2018-0402, State of New Hampshire v. Christina Fay

result of that search. We affirm. (Ignatius, J.) erred by denying her motion to suppress the evidence seized as a Great Danes were seized. The defend ant argues that the Superior Court Society of the United States (HSUS) and others, pursuant to which over seventy warrant at the defendant’s residence in June 2017 with the aid of the Humane (amended 2018, 2019). The Wolfeboro Police Department executed a search convictions on seventeen counts of cruelty to animals. See RSA 644:8 (2016) HANTZ MARCONI, J. The defendant, Christina Fay, appeals her

and orally), for the defendant. Lothstein Guerriero, PLLC, of Concord (Theodore Lothstein on the brief

assistant attorney general, on the brief and orally), for the State. Gordon J. MacDonald, attorney general (Susan P. McGinnis, senior

No. 2 018 - 0402 Carroll

http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. release. The direct address of the court ’ s home page is: Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 a.m. on the morning of their reported by e - mail at the following address: reporter@courts.state.nh. us. corrections may be made before the opinion goes to press. Errors may be Doe Drive, Concor d, New Hampshire 03301, of any editorial errors in order that requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New Hampshire, One Charles as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. Readers are NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule p. 2 22 as well 2

that the dogs would spread disease to other animals in the shelters. be spread out among all of the animal shelters in the state, there was a risk to recover from the residence. Strauch also testified that even if the dogs could transport, or provide shelter for, the roughly seventy - eight dogs they expected residence. However, the police department did not have the resources to Strauch applied for and obtained a search warrant for the defendant’s

from various diseases. defendant informed the police that the dogs were underweight and suffered with feces.” V eterinarians who examined dogs that had be en rehomed by the Strauch also saw several large dogs in kennels, the floors of which were “thick “something rott ing” coming from an open door along the side of the building. dogs barking inside the residence, as w ell as strong odors of feces, urine, and civil dog nuisance summons. While there, Strauch observed a large number of department’s investigation, visited the defendant’s property in May to serve a Off icer Strauch of the Wolfeboro Police Department, who led the

ground. substance resembling dog feces, and maggots in a refrigerator and on the in various parts of the house and garage, the floor covered in a brown The photographs depicted “dogs with injuries,” raw chicken meat, dog kennels employee provided the police with photographs of the insid e of the residence. chicken in the refrigerator. In addition to their eyewitness accounts, each was prepared in unsanitary conditions, and that there were maggots in a box of living. This employee reported that the dogs were fed a diet of raw chicken that there were maggots and bugs covering the floor where some of the dogs were layer of urine and feces covering the floors throughout the residence, and that The defen dant’s other employee told the police that there was a thick

than the defendant who got near it. break up fights among the dogs, and that one dog would bite anyone other employee stated that there were riding crops located throughout the house to many vomited often, were underweight, and had liquid stool. In addition, the entire weekend. She also stated that the dogs were fed spoiled meat, and that let outside, but that it was not uncommon for the dogs to remain inside for an animal waste. She reported that the dogs only received water when they were outside and were not house broken, and that the residence was covered in seventy - eight dogs living at the residence. She stated that the dogs rarely went information to the police. One employee informed the police that there were Wolfeboro. During this time, two of the defendant’s former employees provided was conducting an investigation of the defendant and her residence in Pseudae, 154 N.H. 196, p. 2 200 (2006). In 2017, the Wolfeboro Police Department defendant’s suppression motion and the suppression record. See State v. The following relevant facts are drawn from the trial court’s order on the

The dogs remained in HSUS’s care throughout the defendant’s trial. 1

2 p. 3 31 - 33 (1983). and rely upon federal law only to aid our analysis. Sta te v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, Constitutions. We first address her arguments under the State Constitution Id. The defendant raises arguments under both the State and Federal (2019). Our review of the trial court’s legal conclusions, however, is de novo. in the record or are clearly erroneous. State v. Folds, 172 N.H. 513, 516 suppress, we accept the trial court’s factual findings unless they lack support motion to suppress. When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to On appeal, t he defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying her

followed. convicted the defendant on the remaining seventeen counts. This appeal The State entered a nolle prosequi on one count during trial, and a jury brought to trial on eighteen counts of cruelty to animals. Se e RSA 644:8, III. 1 trial court denied the defendant’s motion. The defendant was subsequently right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. After a hearing, t he search, arguing, among other things, that HSUS’s involvement violated her The defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized as a result of the

efforts. search, as well as photographs from the search, in connection with fundraising the organization’ s expense. HSUS later publicized its involvement in the they were removed from the house, providing them with housing and food at into HSUS trailers for transportation. HSUS took possession of the dogs after photographed the dogs exiting the residence, and placed them in crates and where the dogs were kept, recorded videos, made a map of the rooms, collection. Specifically, HSUS kept track of each dog, took photographs of HSUS assisted with seizing and inventorying all of the dogs, and with evidence assisting, Strauch testified that it t ook the entire day to execute the warrant. executed the warrant on June 16, 2017. Even with the number of persons other town agencies, and staff from HSUS and the Pope Memorial SPCA, Wolfeboro Fire Department, members of the ambulance team, employees from Strauch, along with every member of the police department, the

HSUS was permitted to assist in its execution. would be assisting the police, and the warrant itself did not explicitly state that not include in his affidavit supporting the search warrant’s issuance that HSUS organization to assist with the execution of the search warrant. Strauch did and could pro v i de them with adequate housing. Thus, Strauch asked the including access to large trailers with air conditioning to t ransport the dogs, Conversely, HSUS had the resources to handle large - scale animal s eizures, p. 4 4

constitutional amendments operate prospectively unless the intent to apply the The general rule employed by a majority of jurisdictions presu mes that

retroactively.” essential, and inherent” also “manifests the [] intent to apply the amendment humankind”)). Consequently, s he argues, the use of th e phrase “natural, rather are recognized to be among the natural and inherent rights of all the rights articulated “are not bestowed by that constitutional provision but phrase “natural, essential, and inherent” in Part I, Article 2 demonstrates that (Citing Burrows v. City of Keene, 121 N.H. 590, 596 (1981) (explaining that the characterize the right to privacy as pre - existing rather than newly - created.” essential, and inherent” as indicative of “[t]he cho ice by the citizens to the issue of retroactive application,” but points to the language “natural, The defendant acknowledges that “the amendment does not expressly address information is natural, ess ential, and inherent.” N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 2 - b. individual’s right to live free from governmental intrusion in private or personal supports a finding of retroactive application.” Part I, Article 2 - b states, “An The f irst consideration she raise s is, “T he language of the amendment

applies to this case.” that “[t]hree considerations compel the conclusion that [Part I,] Article 2 - b constitutional rules announced by judicial decision). The defendant asserts Tierney, 150 N.H. 339, 3 p. 4 4 2 - 45 (2003) (analyzing retroactivity of new 341 (2018) (analyzing retroactivity of newly enacted legislation); State v. amendment has retroactive effect. Cf., e.g., State v. Brawley, 171 N.H. 333, occasion to decide the proper means of determining whether a constitutional relevant events in her case, applies to her case retro actively. We have not had The defendant argues that Part I, Article 2 - b, which was enacted after the

Article 2 - b of the State Constitution. Accordingly, we limit our review of her right - to - privacy argument to Part I, arguments on appeal. See State v. Blackmer, 1 p. 4 49 N.H. 47, 48 (2003). privacy argument to the trial court, and we decline to consider any such subsequent “media and fundraising campaign,” she failed to raise any right - to inter alia, HSUS’s involvement in executing the search of her home and its right to privacy, under the State and Federal Constitutions, was violated by, defendant argues that, irrespective of the enactment of Part I, Article 2 - b, her N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 2 - b (effective Dec ember 5, 2018). To the extent the the recently enacted amendment to our State Constitution, Part I, Article 2 - b. We understand the defendant to ground her right - to - privacy argument in

privacy. privacy. We begin with the defendant’s argument regarding her right to right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and h er right to to suppress because the State violated two of her constitutional rights: her The defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion p. 5 5

voters’ manifest intent.” 16 Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § p. 5 50. the actual language of the amendment or extrinsic sources that leave no doubt that such was the presumption of prospective application through, for example, “an express retroactivity provisio n in right, it does not follow that the amendment could not also be deemed to overcome the retroactively. Eve n assuming an amendment to the State Constitution explicitly created a new pre - existing rather than newly - created,” it also demonstrates an intent to apply the amendment and inherent” in Part I, Article 2 - b demonstrates an intent “to characterize the right to privacy as We are not persuaded by the defendant’s reasoning that, because the phrase “natural, essential, 2

standing principle recognized under both state and federal constitutional law, The s econd consideration raised by the defendant is that “under a long -

2 - b to her case. that the defendant’s first consideration compels the application of Part I, Article extraordinary circumstances.” (footnotes omitted)). We are, thus, unpersuaded constitutional amendments apply only prospectively in all but the most constitutions, unless a contrary intention is clearly expressed.. . . In fact, (“[T]he general rule is that prospective effect alone is given to provisions of state (quotation omitted)). See generally 16 Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § p. 5 50 clear and unav oidable implication that they operate on events already past.” future t enses in [a constitutional amendment or statute] does not provide a application. See, e.g., Evans, 21 F. Supp. 3d at 1205 (“[T]h e use of present and 2 - b. This ambiguity is insufficient to overcome the presumption of prospective intent to have the amendment appl y retroactively. See N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 2 essential, and inherent” is ambiguous, at b est, as to whether it manifests an T urning to Part I, Article 2 - b, w e conclude that the phrase “natural,

retroactively. rebutted by the clear manifestation of intent to apply the amendment presumption that constitutional amendments apply prospectively may be abundantly justifiable, and we hereby adopt such a presumption. Our Presuming that constitutional amendments apply prospectively is

concurring)). Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 8 p. 5 55 (1990) (Scalia, J., Landgraf v. USI Film Prod ucts, 511 U.S. 244, 2 p. 6 65 (1994) (quoting Kaiser that existed when the conduct took place has timeless and universal appeal. ’” that the legal effect of conduct should ordinarily be assessed under the law 1204; see, e.g., Shreveport v. Cole, 129 U.S. 36, 4 2 - 4 3 (1889). “[T] he ‘ principle rooted in principles of fairness and due process.” Evans, 21 F. Supp. 3d at presumption against retroactive application of changes in the law is deeply 2d Constitutional Law § 50, West law (database updated Nov. 2020). “The Constitutional Law § 116, Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2020); 16 Am. Jur. 1997); Kneip v. Herseth, 214 N.W.2d 93, 10 1 - 02 (S.D. 1974); see also 16 C.J.S. 808, 812 (Mo. 2015) (per curiam); People v. Dean, 677 N.E.2d 947, 95 2 (Ill. 1192, 120 4 - 05 (D. Utah 2014) (applying Utah law); State v. Merritt, 467 S.W.3d amendment retroactively is clear. See, e.g., Evans v. Utah, 21 F. Supp. 3d 6

examination of her reasonable expectation of privacy. See State v. Schulz, 1 p. 6 64 Article 2 - b, it is un disput e d that the defendant’s case does not implicate an expectation of privacy under Part I, Article 19 necessitates an analysis of Part I, deciding that we agree that analyzing whether a defendant had a reasonable ex pectation of privacy under Part I, Article 19. Even a ssuming without people reasonably expect to remain private,” i.e., a defendant’s reasonable the contours and limits of what places, effects, and personal information the this new enactment by the people of our State is unavoidable in determining The third consideration raised by the defendant is that “consideration of

application of Part I, Article 2 - b to her case. unpersuaded that the defendant’s second consideration compels the stated procedural rules of federal constitutional law”). We are, thus, on Griffith was misplaced because it only governed the retroa ctivity of “newly was not yet final, applied retroactively — explaining that defendant’s reliance argument — that a constitutional amendment, enacted when defendant’s case apply retroactively. Accord Merritt, 4 p. 6 67 S.W.3d at 812 (rejecting a similar bearing on whether an amendment to the State Constitution was intended to However, whether a defendant’s case is pending on appeal has no

rule announced in that case.”). final 2½ years prior to Batson, thus de priving petitioner of any benefit from the 28 (198 p. 7 7)); see also Teague, 489 U.S. at 295 - 9 p. 6 6 (“Petitioner’ s conviction became doctrine.” (brackets omitted) (quoting Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 327 while others simila rly situated have their claims adjudicated under the old occasion f or announcing the new principle — enjoys retroactive application, one chance beneficiary — the lucky individual whose case was chosen as the comports with the ideal of administration of justice with an even ha nd, when announced by judicial decision. See Tierney, 150 N.H. at 34 3 - 4 4 (“It hardly of which was relevant because the constitutional rule at issue had been Teague and T ie rney, was limited to cases pending on direct appeal, the status N.H. 118, 127 (2003), had retroactive eff ect). Retroactivity, as contemplated in absolute right to sever unrelated cases,” as announced in State v. Ramos, 149 cases on direct review, whether the new constitutional rule articulating “the 98 (1986), had retroa ctive effect); Tierney, 150 N.H. at 342 - 45 (analyzing, for peremptory challenges, as announced in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 discrimination based upon the manner in which the prosecution uses evidentiary showing necessary to make out a prima facie case of racial collateral review, whether the new constitutional rule articulating the retroactive effect. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 29 4 - 96 (analyzing, for cases on However, neither case analyzed whether a constitutional amendment ha s two cases: Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), and our decision in Tierney. 2 - b applies to her case. The support for this argument is limited to citations to revi ew when Part I, Article 2 - b was enacted, the defendant reasons that Article review when the new rule is announced.” Because t his case was on direct new constitutional rules apply retroactively to all case[s] pending and on direct 7

constitutionally reasonable for the police to involve civilian s when executing We have not previously considered the extent to wh ich it is

authorization for the involvement of HSUS, a private organization. reasonable” by failing to obtain, prior to the warrant’s execution, judicial “violated the re quirement that the manner of [the warrant’s] execution be the warrant.” (citation omitted)). The defendant contends that the State which governs Fourth Amendment analysis governs the method of execution of Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, p. 7 71 (1998) (“The general touchstone of reasonableness respects be reasonable.” Schulz, 164 N.H. at 221; see also U nited States v. probable cause requirements, “the manner of its execution must in other 161 N.H. at 269. In addition, even if a warrant satisfies the particularity and probable cause.” Schulz, 164 N.H. at 221; see Folds, 172 N.H. at 520; Orde, warrants “must be sufficiently particular and must be supported by a finding of See Folds, 172 N.H. at 520; Schulz, 164 N.H. at 221. For example, search constitutiona l requirements for the issuance and execution of search warrants. 172 N.H. at 516 - 17; see N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 19. There are several possessions, and their homes from unreasonable searches and seizures. Folds, the New Hampshire Constitution protects all people, their papers, their right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Part I, Article 19 of We now turn to the defendant’s argument that the State violated her

the defendant has not demonstrated that her right to priv acy was violated. her remaining arguments pertaining to Part I, A rticle 2 - b. W e conclude that I, Article 2 - b applies retroactively to her case. T herefore, we need not address Ultimately, w e are not convinced by the defendant’s arguments that Part

application of Part I, Article 2 - b to her case. thus, unpersuaded that the defendant’s third consideration compels the intention is clearly expressed.”); see also Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265. We are, provision should not be construed to have retroactive effect unless such the general rule, and settled law in South Dakota, that a constitutional was intended to apply retroactively. See, e.g., Kneip, 214 N.W.2d at 101 (“It is such a prospective implication does not speak to whether Part I, Article 2 - b 19 will necessitate the contemplation of Part I, Article 2 - b, the existence of analysis of a defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy under Part I, Article Furthermore, again assuming without de ciding that, looking forward, an

requirement was needed for the officer to lawfully enter the defendant’s deck”). expectation of privacy in his deck, a warrant or an exception to the warrant 260, 26 p. 7 7 (2010) (reasoning that “[b]ecause the defendant had a reasonable warrant is required in the first place.”); see also, e.g., State v. Orde, 161 N.H. a warrant is a distinct constitutional inquiry from the question of whether a N.H. 217, 225 (2012) (“[T]he reasonableness of a search conducted pursuant to p. 8 8

may possess a peculiar expertise or knowledge regarding the means of retrieval States v. Bach, 310 F.3d 1063, 1067 ( p. 8 8th Cir. 2002). For example, “a civilian searches are sometimes more reasonable than searches by officers.” United some demonstrable need for the presence of the civilian”). In fact, “[c]ivilian been serving a legitimate investigative function,” and “the officers must have (stating that, for civilian involvement to be reasonable, “[t]he civilian must have Aseltine, 958 F.2d 697, 706 (6th Cir. 1992); see also Bellville, 375 F.3d at 33 involvement tends to be within “the bounds of reasonableness.” Bills v. [civilian] assistance is rendered in aid of a warrant,” however, the civilian grounds by United States v. Grise l, 488 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2007). “[W]here United States v. Sparks, 265 F.3d 825, 832 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled on other id. at 614. “Police cannot invite civilians to perform searches on a whim . . . .” involvement of the ci vilians does not aid in the execution of the warrant. See for the police to bring civilians into a home when executing a warrant whe n the Wilson stands for the proposition that it is constitutionally unreasonable

part of a . . . ride - along policy.” Id. at 607. warrant. See id. at 607, 611. The reporters we re merely brought along “as officers — newspaper reporters — did not assist the police in executing the at 614. It was undisputed in Wilson that the civilians who accompanied the in the home was not in aid of the execution of the warrant.” Wilson, 526 U.S. home during the execution of a warrant when the presence of the third parties violation of the Fourth Amendment for police to bring . . . third parties into a Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999), the United States Supreme Court held that “it is a Amendment’s reasonableness standard.” Bellville, 375 F.3d at 33. In Wilson v. evaluating police involvement of citizens in searches under the Fourth case - by - case basis). To that end, “[c] ourts have articulated guidelines for (reasonableness of manner in which searches are conducted must be judged on case. See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 3 p. 8 85, 394 (1997) our inquiry, of course, for such accompaniment will not be reasonable in every constitutional or statutory law, when executing a search warrant does not end That civilian accompaniment is not flatly barred, as a matter of

“suitable ass istants.” Id.; see Bellville, 375 F.3d at 32. C ongress, has authorized officers executing search warrants to take with them 5 p. 9 95 - A: p. 8 8 (2001). Thus, the New Hampshire L egislature, in a manner similar to may take with him suitable assistants and suffer no others be with him.” RSA In New Hampshire, RSA 595 - A:8 states: “An officer executing a search warrant of the officer on his requiring it, he being present and acting in its execution.”). authorized by law to serve such warrant, but by no other person, except in aid cases be served by any of the officers mentioned in its direction or by an officer (citation omitted); see 18 U.S.C. § 3105 (2018) (“A search warrant may in all practice.” Bellville v. Town of Northboro, 375 F.3d 25, 32 (1st Cir. 2004) explic itly authorized the practice, and courts have repeatedly upheld the law does not proscribe the use of civilians in searches. In fact, Congress has search warrants. We begin our analysis by noting that “[f]ederal constitutional 9

argument, is insufficient to warrant judicial review.” (quotation omitted)). Blackmer, 14 p. 9 9 N.H. at 49 (“[A] mere laundry list of complaints . . . , without developed legal assertions are unsupported by citation to authority and ar e insufficiently developed. See Part I, Article 19’s mandate that search warrants be executed in a reasonable manner, those involvement in this case, including the organization’s post - searc h publicization efforts, violated To the extent the defendant asserts additional points in support of her position that HSUS’s 3 deferring to the discretion of the police offi cer.” 3 the state constitutional preference “for favoring judicial oversight rather than provides greater protections than does the Fourth Amendment, and also upon defendant relies upon prio r cases in which we have held that Part I, Article 1 9 ought to be, required under Part I, Article 19 of the State Constitution. The defendant argues that prior judicial authorization for citizen involvement is, or Recognizing this dearth of authority from outside New Hampshire, the

§ 4.10(d), at p. 9 979 (5th ed. 2012). Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment that a failure to follow such a procedure violates the Fourth Amendment,” 2 Sbordone, 678 N.E.2d at 1188 n.9, “there appears to be no authority indicating magistrate permitted this involvement,” Bellville, 375 F.3d at 33 - 34; accord in the execution of the search and for the warrant to indicate that the enforcement officers to disclose to the magistrate th at civilians will be involved opined “that it might be a ‘ better practice, ’ if circumstances permit, for law have found no instance in our own research. Although some courts have execution of a warrant rendered the subsequent search unconstitutional. We failure to obtain express judicial authorization for citizen aid prior to the The defendant has cited no instance in which a court has held that the

issued the search warrant was constitutionally unreasonable. We do not agree. failure to obtain express authorization for HSUS’s aid from the magistrate wh o organization such as HSUS. Instead, the defendant argues that Strauch’s Nor does the defendant dispute that the police required the assistance of an to execute the search warrant for her residence and t o care for the dogs seized. Here, the defendant does not dispute that the police required assistance

the search to bank employees is not improper”). and that “[w]here a warrant is issued for specific bank records, delegation of perform a search of a bank’s records, indeed may not be qualified to do so,” 118 (Wash. Ct. App. 1 p. 9 996) (noting that “police officer[s] will not ordinarily the items seized rather than enlarge upon them”); State v. Kern, 914 P.2d 114, files not covered, “use of [civilian] assistance . . . would tend to limit or restrict specialized knowledge to distinguish computer files covered by warrant from 54 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (explaining that, where officer did not have 1184, 1188 (Mass. 1997); see als o Schalk v. State, 767 S.W.2 d 441, 445, 453 of the search by lessening its intrusiveness.” Com. v. Sbordone, 678 N.E.2d assistance in such circumstances [may] actually enhance[] the reasonableness or identi fication of items covered by a warrant, and . . . permitting civilian p. 10 10

this case.” Bellville, 375 F.3d at 34. That said, for the reasons discussed and approval of that involvement might avoid the type of challenges we have in F.3d at 33 - 34; Sbordone, 678 N.E.2d at 1188 n.9. Indeed, “[p] rior disclosure assist in a warrant ’s execution, whe n it is possible to do so. See Bellville, 375 wise for officers to notify the issuing magistrate of the fact that civilians will and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, however, that it may be We agree with the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

warrant’s execution was unconstitut ional. HSUS’s participation in executing the warrant, that the manner of the from the fact that Strauch did not obtain prior judicial authorization for exec ution . . . [was] reasonable,” Schulz, 164 N.H. at 221, we cannot conclude, analysis under Part I, Article 19 is whether “the manner of [the warrant’s] execution conduct. See Boulanger, 444 F.3d at 83 - 84. Because the pertinent obtained the warrant, and would require analysis of the reasonableness of pre reasonableness inquiry by moving it s f ocus back in time to when the officers required in the first place.”). Such a conclusion would fundamentally alter the distinct constitutional inquiry from the question of whether a warrant is 225 (“[T]he reasonableness of a search conducted pursuant to a warrant is a (citation omitted) (quoting Richards, 520 U.S. at 395)); cf. Schulz, 164 N.H. at be evaluated as of the time they [conduct the entry].’” (alteration in original) reasonableness of a police officer’s decision to conduct a no - knock entry ‘must reasonableness clause, as opposed to its warrant clause [,]. . . the their presence when executing a warrant “falls under the Fourth Amendment’s F.3d at 83 (explaining that, because the rule that officers knock and announce inconsistent with the nature of this inquiry. See id.; see also Boulanger, 444 unreasonably because of conduct that occurred prior to its execution is conclusion that the search warrant for the defendant’s home was executed warrant’s execution was reasonable. See Schulz, 164 N.H. at 221. A pertinent inquiry under Part I, Article 19 is whether the manner of the warrant is executed . . . does not require prior judicial authorization.”). The Henderson, 629 N.W.2 d 613, 621 (Wis. 2001) (“[T]he manner in which a search States v. Boulanger, 444 F.3d 76, 83 - 84 (1st Cir. 2006); see also State v. did not obtain the magistrate’s express authorization to do so. See United the officers intended to utilize civilian aid when they acquired the warrant but time of the warrant’s execution would somehow become unreasonable because Moreover, we fail to see how civilian involv e ment that is reasonable at the

warrant’s execution. See Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 258 (1979). subject to later judicial scrutiny in reviewin g the reasonableness of the participation at the time of the warrant’s issuance, the civilian’s participation is Regardless of whether the issuing magistrate expressly authorizes the civilian’s constitutional standard of re asonableness.” Bellville, 375 F.3d at 33. the use of civilians in the execution of a search must still meet the especially one that is “unnecessary in light of the overarching requirement that We see no reason to create a new constitutional rule in this case, p. 11 11

HICKS, BASSETT, and DONOVAN, JJ., concurred.

such a violation. the evidence obtained from the search would be an appropriate remedy for need not address the defendant’s arguments regarding whether suppressio n of Because we have concluded that a constitutional violation did not occur, we defendant has failed to demonstrate that her right to privacy was violated. See Schulz, 164 N.H. at 221; Bellville, 375 F.3d at 33 - 34. Additionally, the State did not violate the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement. the Federal Constitution in these circumstances, we further conclude that the the warrant’s execution. As the State Constitution is at least as protective as reasonable by failing to obtain authorization for HSUS’s involvement prior to 19’s requirement that the manner of a search warrant’s execution be In summation, we conclude that the State did not violate Part I, Art icle

assistance under Part I, Article 19’s reasonableness requirement. above, such disclosure and approval are not prerequisites to the civilians’