2018-0424, The State of New Hampshire v. James Jaskolka

the negotiated sentence of a fine and a suspended jail sentence. domestically - related simple assault. The court accepted his plea and imposed agreement by which the defendant agreed to plead guilty to a misdemeanor, consulting with court - appointed counsel, entered into a negotiated plea The following facts are undisputed. In June 1991, the defendant, upon

defendant’s motion. however, because it lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of the assault convicti on and grant him a trial. We vacate the trial court ’s order, the Circuit Court (Lyons, J.) denying his request to vacate his 1991 simple DONOVAN, J. The defendant, James Jaskolka, appeals the decision of

Gregory J. Ahlgren, of Manchester, on the brief, for the defendant.

assistant attorney general, on the brief), for the State. Gordon J. MacDonald, attorney general (Susan P. McGinnis, senior

No. 2018 - 0424 9 th Circuit Court - Manchester District Division

page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court’s home reporter@courts.state.nh. us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 to press. Errors may be reported by e - mail at the following address: editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concor d, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule p. 2 22 as 2

between intimate partners.” because of “the existence of what they interpret[ed] as a valid conviction for a domestic assault . . . but state and federal authorities informed him that he was not eligible to purchase the firearm In his motion to vacate, the defendant asserts that he attempted to purchase a firearm in p. 2 2016, 1

hearing. The defendant moved for reconsideration, arguing that his position burden of proving a valid waiver. T he trial court denied the motion without a destroyed the records of the case and then to require the State to bear the delay moving to vacate his conviction until after the court system had The court found that it was “fundamentally unfair” for the defendant to

of regularity” to collateral attacks on final judgments). plea. See Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. p. 2 20, 29 - 32 (1992) (applying the “presumption district court judges conducted plea colloquies before accepting a defendant’s those waiver forms when representing defendants entering guilty pleas, a nd waiver of his or her rights in misdemeanor cases, the public defender s used 196 9, district courts in New Hampshire developed forms to reflect a defendant’s that, subsequent to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Boykin in accordance with the administrative rule. The trial court took judicial notice file and any audio recording of the proceeding has since been destroyed in proceedings and case files for only 7 years; and (3) the defendant’s entire case A dministrative O rder 1992 - 2 that required courts to retain records of filed his motion 27 years after the plea; (2) in 1992, this court adopted The trial court denied th e motion to vacate, noting that: (1) the defendant

initial motion. . . . for trial.” The defendant did not request a hearing with the filing of his “the only appropriate remedy is to vacate the conviction and schedule this case is “NO record of [his] volition and knowledge . . . of the right to a jury trial,” volition when entering a guilty plea). He further maintained that because there ( p. 2 2006) (analyzing a defendant’s collateral attack upon his knowledge and respec t specifically challenged. See State v. Arsenault, 153 N.H. 413, 416 - 17 a clear and convincing degree that the plea was voluntary or knowing in the his plea should be treated as plain error, requiring the State to demonstrate to voluntary and knowing character of his decision to plead guilty, acceptance of argued that, in the absence of a record of the trial court’s inq uiry into the intelligently, and voluntarily. See Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242 - 43. The defendant affirmative showing on the record that he entered his guilty plea knowingly, Court decision in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), require s an a direct attack upon his conviction and, therefore, the United States Supreme Before the trial court, t he defendant claim ed that his motion constitute d

assault would prohib it him from purchasing, owning, or possessing a firearm. 1 jury trial and, more pointedly, was not informed that a conviction for domestic conviction, alleging that he was never advised of his constitutional right to a Nearly p. 2 27 years later, the defendant filed a motion seeking to vacate his p. 3 3

with a petition for a writ of coram nobis”); Ba r ker v. State, 191 N.E.2d 9, 11 - 12 200 p. 3 3) (observing that a motion to vacate “has long been equated in California corpus or coram nobis. See People v. Totari, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 613, 616 (Ct. App. petitions seeking extraordinary relief, such as petitions for a writ of habeas a conviction filed after the expiration of the applicable appeal period with omitted). Other jurisdictions have similarly equated motions seeking to vacate without limit of time.” Daigle, 114 N.H. at 681 (quotations and ellipsis habeas corpus which provides a remedy for constitutional errors at the trial appeal” and that such pleadings are “in the nature of a petition for a writ of limitations to a ppeal “are matters falling outside the normal issues raised on uncounseled guilty plea that would otherwise be barred by the statutory time Daigle, Justice G rimes observed that motions seeking to withdraw an N.H. 483, 484 (1975) (citing State v. Daigle, 114 N.H. 679 (1974)). Indeed, in infringement of a defendant’s constitutional rights.” State v. Beaulieu, 115 “the authority and power to permit withdrawal of guilty pleas based on an Nonetheless, w e have previously concluded that the district courts had

599:1 - a). finding after the expiration of the st atutory period for appeal under RSA (1970) (concluding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to vacate its guilty upon the circuit court’s jurisdiction. See State v. Flynn, 110 N.H. 451, 454 in the circuit courts, se e RSA 599: 1 to : 1 - a, which, in turn, impose limitations pr e scr ibed strict time limitations upon a defendant’s right to appeal convictions to refer to the circuit court). Consistent with this premise, the legislature has that statutes which reference the jurisdiction of the district court are deemed the district court in criminal cases); RSA 490 - F:18 (Supp. 2018) (explaining upon it by statute. RSA 502 - A:11 (Supp. 2018) (identifying the jurisdiction of circui t court, however, is a court of limited jurisdiction with powers conferred State v. Lopez, 156 N.H. 19 p. 3 3, 194, 197 (2007). The district division of the instant challenge constitutes a collateral attack upon the 1991 conviction. See period for filing a direct appeal expired, see RSA 599: 1 to : 1 - b (2001), his Because the defendant’s motion challenges his conviction long after the

(2010). the parties, or by this court sua sponte. State v. Demes m in, 159 N.H. 595, 597 subject matter juris diction may be raised at any time, including on appeal, by defendant’s motion. Although the parties did not address this issue on appeal, trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to address the mer its of the We need not address these arguments, however, because we conclude that the court erred in denying his motion to vacate his conviction without a heari ng. The defendant makes numerous argument s before us as to why the trial

court summarily denied the motion to reconsider. This appeal followed. defendant, without explanation, requeste d an evidentiary hearing, but the trial attack on an underlying criminal conviction, “as there [is] here.” The was, and always had been, that the burden shifted to the State in a direct p. 4 4

available when a petitioner is no longer in custody). 17, 717 n. 1 (observing that coram nobis relief is granted “spari ngly” but may be properly construed as seeking coram nobis relief. See Hart, 171 N.H. at 716 correct an alleged violation of a constitutional right, his motion should be 1 p. 4 41 N.H. at 681. Given that the defendant is not in custody and seeks to nature of a n application for a petitio n seeking e xtraordinary re lief. See Daigle, review of his 1991 conviction, t he defendant ’s motion must be construed in the guilty p lea. See RSA 534:3; Hart, 171 N.H. at 716 - 17. Thus, in order to seek which a party may seek review of the proceeding at which he or she entered a writ s of habeas corpus and coram nobis are the proper procedural vehicles by conviction outside the time limits governing the circuit court’s jurisdiction, t he W hen, as here, a defendant seeks to withdraw a guilty plea and vacate a

beyond that statute’s three - year time limitation. See RSA 526: p. 4 4. the circuit court to grant a new trial, the defendant’s motion was filed well However, even if we assume without deciding that RSA chapter 526 authorizes extent to which, if any, petitions for a new trial may be filed in th e circuit court. originated in district court). T he legislature may wish to consider clarifying the petition for a new trial in superior court pursuant to RSA 526:1 when the case S ee Favazza v. Braley, 160 N.H. 349, 353 (2010) (hold ing that a party cannot motions filed in the circuit court when the case originated in the circuit court. whether RSA chapter 526 (2007), the chapter governing new trials, applies to fail to confer such authority upon th e circuit court. It remains unclear to us Other statutes governing a court’s authority to grant a new trial similarly

to consider and rule upon petitions seeking habeas corpus relief. Daigle was decided the statute did not deprive the district court of jurisdiction RSA 53 p. 4 4:3 (2007). Therefore, unlike the current version of RSA 534:3, when that such petitions “shall” be made to the superior court. Laws 1994, 56:1; (amended 1994). Subsequently, the legislature amended the statute to provide of habeas corpus “may” be made to the superior court. RSA 534:3 (1974) habeas corpus. At that time, RSA 534:3 stated merely that a petition for a writ courts to consider petitions seeking extrao rdinary relief, such as a writ of Daigle at a time when the legislature, at least implicitly, authorized the district Warden, N.H. State Prison, 171 N.H. 70 9, 716 - 18 (2019). Moreover, we decided of extraordinary relief sought by the defendant in this case. See Hart v. jurisprudence which, under our common law, is intended to address the type id. at 681. Yet, Daigle was decided well before our development of coram nobis relief similar to that of a writ of habeas corpus, like the motion in Daigle. See Daigle, 114 N.H. at 679 - 80. Thus, the defendant’s motion seeks extraordinary outside the jurisdictional time limits for an appeal from the circuit court. See upon an alleged involuntary guilty plea, and he filed his motion to vacate well Here, as in Daigle, the defendant seeks to vacate his conviction based

of a motion for a new trial”). (Ind. 1963) (considering a petition for a writ of coram nobis to be “in the nature p. 5 5

concurred. LYNN, C.J., and HICKS, BASSETT, and HANTZ MARCONI, JJ.,

matters that fall outside of the circuit court’s purview. and weighing the factual circumstances necessary to meet that standard are nobis relief explain his failure to seek appropriate relief earlier). De termining Appeals’ tripartite test which requires, in part, that a petitioner seeking coram petition); s ee also Hart, 171 N.H. at 717 - 18 (applying the First Circuit Court of not explain his delay in seeking relief between 2008 and 2014 when he filed his N.H. at 168 (quotations and brackets omitted) (concluding that petitioner could “sound reasons exist for his failure to seek appropriate earlier relief.” Widi, 170 We note that coram nobis relief requires a defendant to demonstrate that

dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Consequently, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand with instructions to claim of title because the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to do so). (concluding that the circuit court erred in ruling on the merits of plaintiff’s merits of his motion. S ee Fried l ine v. Roe, 166 N.H. 264, 268 (2014) by the defendant here deprived the circuit court of jurisdiction to consider the absence of any statutory authority to consider the extraordinary relief sought corpus, and, by comparison, a petition for a writ of coram nobis. Therefore, the lacks jurisdiction to consider the merits of a petition for a writ of habeas 166 - 67 (2017). In lig ht of this approach, we conclude that the circuit court our approach to coram nobis proceedings. See State v. Widi, 170 N.H. 163, habeas corpus relief and considered our habeas corpus procedures to inform and coram nobis, w e have analogized the common law writ of coram no bis to a writ of habeas corpus). Given the similarities between writs of habe as corpus the superior court has concurrent jurisdiction with the supreme court to issue p. 5 534: 3; see also Martel v. Hancock, 115 N.H. 237, 237 (1975) (explaining that supreme court the authority to, inter alia, issue writs of habeas corpus); RSA petitions seeking extraordinary relief. See RSA 490:4 (2010) (granting the n o statutory authority confers upon the circuit court the authority to consider instance, lie with the circuit co urt. Unlike the supreme and superior courts, However, the jurisdiction to consider such relief canno t, in the first