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2018-0035, Curtis S. Ridlon v. New Hampshire Bureau of Securities Regulation
We disagree and therefore reverse. The Superior Court (McNamara, J.) answered the question in the affirmative. Hampshire Bureau of Securities Regulation (Bureau), be afforded a jury trial. to an administrative enforcement action under taken by the defendant, the New Article 20 of the New Hampshire Constitution guarantees that a party subject LYNN, C. J. In this appeal we are asked to determine whether Part I,
brief, and Mr. Brooks orally), for the defendant. attorney general, and Scott E. Sakowski, assistant attorney general, on the Gordon J. MacDonald, attorney general (K. Allen Brooks, senior assistant
Fennessy on the brief, and Mr. Quirk orally), for the plaintiff. Preti Flaherty, PLLP, of Concord (Brian M. Quirk and Nathan R.
Opinion Issued: July 24, 2019 Argued: October 24, 2 0 18
NEW HAMPSHIRE BUREAU OF SECURITIES REGULA TION
v.
CURTIS S. RIDLON
No. 2018 - 0035 Merrimack
___________________________
THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. release. The direct address of the court’ s home page is: Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 a.m. on the morning of their reported by e - mail at the following address: reporter@courts.state.nh. us. corrections may be made before the opinion goes to pre ss. Errors may be Doe Drive, Concor d, New Hampshire 03301, of any editorial errors in order that requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New Hampshire, One Charles as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. Readers are NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as well 2
parties did same). N.H. 619, 6 21 (2018) (applying the current version of a statute where the trial court and the assume that the 2016 version of the chapter applies. See In the Matter of White & White, 170 (2015). Because the pa rties apply the 2016 version on appeal, for purposes of this appeal, we would arguably be governed by the previous iteration of the chapter. See RSA 421 - B:7 - 701(a) Ridlon’s alleged conduct. See Laws 2015, 273:1 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016). At least some of this conduct We note that RSA chapter 421 - B was repealed and reenacted in 2015, during the course of 1
and the criminal contexts,” State v. Morrill, 1 23 N.H. 707, 711 (1983), it is jury trial is a fundamental one under our State Constitution in both the civil N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 20. Although “[i] t is beyond dispute that the right to a
think it necessary hereafter to alter it. seas and in cases relating to mariners’ wages, the legislature shall procedure shall be held sa c red, unless, in cases arising on the high involved, the parties have a right to a trial by jury. This method of controversy does not exceed $1,500 and no title to real estate is has been customary and except those in which the value in two or more persons except those in which another practice is and In all controversies concerning property, and in all suits between
in civil cases. It provides: Part I, Article 20 of the New Hampshire Constitution govern s jury trials
County Co mm’rs, 151 N.H. 276, 2 78 (2004). (2004), we review the trial court’s decision de novo, Linehan v. Rockingham 555 (2013), and the State C onstitution, Petition of Below, 151 N.H. 135, 139 meaning of both statutes, Appeal of Laconia Patrolman Assoc., 164 N.H. 552, to an action for common law fraud.” Because we are the fin al arbiter of the of $6 million and, in the alternative, because the action against him “amounts constitutional right to a jury trial because the Bureau seeks penalties in excess Ridlon argues that the trial court correctly ruled that he ha s a
by the Bureau. This appeal followed. the right to a jury trial, and enjoin ing any further administrative proceedings motion, ruling that Part I, Article 20 of the State Constitution affords Ridlon the B ureau filed a motion to dismiss. The trial c ourt denied the Bureau’s seeking to enjoin the administrative proceedings from continuing. In response, trial court asserting that he was constitutionally entitled to a jury trial and agreement of the parties, Ridlon filed a declaratory judgment petition in the up to $1,51 3,711.09. See RSA 421 - B:6 - 604 (d) - (e) (2015) (amended 2018). By 1 $3,235,000, restitution in the amount of $1,343,427.20, and disgorgement of fees. The reli ef sought by the Bureau included civil penalties of up to Ridlon, alleging that he charged clients approximately $2.8 million in improper 2017, the Bureau brought an administrative enforcement action against Curtis S. Ridlon, was formerly employed as a n investment adviser. In April The following relevant facts are derived from the record. The plaintiff, 3
that focusi ng solely upon the nature of damages “fails to address whether. . . with Franklin Lodge of Elks v. Marcoux, 149 N.H. 581, 592 (200 3) (explaining Seventh Am endment guarantees a jury trial” (quotation and brackets omitted)), a precisely analogous common - law cause of action in determining whether the and noting that “characte rizing the relief sought is more important than finding Amendment may require “tria l by jury in actions unheard of at common law,” United States, 481 U.S. 412, 42 0 - 21 (1987) (cautioning that the Seventh similar determinations under the Seventh A mendment. Compare, e.g., Tull v. applies in a given case differs from that employed by federal courts in making use in determining whether the jury trial right conferred by Part I, A rticle 20 at 630 (2006). More importantly, a s the Bureau points out, the analysis we Fourteenth Amendment” (quotation omitted)); see also 4 7 Am. Jur. 2d Jury § 5, Rights which has not been held to be applicable to the states through the “the Seventh Amendment is one of the few remaining provisions in the Bill of state court”); Opinion of the Justices, 121 N.H. 480, 482 - 83 (1981) (noting that that the Seventh Amendment “governs proceedings in federal court, but not in Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 432 (1996) (recognizing Amendment’s due process clause and thus binding in state cou rt actions. See federal rights that ha ve been held to be encompassed within the Fourteenth T he jury trial guaranty enshrined in the Seventh Amendment is not among the Amendment to the United States Constitution, such reliance was misplaced. to the extent the trial court relied on federal precedent interpreting the Seventh jury determination of liability.” At the outset of our analysis, we observe that, Bureau “cannot seek a fine of $2,500 for a violation of RSA 421 - B without a Relying on state and federal case law, the trial court concluded that the
Sandra H., 150 N.H. 6 34, 636 (2004). the common law.” Hallahan v. Riley, 94 N.H. 338, 339 - 40 (1947); accord In re cannot be invoked in special, statutory or summary proceedings unknown to independently thereof, it has been decided that a guaranty of trial by jury 1784.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Partly as a result of this test, and at times and ascertain whether the customary prac tice included a trial by jury before action, we generally look to both the nature of the case and the relief sought, “T o resolve whether a party has a right to trial by jury in a particular
(quotation omitted). extending it so as to include what had not before been within its benefits.” Id. it against repeal, infringement, or undue trammel by legislative action, but not an existing right, guaranteeing it as it then stood and was practiced, guarding 368 (2009) (quotation and br acket s omitted). Rather, “[i] t was a recognition of jury trial not before existing.” Hair Excitement v. L’Oreal U.S.A., 158 N.H. 363, As we have explained, “Part I, Article 20 did not create or establish a right to a existed when the c onstitution was adopted in 178 4.” Morrill, 123 N.H. at 7 12. civil cases the right “extends only to those cases for which the jury trial right it is in criminal cases, State v. Bilc, 158 N.H. 651, 653 (2009). Specifically, in equally irrefutab le that in civil cases the right is considerably more limited than 4
1981, ch. 21 4, at 213. At the time, the commissioner of insurance was charged with administering the statute. Laws 2
sections contained in seven separate articles. See RSA 421 - B: 1 - 101 to B:7 - 701 In its current form, the Uniform Securities A ct is co mprised of 55
See Laws 2015, 273:1. a mendments to the statute as a whole created the current statutory scheme. or order” issued by the comm issioner. Laws 1981, ch. 21 4, at 216. In 2015, 2 administrative fine of not more than $2,500 for knowing v iolations of “any rule further granted the commissioner of insurance the authority to impose an vi olations of” the statute. See Laws 1981, ch. 214, at 214. The amendments provision that gave the attorney general the authority to seek “civil penalties for 1917, ch. 202, at 762 - 63. The statute was amended in 1981 to include a . . . in a suit to recover damages on account of loss sustained . . . .” Laws misleading statements or information so furnished shall be evid ence in court or by both such fine and imprisonment,” and also provided that “such false or than two thousand dollars, or by imprisonment for not more than six months, violations of its terms “punishable u pon conviction . . . by a fine of not more 1917. Se e Laws 1917, ch. 202. In its original form, the statute made 2002) (quotation omitted). New Hampshire enacted its first blue sky law in statut es by 1933.” Brenner v. Oppenheimer & Co. Inc., 44 P.3d 364, 371 (Kan. by the State of Kansas in 1911, and with 48 jurisdictions having enacted such state level, with the first general securities law being said to have been enacted legislative attempts to regulate securities transactions were effected on the problems of modern securities markets” in a given state. Id. at 534. “The first (2009). The y seek to create “a balanced regulatory scheme to cope with the and protect the public. 79A C.J.S. Securities Regulation § 482, at 534 - 36 laws, commonly referred to as “Blue Sky Laws,” are designed to prevent fraud action.” Hair Excitement, 158 N.H. at 368 (quotation omitted). State securities statutory framework to determine whether the jury trial right extends to the have explained that we must “consider the comprehensive nature of the (1965). When assessing the ri ght to a jury trial in such circumstances, we “purely statutory” causes of action. See Pomponio v. State, 106 N.H. 273, 274 the jury trial right under the State Constitution to what we have described as constitutional limit obligate a trial by jury, do not address the applicability of appeal for the proposition that claims involving statutory penalties above the Moreover, t he case s cited by the trial court, and relied upon by Ridlon on
Article 20 affords a state court litigant the right to a jury trial. weight to Seventh Amendment jurisprudence when determining w hether Part I, methodology in favor of the federal approach, we decline to give controlling divergence, and b ecause neither party has as ked us to eschew our traditional seemin gly comprehensive nature of the” statutory scheme). In light of this customarily resolved by jury trial,” and “makes no effort to appraise the the right remedied in this case. . . was recognized at common law in 178 4 and 5
trial by jury. created was unknown to the common law in 1784 and is not compatible with Securities Act persuades us that the administrative enforcement mechanism it 481 U.S. at 420, consideration of the overa ll statutory scheme fashioned by the debt as to which a right to trial by jury would have existed in 1784, see Tull, 601(b)( 5),:6 - 604(d) - (e)) — bear certain similar ities to a common law claim in of which remedies the statute describes as “penalties,” see RSA 421 - B:6 under the statute — i.e., civil penalties, fines, restitution, and disgorgement (all as Ridlon posits, that the types of relief that may be sought by the s ecretary orderly, and fair conduct of the proceeding”). Thus, e ven if we were to assume, and consider “[a] ny other matters which might contribute to the prompt, the issues, reach agree ments or stipulations which “avoid unnecessary proof,” 421 - B:6 - 613(o) (outlining informal conference procedure s intended to simplify the claims brought by the secretary, Hallahan, 94 N.H. at 340; see, e.g., RSA N.H. at 368, and “d esigned to facilitate a simple and speedy determination” of N.H. at 274. They are comprehensive in their scope, see Hair Excitement, 158 obligations that govern “depend entirely upon the statute.” Pomponio, 106 any implication of a trial by jury.” Hallahan, 94 N.H. at 340. The rights and established by th e legislature for the regulation of securities “militate [ ] against As the above recitation demonstrates, th e statutory procedure s
aggrieved party may appeal directly to this court, see RSA 541: 6 (2007). B:6 - 609, meaning that upon satisfying the statutory rehearing procedures, an chapter are subject to judicial review in accordance with RSA 541,” RSA 421 - 421 - B:6 - 604(e). All “[f]inal orders issued by the secretary of state under this 604(d), as well as “an order of rescission, restitution, or disgorgement,” RSA civil penalty up to a maximum of $2,500 for a single violation,” RSA 421 - B:6 evidence.” RSA 421 - B:6 - 613(v). The actions may include the imposition of “a department,” which “shall be reached upon the basis of a preponderance of the “sh all issue a written decision stating the action to be taken by the admissible.” RSA 421 - B:6 - 613(u). Following a hearing, the presiding officer rules of procedure,” and “[a] ll relevant, material, and reliable evidence shall be bound by common law or statutory rules of evidence, nor by technica l or formal 613. See RSA 421 - B:6 - 613(a). These “[a] dministrative hearings shall not be hearing s procedures at the administrative level are governed by RSA 421 - B:6 enforcement action under RSA 421 - B:6 - 604. See RSA 421 - B:6 - 604. The been, or are about to be, violate d, the secretary may bring an administrative 601(b)(4) - (5). Whe n the secretary of state believes provision s of the Act have “investigate and imp ose penalties fo r violations of” said laws, RSA 421 - B:6 power t o “bring administrative actions to enforce the securities law” and responsibilities imposed by this chapter,” RSA 421 - B:6 - 601(d), including the granted or reasonably implied in order to perform the substantive administering the Act, and confers upon the secretary “all powers specifically them, see RSA 421 - B:4 - 401 to - 412. It charges t he secretary of state with registration of securities, see RSA 421 - B:3 - 301 to - 307, and those who sell (2015) (amended 2017, 2018). The Act specifies detailed requirements for the 6
159 N.H. 2 6, 30 (2009) (providing a brief outline of Article 20’s history). beyond which a jury trial was required from $500 to $1,500. See Gilman v. Lake Sunapee Props., In 1988, Part I, Article 20 of the State Constitution was amended to increase the threshold 4 opposed to a private party, as in Hair Excitement, is immaterial. private party, the fact that such party’s opponent in the litigation is the State, as in this case, as government. Thus, in determining whether a constitutional right to a jury trial is available to a some special status when the claim at issue is brought against a private party by an agency of available whether the party claiming it is a plaintiff or a defendant, or that the jury right enjoys 20 cases have never suggested either that the right to a jury trial, where it exists, is not equally against a private party as defendant. The distinction is unavailing, however, beca use our Article whereas this case involves a statutory claim (under the Securities Act) brought by the State with a statutory claim (under the Consumer Protection Act) made by a private party as plaintiff, Ridlon attempts to distinguish this case from Hair Excitement on the basis that that case dealt 3
in controversy exceeded $500, but a criminal litigant would not be afforded 4 would be entitled to a jury trial pursuant to Part I, Article 20 when the amount (emphasis added). I n our view, it was illogical to believe that a civil litigant the amount constitutionally entitling civil litigants to a jury determination.” Id. be denied a jury trial in cases where fines may be levied which are greater than framers o f our constitution did not intend that individual criminal defendants (quotation and brackets omitted). We held that they did, explaining “that the requiring trial by jury” under Part I, Article 15. Morrill, 123 N.H. at 712 intoxicated, first offense] take it outside the realm of petty offenses not sanctions, including a fine of up to $1,000, “attached to [driving while For example, in Morrill we were asked to determine whether the
holding are readily distinguishable from the case at hand. that bri ngs the claim. The authorities relied upon by the trial cour t in so 3 enjoys an enhanced status when it is the State, rather than a private party, our case law offers no support for the view that a person’s right to a jury trial Wooster, 62 N.H. at 204; see 4 7 Am. Jur. 2d Jury § 43, at 661 - 62. However, it consents to be sued, and the manner in wh ich the suit shall be conducted.” does waive this privilege, “it may prescribe the terms and conditions on which own courts, or in any other, without its consent and permission,” and where it jurisprudence in all civilized nations that the sovereign cannot be sued in its treatment described in Newell stems from the “established principle of Welfare, 131 N.H. 88, 90 (1988) (emphasis added). But the differential trial by jury in an acti on [brought] against the State.” Newell v. N.H. Div. of 201 (1882). W e have also explained that there is “no right under article 20 to a be a plaintiff or defendant in litigation. See Wooster v. Plymouth, 62 N.H. 193, constitutional rig ht to a jury trial is not available to the State at all, whether it availability of a jury trial under Part I, Article 20. For example, the which the State is treated differently from a private party when it comes to the respect to the first point, it is true that there are certain circumstances in party; and (2) the action against Ridlon is akin to common law fraud. With 20 applies differently when the State seeks to recover a penalty from a private reasoned that the y were not controlling because, in its view: (1) Part I, Article T he trial court acknowledged our precedents as cited above, but 7
48 N.H. at 63. with “the right of trial in all controversies relating to property” under Part I, Article 20, see Towle, with the right to a jury trial under Part I, Article 15, see Jackson, 69 N.H. at 512, and Towle dealt 5 7 (1868), to support the trial court’s decision is similarly unavailing. Jackson expressly dealt Ridlon’s reliance on State v. Jackson, 69 N.H. 511 (1899), and East Kingston v. Towle, 48 N.H. 5
common law tort. Thus, the Act is designed to encompass a broader class of claims than the and ‘ defraud ’ are not limited to common law deceit.” R SA 421 - B:1 - 102(1 7). Act specifically states in its definitional section that the terms “‘ [f]raud, ’ ‘ deceit, ’ Ridlon is dissimilar to common law fraud in significant respects. To start, the two actions were dissimilar. Id. Here also, the s ecretary’s action against comparing the elements and proofs of the two claims, we concluded that the law claim for fraud or deceit. See Hair Excitement, 158 N.H. at 369 - 70. After statutory claim brought under the Consumer Protection Act wit h a common to a common law cause of action for fraud. I n Hair Excitement, we compared a conc lusion, that the statutory claim against him can be considered equivalent L i kewi se, we disagree with Ridlon’s argument, as well as the trial court’s
Part I, Article 20. 5 penalty that exceeds the $1,500 threshold specified in the current version of right to a jury trial to a person facing a governmental action to collect a civil of Henniker stand for the proposition that the State Constitution affords the jury trial,” id. at 89 (emphasis added). Consequently, neither Morrill nor Town totalled in excess of the amount that constitutionally entitles civil litigants to a violations, id. at 90, even though the superior court “imposed fines which that the defendants did not have a right to a jury trial on any of their Because the ordinance limited the maximum fine per violation to $100, we held fine per violation exceeded the threshold of Part I, Article 20. See id. at 89. defendants would be constitutionally entitled to a jury trial if the maximum separate violations. See i d. at 89 - 90. We assumed, without deciding, that the they continued to operate the junk yard without a lice nse, resulting in 606 concluded that the defendants had committed a separate violation on each day Henniker, 136 N.H. at 88. Based on the language of the relevant statutes, we in violation of RSA 236:11 4 and t he Henniker Zoning Ordinance.” Town of superior court “for maintaining a junk yard on their property without a license, compel a different conclusion. There, the defendants were fined by the Nor does our decision in Town of Henniker v. Homo, 136 N.H. 88 (1992),
right to a jury trial applicable to criminal cases under Part I, Article 15. whether the fine called for by the st atute was sufficiently severe to confer the applicable to the case, but m erely for comparison purposes, in determining our analysis refere nced Part I, Article 20, not beca use it was substantively as a violation, which does not constitute a crime, see RSA 625:9, II(b) (2016), (emphasis added). Thus, although the offense at issue in Morrill was classified that same right when “charged with o ffenses under our penal code.” Id. at 713 8
court. See RSA 421 - B:6 - 603. We have no occasion to consider in this case whether a person forgo administrative enforcement and instead initiate enforcement proceedings directly in superior We note that the Securities Act appears to permit the attorney general or the secretary of state to 6
Consumer Protection Act claim at issue in Hair Excitement, the administrative 6 American Morgan Horse Assoc., 141 N.H. 467, 46 8 (1996). In short, like the demanding burden of proving fraud by clear and convincing evide nce. Snow v. N.H. 73, 77 (2000). In addition, t o prevail, the plaintiff must meet the more the facts of the de fendants’ fraudulent conduct.” Snierson v. Scruton, 145 justifiable reliance, and “specifically allege the essential det ails of the fraud and establish that it was personally harmed by the d efendant’s conduct, prove at 369. Thus, in a common law fraud action, the party bringing th e claim must the plaintiff reaso nably to rely to his det riment. See Hair Excitement, 158 N.H. knowledge or belief to be true, for the purpose of caus ing, and which d id cause, the plaintiff, which the defendant knew to be false or which he had no must prove that a defendant intentionally made material ly false statements to By contrast, i n order to prove common law fraud or deceit, a plaintiff
preponderance of the evidence. RSA 421 - B:6 - 613(v). 421 - B:5 - 502(a)(1) to (2). The above requirements must be established by a “in an act, practice, or course of business” designed to defraud ano ther. RSA established that the party employed “a device, scheme, or artifice,” or engaged specifically relate to the purchase and sale of securities. Id. It must then be be a “person that advises others for compensation,” and that the conduct RSA 421 - B:5 - 502(a). Therefore, the Act first requires that the offending party
another person. operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon (2) to engage in an act, practice, or course of business that
another person; or (1) to employ a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud
reports relating to securities: part of a regular business, issues or promulgates analyses or purchasing, or selling securities or that, for compensation and as to the value of securities or the advisability of investing in, either directly or indirectly or through publications or writings, as It is unlawful for any person that advises others for compensation,
provides: Ridlon. The s ecretary alleges that Ridlon violat ed RSA 421 - B:5 - 502(a), which B: 6 - 604(a), in response to financial injuries sustained by third - party clients of brou ght by the s ecretary to enforce compliance with the statute, see RSA 421 distinguishable from a common law action for fraud or deceit. The claims are Furthermore, the claims brought against Ridlon are readily 9
trial. against whom an enforcement proceeding is commenced in superior court e njoys a right to a jury
respectfully dissent because we believe that Ridlon is ent itled to a jury trial HANTZ MARCONI, J., with whom DONOVAN, J., joins, d issenting. We
DONOVAN, J.
, joined, dissented. HICKS and BASSETT, JJ., concurred; HANTZ MARCONI, J., with whom
Reversed.
For the reasons stated above, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.
doubt on its continued validity. effectively overrule Hair Excitement or, at a minimum, cast constitutional thus subject to a jury trial under the dissent’s vi ew. Such a ruling would it seems that this remedy could easily be characterized as a “civil penalty” and that this recovery is allowed whether a plaintiff suffered actual damages or not, 358 - A:10, I (200 9); Simpson v. Y oung, 153 N.H. 471, 474 - 75 (2006). Given defendant’s conduct was a willful or knowing violation of the Act. See RSA multiplied by up to three times by the court if it determines that the C onsumer Protection Act is an award of $1,000 per violation, which can be law. In this regard, we note that one of the remedies provided for in t he would be hard pressed to understand how Hair Excitement would remain good doctrine of stare decisis). Yet, if we were to adopt the dissent’s rationale, we Ford v. N.H. Dep’t of Transp., 163 N.H. 284, 290 (2012) (discussing the the jury trial right, we are bound by the law as set forth in our past cases. See Furthermore, although we agree with the dissent as to the importance of
Lodge, 14 9 N.H. at 591. constitutional context. See Hair Excitement, 158 N.H. at 368 - 69; Franklin have referenced and applied the framework outlined in Hallahan in the Hallahan applied only to the court’s statutory analysis. In fact, later cases that the d iscussion of the comprehensiveness of the statutory scheme in opposed to the statutory interpretation, we disagree with the dissent ’ s assertion portions of the analysis pertained to the constitutional interpretation as Although we acknowledge that Hallahan does not specifically indicate which statutory right to a jury tr ial, rather than one under the State C onstitution. outlined in Hallahan pertained only to whether there existed an implied W e do not share the dissent’s view that the comprehensiveness analysis
to a jury trial under Part I, Article 20 of t he State Constitution. proof.” Hair Excitement, 158 N.H. at 370. Accordingly, Ridlon is not entitled significantly different elements and satisfaction o f a different standard of not analogous to commo n law fraud or deceit because it “require [s] proof of proceeding brought against Ridlon by the s ecretary under the Securities Act is 10
jury as a matter of statutory i nterpretation or constitutional law. We did not have occasion to consider whether the de novo appeal provision required a trial by 7
(1992) (explaining that Part I, Article 15 of the State Constitution guarantees (1875); cf. Opinion of the Justices (DWI Jury Trials), 135 N.H. 538, 541 - 42 the Justices, 1 13 N.H. 205, 214 (1973); Copp v. Henniker, 55 N.H. 179, 202 - 03 ICS Communications v. Fitch, 145 N.H. 433, 434 - 35 (2000); see also Opinion of reasonably unfettered right of appeal to a court where a jury trial can be held. trial to first be adjudicated by an administrative agency, so long as there is a legislature can require claims for which there is a constitutional right to a jury inquiry differently. T he relevant New Hampshire authority suggests that the that Ridlon has no constitutional right to a jury trial. We view the pertinent administrative proceeding itself. This focus heavily influences its conclusion administrative enforcement action in the first instance, i.e., in the The majority focuses on whether a jury trial must be provided in an
(repealing de novo appeal provision). 1994, 388:22 (enacting de novo appeal provision), with Laws 2009, 1 28:3 relief, but the legislature repealed this provision in 2009. Compare Laws 7 appeal to superior court when the secretary of state ordered certain kinds of RSA 541:6 (2007). T he predecessor to the current Act provided for a de novo court, governed by the procedures in RSA chapter 541. See RSA 421 - B:6 - 609; administrative enforcement actions to appeals of final orders taken to this single violation” in its final order. The Act currently limits judicial review of secretary of state to “impose a civil penalty up to a maximum of $2,500 for a Bureau sought civil penalties under RSA 421 - B:6 - 604(d), which authorizes the (governing administrative enforcement proceedings). Among other relief, the Ridlon in 2017 for conduct spanning 2007 to 2016. See RSA 421 - B:6 - 604 The Bureau instituted an administrative enforcement action against
I
respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. contravenes the protections afforded by our State Constitut ion. Therefore, we $1,500). The Act’s failure to provide for a jury trial under such circumstances law); N. H. CONST. pt. I, art. 20 (requiring “the value in controversy” to exceed provisions” are “one type of action in debt” th at required a jury trial at common “[a]ctions by the Government to recover civil penalties under statutory 481 U.S. 412, 418 - 19 (1987) (concluding, based on historical analysis, that has a right to a jury trial under Part I, Article 20. See Tull v. United States, civil penalties in excess of $1,500 per violation in this action in debt, Ridlon RSA ch. 421 - B (2015) (amended 2017, 2018). Because the Bureau is seeking for alleged violations of the New Hampshire Uniform Securities Act (Act). See Securities Regulation, seeks millions of dollars in civil penalties against Ridlon pt. I, art. 20. The State of New Hampshire, acting through the Bureau of under Part I, Article 20 of the New Hampshire Constitution. See N. H. CONST. 11
does not exceed $1,500 and no title to real estate is involved, the been customary and except those in which the value in controversy or more persons except those in which another practice is and has In all controversies concerning property, and in all suits between 2
causes is guaranteed by Part I, Article 20, which provides: 20; see also Wooster, 62 N.H. at 19 6, 202 - 03. The right to a jury trial in civil Hampshire Constitution’s Bill of R ights. See N.H. CONST. pt. I, arts. 15, 16, T he right to a jury trial is enshrined in several places in the New
U.S.A., 158 N.H. 363, 368 (2009). N.H. 26, 31 (2009) (quotation omi tted); accord Hair Excitement v. L’Oreal undue trammel by legislative action.” Gilman v. Lake Sunapee Props., 159 Our State Constitution guards this right “against repeal, infringement, or “trial by jury [is] secured to the subject by the constitution” (emphasis added)). added); see also East Kingston v. Towle, 48 N.H. 57, 64 (1868) (noting that weak subject against the powerful subject.” Wooster, 62 N.H. at 201 (emphasis government, but a protection of the subject against the governmen t, and of the The constitutional right to trial by jury is “not a protection of the
(Robert J. Taylor et al. eds., 1977). Adams to William Pym (Jan. 27, 1766), in 1 Papers of John Adams 164, 169 lungs, the main spring, and the center wheel” of our liberties. Letter from John country viewed the right to trial by jury and the right to vote as “the heart and Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 860 (2017). The founders of this system of government.” State v. Elbert, 121 N.H. 43, 44 (1981); see also Pen a - (quotation omitted). Ind eed, “the jury is a cornerstone of our democratic excitements of popular feeling.” Wooster v. Plymouth, 62 N.H. 193, 194 (1882) the subject against the abuses of arbitrary power, as well as against undue history in England, as the great safeguard of the lives, liberty, and property of The jury trial “has been steadily regarded, from the earliest judicial
II
contravene Part I, Article 20? As explained below, we believe that it does. the Act’s failure to provide an appeal to a court where a jury trial can be held excess of $1,500 per violation in an administrative enforcement action, does question we must answer is this: when the government seeks civil penalties in contains no such provision, however. See RSA ch. 421 - B. Therefore, the be no constitutional problem” under Part I, Article 20. The Act currently administrative action to the superior court for a de novo jury trial, “there would aggrieved party to appeal the secretary of state’s final order in the Acknowledging this authority, Ridlon concedes that if the Act allowed the
court, to all criminal defendants facing the possibility of incarceration). the right to a jury trial, either in the first instance or on appeal to the superior 12
exception, however, h as not changed. See Gilman, 159 N.H. at 30. customary.” N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 20; see Gilman, 159 N.H. at 29 - 30. The meaning of the In 1988, that language was changed to “those [cases] in which another practice is and has been heretofore otherwise used and practiced.’” Gilman, 159 N.H. at 29 - 30 (quoting Laws 1788 at 12). Until 1988, Part I, Article 20 described the exception as applying to “‘cases in which it has been 8
75 - 76. Enacted in 1784, Part II, Article 90 provides in relevant part: consider Part II, Article 90 of the State Constitution. See Saunders, 66 N.H. at In conducting the historical inquiry under Part I, Article 20, we also
trial by jury before the adoption of the con stitution.” Copp, 55 N.H. at 190. thorough and critical examination, that a party in any case was not entitled to 636 (2004). We must be “extremely cautious in asserting, without the most USA v. MacMillan, 160 N.H. 375, 377 (2010); In re Sandra H., 150 N.H. 634, requires a historical discussion.” Gilman, 159 N.H. at 31; see also HSBC Bank (citations omitted); accord Daley, 75 N.H. at 537. “Our analysis, therefore, shown by common - law principles and by history.” Wooster, 62 N.H. at 203 (1950). “[T]he cases in which it had been otherwise used and practi s ed are 158 N.H. at 368; Employers Assurance Co. v. Tibbetts, 96 N.H. 296, 298 1784.” Gilman, 159 N.H. at 30 - 31 (quotation omitted); accord Hair Excitement, and ascertain whether the customary pra ctice included a trial by jury before action, we generally look to both the nature of the case and the relief sought, “To resolve whether a party has a right to trial by jury in a particular
Dyer, 62 N.H. 231, 235 (1882). to trial by jury to cases that “had not before been within its benefits.” Davis v. guaranteeing it as it then stood and was practi s ed”; it did not extend the right 20). This constitutional provision “was a recognition of an existing right, 8 (explaining that “‘heretofore’ means before 1784” in the context of Part I, Article (1910) (quotation omitted); see State v. Saunders, 66 N.H. 39, 72 (1889) heretofore otherwise used and practiced.” Daley v. Kennett, 75 N.H. 536, 537 themselves t he right of jury trial, except in cases in which it has been In Part I, Article 20, the people of New Hampshire “reserved to
trial by jury whenever possible.” Hampton v. Palmer, 99 N.H. 143, 146 (1954). Further, our precedent “indicate[s] a strong tendency to uphold the right of sacredness is not a matter of degree: it is absolute.” Copp, 55 N.H. at 195. constitutional right, that right is as sacred as it is in criminal cases. Its N. H. CONST. pt. I, art. 20. “In those civil cases in which trial by jury is a
necessary to alter it. in cases relating to mariners’ wages, the legislature shall think it shall be held sacred unless, in cases arising on the high seas and parties have a right to a trial by jury. This method of procedure 13
While we agree with the majority that this court must be circumspect in relying on case law that 9
debt requiring trial by jury.” Tull, 481 U.S. at 418 - 19. Thus, the available 9 statutory provisions . . . historical ly have been viewed as one type of action in relevant here, “[a]ctions by the Government to recover civil penalties under 473, 481 (1826) (“[A]n action of debt to recover a penalty is a civil cause.”). As matter of right in the common - law action of debt”); cf. Woart v. Winnick, 3 N.H. 239 P.2d 19, 2 6 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1951) (noting that “[a] jury trial was a Laredo, Inc., 530 S.W.2d 288, 292 (Tex. 1975); see also Grossblatt v. Wright, and actions for debt were triable before a jury.” State v. Credit Bureau of “At common law, suits for civil penalties were tried as actions for debt,
at 31 (quotation omitted); accord Copp, 55 N.H. at 187. intensified, if possible, by their experience in this country.” Gilman, 159 N.H. 194. Indeed, the colonists were “full of the English passion for trial by jury, Opinion of Justices, 41 N.H. 550, 550 - 51 (1860); accord Wooster, 62 N.H. at
colonists was more urgently and strenuously insisted upon. struggle which secured our national independence, no right of the and as the most valuable of the rights of freemen; and in the great jury was claimed by the people as the birthright of Englishmen, In our own country, almost from its earliest settlement, the trial by
earliest settlement of this state.” Wooster, 62 N.H. at 194 (quotation omitted). “Jury trial was an established right of British subjects long before the
begins with English common law. N.H. 722, 724 - 25 (2017). The historical discussion in this case therefore in [our] constitution,” N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 90; see State v. Santamaria, 169 Article 90 so long as it was not “repugna nt to the rights and liberties contained N.H. 423, 426 - 27 (1881), and remained in effect after 1784 by virtue of Part II, the organization of the provincial government” in the 1600s, State v. Albee, 61 and ellipsis omitted). This body of common law continued “in force here upon of New Hampshire and usually practi s ed on in the courts.” Id. at 73 (quot ation laws which have heretofore been adopted, used, and approved in the province “Th e English common law, modified by American conditions, is one of the
“‘heretofore’ means before 1784.” Saunders, 66 N.H. at 72. N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 90 (emphasis added). As used in Article 90,
contained in this constitution . . . . thereof only excepted, as are repugnant to the rights and liberties full force, until altered and repealed by the legislatur e; such parts usually practiced on in the courts of law, shall remain and be in approved, in the province, colony, or state of New Hampshire, and All the laws which have heretofore been adopted, used, and 14
instant case.” Id. at 479. facts establishing the types of actions triable by jury at common law is highly pertinent to the App.), review granted, 426 P.3d 302 (Cal. 2018). Indeed, “Tull ’s discussio n of the historical legal See, e.g., Nationwide Biweekly Admin., Inc. v. Superior Court, 234 Cal. Rptr. 3d 468, 479 - 80 (Ct. federal and other state courts with respect to matters of historical fact is entirely appropriate. interprets the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, reliance on decisions from
275 F.3d 384, 388 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating that “civil penalties” are “fines or 1313 (10th ed. 20 14); see also Ellett Bros., Inc. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., assessed for a violation of a statute or regulation.” Black’s Law Dictionary to a jury trial under Part I, Article 20. See id. A “civil penalty” is “[a] fine sought under RSA 421 - B:6 - 604(d) — further supports the existence of a right The nature of the relief requested — specifically, the civil penalties
Gilman, 159 N.H. at 30 - 31. supports the existence of a right to trial by jury under Part I, Article 20. See action in debt by the government for civil penalties pursuant to a statute — J., dissenting). Accordingly, we conclude that the nature of the case here — an England.” Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 340 (1979) (Rehnquist, of the English was one of the important grievances leading to the break with jury was held in such esteem by the colonists that its deprivation at the hands their independence.” Albee, 61 N.H. at 427 - 28. Indeed, “th e right of trial by to surrender it after engaging in an exhaustive war for seven years to establish to trial by jury for actions in debt] under the British crown would not be likely founding of this country, it is fair to say that “[m]en who had enjoyed [the right Tull, 481 U.S. at 418. Given the importance of the jury trial right in the law treated civil penalty suits as actions in debt that required trial by jury. See historical evidence indicates that, both before and after 1784, English common the burden of demonstrating reversible error). Additionally, the available 302 (Cal. 2018); Gallo v. Traina, 166 N.H. 737, 740 (20 14) (appealing party has Superior Court, 234 Cal. Rptr. 3d 468, 479 (Ct. App.), review granted, 426 P.3d New Hampshire Constitution. See Nationwide Biweekly Admin., Inc. v. law right to a jury trial for actions in debt changed prior to the adoption of the The Bureau has not identified any authority that suggests the common
not been altered by usage or legislation before 17 84.” Id. at 75. debt, “brought to this country by the first settlers, is in force so far as it had See id. Therefore, the law concerning the right to trial by jury for actions in and repeal by the jury trial provisions in the State Constitution’s Bill of Rights. law, however, this right was withheld from the legislative power of alteration body of laws. See Saunders, 66 N.H. at 75 - 76. Unlike other areas of common Hampshire through and aft er 1784 via Part II, Article 90, as part of the existing The common law right to a jury trial continued in force in New
debt, for which there wa s a right to a jury trial at common law. recover civil penalties against him pursuant to the Act renders this an action in historical evidence supports Ridlon’s position that the Bureau’s action to 15
constitution’s adoption” in 1784. Gilman, 159 N.H. at 30. Accordingly, unlike the controversy was one that was resolved by a jury at the time of the from our well - settled constitutional inquiry, under which we consider “whether statements in Franklin Lodge and Hair Excitement were isolated departures Our vast body of Part I, Article 20 jurisprudence demonstrates that these 149 N.H. 581, 591 (2003), and resurfaced in Hair Excitement, 158 N.H. at 368. comprehensive nature originated in dicta in Franklin Lodge of Elks v. Marcoux, careful review of our case law demonstrates that the reference to statutes’ and scope of the constitutional right to trial by jur y under Part I, Article 20. A that the comprehensiveness of the statutory scheme determines the existence constitutes an action in debt, the majority rests its analysis upon the premise Instead of addressing whether the administrative enforcement action
III
proceeding seeking civil penalties against Ridlon violates Part I, Article 20. where the jury trial right can be exercised, the administrative enforcement Const itution. Because the Act does not provide an avenue of appeal to a court Ridlon has a right to a jury trial under Part I, Article 20 of the New Hampshire of the case and the nature of the relief sought support the conclusion that penalties pursuant to statute in excess of $1,500 per violation, both the nature In conclusion, because the government, i.e., the Bureau, seeks civil
where zoning ordinance limited maximum fine to $100 per violation). civil fines in superior court, amount in controversy requirement was not met constitutional right to jury trial applied to zoning enforcement action seeking Henniker v. Homo, 136 N.H. 88, 89 - 90 (1992) (assuming that state exceeds $1,500, the amount in controversy requirement is met. Cf. Town of action. RSA 421 - B:6 - 604(d). Because the maximum penalty per viola tion maximum of $2,500 for a single violation” in an administrative enforcement provides that “the secretary of state may impose a civil penalty up to a $1,500 threshold of Part I, Article 20. See N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 20. The Act The final consideration is whether the amount in controversy exceeds the
to a jury trial. Nationwide Biweekly Admin., 234 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 480 - 81. would have been tried in the courts of law and as to which” Ridlon has a right B:6 - 604(d) “is the kind of case that, under the historic English common law, government action seeking civil penalties” such as those contained in RSA 421 a jury.” Saunders, 66 N.H. at 76 (quotation omitted). Consequently, “a “[C]ourts of common law . . . proceed to the trial of contested facts by means of civil penalty up to a maximum of $2,500 for a single violation” of the Act). 423; see RSA 421 - B:6 - 604(d) (authorizing the secretary of state to “impose a RSA 421 - B:6 - 604 “was traditionally available o nly in a court of law.” Id. at 422. Thus, the nature of the relief authorized by the civil penalty provision of at common law that could only be enforced in courts of law.” Tull, 481 U.S. at assessments payable to the gover nment”). “A civil penalty was a type of remedy 16
regarding the constitutional right to a jury trial: statutory portion of our analysis in that case to support a new proposition More than fifty years after we decided Hallahan, we relied on the
was “required by virtue of the st ate constitution,” id. at 339 (emphasis added). whether a jury trial “c[ould] be fairly implied” from the statute, not whether it (emphasis added), signaled that this sentence concerned our analysis of superior cour t. Id. Our use of the phrase “implication of a trial by jury,” id. “the appellants [were] not entitled to a trial by jury” in their appeal to the implication of a trial by jury,” and thus, as a matter of statutory interpretation, a dministrative and judicial review provided by the statute militates against any benefit claims.” Id. at 340. We concluded that the “elaborate procedure for comprehensive and designed to facilitate a simple and speedy determination of procedure for filing and obtaining unemployment compensation benefits is added)). In conducting the statutory analysis, we observed that “[t]he be fairly implied or it is required by virtue of the state constitution.” (emphasis does not expressly provide for trial by jury, plaintiffs can prevail only if it can Unemployment Compensation Division.” Id.; see id. at 339 (“Since the statute superior court from the “Appeal Tribunal of the [Bureau of Labor’s] “c[ould] be fairly implied” from the provision that governed appeals to the We also examined in Hallahan whether a sta tutory right to trial by jury
Hallahan, 94 N.H. at 339 - 40. special, statutory or summary proceedings unknown to the common law.” by relying on the rule that “a guaranty of trial by jury cannot be invoked in 149 N.H. at 591 - 92. Indeed, in Hallahan, we resolved the constitutional issue there was a right to a jury trial under Part I, Article 20. See Franklin Lodge, statutory scheme had any bearing on the constitutional question of whether Prior to 2003, we had never indicated that the comprehensive nature of a
Douglas v. Company, 81 N.H. 371, 374 (1924). 1784.” Hallahan v. Riley, 94 N.H. 338, 339 (1947) (quotation s omitted); accord to trial by jury is settled by ascertaining how it was used and practiced before Daley, 75 N.H. at 540. We have also maintained that “[t]he extent of the right sought must be looked to for the settlement of the constitutional question.” In Daley, for example, we stated: “The nature of the case and of the relief Assurance, 96 N.H. at 298; Palmer, 99 N.H. at 145; Gilman, 159 N.H. at 30 - 31. and the nature of the relief sought. See, e.g., Daley, 75 N.H. at 540; Employers inquiry under Part I, Article 20 in language referencing the nature of the case For at least a century, we have consistently described the pertinent
matter. determine whether Ridlon has a constitutional right to a civil jury trial in this our colleagues, we believe that the comprehensive nature of the Act does not 17
Constitution. majority does, that Ridlon has no right to a jury trial under the State view, the comprehensiveness of the Act is not a basis for concluding, as the appears to view its decision as compel led by stare decisis, we disagree. In our 221 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1946) (emphasis omitted). Thus, while the majority actually involved and actually decided.” Childers v. Childers, 168 P.2d 218, decision is not aut hority for what is said in the opinion but only for the points to do so in this case. Indeed, “[i]t is a fundamental rule of that doctrine that a e.g., AT&T, 170 N.H. at 115; Burris, 170 N.H. at 810 - 11, and we would decline The doctrine of stare decisis does not compel us to perpetuate dicta, see,
1256 (2006))). Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1249, why the court’ s judgment goes in favor of the winner.’” (quoting Pierre N. Leval, ‘an assertion in a court’s opinion of a proposition of law which d oes not explain Corp. v. Faria, 513 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2007) (“Dictum is superfluous content — Excitement can also be classified as dicta. See, e.g., Arcam Pharmaceutical turn on that observation, see id. Accor dingly, these statements in Hair Excitement, 158 N.H. at 368 (quotation omitted), our holding did not appear to observed that the statutory scheme at issue was “comprehensive,” Hair Al though we repeated the aforementioned dicta in Hair Excitement and
court. See, e.g., AT&T, 170 N.H. at 115. Therefore, Franklin Lodge is not binding precedent on the issue before this the [appellant]’s argument any further.” Franklin Lodge, 149 N.H. at 592. inquiry, and “[w]ith out adequate appellate argument, we decline[d] to address that the appellant had failed to address aspects of our state constitutional decision”); State v. Burris, 170 N.H. 802, 810 - 11 (2018). Instead we stated therefore, “not controlling” because those “comments were unnecessary to the 115 (2017) (holding that certain language in a prior case was “dicta” and, 20. See id.; s ee, e.g., In re Search Warrant for Records of AT&T, 170 N.H. 111, the appellant’s argument that it had a right to trial by jury under Part I, Article statement in Franklin Lodge is dicta because we did not a nalyze the merits of comprehensive. See id. at 591 - 92. More importantly, however, the foregoing right to a jury trial should depend on whether the statutory scheme at issue is Franklin Lodge, 149 N.H. at 591. We did not explain why the constitutional
jury). compensation statute militates against any implication of a trial by administrative and judicial review provided by unemployment Hallahan v. Riley, 94 N.H. 338, 340 (1947) (elaborate procedure for determine whether the jury trial right extends to the action. See consider the comprehensive nature of the statutory framework to When a pla intiff seeks relief for breach of codified rights, we further 18
the growing backlog in superior court cases.” Id. made by proponents of the change that [the proposed increase to $5,000] was needed to reduce Constitution 88 (2d ed. 2015). The voters did so in 1984, for example, “despite the argument amount in controversy requirement. See Lawrence Friedman, The New Hampshire State amendments to Part I, Article 20 that would limit the scope of its protections by increasing the It is worth noting that, on multiple occasions, the citizens of New Hampshire have rejected 10 Article 20 of the New Hampshire Constitution because the Bureau is seeking In sum, we believe that Ridlon has a right to a jury trial under Part I,
IV
government they created to abridge it.” State v. Almy, 67 N.H. 274, 280 ( 1892). and by its reservation they exempted themselves from the authority of the rights not surrendered by the peopl e when they formed themselves into a state, degree, is as sacred as the most convenient one.” Id. at 206. “It is one of the of the court.” Id. at 209. “A constitutional right, inconvenient in the highest 10 amendment, but it canno t be amended by an act of the legislature or a decision intelligence of the age, that may show that the constitution requires be regarded as in many cases expensive, inconvenient, and behind the jury puts a plain limitation upon legislative power.” Id. at 202. “If trial by jury trial. Copp, 55 N.H. at 194. Indeed, “t he constitutional guaranty of t rial by regulating, injuriously limit or restrain” the constitutional right to a civil jury 27 (quotation omitted). The legislature, however, “cannot, under pretence of courts lose their power to enforce the Bill of Rights.” Gr ossblatt, 239 P.2d at of trial by jury by mere statutory enactments. It is by such methods that effect, this approach allows the legislature to “nullify the [c]onstitutional right comprehensive statutory scheme, out of which the claim at issue arises. In the nature of the relief sought are less important than the existence of a analysis, as the majority does here, suggests that the nature of the case and Furthermore, elevating comprehensiveness to the forefront of the
N.H. at 540. does not assist in “the settlement of the constitutional question.” D aley, 75 Accordingly, considering the comprehensive nature of the statutory scheme such light on the inquiry of whether a right to trial by jury existed in 1784. jury trial. The comprehensive nature of t he statutory framework sheds no relief sought bear upon whether the customary practice in 1784 included a Saunders, 66 N.H. at 76. Thus, the nature of the case and the nature of the equity, which d id not, at the time of the State Constitution’s adoption. See would have been tried in a court of law, which had jury trials, or a court of the case and the nature of the relief sought are relevant to whether the action as relevant to our inquiry under Part I, Article 20. By contrast, the nature of the statutory scheme is not germane to the considerations we ha ve identifie d established by our Part I, Article 20 jurisprudence. The comprehensiveness of jury should be determined by relying on the well - settled legal principles We believe that the existence of the state const itutional right to trial by 19
opinion. For all of the foregoing reasons, we respectfully dissent from the majority
required under Part I, Article 20 of our State Constitution. argument in Hair Excitement can be reconciled with the historical inquiry parties in future cases would be wise to address how our analysis of the fraud Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 485 ( 1935). While the issue must wait for another day, the result will be to weaken or sub vert” our constitutional principles. Dimick v. questionable precedent “be not extended by mere analogy to a different case if Hampshire Constitution, this court must be vigilant in ensuring that Article 20. In the discharge of our duty to construe and uphold the New analysis that is untethered from our established framework under Part I, addressing the fraud argument, while understandable, risks extending an we believe that the majority’s use of Hair Excitement as a template for deceit, based upon differences in element s and burdens of proof). A s a result, brought in private action was not “analogous to” claim for common law fraud or Excitement, 158 N.H. at 369 - 70 (holding that Consumer Protection Act claim Excitement comports with our state constitutional framework. See Hair for common law fraud.” However, we have misgivings about whether Hair We also do not reach the issue of whether the action “is in essence one
where equitable and legal claims are joined in the same action). Article 20 in “purely equitable proceedings,” but noting that the right is not lost (plurality opinion) (recognizing that there is no right to a jury trial under Part I, is no right to trial by jury. Cf. McElroy v. Gaffney, 129 N.H. 382, 386 ( 1987) the other forms of relief it sought constitute equitable remedies for w hich there Given our conclusion, we need not address the Bureau’s argument that
Constitution. an avenue of appeal to a court where trial by jury can be held violates our State Securities Act. See RSA 421 - B:6 - 604(d). Therefore, the Act’s failure to provide civil penalties in excess of $1,500 per violation of the New Hampshire Uniform