considerations: on personal feelings and ad hoc judgments to justify its finding that The comments of board member Sims demonstrate the board’s reliance 15

LYNN, C.J.

, and HICKS and HANTZ MARCONI, JJ., concurred.

Reverse d and r emanded.

board. identified by Hanover’s planning board staff and considered by the planning B uilder’s R emedy provided the college complies with each of the 21 conditions A.2d 464, 469 (Pa. 1974)). Thus, w e grant Dartmouth’s request for the Id. at 443 (quoting Casey v. Zoning Hearing Board of Warwick Township, 328 effort and capital invested in such a challenge [would be] grossly inequitable. ’” “‘ T o forsake [the college’s] reasonab le development plans after all the time, by the municipality. Britton v. Town of Chester, 134 N.H. 434, 442 (1991). challenging the legality of the board’ s decision and prevents retributive action reasonable. Therefore, Dartmouth is entitled to relief which rewards its efforts unnecessary to determin e whether the college’s application is lawful or and si te plan regulations. Further deliberations or fact - finding are es tablishes that the IPF complies with Hanover’s specific zoning ordinances Dartmouth’s site plan application. As we previously found, the record reverse the trial court’s order upholding the planning board’s denial of general considerations are vague or ambiguous. For the foregoing reasons, we In light of ou r decision, we need not address the college’s claim that the

create unusual public safety, he alth, or welfare concerns.”). ordinance, it cannot be barred by the site review process unless the use would and Zoning, §30.09, at 556 (2010) (“If the use is permitted by the zoning omitte d); s ee also 15 P. Loughlin, New Hampshire Practice, Land Use Planning no protection to the landowner.” Id. at 81 (Nadeau, J., dissenting) (quotation inappropriate. Such a finding would render zoning “obsolete, as it would afford members felt that the owner’s permitted use of its own property was denial of a property owner’s site plan application simply because board was unreasonable. Sustaining the board’s decision here would sanction a regulations and ordinances, without sufficient evidentiary support for doing so, up on general considerations to overri de the site plan’s conformity with specific plan regulations. In this case, however, the planning board’s reliance solely

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