2017-0536, David F. Dietz & a. v. Town of Tuftonboro

related to two additions Sawyer Point constructed on its house in violation of Realty Trust, its predecessor in interest, Sawyer Point), two equitable waivers to the intervenor, Sawyer Point Realty, LLC (collectively with Sawyer Point board of adjustment (ZBA) for the defendant, the Town of Tuftonboro, to grant order of the S uperior C ourt (Fauver, J.) upholding a decision by the zoning BASSETT, J. The plaintiffs, David F. and Katherine W. Dietz, appeal an

M. Deschenes on the brief, and Mr. Arnold orally), for the intervenor. Hinckley, Allen & Snyder, LLP, of Manchester (John L. Arnold and Daniel

Sager & Smith, PLLC, of Ossipee, for the defendant, filed no brief.

brief and orally), for the plaintiffs. Wadleigh, Starr & Peters, PLLC, of Manchester (Michael J. Tierney on the

No. 2 017 - 0536 Carroll

http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. release. The direct address of the court's home page is: Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 a.m. on the morning of their reported by E - mail at the following address: reporter@courts.state.nh. us. corrections may be made before the opinion goes to press. Errors may be Doe Drive, Concor d, New Hampshire 03301, of any editorial errors in order that requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New Hampshire, One Charles as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. Readers are NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule p. 2 22 as well 2

variance. The ZBA granted the equitable waivers and subsequently denied the Addition that is within the setback but is not within the scope of the p. 2 2008 the setback, and the approximately fifty square - foot portion of the 2008 pursuant to RSA 674:33 - a (2016) for the portion of the 1999 Addition within (2016). Thereafter, Sawyer Point applied to the ZBA for equitable waivers that the court order the removal of the unlawful construction. See RSA 676:15 within the setback without obtaining the required approval s, and requesting injunctive relief against Sawyer Point, claiming that Sawyer P oint had built December 2014, the Dietzes, a fter learning of this discrepancy, sought structure was within the setback than had been represented to the ZBA. In The survey revealed that, in regard to the 2008 Addition, more of the new In February 2014, Sawyer Point commissioned a survey of its property.

permit. hearing, t he ZBA unanimously approved the variance and issued a building subm itted a variance application to the ZBA on behalf of Sawyer Point. After a portions of the addition would be within the setback, and, accordingly, obtaining a building permit for the p. 2 2008 Addition, Braun determined that the side of the structure facing away from the lake (2008 Addition). Prior to adding a second floor o ver the existing enclosed porch as well as an addition off In 2008 - 2009, Sawyer Point constructed a second addition to its house,

addition. would cause “no change in footprint.” Sawyer Point then constructed the Town’s building inspector granted the building permit, noting the a ddition house was situated less than fifty feet from the lake. On February 8, 1999, the containing a rough sketch of the existing house, wh ich also showed that the from the lake. Braun then submitt ed a building permit application to the Town of the house, which showed that the house was situated less than fifty feet Luby, provided Sawyer Point’s builder, David Braun, with an interior floor pl an within the setback. Prior to construction, Sawyer Point’s principal, Laurel within the setback, and that the second floor addition would, therefore, also be Addition, Sawyer Point was aware that the existing structure was located portion of the first floor of its house (1999 Addition). At the time of the 1999 In 1999, Sawyer Point added a second floor addition over the e astern

fifty - foot setback from the lake for buildings located within the District. the District. Section 4. p. 2 2 of t he Town’s z oning o rdinance requires a minimum District (Distri ct). The Dietzes own the abutting property, which is also within Lake Wi nnipesaukee and within the Town’s Lakefront Residential Zoning following relevant facts. Sawyer Point’s h ouse is located along the shore of The trial cou rt recited in its narrative order, or the record supports, the

Winnipesaukee. We affirm. the Town’s zoning ordinance requiring a fifty - foot setback from Lake p. 3 3

satisfaction of the board that t he violation has existed for 10 years subparagraphs I(a) and (b), the owner may demonstrate to the II. In lieu of the findings required by the board under

to be corrected. gained, that it would be inequitable to require the violation cost of correction so far outweigh s any public benefit to be made in ignorance of the facts constituting the violation, the (d) That due to the degree of past construction or investment

any such property; and adversely affect any present or permissible future uses of value of other property in the area, nor inte rfere with or constitute a public or private nuisance, nor diminish the (c) That the physical or dimensional violation does not

authority; the process of issuing a permit over which that official had interpretation or applicability made by a municipal official in by an owner or owner’ s agent, or by an error in ordinance either a good faith error in measurement or calculation ma de owner’ s agent or representative, but was instead caused by misrepresentation, o r bad faith on the part of any owner, law or ordinance, failure to inquire, obfuscation, (b) That the violation was not an outcome of ignorance of the

conveyance to a bona fide purchaser for value; division of land in violation had been subdivided by been substantially completed, or until after a lot or other municipal official, until after a structure in violation had owner, former owner, owner’ s agent or representative, or (a) That the violation was not noticed or discovered by any

boar d makes all of the following findings: grant an equitable waiver from the requirement, if and only if the application by and with the burden of proof on the property owner, RSA 674:16, the zoning board of adjustment shall, upon requirement imposed by a zoning ordinance enacted pursuant to discovered to be in violation of a physical layout or dimensional I. When a lot or other division of land, or structure thereupon, is

waiver statute, we set forth the pertinent provisions of RSA 674: p. 3 33 - a: Because resolution of this appeal requires us to interpret the equitable

which upheld the ZBA’s decision. This appeal followed. Dietzes’ request for a rehearing. The Dietzes appealed to the superior court, p. 4 4

whole.” Petition of Carrier, 165 N.H. 719, 721 (2013). “We first look to the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the intent of the factual findings requires that we engage in statutory interpretation. “In R esol ving the issue of whether the ZBA was required to make written

forth the findings in writing. requires the ZBA to make certain findings, it does not require the ZBA to set met.” (Quotation omitted). Sawye r Point counters that, although the statute ZBA that all of the statutory requirements for an equitable waiver had been ZBA’s grant of the equitable waivers “amounted to an implicit finding by the added). The y contend that the trial court erred when it determined that the the board makes all of the following findings.” RSA 67 p. 4 4:33 - a, I (emphasis property owner, grant an equitable waiver from the requirement, if and only if adjustment shall, upon application by and with the burden of proof on the language of Paragraph I of the statute, which provides that “the zoning board of statute, and that here the ZBA failed to do so. The Dietze s focus on the requires that the ZBA make written factual findings as to each elem ent of the The Dietze s first argue that the trial court erred because RSA 674:33 - a

Grafton, 168 N.H. 563, 566 (2016). review the trial court’s statutory interpretation de novo.” Olson v. Town of “[W]e are mindful that we do not act as a super zoning board.” Id. at 82. “W e supported by the evidence or is legally erroneous.” Harrington, 152 N.H. at 77. “We will uphold the trial court’ s decision on appeal unless it is not

of law decided by the ZBA de novo). Investors of NH v. Town of Jaffrey, 161 N.H. 675, 682 (2011) (reviewing issues the ZBA’s statutory interpretation de novo. See RSA 677:6; Golf Course Hollis, 1 p. 4 49 N.H. 668, 6 70 (2003) (quotation omitted). T he trial court reviews they could have been reasonably based.” Lone Pine Hunters’ Club v. To wn of adjustment’s findings, but to determine whether there is evidence upon which court’s review “is not to determine whether it agrees with the zoning board of that the ZBA ’s decision is unreasonable.” Id.; see RSA 677:6 (2016). The trial persuaded, based upon a balance of probabilities, on the evidence before it, be set aside by the trial court absent errors of law, unless the court is findings of the ZBA are deemed prima facie lawful and reasonable, and will not bears the burden of proof on appeal to the trial court.” Id. “The f actual 152 N.H. 74, 77 (2005). “The party seeking to set aside the ZBA’s decision “Our review in zoning cases is limited.” Harrington v. Town of Warner,

RSA 67 p. 4 4:33 - a, I - II.

time by the municipality or any person directly affected. of violation, has been commenced against the violation during that or more, and that no enforcement action, including written notice p. 5 5

statute provides that the ZBA shall grant a waiver if the four enumerated for a variance are satisfied. RSA 674:33, I(b). S imilarly, the equitable waiver to grant “a variance from the t erms of the zoning ordinance if” the five elements The variance statute provides that a zoning board of adjustment has the power conditions are met, then the ZBA is empowered to grant the requested relief. Both statutes employ a similar construction: if certain enumerated

waivers, but not before granting variance s. We disagree. intended to require the ZBA to make written findings before granting equitable RSA 674:33, the variance statute. T he Dietzes argue that the legislature present in RSA 674:33 - a, the equitable waiver statute, but is not present in the language “if and only if the board makes all of the following findings” is (2006). The Dietze s assert that the se variance cases are inapposite because ruling constitutes error.”); Thomas v. Town of Hooksett, 1 p. 5 53 N.H. 717, 724 reversed the ZBA’s decision because it found the decision lacked findings, the N.H. 307, 310 (2007) (“To the extent this ruling means the superior court and of itself error”); Kalil v. Town of Dummer Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 155 the absence of findings, at least where there is no request therefor, is not in findings o f fact by a board of adjustment may often facilitate judicial review, a v ariance had been met,” and holding that “[a]lthough disclosure of specific board’s decision amounted to an implicit finding that the several requisites for City of Manchester Zoning Bd., 117 N.H. 622, 625 (1977) (stating that “[t] he granting a variance under RSA 674:33 (2016) (amended 2018). See Pappas v. have held that a ZBA is not required to make written factual findings when made all subsidiary findings necessary to support its decision.”). Moreover, we (“Although the trial court did not express ly make this finding, we assume it See, e.g., Smith v. Lillian V. Donahue Trust, 157 N.H. 502, 508 (2008) finder makes all of the necessary factual findings to support its conclusion. waiver statute. A t the outset, we observe that we generally assume that a fact - W e have not ye t had occasion to interpret RSA 674:33 - a, the equitable

1 p. 6 69 N.H. 32, 36 (2016) (quotation omitted). way that would render it a virtual n ullity.” Wolfgram v. N.H. Dep’t of Safety, advanced by the statutory scheme.” Id. “We will not construe a statute in a interpret statutory language in light of the policy or purpose sought to be a whole.” Id. “This enables us to better discern the legislature’s intent and to words and phrases in isolation, but rather within the co ntext of the statute as or unjust result.” Carrier, 16 p. 5 5 N.H. at 721. “Moreover, we do not consider parts of a statute together to effectuate its overall purpose and avoid an absurd Town of Exeter, 159 N.H. 136, 141 (2009) (quotation omitted). “We construe all whenever possible, every word of a statute should be given effect.” Garand v. legislature is not presumed to waste words or enact redundant provisions and add language that the legislature did not see fit to include.” Id. “The statute as written and will not consider what the legisla ture might have said or to its plain and ordinary meaning.” Id. “We interpret legislative intent from the language of the statute itself, and, if possible, construe that language according 6

had been met. waiver s amounted to an implicit finding that all of the statutory requirements requirements. T he trial court found that the board’s decision to grant the reflect that the board discussed and analyzed the fou r equitable waiver Moreover, w e observe, as did the trial court, that the minutes of the meeting to make a written finding as to each requirement set forth in RSA p. 6 674:33 - a, I. Accordingly, we agree with the trial court th at the ZBA was not required

the board make findings. Compare RSA p. 6 674:44, III(e) with RSA 674:33 - a, I. board set forth “the basis” f or its decision in the minutes; it simply requires that unlike the statute at issue in Property Portfolio Group, does not require that the include. Carrier, 165 N.H. at 721. Moreover, we note that RSA 674:33 - a, I, findings). We will not add language that the legislature did not see fit to subdivision or site plans must be based on the planning board’s written temporary moratorium or limitation on issuing building permits or approving guidelines); RSA 674:23, IV (2016) (r equiring that any ordinance establishing a finding or a specific finding on the record” when deviating from child support See, e.g., RSA 458 - C:4, IV (2016) (requiring a judicial officer to “enter a written have said so expressly. I t has often required written findings in other contexts. written findings as a prerequisite to the grant ing of an equitable waiver i t would and equitable waivers. If the legislature intended to require the ZBA to make The s ame reasoning supports our conclusion here in regard to the ZBA

planning board make express findings of fact.” Id. at 758 - 59. requirement, which the legislature itself did not see fit to include, that the 758 (citing statutes). Accordingly, we decline d to “read into RSA p. 6 674:44, III(e) a specific findings be made, it has, in other contexts, said so expressly.” Id. at N.H. at 758 - 59. W e explained that, “[w] here the legislature intends that forth “the basis” for its decision in the minutes. Property Portfolio Group, 163 board to make express findings of fact; rather, the board simply needed to set th at language, w e observed that nothing in RSA 674:44, III(e) obligated the two enumerated elements had been met. RSA 674:44, III (e). In interpreting board “may only g rant a waiver if the boar d finds, by majority vote, that” one of planning board shall be recor ded in the minutes of the board,” and that the provision at issue provided that “[t]he basis for any waiver granted by the 674:44, III(e) (2016). Property Portfolio Group, 163 N.H. at 757. The statutory because the board failed to make findings on the record as required by RSA planning board erroneously granted a waiver of the town’s site plan regulations (2012), instructive. T he petitioners in Property Portfolio Group argued that the W e find Property Portfolio Group, LLC v. Town of Derry, 163 N.H. 754

that it must set forth those findings in writing. Notably, h owever, this language requires only that the ZBA make findings, not issued “if and only if the board makes all of the following findings.” Id. variance statute, contains the additional requirement that a waiver can be conditions are met. RSA p. 6 6 p. 7 74:33 - a, I. T he equitable waiver statute, unlike the 7

at 141. Paragraph I(d) does not require simply that the applicant be “ignoran [t] give effect to every word of a statute whenever possible. See Garand, 159 N.H. in issuing a permit within that offi cial’s scope of authority. Moreover, we must applicant relied on the misinterpretation of an ordinance by a municipal official Paragraph I(d) mus t be broad enough to encompass the situation in which an purpose and avoid an absurd result). Therefore, our interpretation of N.H. at 36 (observing further that we seek to effectuate a statute’s evident municipal error element of Paragraph I(b) a virtual nullity. See Wolfgram, 169 We will not construe Paragraph I(d) in such a way as to render the

applicant also having erred in measure ment or calculation. for a waiver based on an error made by a municipal official without the then there would never be a situation in which an applicant would be eligible Dietzes — that an applicant must always be ignorant of the underlying facts — a, I(b). If we were to adopt the interpretation of Paragraph I(d) advanced by the applica bility made by a municipal official” when issuing a permit. RSA 6 p. 7 74:33 error in measuremen t or calculation, or “an error in ordinance interpretation or 135 (2014). Paragraph I(b) requires an applicant to show either a good faith scheme and not in isolation. Dembiec v. Town of Holderness, 167 N.H. 130, language of Paragraph I(d) must be read in the context of the overall statutory (sustain ing the decision of the trial court on valid alternative grounds). The reach our conclusion. See Q uinlan v. City of Dover, 136 N.H. 226, 230 (1992) requirements of Paragraph I (d); nonetheless we employ a different analysis to We agree with the trial court that Sawyer Point sa tisfied the

a, I(b). m ade by a municipal official” is an excuse under Paragraph I(b). RSA 6 p. 7 74:33 - Point correctly notes, “an error in ordinance interpretation or applicability violation, as the building inspector had granted the building permit. A s Sawyer did not know that building on the existing footprint would constitute a that, although it knew the 1999 Addition would be built within the setback, it behind Paragraph I(d) was to create a balancing test. Sawyer Point also argues Paragraphs I(a) and (b) a virtual nullity, and, further, that the legislative intent effect would render Paragraph II ’s waiver of the ignorance req uirements in of the facts” language in Paragraph I(d) should be disregarded because to give it Sawyer Point counters that, as the trial court concluded, th e “ignorance

Addition to be within the setback. the interior floor plan and the building permit application showed the 1999 that it was aware that the 1999 Addition was within the setback; and (2) both not “ignoran [t] of the fact s” because: (1) Sawyer Point admitted in its answer I(d). The Dietzes assert that, for purposes of Paragraph I(d), Sawyer Point was [was] made in ignorance of the f acts constituting the violation.” RSA 6 p. 7 74:33 - a, language in Paragraph I (d) requiring that the “past construction or investment The Dietze s next argue that the trial cou rt erred when it ignored the p. 8 8

the elements for a waiver has been satisf ied. See RSA 674:33 - a, I. We are not places the burden on the property owner to establish at the ZBA that each of the trial court’s analysis runs counter to the equitable waiver statute, which sketch. . . accurat ely depicted the front setback.” The Dietzes contend that evidence that Sawyer Point or Braun believed the interior floor plan and 1999 was aware of the location of the setback line, it stated that “the ZBA heard no shifted the burden of proof onto them when, in analyzing whether Sawyer Point The Dietze s next argue that the trial court erred and impermissibly

that have been fully briefed). Blackmer, 149 N.H. 47, 49 (2003) (confining our review to only those issues address that argument because it is not fully developed. See State v. 674:33 - a, I(d) were not satisfied in regard to the 200 p. 8 8 Addition, we decli ne to To the extent that the Dietzes also argue that the requirements of RSA

more than ten years old than for more recent violations. illogical and unjust if it were harder to secure an equitable waiver for violations situations involving municipal error as described in Paragraph I(b). It would be our interpretation of Paragraph I(d) must be broad enough to encompass apply t o the 1999 Addition because the violation is more than ten years old, Although, due to the operation of Paragraph II, Paragraph I(b) does not

producing an absurd or unjust result). Carrier, 165 N.H. at 721 (observing that, when construing statutes, we avoid given these fac ts, to hold otherwise would produce an unjust result. See (emphasis added). Therefore, we hold that Paragraph I(d) is satisfied. Indeed, “ignoran[t] of the facts constituting the violation.” RSA 674:33 - a, I(d) over which that official had authority,” RSA 674:33 - a, I(b), Sawyer Point was applicability made by a municipal official in the process of issuing a permit conclude that, due to its reliance on “an error in ordinance interpretation or Point was aware that the 1999 Addition would be built within the setback, we without deciding, that it is a violation. Alth ough it is undisputed that Sawyer as though the 1999 Addition violated the ordinance. Therefore, we assume, Nonetheless, by applying for an equitable waiver, Sawyer Point has proceeded decide whether the 1999 Addition constituted a violation of the ordinance. interpretation of the ordinance was challenged. We have not been asked to Dietzes brought their 2014 zoning enforcement action, that the Town’s a foul of the setback requirement. I t was not until fifteen years later, when the o rdinance such that building a second floor on the existing footprint would run existin g footprint. N either Sawyer Point nor the Town interpreted the zoning Sawyer Po int’s application, noting that there would be no change in the which was granted by the Town. The building inspector reviewed and approved Here, Sawyer Point applied for a building permit for the 1999 Addition,

constituting the violation.” RSA 674:33 - a, I(d) (emphasis added). of the facts,” it requires that the applicant be “ignoran[t] of the facts p. 9 9

the back of the house.” made by Sawyer Point’s attorney that “the cost would be prohibitive to remove un reasonable for both the ZBA and the trial court to credit the representations 2008 Addition s would “far outweigh[] any public benefit.” Moreover, it was not conclude, as they did, that the cost of tearing down portions of the 1 p. 9 999 and use their own knowledge and experience — as well as their common sense — to Sandwich, 124 N.H. 421, 427 (1984). Here, the ZBA members could properly upon “their own knowledge, experience and observations.” Biggs v. Town of We have previously held that ZBA members may base their conclusions

erred when it sustain ed the ZBA’s findings. Here, we conclude that the Dietzes have not established that the trial court before it, that the ZBA’ s decision is unreasonable.” Harrington, 152 N.H. at 77. court is persuaded, based upon a balance of probabilities, on the e vidence and “will not be set aside by the trial court absent errors of law, unless the The ZBA’s factual findings are deemed prima facie lawful and reasonable,

Point. zoning violations would, in this case, be subst antial. We agree with Sawyer entitled to use their own knowledge to conclude that the cost of correcting the violations at issue. Sawyer Point counters that the members of the ZBA were Sawyer Point presented no evidence to show the cost of correct ing the zoning Dietze s argue that the equitable waivers should not have been granted because require the violation to be corrected.” RSA 674:33 - a, I(d). Specifically, t he outwe ighs any public benefit to be gained, that it would be inequitable to ZBA may grant an equitable waiver if it finds that “the cost of correction so far balancing test set forth in RSA 674:33 - a, I (d). Paragraph I(d) provides that the The Dietzes next argue that the trial court erred in its application of the

unreasonable. We find no error. such additional evidence, the trial court found that the ZBA’s decision was not Harrington, 152 N.H. at 77. H ere, based on the record before it, and absent show that th e ZBA made an error of law, or that its decision was unreasonable. Dietzes appealed to the trial court, the burden of proof shifted to the Dietzes to an equitable waiver. However, once the ZBA granted the waivers and the proof at the ZBA to show that its application met the statutory requirements for conclusions. Pursuant to RSA 674:33 - a, I, Sawyer Point had the bu rden of presented to the ZBA, the ZBA might have changed its analysis and W e read the trial court’s order as positing that, had certain evidence been

law for us to decide). (observing that the interpretation of a trial court order presents a question of trial court order. See Edwards v. RAL Auto. Group, 156 N.H. 700, 705 (2008) persuaded, primarily because we disagree with the Dietzes’ interpretation of the p. 10 10

RSA 674:33 - a, I(d) (emphasis added). When read in its entirety, and within the gained, that it would be inequitable to require the violation to be corrected.” violation, the cost of correction so far outweighs any pu blic benefit to be construction or investment made in ignorance of the facts constituting the context. We disagree. Paragraph I(d) provides: “That due to the degree of past consider the cumulative impact of zoning violations in the equitable waiver benefit to be gained,” RSA 674:33 - a, I(d) (emphasis added), compels us to The Dietzes argue that the mandate in Paragraph I(d) to weigh “any public the lead opinion in Bacon should be extended to the equitable waiver context. Nor are we persuaded that the “cumulative impact” rationale endorsed by

674:33, I(b)(2) with RSA 674:33 - a. requirement is not present in the equitable waiver statute. Compare RSA [zoning] ordinance.” Bacon, 150 N.H. at 471 - 73. The same statutory applicant establish that granting a variance is “consistent with the spirit of the concept of cumulative effect in the context of the statutory requirement that an this proposition. T heir reliance is misplaced. In Bacon, we addressed the Dietze s rely on Bacon v. Town of Enfield, 150 N.H. 468 (2004), as support for rather than just the impact of the specific violations at issue in this case. The effect of the failure to enforc e the lakefront setback throughout the Town, violation. The Dietzes contend that the ZBA failed to co nsider the cumulative decision with respect to the “public benefit to be gained” by correction of the T he Dietze s also argue that the trial court erred in sustaining the ZBA’s

legislature did not see fit to include). N.H. at 721 (observing that we will not add language to a statute that th e have said so. It did not, and we decline to do so in its stead. See Carrier, 165 request denied — a prerequisite for securing an equitable waiver, it could easily Had t he legislature intended to make appl ying for a variance — and having the applicant had not already applied for a variance — and been turned down. effect, make it impossible for an applicant to obtain an equitable waiver if the Finally, the Dietzes’ pro ferred interpretation of RSA 674:33 - a, I(d) wo uld, in would be the appropriate “cost of correction” for purposes of Paragraph I(d). zoning violation, it cannot be the case that the cost of applying for a variance requirements . . . .”). Accordingly, because a variance would not “correct” the It is permission given to a property owner to depart from the applicable zoning to build on land in a way prohibited by strict application of a zoning ordinance. of Zoning and Planning § 58:1, at 58 - 2 (2012) (“A variance is the right to use or that violation to continue. See 3 Arden H. Rathkopf et al., Rathkopf’s The Law Indeed, a variance, rather than “correct ing” a zoning violation, simply allows position that obtaining a variance would somehow “correct” the violation. disagree. There is nothing in the language of the statute to lend support to the but rather the de minimis cost of applying to the Town for a variance. We the “cost of correction” should not be the cost of tearing down the additions, In the alternative, t he Dietzes argue that, for purpose s of Paragraph I(d), p. 11 11

concurred. LYNN, C.J., and HICKS, HANTZ MARCONI, and DONOVAN, JJ.,

230 (2003). not b riefed, they are deemed waived. See In re Estate of King, 149 N.H. 226, Because the additional issues raised in the Dietzes’ notice of appeal were

authority supporting the proposition that partial relief would be void. from the Town’s zoning ordinance, nor have we been presented with any in RSA 674:33 - a that prohibits a property ow ner from seeking partial relief improvements exceeded the maximum lot coverage standards, there is nothing this court. Moreover, even if we were to assume that Sawyer Point’s therefore, the Dietzes’ allegations regarding lot coverage are not properly before not germane to the equitabl e waiver applications that are under appeal; grant ed the equitable waivers. However, purported lot coverage violations were maximum lot coverage standards in the zoning district, the ZBA erred when it Point’s property, including the house and additions, allegedly exceed the Finally, t he Dietze s argue that, because the improvements on Sawyer

court’s decision. See Harrington, 152 N.H. at 77. finding was unreasonable or unsupported by the evidence, we uphold the trial by correcting the violations. Because the Dietzes have failed to show that this court agreed with the ZBA that there was little or no public benefit to be gained throughout the Town. Moreover, relying on the evidence before it, the trial declined to weigh the cumulative effect of building within the lakefront setback Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it sustained the ZBA and

issue. the cost - benefit analysis is properly limited to the spe cific zoning violation at context of RSA 674:33 - a as a whole, Paragraph I(d) is clear that the scope of