2018-0604, John C. Rankin & a. v. South Street Downtown Holdings, Inc.; South Street Downtown Holdings, Inc. v. TruexCullins and Partners Architects & a.

the defendant /third - party plaintiff, South Str eet Downtown Holdings, Inc. (Andrew D. Dunn and Tavish M. Brown on the brief, and Mr. Dunn orally), for Devine, Millimet & Branch, P rofessional A ssociation, of Manchester

MaryAnne Rankin, filed no brief. Shaheen & Gordon, P.A., of Dover, for the plaintiff s, John C. Rankin and

TRUEXCULLINS AND PAR TNERS ARCHITECTS & a.

No. 2018 - 0604 Grafton

http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. release. The direct address of the court’ s home page is: Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 a.m. on the morning of their reported by e - mail at the following address: reporter@courts.state.nh. us. corrections may be made before the opinion goes to pre ss. Errors may be Doe Drive, Concor d, New Hampshire 03301, of any editorial errors in order that requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New Hampshire, One Charles as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. Readers are NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule p. 2 22 as well 2

more than 8 years after the date of substantial completion.” On appeal, South Street concedes that its “third - party action[] was brought defendants were invo lved in designing the area in which Rankin allegedly fell. completed by January p. 2 2009. South Street alleged that both third - party property that took place between 2002 and 2009, and were substantially third - party defendants to serve as design professionals for renovations to the Hodgson), seeking indemnity and/or contribution. South Street had hired the (Truex Cullins) and landscape architect Wagner Hodgson, Inc. (Wagner party defendants, project architect TruexCullins and Partners Architects South Street, in turn, filed a third - party complaint against the third -

or partial stair” that “did not meet applicable building codes.” of consortium, alleging that Rankin fell on an “inadequate and dangerous ramp March p. 2 2017, the underlying plaintiffs sued South Street for negligence and loss Street in Hanover (the property). The property is owned by South Street. In I n March 2015, Rankin fell while leaving a business located at 70 South Main South Street Downtown Holdings, Inc.’s (South Street) third - party complaint. (Rankin) and his wife MaryAnne (collectively, the underlying plaintiffs) and in bac kground only, as alleged in the complaint brought by John C. Rankin See In re C.M., 163 N.H. 768, 770 (2012). We recite additional facts, for We accept the facts as presented in the interlocutory transfer statement.

We conclude that it does.

was dangerous and did not meet applicable building codes? improvement to real property which the injured plaintiff alleges contribution against architects involved in the design of the defendant (in a premises liability action) for indemnity and/or 1990 apply to and bar third party actions by a property owner Does RSA 508:4 - b (“the statute of repose”) as amended in

court transferred the following question: ruling from the Superior Court (MacLeod, J.). See Sup. Ct. R. 9. The trial HICKS, J. This case is before us on an interlocutory transfer without

Hodgson, Inc. Meunier on the brief, and Mr. Staar orally), for third - party defendant Wagner Morrison Mahoney LLP, of Manchester (William A. Staar and Nicholas

for third - party defendant TruexCullins and Partners Architects. (Kenneth B. Walton and Elena M. Brander on the brief, and Mr. Walton orally), Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, of Boston, Massachusetts p. 3 3

deficiency in the creation of an improvement to real property” — and notes that injury to the person, wrongful death or economic loss arising out of any subject to the statute — “all actions to recover damages for injury to property, supports its position. South Street focuses first up on the specific list of actions Each of the parties contends that the plain language of the statute

statute. See RSA 508:4 - b. explicit exception for indemnity or contribution is contained in the current RSA 508:4 - b, III, V, VI. N one of the listed exceptions are applicable here. N o RSA 508:4 - b, I. The statute sets forth a limited numbe r of exceptions. See

substantial completion of the improvement, and not thereaft er. improvement, shall be brought within 8 years from the date of construction, observation, supervision or inspection of that the design, labor, materials, engineering, plannin g, surveying, of an improvement to real property, including without limitation death or economic loss arising out of any deficiency in the creation damages for injury to property, injury to the person, wrongful Except as otherwise provided in this section, all actions to recover

The statute at issue, RSA 508:4 - b, currently provides, in relevant part:

Bank of N. Y. Mellon v. Dowgiert, 169 N.H. 200, 204 (2016) (citations omitted).

language of the statute to discern legislative intent. scheme. Absent an ambiguity, we will not look beyond the interpret statutory provisions in the context of the overall statutory language that the legislature did not see fit to include. We and will not con sider what the legislature might have said or add used. We interpret legislative intent from the statute as written possible, we ascribe the plain and ordinary meanings to the words first examine the language found in the statute, and when the statute consi dered as a whole. In construing its meaning, we final arbiter s of the legislature’ s intent as expressed in the words of review de novo. In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we

interpretation. To answer the transferred question, we must e ngage in statutory

property,” and transferred the question now before us. claims arising out of a deficiency in the creation of an improvement to real current version of [RSA 508: p. 4 4 - b] applies to indemnity and/or contribution that “a substantial basis exists for a difference of opinion as to whether the are barred by the statute of repose, RSA 508:4 - b (2010). The trial court found Wagner Hodgson moved to dismiss on grounds that the claims against it 4

to an argument of one third - party defendant, we treat it as responding to an argument of both. as arguments of the third - party defendants. Similarly, where we addr ess South Street’s response same outcome, we do not differentiate their individual arguments but, rather, reference all of them Because TruexCullins and Wagner Hodgson make similar arguments on appeal and seek the 1

be construed according to the common and approved usage of the language; (2012) (providing rule of statutory construction that “[w] ords and phrases sha ll pursuant to RSA 21:2, that term must be construed accordingly. See RSA 21:2 a term of art which has acquired a meaning at common law” and that, improvement to real property. South Street first asserts that “‘economic loss’ is “economic loss” and that it “arise[s] out of” a deficiency in the creation of an defendants’ interpretation; namely, that the third - party action is a claim for South Street challenges two of the premises underlying the third - party

‘arise out of’ such improvements.” improvement - deficiency claims are ‘actions’ to recover ‘economic loss’ that against them because “[i] ndemnity and c ontribution claims linked to building - (2012) (emphasis added). They conclude that RSA 508: p. 4 4 - b bars the claims property.” Phaneuf Funeral Home v. Little Giant Pump Co., 163 N.H. 727, 731 long as they arise from a deficiency in the creation of an improvement to real statute’s “language [as] unambiguously encompass [ing] all types of claims, as b, I (emphases added). They note that we have broadly interpreted the any deficiency in the creation of an improvement to real property.” RSA 508:4 property, injury to the person, wrongful death or economic loss arising out of expansive language, covering “all actions to recover damages for injury to The third - party defendants, on the other hand, point to the statute’s 1

RSA p. 5 508: p. 4 4 - b, I[,] superfluous.” category of damage the claim seeks to recover would render the se rial list in South Street, “[t]o read RSA 508:4 - b to apply to any action regardless of the Merrill v. Great Bay Disposal Serv., 125 N.H. 540, 543 (1984). According to legislature is presumed not to have use d superfluous or redundant words.” the rule that “all of the words of a statute must be given effect and that the be read to include actions for indemnity and/or contribution without violating Finally, South Street argues that the words “all actions” in RSA 508:4 - b cannot legislature did not see fit to include.” Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 169 N.H. at 204. consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the that “[w] e in terpret legislative intent from the statute as written and will not contribution actions would add language to the statute in violation of the rule also argues that to interpret RSA 508:4 - b as applying to indemnity and/or statute implies the exclusion of another” (quotation omitted)). South Street the expressio unius canon to mean “[n] ormally the expression of one thing in a types of actions.” See Appeal of Cover, 168 N.H. 614, 622 (2016) (interpreting contend s that “it must be presumed that the legislature excluded all other the interpretive canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius, South Street actions for indemnity and contribution are not included in that list. Id. Citing 5

clearly not related to the cost of repairing a defective product. See, e.g., State We have used the term i n other c ontexts in which its meaning was

purposes and in all contexts. Kelleher, 1 p. 5 52 N.H. at 835. Neither case define d the term “economic loss” for all liability context” and, again, related to the damages sought in that case, quotes from Kelleher was explicitly qualified as applying “[i]n the products liabil ity origins of th e economic loss doctrine itself. T he definition South Street garage), Lempke, 130 N.H. at 783 - 84, and harkens back to the products - Lempke was applicable to the damages sought in that case (repair to a defective The narrow definition of “economic loss” that South Street quotes from

with the contract relationship.” Id. (quotation omitted). pursuing tort recovery for purely economic or commercial losses associated remedies principle that operates generally to preclude contracting parties from & Gravel v. JGI E astern, 1 p. 5 54 N.H. 791, 794 (2007). It “is a judicially - created but has been expanded in many jurisdictions to other tort cases, Plourde Sand which “is a common law rule that emerged with the advent of products liability” 835 - 36, or implicitly, Lempke, 130 N.H. at 792, the “economic loss doctrine,” 152 N.H. at 821. In each, we referenced, either explicitly, Kelleher, 152 N.H. at repairing water damage allegedly caused by the defective windows.” Kelleher, value of the house in which the windows were installed and costs related to “seeking damages for the replacement costs of. . . defective windows, loss of privity of contract.” Lempke, 130 N.H. at 783. Kelleher involved an action workmanlike quality for latent defects which cause economic loss, absent property may sue the builder/contractor on th e theory of implied warranty of repair, and presented the question “whether a subsequent purchaser of real involved structural problems in a recently constructed garage that required South Stree t’s reliance upon Lempke and Kelle her is misplaced. Lempke

loss under the statute. dimin ution in their value, it is not an action to recover damages for economic recover damages to repair or replace the allegedly defective stairs or for the omitted). It then argues that because its third - party action is not one to product because it is inferior in quality.” Kelleher, 1 p. 5 52 N.H. at 835 (citation both damage to the defective product itself and the diminution in value of the itself, through deterioration or non - accidental causes. . . [and] encompass [es] “economic loss is characterized as damage that occurs to the inferior product v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co., 152 N.H. 813 (2005), for the proposition that (Quoting Lempke v. Dagenais, 130 N.H. 782, 792 (1988).) It also cites Kelleher commonly measured by the cost of repairing or replacing the product.’” failure of the product to perform to the level expected by the buyer and . . . that “[t]his Court defines an economic loss as ‘that loss resulting from the according to such peculiar and ap propriate meaning”). South Street contends peculiar and appropriate meaning in law, shall be construed and understood but technical words and phrases, and such others as may have acquired a p. 6 6

losses, which are the damages paid to a third person, wheth er the underlying has noted: “Indemnification is always sought as compensation for economic term. As the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire part y action for indemnity and/or contribution f alls within the meaning of that Having so defined “economic loss,” we conclude that South Street ’s third -

statutes. This meaning accords with the term’s usage in the above - cited cases and (including, as synonyms for “economic,” “fiscal,” “monetary,” and “pecuniary”). considerations, financial”); see also Roget’s 21st Century Thesaurus 289 (1992) ed. 2007) (defining “economic,” in relevant part, as “relating to monetary (Quotations omitted.) See, e.g., 1 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 794 ( p. 6 6th meaning of “econo mic loss” is a loss that is “financial [,] fiscal [,] [or] monetary.” We agree with the third - party defendants that the plain and ordinary

N.H. at 204; see RSA 21:2. apply the “plain and ordinary” meaning of th at term. Bank of N. Y. Mellon, 1 p. 6 69 a reference to the common - law term or doctrine”). Our task becomes, then, to term ‘ economic loss ’ in the construction statute of repose [RSA 508:4 - b] is not 117 - JL, 2019 WL 1318274, at *7 (D.N.H. Mar. 22, 2019) (concluding that “the RSA 21:2; see also Cont’ l W. Ins. Co. v. Superior Fire Prot., Inc., No. 18 - CV be “construed and understood according to” that meaning in RSA 508:4 - b. has “acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law” such that it should Accordingly, we disagree with South Street that the term “economic loss”

by a victim as a result of such violation” (emphasis added)). identity fraud shall “be ordered to make restitution for economic loss sustained (emphasis added)); RSA p. 6 638:26, III (2016) (pr oviding that person found guilty of in substantial economic loss to the marital estate or the injured party” fault of either party if it caused the breakdown of the marriage and “[r] esulted ordering property settlement between divorcing parties, court may consider defective product. See, e.g., RSA 458:16 - a, I I(l)(2) (2018) (providing that in contexts in which it cannot be construed as meaning the cost of repairing a We note, moreover, that the legislature has used the term in other

(emphasis added)). potential effect of victim’s drug use on his estimated lifetime earnings economic loss to [accident victim’s] estate as a result of his early death,” on the examination of plaintiff’s economic expert, “[w] hen [he] testified about the likely Eng’ g, 150 N.H. 195, 200 (2003) (upholding trial court’s decision to allow cross properly belong to private parties” (emphasis added)); McLaughlin v. Fisher other business and economic losses resulting from MBTE contamination for diminution in value of private proper ty, lost business expenditures and waters from contamination by methyl tertiary butyl ether (MBTE), “that claims the extent of its parens patriae authority to recover damages to New Hampshire v. Hess Corp., 1 p. 6 61 N.H. 426, 43 p. 7 7 (2011) (agreeing with State, in determining 7

language construed in South Dearborn and Ray & Sons. RSA 508:4 - b applies, The statutory language applicable here, however, is broader than the

Ray & Sons, 114 S.W.3d at 202.

repose is not applicable to this case. from alleged defective construction. Therefore, the statute of obligation to indemnify. This case is not one based on damages contract, or in other words, an alleged breach of the contractual alleging breach of the indemnity provision in the construction improvement to real property. At issue before us is an action recover damages caused by a deficiency in the construction of an [The applicable statute] provides a statute of repose on actions to

612 N.E.2d at 209. Similarly, the court in Ray & Sons held: grounded solely in rights granted pursuant to the contract.” S outh Dearborn, Instead, any damages [the plaintiff] would be entitled to recover would be deficiency or any injury to property or person arising out of a deficiency. were to recover from the defendant, “the damages recovered would not be ‘ for ’ a language. Thus, i n South Dearborn, the court reasoned that if the plaintiff that the indemnity action at issue did not fall within the applicable statutory construction (quotation omitted) (emphase s added)). Finally, each concluded based on contract, tort, nuisance, or otherwise, for.. . any deficiency” in repose covering, in relevant part, any “action to recover damages whether (emphasis added)); S outh Dearborn, 612 N.E.2d at 205 (applying statute of damages caused by any deficiency” in construction (quotation omitted) (applying statute of repose covering any “action in contract . . . to recover caused by construction deficiencies. See Ray & Sons, 114 S.W.3d at 200 involved a statute of repose barring certain actions to recover damages for or Sons, 114 S.W.3d at 196; S outh Dearborn, 612 N.E.2d at 205. Each also Each case involved an express contractual duty to indemnify. See Ray &

distinguishable. Duerstock, 612 N.E.2d 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993). We find these cases S.W.3d 189 (Ark. 2003), and S outh Dearborn Sch ool B ui ld in g Corp. v. jurisdictions: Ray & Sons Masonry v. U nited S tates Fid elity & Gu ar anty, 114 contract.” South Stree t principally relies upon two cases from other bre ach of the express and/or implied duty to indemnify aris[ing] from real property,” RSA 508:4 - b, I, but, rather, are “actions to recover damages for damages. . . arising out of any deficiency in the creation of an improvement to the plain language of RSA 508:4 - b because they are not “a ction s to recover South Stree t next contends that its indemnity claims do not fall within

*9 (D.N.H. Sept. 25, 2013). Johnson v. Capital Offset Co., Inc., No. 11 - CV - 459 - JD, 2013 WL 5406619, at loss is economic or the result of physical injury or damage to property.” p. 8 8

building trades, notwithstanding the bar on a direct action, would allow an end cases, allowing indemnity and/or contribution actions against those in the statute’s purpose. As courts in o ther jurisdictions have observed in similar applying to actions for indemnity and contribution would contravene the We agree with the third - party defendants that to read the statute as not

Laws 1990, 164:1.

property. planning, des ign and construction of improvements to real and balance the interests of prospective litigants in cases involving This act is determined to be in the public interest and to promote planning, design and construction o f improvements to real estate. which no action may be b rought for errors and omissions in the Therefore, it is in the public interest to set a point in time after the construction of improvements to real estate in New Hampshire. industry and will eventually have very serious adverse effects on based on the discovery rule, part icularly affects the building to an almost infinite period of liability. This period of liability, designers, architects and others in the building trade are subject The general court finds that, under current law, builders,

legislature stated: Indus., 149 N.H. 4 p. 8 80, 484 (2003). In amending the statute in 1990, the infinite liability perpetuated by the discovery rule.” Big League Entm’t. v. Brox purpose, which is to relieve potential defendants in the building trades “from In addition, our construction of RSA 508:4 - b comports with the statute’s

superfluous or redundant words”). must be given effect and that the legislature is presumed not to have used at 543 (stating rule of statutory construction that “all of the words of a statute words in a statute” (quotation and brackets omitted)); see also Merrill, 125 N.H. ignore language in provision of C riminal C ode “as we must give effect to all decline to do. See State v. Bobola, 16 p. 8 8 N.H. 771, 775 (2016) (declining to & Sons would require us to ignore a portion of the st atute’s language, which we 508:4 - b in accordance with the reason ing applied in South Dearborn and Ray actions such as those for indemnity and/or contribution. To construe RSA broadens New Hampshire ’s construction statute of repose to include indirect that inclusion of the phrase “economic loss arising out of any deficiency” economic loss. See Johnson, 2013 WL 540661 p. 9 9, at *9. We therefore conclude previously noted, indemnity and contribution actions are actions to recover for an improvement to real property.” RSA 508:4 - b, I (emphasis added). As just to “all actions to recover damages for. . . any deficiency in the creation of out of any deficiency in th e creation of an improvement to real property,” not in relevant part, to “all actions to recover damages for. . . economic loss arising 9

508:4 - b’s “arising out of any deficiency” language. RSA 508:4 - b, I. reject South Street’s argument that its third - party claims do not fall within RSA indirect recovery would f rustrate the purpose of RSA 508:4 - b. Accordingly, we claims alleging deficient design and/or construction. We conclude that such indirectly by recovering any damages paid to the underlying plaintiffs on their claims seek to recover damages for such alleged professional negligence prove professional negligence directly to maintain its indemnity claims, thos e real property” under RSA 508:4 - b, I. Even if South Street does not have to alleged defects constitute “deficienc[ies] in the creation of an improvement to handrails,” and, therefore, did not meet applicable building codes. These “too steep” and was “not designed, built, or maintained with appropriate defects in the ramp or stair on which Rankin allegedly fell, including that it was The underlying plaintiffs’ action against South Street alleges a number of damage claims . . . are not dependent upon proof of professional negligence.” repose would not frustrate the purpose of that statute because “indemnity Stre et’s contention that a llowing its indemnity claim to survive the statute of deficiency in the subject stairs and ramp.” Moreover, w e disagree with South underlying plaintiffs “would be an ‘economic loss’ that ‘arises from’ the alleged against South Street, the payment of damages by South Street to the party defendants that should the underlying plaintiffs prevail in their claims stair in the area between its doors and the sidewalk.” We agree with the third arising from South Street’s alleged failure “to provide a reasonably safe ramp or The underlying plaintiffs’ action against South Street seeks damages

does not permit it to do directly”). deficient construction,” and “cannot be permitted to do indirectly what the law losses caused by deficient construction or inj ury to property caused by terms of indemnification and defense, . . . [p]laintiff is attempting to recover for Ga. Mar. 24, 2010) (noting that while plaintiff’s claims “may be couched in Concrete Floors, Inc., No. 1:08 - CV - 01600 - JOF, 2010 WL 1265184, at *8 (N.D. 1 p. 9 994) (citations omitted); see also Facility Constr. Mgmt. Inc. v. Ahrens Gwinnett Place Assoc. v. Pharr Engineering, 449 S.E.2d 889, 891 (Ga. Ct. App.

legislature. circumstances would indirectly thwart th e intention of the maintenance. Allowing a claim for indemnification under t hese years after losing control over the improvements and their use and protection, such persons would be exposed to liability for many constructing improvements to real estate. Without such contractors are insulated from suit based upon the ir work in outside time limit beyond which architects, engineers, and enacting statutes of ultimate repose, to establish a reasonable These decisions all defer to the legislature’s intent, in

explained: run around the statute of repose. As the Court of Appeal s of Georgia p. 10 10

in construing the statute currently in force. See Bank of N. Y. Mellon, 169 N.H. unambiguous, it would be improper to consider the prior version of the statute other hand, contend that because the current version of RSA 508:4 - b is such claims from the statute of re pose. The third - party defendants, on the version omits such reference, the legislature must have intended to exclude explicitly mentioned actions for contribution and indemnity, and the current South Street argues that because the pre - 1990 version of the statute

(providing effective date of amendment). RSA 508:4 - b (1968) (amended 1990) (emphasis added); s ee Laws 1990, 164: 4

which it is proposed to bring an action. improvement constitutes the proximate cause of the injury for improvement at the time the defective and unsafe condition of such actual possession and control as owner, tenant or otherwise, of the construction. This limitation shall not apply to any person in years after the pe rformance or furnishing of such services and construction of such improvement to real property more than six furnishing the design, planning, supervision of construction or such injury, may be brought against any person performing or contribution or indemnity for damages sustained on account of construction of an improvement to real property, n or any action for planning, supervision or observation of construction, or wrongful death, arising out of any deficiency in the design, personal, or for an injury to the person, or for bodily injury or No action to recover damages for injury to property, real or

statute provided: evidenced in the 1990 amendment to RSA 50 8:4 - b. Prior to June 26, 1990, the exclude indemnity and contribution claims from the statute of repose is South Street nevertheless contends that the legisl ature’s intent to

to bar such claims. RSA 508:4 - b, we conclude that the legislature has clearly expressed the intent because indemnity and/or contribution claims fit within the plain language of indemnity and/or contribution damage claims. To the contrary, however, expression that it intended RSA 508:4 - b to bar the common law right to bring construed”). It then argues that “[t]he Legislature did not provide a clear provisions barring th e common law right to recov er are to be strictly and contribution are common law rights. See id. (stating that “immunity Peak, 158 N.H. 735, 737 (2009). South Street notes that rights of indemnity omitted), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Martin v. Pat’s intent.” Sweeney v. Ragged Mt. Ski Area, 151 N.H. 239, 241 (2004) (quo tation statute to abrogate the common law unless the statute clearly expresses that common law are to be interpreted strictly” and that “we will not interpret a South Street next invokes the doctrine that “statutes in derogation of the p. 11 11

defendants’] negligence, thereby granting [them] a protection which, if. . . South Street a duty to assume full responsibility for [the third - party Street’s indemnity and/or contribution damage claim . . . it would impose upon South Street also argues that i f we construe RSA 508:4 - b “to bar South

argument. find clear legislative intent in the plain language of RSA 508:4 - b, we reject this State’s general policy of holding negligent parties accountable.” Because we otherwise, RSA 508:4 - b should not be extended in contravention of . . . the South Street next argues that “[a] bsent clear legislative intent indicating

claims”). contains additional new language that unambiguously encompasses those “does not explicitly address indemnification and contribution claims, it 1318274, at *6 (concluding that while the 1990 amendment to RSA 508:4 - b language that covers those actions and more. Cf. Cont ’ l W. Ins. Co., 2019 WL write indemnity and contribution actions out of the statute when it added used phrase. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the legislature intended to defendants that the new statutory language is broader than the previously improvement to real property,” RSA 508:4 - b, I. We agree with the third - party loss” to the phrase “arising out of any deficiency in the creation of an account of such injury,” RSA 508:4 - b (1968), and added the term “economic phrase “n or any action for contribution or indemnity for damages sustained on the statute’s bar. Am ong other textual changes, the amendment deleted the intended alteration was the removal of indemnity and contribution actions from le gislature ’s intent to alter legal rights, it does not necessari ly follow that the the prior act. Even presuming, however, that the change indicates the amendment to RSA 508:4 - b constituted a material change in the language of unavailing even if the rule were to be applied. We recognize that the 1990 ambiguity is required, because we conclude that South Street’s argument is We decline, in the instant case, to determine whether a finding of

Conrad v. Hazen, 140 N.H. 249, 251 - 52 (1995). applying this rule, see, e.g., id., we have not uniformly done so, see, e.g., found the statutory language under consideration to be ambiguous before (2001) (quotation and ellipsis omitted). While i n some cases we have explicitly change in legal rights.” Appeal of Manchester Transit Auth., 146 N.H. 454, 458 material change in the language of the original act is presumed to indicate a and brackets omitted). Accordingly, we have recognized t hat “[o] rdinarily, any Ass oc. of N. H. v. N. H. Div. of Pers onnel, 158 N.H. 338, 345 (2009) (quotation s mind previous statutes relating to the same subject matter.” State Employees “we generally assume that whenever the legislature enacts a provision, it has in “[T] he legislature’ s choice of language is deemed to be meaningful,” and

statute to discern legislative intent.”). at 204 (“Absent an ambiguity, we will not look beyond the language of the p. 12 12

concurred. LYNN, C.J., and BASSETT, HANTZ MARCON I, and DONOVAN, JJ.,

the affirmative. For all of the foregoing reasons, we answer the transferred question in

legislature.” In the Matter of Ross & Ross, 169 N.H. 299, 303 (2016). wrong forum, however, as “[m] atters of public policy are reserved for the professionals” such as doctors and lawyers. These argument s are made in the liability protection against long tail claims which is not available to other “[t]here is no pu blic policy reason why design professionals should be afforded impose very few burdens on the design profession.” It further argues that indemnity and contribution damage claims from the statute[’]s bar would Finally, South Street contends, for several reasons, that “[e]xcepting

which they work. See RSA 508:4 - b, III. guaranteed in writing, after substantial completion of the improvements on professional negligence for 8 years, or longer if expressly warranted or time in which such claims can be brought. Architects remain liable for their provide absolute immunity from professional negligence but, rather, limit s the for professional negligence by contract. RSA 508:4 - b, by contrast, does not professionals, from contractually absolving themselves completely from liability RSA 338 - A:1 (2009). Thus, RSA 338 - A:1 prohibits architects, among other

and wholly unenforceable. on the part of any said persons shall be against public policy, void circumstances giving rise to legal liability by reason of negligence or indemni fied for damages and claims arising out of surveyor or his agents or employees is sought to be held harmless A ny agreement or provision whereby an architect, engineer,

RSA 338 - A:1.” We disagree. RSA 338 - A:1 provides: sought vi a contract, would be prohibited as against public policy pursuant to