2018-0217, Appeal of Town of Belmont

discharged in 1969. In 1998, Louis and his wife, Robin Nordle, purchased a Vietnam War as a member of the United States Air Force. He was honorably T he material facts are not in dispute. Louis Nordle served during the

property tax exemption. We affirm. acquired with the assistance of the Veterans Administration,” qualifies for a statute, and “who owns a specially adapted homestead which has been 72:36 - a provides that a person who meets certain qualifications set forth in the entitled to a 100% real estate tax exemption for a homestead in Belmont. RSA RSA 72:36 - a (2012), the respondent, the Robin M. Nordle 2013 Trust, is the New Hampshire Board of Tax and Land Appeals (BTLA) that, pursuant to BASSETT, J. The petiti oner, the Town of Belmont, appeals a decisi on of

brie f and orally), for the respondent. Law Office of Joshua L. Gordon, of Concord (Joshua L. Gordon on the

brie f and orally), for the petitioner. Mitchell Municipal Group, P.A., of Laconia (Laura Spector - Morgan on the

(New Hampshire Board of Tax and Land Appeals) APPEAL OF TOWN OF BELMONT

No. 2018 - 0217 Board of Tax and Land Appeals

page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court’s home reporter@courts.state.nh. us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 to press. Errors may be reported by e - mail at the following address: editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concor d, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule p. 2 22 as 2

disabled due to his military service to our country . . . who needs the legislature to benefit one who is totally and permanently veteran to relocate in order to qualify for an exemption intended by [i]t would be illogical and an unnecessary hardship . . . to require a

town’s motion, the BTLA emphasized that The town unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration. In denying the

improvements to the homestead” made by the Nordles satisfy this condition. specially adapted housing.” The BTLA determined that “[c] learly the veterans who “may remodel an existing home if it can be made suitable fo r Adapted Housing grant program that states that VA assistance is available to conclusion, the BTLA referred to the “Grant Fact Sheet” for the VA’s Specially entitled to the tax exemption set forth in RSA 7 p. 2 2:36 - a. As suppo rt for its because of the financial assistance he received from the VA,” the taxpayer i s “obtained, and is now in possession of, a specially adapted homestead . . . only improvements financed by a VA loan or mortgage),” and tha t because Louis ‘purchased’ (as in the purchase of a house with specially adapted word ‘acquired’ in the statute has a plain meaning broader than simply assistance wi th the purchase of the property. The BTLA reasoned that “the “acquired with the assistance of the Veterans Administration” is limited to exemption, disagreeing with the town ’s position that the statutory phrase determined that the taxpayer’s p roperty is entitled to the full property tax T he taxpayer appealed to the BTLA. Following a he aring, the BTLA

‘purchase’ the home not adapt it.” in order to be entitled to the property tax exemption, the VA “had to help town relied upon advice from the New Hampshire Department of Revenue that, VA, which you have advised us it was not.” In making its determination, t he exemption states that the property must be acquired with the assistance of the adapt the home for Mr. Nordle’s disabilities, however the statute regarding this VA loan.” The town informed the Nordles that “the VA is providing a grant to that the “home was not ‘acquired’ or ‘purchased’ by or with the assistance of a taxes pursuant to RSA 7 p. 2 2:36 - a. The town denied the application, determining In 2017, the taxpayer appli ed to the town for an exemption from property

installing access ramps, and remodeling the bathroom. connected disability, by widen ing the doors, raising and leveling the floors, $7 p. 3 3,768, and used the funds to modify his home to accommodate his service - Housing Grant” from the Veterans Administration (VA) in the amount of service - connected disabilities. I n p. 2 2016, Louis received a “Specially Adapted Affairs determined that Louis is totally and permanently disabled due to his Robin is the trustee. In 2015, the United States De partment of Veterans 2013 Trust, t he “taxpayer” in this case. Louis has a life estate in the trust and and built a new home. The house was later transferred to the Robin M. Nordle summer camp in Belmont. In 2007, the Nordles demolished the original home 3

699, 70 p. 3 3 (2010). review is de novo. See Prof’l Firefighters of N.H. v. Local Gov’t Ctr., 159 N.H. Resol vin g this issue requires us to interpret RSA 72:36 - a; therefore, our

home became specially adapted,” it is entitled to the tax exemption. The taxpayer assert s that, b ecause “[i]t was only with VA assistance that the the transitive verb ‘acquire’ in RSA 72: p. 3 36 - a is a ‘specially adapted homestead. ’” does not refer only to the purchase of a home, but rather, that “the object of “specially adapted” at that time. The taxpayer counter s that the word “acquire” when they became the owners of the property in 1998, nor was the home exemption b ecause the Nordles “did not utilize” Veterans Admini stration funds such assistance.” The town reasons that the taxpayer is not entitled to the tax provide for an exemption for those who have ‘adapted’ their homestead with homestead with the assistance of the Vet erans Administration,” and “does not exemption to those veterans who have ‘acquired’ their specially adapted On appeal, the town argues that RSA 72:36 - a “specifically limits the

eq uitable title or beneficial interest for life in the subject property”). those who have placed their property in a grantor/revocable trust or who have estate, as expressed by such words as ‘owner,’ ‘owned’ or ‘own,’ shall include 2018) (providing that, for purposes of RSA 72: p. 3 36 - a, “the ownership of real RSA 72:36 - a (bolding omitted; emphasis added); s ee RSA 72:29, VI (Supp.

shall be exempt from all taxation on said homestead. Veterans Administration, the person or person’s surviving spouse, prev ious homestead which was acquired with the assistance of the which has been acquired using proceeds from the sale of any acquired with the assistance of the Veterans Administration or and who owns a specially adapted homestead which has been visual acuity of 5/200 or less as the result of service connection combination thereof, paraplegic, or has blindness of both eyes w ith who is a double amputee of the upper or lower extremities or any proof of such service connection is furnished to the assessors and pe rmanently disabled from service connection and satisfactory is honorably separated from military service, who is totally and States under conditions other than dishonorable, or an officer who Any person, who is discharged from military service of the United

RSA 72: p. 3 36 - a, titled “Certain Disabled Veterans,” provides:

(Parentheses omitted.) T his appeal followed.

purpose. all of its requirements for financial assistance to accomplish this as determined by the Veterans Administration and after satisfying to live in a s pecially adapted homestead because of his disabilities p. 4 4

See Green v. Sch. Admin. Unit #55, 168 N.H. 796, 801 (2016). Under such each party’s position. Accordingly, we conclude that the statute is a mbiguous. Here, the diction ary definition s of the word “acquire” reasonably support

the assistance of the VA. specially adapted, the specially adapted homestead has been “acquired” with because it was only with the assistance of the VA that the homestead became adapted homestead with the assistance of the VA. The taxpayer contends that not satisfy the statutory requirement that the taxpayer “acquire d” its specially acquired and was later modified” with the financ ial assistance of the VA does these definition s, the t own contends that a property that “had been earlier Third New International Dictionary 18 (unabridged ed. 2002). Based upon power of disposal of often by some uncertain or unspecified means.” Webster’ s Dictionary defines “acquire” as meaning “to come into possession, control, or get or obtain.” Black’s Law Dictionary 28 (10th ed. 201 p. 4 4). Webster’s Dictionary define s “acquire” as meaning “[t]o gain possession or control of; to 21:2 (2012); s ee Kenison v. Dubois, 152 N.H. 448, 451 (2005). Black ’s Law construed according to the common and approved usage of the language.” RSA 72:36 - a. U nless otherwise defined in a statute, “[w]ords and phrases shall be meaning of the word “acquire.” The word “acquir e” is not defined in RSA the Veterans Administration” in RSA 72:36 - a. The parties focus on the specially adapted homestead which has been acquired with the assistance of The sole issue on appeal is the meaning of the phrase “who owns a

be construed restrictively against the taxpayer seeking the exemption”). 12 p. 4 4 N.H. 79, 84 (1983) (rejecting the argument that “a tax exemption law is to 496, 499 (1994) (quotation omitted); see Appeal of Public Service Co. of N. H., intent of the statute.” Wolfeboro Camp School v. T own of Wolfeboro, 138 N.H. construed not with ri gorous strictness but to give full effect to the legislative Petition of Carrier, 165 N.H. 719, 721 (2013). “A tax exemption statute is

advanced by the statutory scheme. statutory language in light of the policy or purpose s ought to be us to better discern the legislature’s intent and to interpret rather within the context of the statute as a whole. This enables Moreo ver, we do not consider words and phrases in isolation, but its overall purpose and avoid an absurd or unjust re sult. include. We construe all parts of a statute together to effectuate have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might and ordinary meaning. We interpret legislative intent from th e itself, and, if possible, construe that language according to its plain considered as a whole. We first look to the language of the statute intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of the statute In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the p. 5 5

less.” Laws 1987, 200:1. thereof,” paraplegia, or “blindness of both eyes with visual acuity of p. 5 5/200 or double amput ation of the upper or lower extremities “or any combination RSA 72:36 - a to expand the eligible service - connected disabilities to include § 301(a) (1980). Accordingly, in 1987, the New Hampshire legislature amended “the anatomical loss or loss of use of both hands.” Pub. L. 96 - 385, Title III, disabilities due to “blindness in both eyes with 5/200 visual acuity or less,” or VA assistance to include those with permanent and total service - connected In 1980, t he federal law was amended to expand the veterans eligible for

amputation of the legs or paraplegia. See Laws 196 p. 5 5, 291:1. with total and permanent service - connected disabilities due to double (1958). Similarly, as originally enacted, RSA 72:36 - a applied only to veterans of both lower extremities to qualify for VA assistance. See P ub. L. 85 - 857 permanent and total service - connected disability due to the loss, or loss of use, When enacted, the federal law only allowed those veteran s with

dwell ing purposes.” 38 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(3)(A) - (C). proposed housing unit are such as to be suitable to the veteran’s needs for anticipated income and expenses”; and (3) “the nature and condition of the “the proposed housing unit bears a proper relation to the veteran’s present and veteran to reside in the proposed housing unit and in the prop osed locality”; (2) eligible veteran, the Secretary must find that: (1) “it is medically feasible for the therefor.” 38 U.S.C. § 2101(a) (2014). Prior to providing assistance to an made necessary by the nature of the veteran’s disability, and necessary land “in acquiring a suitable housing unit with special fixtures or movable facilities to receive compensation for service - connected permanent and total disability Pursuant to the federa l law, the VA may assist veterans who are entitled

federal law provides useful context. acquir e a specially adapted homestead. Therefore, a brief summary of the the VA’s determination whether to provide a disabled veteran with assistance to 8 p. 5 5 - 857 (1958); Laws 1965, 291:1. T he plain language in RSA 72:36 - a defers to certain disabled veterans in acquiring specially adapted housing. See Pub. L. States Congress passed a bill authorizing the Secretary of the VA to assist The New H ampshire legislature enacted RSA 72:36 - a after the United

language. history that does exist supports the taxpayer’s interpretation of the statutory the legislative history of RSA 72:3 p. 6 6 - a is “scant,” we conclude that the legislative Lifts Trust, 149 N.H. 679, 682 (2003). Although w e agree with the t own that the meaning of the statutory language. Id.; see Town of Ossipee v. Whittier circumstances, we look to the legislative history to aid in our interpretation of 6

fully exempt someone from taxes.” We disagree with the town ’s nothing in RSA 72:3 p. 6 6 - a . . . which suggests that veteran status alone should property taxes for the rest o f his or her life.” According to the t own, “there is $10,000 for a relatively modest adaptation, and then be fully exempt from example, that “a person could obtain a Veterans Administration grant of The town argues that it would be illogical for the legislature to intend, for

requirements of the veteran’s disability at that time. veteran prior to applying for VA assistance, but which was not adapted to the “acquire” encompasses remodel ing a home that was itself acquired by the loan. Rather, given the scope of assistance available from the VA, t he term acquisition or purchase of a specially adapted home with the assistance of a VA The word “acquire” in this context, therefore, is not limited to the initial

§ 2102(a)(1) - (4). “where the individual has acquired a suitable housing unit.” 38 U.S.C. individual prior to application for assistance”; or (4) receive compensation adapted to the requirements of such individual’s disability, acquired by such application for assistance”; (3) “elect[ ] to remodel a dwelling which is not construct a housing unit on land acquired by such individual prior t o housing unit on land to be acquired by such individual”; (2) “elect[ ] to Pursuant to such “plans,” a n eligible veteran may: (1) “elect[ ] to construct a following plans, at the option of the individua l.” 38 U.S.C. § 2 1 0 2(a) (2014). U.S.C. § 2101(a). The VA’s assistance “shall be afforded under one of the by the nature of the veteran’s disability and necessary land therefor.” 38 suitable housing unit w ith special fixtures or movable facilities made necessary The VA is authorized to “assist a disabled veteran . . . in acquiring a

assistance authorized by federal law. the Veterans Administration” must be informed by the scope of the VA meaning of the word “acquir e” in the phrase “acquired with the assistance of disabled veteran with assistance to acquire a specially adapted homestead, the legislature expressly defers to the VA’s determination as to whether to provide a under New Hampshire law for a property tax exemption. Because the assistance from the VA to acquir e a specially adapted homestead also qualif ies align RSA 72:3 p. 6 6 - a with the federal law so that a veteran who qualif ies for N.H.S. Jour. 1201 (1987). Th us, th e manifest intent of the legislature i s to

unanimously felt that they were entitled to. qualify for the homestead exemptions, that [the] committee language or a combination thereof, our disabled veterans will now missing one arm and one leg, is not eligible. By adding the language.. . . Without this, an amputee with a combination, say b ring [ ] the New Hampshire language in line with the Federal

T he intent of the amendment was to p. 7 7

concurred. LYNN, C.J., and HICKS, HANTZ MARCON I, and DONOVAN, JJ.,

exemption for the homestead in Belmont. BTLA’s determination that the taxpayer is entitled to a 100% real estate tax of t he Veterans Administration.” RSA p. 7 72:36 - a. Accordingly, we affirm the owned a specially adapted homestead which was “acquired with the assistance remodel the homestead. Once the remodeling was completed, the taxpayer service - connected disability, the taxpayer was eligible to receive $73,768 to In this case, the VA determined that, in ord er to accommodate Louis’s

qualified veteran.” remedy is to seek amendment of the statute, not prevent its application to a entitlement provided by the legislature . . . is overly generous, the obvious at p. 7 721. T he BTLA correctly observed th at “[i]f the Town believes the tax that the legislature did not see fit to include. See Petition of Carrier, 165 N.H. a specially adapted homestead, and we will not add language to the statute legislature did not establish that a minimum expenditure be made in acquiring special adaptations that enable the disabled veteran to live in the home. T he requirements under federal law for receiving VA assistance to acquire the dou ble amputation, paraplegia, or blindness, in addition to meeting the other These criteria includ e permanent and total service - connected disability due to to qualify for a property tax exemption on a specially adapted homestead. set forth above, the statute contains several criteria that must be met in order characterization of the exemption as being based on “veteran s tatus alone.” As