2018-0029, The State of New Hampshire v. Jonathan Folds

from at least three separate criminal episodes. We affirm the dismissal of the statute does not require th e defendant’s qualifying felony convictions to arise exception to the warrant requirement, and (2) the armed career criminal because (1) the firearm’s seizure satisfied the requirements of the plain view trial court granted both motions. The State argues that the court erred armed career criminal statute. See RSA 159:3 - a (2014) (amended 2017). The firearm and a motion to dismiss two indictments that alleged he violated the (Ignatius, J.). The defendant, Jonathan Folds, filed a motion to suppress a HANTZ MARCONI, J. The State appeals an order of the Superior Court

brief and orally, for the defendant. Thomas Barnard, senior assistant appellate defender, of Concord, on the

assistant attorney general, on the brief and orally), for the State. Gordon J. MacDonald, attorney general (Susan P. McGinnis, senior

No. 2018 - 0029 Carroll

http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. release. The direct address of the court ’ s home page is: Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 a.m. on the morning of their reported by e - mail at the following address: reporter@courts.state.nh. us. corrections may be made before the opinion goes to press. Errors may be Doe Drive, Concor d, New Hampshire 03301, of any editorial errors in order that requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New Hampshire, One Charles as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. Readers are NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule p. 2 22 as well 2

probable cause as to that object.” to suppress the firearm, arguing that the warrant “was unsupported by as a matter of law to satis fy the requirements of RSA 159:3 - a. He also moved armed career criminal charges, arguing that his prior felonies were insufficient owning, possessing, or controlling deadly weapons. He moved to dismiss the ( p. 2 2014), which prohibits persons with certain types of felony convictions from violating RSA 159:3 - a, the armed career criminal statute, as well as RSA 159:3 Based on the discovery of the firearm, t he defendant was charged with

firearm was then marked as evidence and secured. floor. Blodgett picked up the firearm and removed its ammunition. The and unfurled it. When he did so, a firearm fell out of the shirt and onto the anything, was inside of the shirt. Blodgett then removed the shirt from the box looked in the box, he saw a tightly rolled shirt. He cou ld not identify what, if Blodgett began searching a closet, in which he discovered a box. When he defendant’s residence. Having already assisted with the search of other rooms, Blodgett helped with the search. The police discovered drugs and money in the The police executed the warrant on October 11; Detective Sergeant

would have asked for firearms.” asks for firearms in warrant applications, “this isn’t a case that we typically that there was a firearm in the home.” She te stified that, although she often motions hearing that “there was never any information that led us to believe for firearms when she applied for the warrant, she later acknowledged at the firearms,” among other i tems. Although Scott asked for authorization to search scales, drug packaging material and devices, drug paraphernalia, . . . and search the defendant’s residence for “[h]eroin, any controlled drugs, drug submitted an affidavit in support thereof. A search warrant was issued to Scott applied for a warrant to search the defendant’s residen ce and

defendant and his residence based on the CI’s observations. on these trips. Scott and the CI also discussed additional details about the residence, and that he typically obtained between 500 and 600 grams of heroin “down south” to obtain heroin, which the defendant then s old out of his defendant’s residence. T he CI reported that the defendant ma de frequent trips and turned the drugs over to Scott. Both purchases took place at the 50 grams, or “five fingers,” of what appeared to be heroin from the defendant, of narcotics from the defendant. On each occasion, the CI allegedly purchased worked with a “cooperating individual” (CI) to conduct two controlled purchases the f all of p. 2 2016, Detective Sergeant Scott of the Conway Police Department The trial court found, or the record establishes, the following facts. In

remand. armed career criminal indictments, reverse the suppression ruling, and p. 3 3

without a warrant, if such evidence is inadvertently discovered during lawful a law enforcement officer to seize clearly incriminating evidence or contraband the plain view doctrine. Generally speaking, the plain view exce ption “permits On appeal, the State argues that the trial court erred in its application of

exception. Id. warrantless seizure falls within a recognized exception, such as the plain view State bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a judicially crafted exception. State v. Nieves, 160 N.H. 245, 247 (2010). The under Part I, A rticle 19 unless they fall within the narrow confines of a N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 19. Wa rrantless seizures are per se unreasonable seizures.” State v. Schulz, 164 N.H. 217, 221 (2012) (quotation omitted); see papers, their possessions and their homes from unreasonable searches and “Part I, Article 19 of our State Constitution protects all people, their

Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 2 p. 3 31 - 33 (1983). State Constitution and rely upon federal law only to aid our analysis. State v. however, is de novo. Id. We first address the parties’ arguments under the 169 N.H. 232, 240 (2016). Our review of the trial court’s legal conclusions, unless they lack support in the record or are clearly erroneous. State v. Gay, ruling on a motion to suppress, we accept the trial court’s factual findings We begin with the suppression issue. When reviewing a t rial court’s

motions for reconsideration, and the State brought this appeal. to the plain view excepti on. The trial court denied the State’s subsequent the State had not demons trated that the firearm’s seizure was lawful pursuant there was “no dispute that the search of the residence for drugs was lawful,” could not be justified by the warrant itself. The court concluded that, although firearm s to be included in the search warrant,” and thus the firearm’s seizure to suppress, the trial court agreed that “there was no probable cause for two criminal episodes, the court dismissed those indictments. On the motion convictions alleged in the armed career criminal indictments arose from only separate criminal episodes. Because the court concluded that the qualifying statute requires that the defendant’s qualifying con victions stem from three On the motion to dismiss, the court ruled that the armed career criminal After a hearing, t he trial court granted both of the defendant’s motions.

time it was seized. to the warrant, and its incriminating nature was immediately apparent at the because it was discovered while conducting a lawful search for drugs pursuant seizure was justified by the plain view exception to the warrant requirement cause to search for firearms. Nevertheless, the State argued that the firearm’s State conceded that the searc h warrant affidavit did not establish probable The State objected to both motions. With respect to the firearm, the p. 4 4

issues it was asked to consider. appeal that the warrant itself was invalid, we confi ne our review of the trial court’s ruling to the during a lawful search of the defendant’s residence for drugs. Although the defendant argues on the parties, was whether the firearm was permissibly seized pursuant to the plain view exception of the search of his residence for drugs, we note that the issue before the trial court, as framed by residence for drugs was lawful. To the extent the defendant challenges on appeal the lawfulness The trial court understood that the parties were not disputing that the search of the defendant’s 1

not have violated the constitution in arriving at the place from which the object access to the firearm. The difference between the requirement that the officer For similar reason s, we conclude that Blodgett had a lawful right of

when they opened the box . .. .”). in a closet. The police were, therefore, acting within the scope of the warrant drugs and drug paraphernalia, either of which could have been stored in a box p. 4 400 (8th Cir. 1 992) (“The search warrant . . . authorized the police to seize . . . which he viewed the firearm. See id.; United States v. Evans, 966 F.2d 398, State that Blodgett did not violate the constitution in arriving at the place from closet, the box, and the rolled - up shirt could conceal heroin, we agree with the in baggies as small as a thumbnail.” Since it was reasonable to believe that the the object of the search.” Id. As the trial court noted, “heroin can be packaged may be searched if it is reasonable to believe that the container could conceal (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820 - 21 (1982)). “Any container the search.’” United States v. Giannetta, 909 F.2d 571, 577 (1st Cir. 1990) possibility that separate acts of entry or opening may be required to complete which the object of the search may be found and is not limited by the that ‘[a] lawful search of fixed premises generally extends to the entire area in residence for drugs pursuant to the warrant was lawful. “It is well accepted 1 have been found.” We assume, as did the trial court, that the search of the pursuant to the warrant, since they “were all places where drugs . . . could permissibly sear ch “the closet, the box, and the rolled up T - shirt” for drugs arriving at the place from which he viewed the firearm because Blodgett could The State contends that Blodgett did not violate the constitution in

N.H. at 2 p. 5 50. required to demonstrate that its discovery was inadvertent. See Nieves, 160 apparent. See id. Because the item at issue is a weapon, the State is not State must show that the incriminating nature of the firearm was immediately right of access to the firearm itself. See Cora, 170 N.H. at 191. Finally, the requirement). The State must also demonstrate that th e officer had a lawful must have been justified by a warrant or an exception to the warrant afforded the view of the item must have been lawful, meaning the intrusion Nieves, 160 N.H. at 2 p. 4 47, 251 (explaining that the initial intrusion which viewed the firearm. See State v. Cora, 170 N.H. 186, 191 (2017); see also the officer did not violate the constitution in arriving at the place from which he to be justified under the plain view exception, the State must demonstrate that police activity.” Ball, 124 N.H. at 234. In order for the seizure of th is firearm 5

seizure). Assuming without deciding that the firearm was seized when Blodgett that “the item must be i n plain view” for plain view doctrine to justify its the shirt, i.e., after it came into plain view. See Cora, 170 N.H. at 191 (noting was not seized for purposes of the plain view doctrine until after it fell out of v. Bell, 164 N.H. 4 p. 5 52, 455 - 56 (2012); Murray, 134 N.H. at 615. The firearm evident “at the time of the seizure.” Id. at 701 (quotation omitted); accord State apparent requirement asks whether the item’s incriminating nature was Blodgett unfurled the shirt. We agree with the State. The immediately been immediately apparent after the firearm fell out of the shirt, not before the State argues that the incriminating nature of the firearm need only have did not know the shirt contained a firearm before he unfurled it. On appeal, incriminating nature of the firearm was immediately apparent because Blodgett The trial court found that the State had not demonstrated that the

knowledge and prior experience. Id. at 701 - 02. draw reasonable inferences from the facts available to them in light of their proba ble cause determination, Davis, 149 N.H. at 701. Officers are entitled to objective standard, i d., t he officer’s expertise and experience are relevant to the presence or absence of pro bable cause is determined by reference to an Seizure on mere suspicion is not enough. Ball, 124 N.H. at 23 p. 5 5. While t he probable cause to believe the item is contraband or incriminating evidence.”). item in plain view may be seized, the law enforcement official must have v. Davis, 149 N.H. 698, 701 (2003); accord Ball, 124 N.H. at 235 (“[B]efore an probable cause to believe that the object seized is incriminating evidence. State apparent requirement is met if, at the time of the seizure, the officer has belongings. State v. Murray, 134 N.H. 613, 615 (1991). The immediately th is requirement is to prevent general, exploratory rumma ging in a person’s We next address the immediately apparent requirement. T he purpose of

also United States v. Naugle, 997 F.2d 819, 823 (10th Cir. 1993). lawful search of residence for evidence of bank fraud pursuant to warrant); see (officers had a lawful right of access to weapon discovered while conducting firearm. See United States v. Wells, 98 F.3d 808, 8 09 - 10 (4 th Cir. 199 p. 6 6) reasonably have been found. T hus, Blodgett had a lawful right of access to the discovered the firearm while he was searching in a place where drugs could the defendant’s residence for drugs pursuant to a warrant, and Blodgett 704 N.E.2d 1166, 1173 (Mass. 1999). Here, t he police were lawfully searching the warrant entitle him to search where the object is found.” Com. v. D’Amour, executing officer has a lawful right of access to the object seized if the terms of 187 F.3d 210, 221 n.10 (1st Cir. 1999). In the search wa rrant context, “[a]n retrieved the item. See Cora, 170 N.H. at 191; see also United States v Jones, could permissibly enter or be present in the place from which he or she (6th Cir. 2004). The lawful right of access requirement asks whether the officer where she must be to retrieve the item.” Boone v. Spurgess, 38 p. 5 5 F.3d 923, 928 refers to where the officer stands when she sees the item, and the latter to was viewed, and the lawful right of access requirement, is that “the former 6

that the State cannot avoid the firearm’s suppression. Because the State did not invoke the severance doctrine, the defendant asserts these circumstances. See State v. Tucker, 133 N.H. 204, 20 7 - 10 (1990). doctrine is the only way for the State to avoid suppression of the firearm in t - shirt.” The defendant seems to suggest that application of the severance “[t]he p olice executed th[e] warrant by, among other things, unfurling the correctly ruled that unfurling the t - shirt violated the constitution” because issuance and execution were unconstitutional. He submits that “the court firearms was not supported by probable cause, the warrant was invalid, and its the portion of the search warrant which authorized the poli ce to search for argument, as we understand it, is that because the trial court concluded that pertaining to the firearm’s suppression are not properly before us. His On appeal, the defendant appears to contend that the State’s arguments

picked it up from the floor. probable cause to believe the firearm was incriminating evidence before he illegal drugs and the defendant’s suspected drug offenses, Blodgett had that, on the facts of this case, which include the firearm’s cl ose proximity to firearm the police may come across is inherently incriminating, we conclude w eapons’ accessibility and proximity to illegal drugs”). Although not every executing search warrant for drugs under plain view exception, given “the 779, 783 (10th Cir. 1991) (upholding seizure of weapons discovered while time Blodgett discovered the gun. See United States v. Matthews, 942 F.2d fou nd drugs and a large amount of cash in the defendant’s residence by the discov ered while searching for drugs). Furthermore, the police had already Cir. 1990) (noting the clear “evidentiary significance” of firearms when 420 (9th Cir. 1995); s ee United States v. Caggiano, 899 F.2d 99, 103 - 04 (1st (9th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted), vacated in part on other grounds, 55 F.3d named in the search warrant.” United States v. Simpson, 10 F.3d p. 6 645, 647 been” generally upheld by courts “even when firearms are not specifically trade, the plain view s eizure of firearms as evidence of narcotics offenses has “Because of the close relationship between drugs and firearms in the narcotics of several “fingers” of what Scott suspected to be heroin from those buys. the warrant were the two controlled buys from the defendant and the recovery and the warrant itself. Included in the information that led Scott to apply for the defendant, the information that led the police to apply for a search warrant, warrant’s execution, Blodgett attended a briefing that included an overview of experience in drug investigations. . . and drug searches.” P rior to the General’s Drug Task Force since 2010, and that he ha s “extensive training and The trial court noted that Blodgett had been assigned to the Attorney

by this point. there was probable cause to believe that the fire arm was incriminating evidence picked it up off of the floor and removed its ammunition, we conclude that p. 7 7

arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of the statute novo. State v. Lathrop, 164 N.H. 468, 469 (2012). This court is the final The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we review de

criminal activity. applies when the defendant’s convictions arise fro m one or two episode s of qualifying convictions stem from three or more criminal episodes, or if it also issue in this case is whether that statute applies only when the defendant’s We turn now to RSA 159:3 - a, the armed career criminal statute. The

as we do under the State Constitution. 130, 136 - 3 p. 7 7 (1990), we reach the same result under the Federal Constitution circumstances, see Nieves, 160 N.H. at 250; Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, with at least as much protection as the F ederal Constitution under these plain view exception. Because the State Constitution provides the defendant In conclusion, we hold that the firearm’s seizure was justified by the

Canelo, 139 N.H. 3 p. 7 76, 383 (1995). view ruling as the issue has been developed and presented to us. Cf. State v. defendant has not persuaded us that we cannot review the trial court’s plain plain view analysis on the basis of this mutual understanding. Thus, the the residence for dru gs pursuant to the warrant was lawful. It conducted its parties, the trial court understood there to be “no dispute” that the search of pursuant to the warrant. Based on the arguments presented to it by the to firearms, the police could validly search the defendant’s residence for drugs that the parties did not contest that, despite this probable cause deficiency a s the word “firearms” in the search warrant. The record also shows, however, position — and the court agreed — that there was no probable cause to include case. The record of the trial court proceedings shows that both parties took the Ultimately, we need not decide how the severance doctrine bears on this

cause can be severed from those that are. See id. at 205 - 10. to address when, or if, portions of a warrant that are not supported by probable warrants be supported by probable cause; thus we had no occasion in Tucker circumstances. See id. Tucker, however, did not concern the requirement that severable from the warrant’s otherwise specific directives in some Tucker, we held that insufficiently particularized clauses in a warrant are invalid warrant need not inexorably be suppressed. See id. at 20 9 - 10. In Under the severance doctrine, however, evidence seized pursuant to a partially objects of the search with sufficient parti cularity. See Tucker, 133 N.H. at 206. Kellenbeck, 124 N.H. p. 7 760, 764 (19 p. 8 84). Search warrants must also describe the supported by probable cause. See Schulz, 164 N.H. at 221, 223; State v. I, Article 19 of the State Constitution require that search warrants be Both the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution as well as Part 8

language because the statute provides that any combination of felonies may be asserts that the trial court’s interpretation runs counter to the statute’s plain qualifying convictions arise from a single episode of criminal activity. The State episodes. In the State’s view, the statute applies even if all of the defendant’s defendant’s qualifying convictions to arise from three or more criminal On appeal, the S tate argues that RSA 159:3 - a does not require the

motion to dismiss the indictments. arose from only two criminal episodes, the court granted the defendant’s the qualifying convictions alleged in the armed career criminal indictments arise from three or more criminal episodes. Because the court concluded that interpreted RSA 159:3 - a as requiring the defendant’s qualifying convictions to three drug convictions arose from a single criminal episode. The trial court The trial court found, and the State does not dispute on appeal, that the

residence and person on October 11, 2012. convictions for drug offenses that arose from a search of the defendant’s stemmed from an un lawful entry into a residence on May 1, 2015, and three allege d the same underlying felony convictions: one burglary conviction that he violated the statute by “own[ing]” that same firearm. Both indictments discovered while executing the search warrant. The other indictment alleged having “in his possession or under his control” the firearm that Blodgett violations of this statute. One indictment alleged he violated RSA 159:3 - a, I, by RSA 159:3 - a, I (2014) (amended 2017). The defendant was charged with two

any other firearm. possession o r under his control, a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, or pornography, or controlled drug laws, shall own or have in his sexual assault, arson, burglary, robbery, extortion, child felonies in this state or any other state under homicide, assault, No person who has been convicted of any combination of 3 or more

provided: At the time that the search warrant was executed, RSA 159:3 - a, I,

legislative history to aid our analysis. Lathrop, 164 N.H. at 470. statutory scheme. Id. Whe n the language of a statute is ambiguous, we review We do not read words or phrases in isolation, but in the context of the entire language according to its plain and ordinary meaning. Allain, 171 N.H. at 2 p. 8 88. look first t o the language of the stat ut e itself, and, if possible, construe the statutory scheme. Lathrop, 164 N.H. at 46 p. 9 9. When interpreting a statute, we in enacting them and in light of the policy sought to be advanced by the entire 625:3, :7 (2016). Our goal is to apply statutes in light of the legislature’s intent to promote justice. See In re Justin D., 144 N.H. 450, 452 - 53 (1999); RSA the armed career criminal statute according to the fair import of its terms and considered as a whole. State v. Allain, 171 N.H. 286, 287 (2018). We construe 9

statutory language defies the importation of a same - incident test must have arisen from separate incidents. To the contrary, the Nothin g in the statutory text suggests that the felony convictions been “convicted” of “felonies or attempts to commit felonies.” The text clearly contemplates the number of times a person has

Michigan Supreme Court stated: 85 (quotation and brackets omitted). In interpreting this language, the sentenced under Michigan’s habitual offender laws. Gardn er, 753 N.W.2d at person commits a subsequent felony within this state,” the person must be combination of 2 or more felonies or attempts to commit felonies . . . and that statute at issue in Gardner provided that “if a person has been convicted of any Court ’s decision in People v. Gardner, 753 N.W.2d 78 (Mich. 2008). The A:10 - a, III, t he State contends that we should follow the Michigan Supreme “any combination” as used in RSA 15 p. 9 9:3 - a, which does not appear in RSA 632 - The State argues that Gordon is not on point. Relying on the phrase

enhancement statute”). same criminal episode would be treated as one conviction under the (explaining that, in Gordon, we held that “several AFSAs arising out of the at 715 - 16; see also Petition of State of N.H., 152 N.H. 185, 188 (2005) persons whose prior convictions arose from a single criminal episode. See id. scheme as a whole, we held that the sentencing enhancement did not apply to of the legislature’s intent to target repeat offenders, as well as the statutory acquire three convictions as a result of a single criminal episode.” Id. In light sentencing enhancement was] intended to apply to individuals who happen to offenders.” Id. at 715. Further, “[n]othing in the history indicate[d] that [the examination of that history revealed that the statute was “aimed at repeat issue, and looked to legislative history to aid our interpretation. Id. Our arose. See Gordon, 148 N.H. at 714. We found the statute ambiguous on this referenced the numbe r of criminal episodes from which the prior convictions convictions arose from the same criminal episode, or whether the phrase enhancement applied regardless of whether the defendant’s prior AFSA the statutory language “previously convicted of 2 or more offenses” meant the A:10 - a, III); see RSA 632 - A:2 (Supp. 2018). The issue befor e us was whether RSA 632 - A:2, ’” the AFSA statute. Gordon, 148 N.H. at 713 (quoting RSA 632 assault (AFSA) who had been “‘ previously convicted of 2 or more offenses under sentencing enhancement for persons convicted of aggravated felonious sexual In Gordon, t he statute at issue, RSA 632 - A:10 - a, III (2016), set forth a We con sidered a similar statute in State v. Gordon, 148 N.H. 710 (2002).

correctly interpreted the statute. its interpretation. By contrast, the defen dant argues that the trial court In the alternative, the State appears to contend that legislative history supports history to aid our construction of the statute, as the statute is not ambiguous. counted. The State further argues that we should not resort to legislative p. 10 10

Corp. v. N.H. Retirement Sys., 162 N.H. 673, 677 (2011). In comparable cases, is ambiguous. See State v. Costella, 166 N.H. 705, 7 p. 10 10 (2014); Union Leader the armed career criminal statute are reasonable, we conclude that the statute Because both the State’s and the defendant’s respective constructi ons of

criminal episode. See Gordon, 148 N.H. at 715. persons who happen to acquire multiple convictions as a result of a single skeptical that the legislature sought to sweep within the statute’s scope of the armed career criminal statute, namely, to target career criminals, we are Legislature” (quotation and brackets omitted)). In light of the apparent intent constructio n of a statute if it does violence to the apparent policy of the Chrisicos, 159 N.H. 405, 408 (2009) (noting that “we will reject a literal “would thwart the clear l egislative goals underlying the [Act]”); State v. construction” of the F ederal Armed Career Criminal Act because doing so also Towne, 870 F.2d at 8 90 (declining to adopt the trial c ourt’s “literal illogical results that the legislature could not have intended.” Id. at 265; see adopt “strictly literal interpretation [s]” of statutes that “would produce . . . 264 (2017) (quotation omitted). Furth ermore, w e have previously declined to fair import of their terms and to promote justice.” State v. Paige, 170 N.H. 261, strictly construe criminal statutes, but rather construe them according to the count the defendant ’s total number of convictions). However, “[w]e do not support[ed]” the trial court’s “literal construction” of it as requiring the court to the plain language of the F ederal Armed Career Criminal Act “arguably text. See United States v. Towne, 870 F.2d 880, 890 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that strictly literal manner, which is arguably more faithful to the statute’s plain Both constructions are reasonable. The State construes the statute in a

felony convictions fall under. statute applies regardless of which “combination” of categories a person’s legislature’s inclusion of the phrase “any combination,” then, clarifies that the the same category; for example, only if they are all drug crimes. The construed to apply only when the defendant’s underlying felonies al l fall within the phrase “any combination,” the defendant argues, it could reasonably be drug laws.” RSA 159:3 - a, I (2014) (amended 2017). I f the statute was shorn of assault, arson, burglary, robbery, extortion, child pornography, or controlled lists several categories of qualifying felon ies, namely, “homicide, assault, sexual “any combination” language is misplaced. He points out that RSA 159:3 - a, I, The defe ndant counters that the significance the State attaches to the

convictions arose. felonies, rather than the number of criminal episodes from which those us to count the defendant’s total number of convictions for enumerated Id. From Gardner, the State argues that RSA 159:3 - a’s plain language directs

cou nted. because it states that any combination of convictions must be p. 11 11

Under Habitual Offender Statutes, 7 A.L.R.5th 263, 293 (1992) (“[C]ourts Procedural Sequence of Former Convictions as Affecting Enhancement of Penalty overall purpose); see also Cynthia L. Sletto, Annotation, Chronological or See Paige, 170 N.H. at 264 (when interpreting a statute, we aim to effectuate its effectuate that purpose by limiting the statute’s application to “career” criminals. each underlying conviction to arise from a separate criminal episode would criminal episode.” Gordon, 148 N.H. at 715. Interpreting RSA 159:3 - a to require “individuals who happen to acquire th ree convictions as a result of a s ingle enacting the armed career criminal statute was to target repeat offenders, not This legislative history demonstrates that the legislature’s purpose in

N.H.H.R. Jour. 543 (1989) (emphasis add ed). criminals and shall be sentenced to a minimum mandatory term of 10 years.” has firearms in his control. Such persons are considered as armed career that the act applied “when a person who has been convicted three or more times 1989). The House Judiciary Committee reported to the House of Representatives 1989); Hearing on HB 699 - FN Before the Sen. Judiciary Comm. 1 - 2 (April 25, See Hearing on HB 699 - FN Before the House Judiciary Comm. 1 (February 21, the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, repeat offenders were e mphasized. (emphasis added) (capitalization omitted). Throughout the testimony before both firearms by career criminals and imposing a minimum mandatory sentence.” Id. Laws 1989, ch. 295. The bill was entitled “a n act prohibiting the possession of crimes. The statute was enacted in 1989 as a result of House Bill (HB) 699 - FN. reveals what its title suggests: that it is aimed at persons who repeatedly commit The legislative history of RSA 159:3 - a, entitled “Armed Career Criminals,”

710; Gordon, 148 N.H. at 714. statute is ambiguous, we turn to legislative history. See Costella, 16 6 N.H. at proceeding but separate criminal transactions.”). Accordingly, because the apply to defendants who have multiple convict ions based on one judicial determine whether the [Federal Armed Career Criminal Act] was intended to convictions’ is ambiguous, it is necessary to refer to the legislative history to Herbert, 860 F.2d 620, 622 (5th Cir. 1988) (“Because the term ‘three previous relate to different criminal incidents” (quotation omitted)); United States v. convicted” ambiguous as to “whether the necessary two prior convictions must 987, 990 - 91 (Mass. 2017) (finding statutory language “previously twice courts have done the same. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Garvey, 76 N.E.3d number of judicial proceedings in which the convictions were entered). Other as separate convictions for purposes of RSA 632 - A:10 - a, III, regardless of multiple convictions arising from multiple criminal episodes should be treated 134, 136, 138 - 39 (2003) (looking to legislative history to determine whether convictions arising from a single criminal episode); State v. Melvin, 150 N.H. discern whether RSA 632 - A:10 - a, III applied to defendants with multiple we face here. See Gordon, 148 N.H. at 714 - 15 (looking to legislative history to that was similarly ambiguous and which presented a question akin to the one we have consul ted legislative history to aid in our interpretation of a statute p. 12 12

Compare id., with N.H.H.R. Jour. 110 (1989). January 1989, less than three months after the federal statute was amended. 4402. HB 699 - FN was introduced in the New Hampshire Legislature in Anti - Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100 - 690, § 7056, 102 Stat. 4181, from one another” was added to the f ederal statute in November 1988. S ee another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The phrase “committed on occasions different a seriou s drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different from one 922(g),” if that person “has three previous convictions . . . for a violent felony or minimum sentence of fifteen years upon any “person who violates [18 U.S.C. §] Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2247 (2016). It imposes a mandatory Career Criminal Act is presently codified at 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (20 p. 12 12). See Before the House Jud iciary Comm. 1 (February 21, 1989). The F ederal Armed that HB 699 - FN was modeled after federal law. See Hearing on HB 699 - FN Additionally, testimony before the House Judiciary Committee indicates

Leader Corp., 162 N.H. at 678 (quotation omitted). our task in interpreting statutes is to determine legislative intent.” Union particular construction of the statute, we will adopt that construction, since felony convictions fell under. Where legislative history “plainly supports a regardless of which “combination” of categories, “as listed,” the defendant’s phrase “any combination of” to clarify that the statute applied to defendants demonstrates, as the defendant suggests, that the legislature included the control.” N.H.H.R. Jour. 543 (1989) (emphasis added). This history person who has been convicted three or more times has firearms in his t o include arson and extortion in a list of felonies to be considered when a committee reported its changes to the House as follows: “The bill was amended o f the House Judiciary Comm. (March 9, 1989) (emphasis added). T he any combination of crimes as listed.” Hearin g on HB 699 - FN Before Subcomm. 1989, 295:1. T h e latter change was intended “to include persons convicted of Compare House Bill 699 - FN (1989), with N.H.H.R. Jour. 544 (1989), and Laws any combination of 3 or more felonies” language that was ultimately enacted. “convicted 3 or more times” l anguage in the proposed bill with the “convicted of Jour. 543 - 44 (1989). The committee also recommended replac ing the amended to include arson and extortion among the crimes listed. See N.H.H.R. added). T he House Judiciary Committee recommended that the bill be possessing, or controlling a firearm. House Bill 699 - FN (19 89) (emphasis burglary, robbery, child pornography, or controlled drug law” from owning, times. . . of a felony offense under a homicide, assault, sexual assault, introduced, the bill prohibited any “person who has been convicted 3 or more of the “any combination” language used in the statute. As originally In addition, the legislative history supports the defendant’s interpretation

conviction result from a separate criminal episode.”). are targeted at persistent or repeat offenders, thus mandating that each histories of the pertinent statutes . . . support the conclusion that the statutes imposing the separate transaction requirement have reasoned that the legislative p. 13 13

LYNN, C.J.