2019-0464, Appeal of Laura LeBorgne

record. In May 2011, while working as a nurse for the respondent, the The f ollowing facts were found by the C A B or are undisputed in the

(2010) to her case. We reverse and remand. her workplace injury, and in applying the requirements of RSA 281 - A:23, V(c) burden to prove that the treatment was reasonable, necessary, and related to Hospital. She argues that the CAB erred in finding that she failed to satisfy her in New York to treat an injury suffered while working for the respondent, Elliot denial of her request for reimbursement for massage therapy that she received of th e New Hampshire Compensation Appeals Board (CAB) upholding the HANTZ MARCONI, J. The petitioner, Laura LeBorgne, appeals a decision

G. Falkenham on the brief and orally), for the respondent. Devine, Millimet & Branch, Professional Association, of Manchester (Eric

Callan E. Sullivan on the brief, and Mr. Wiseman orally), for the petitioner. Cleveland, Waters and Bass, P.A., of Concord (Mark D. Wiseman and

(New Hampshire C ompensation Appeals Board) APPEAL OF LAURA LEBO RGNE

No. 2019 - 0464 Compensation Appeals Board

http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. release. The direct address of the court ’ s home page is: Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 a.m. on the morning of their reported by e - mail at the following address: reporter@courts.state.nh. us. corrections may be made before the opinion goes to press. Errors may be Doe Drive, Concor d, New Hampshire 03301, of any editorial errors in order that requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New Hampshire, One Charles as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. Readers are NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule p. 2 22 as well 2

treatment plan has significantly improve[d] her quality of life and mobility, circu lation and helps decrease pain. Her current [the petitioner’s] work related injury. Massage therapy improves reasonable and necessary in managing chronic should er pain from It is my medical opinion that the weekly massage therapy is

p. 2 2012.” In his letter dated September 2018, Kim further stated, has been an intricate part of her rehabilitation and management of pain since with weekly deep tissue massages with [a] licensed massage therapist as this Kim further opined, “I t is medically necessary that [the petitioner] continue combination with other treatment provided a “significant decrease in pain.” that she had been completing weekly deep tissue massages, which in management of right shoulder pain/right upper back pain” and highlighted 2018 letter, Kim explained that he was seeing the petitioner for “treatment and and necessary in managing the petitioner’s work - related injury. In a June opinion that the massage therapy the petitioner had undergone was reasonable two lett ers summarizing the petitioner’s treatment plan and stating his medical contemporaneous treatment notes reference massage therapy. Kim later wrote ordered the continuance of massage therapy. Not all of Kim’s took the petitioner off opioid medications, prescribed a new muscle relaxer, and resides, and started seeing Dr. Charles Kim, an ort hopedic pain specialist. He The petitioner subsequently moved to New York, where she currently

daily function.” and reported that this regimen of treatment was “necessary to maintain her Her doctor had also prescribed chiropractic treatments and massage therapy, shoulder girdle” a nd stated that he was we a ning her off opioid medications. diagnosed her with “chronic myofascial pain of [the] right cervical spine and time. As of p. 2 2016, the petitioner’s treating physician in New Hampshire had with physical therapy, trigger point injections, and acupuncture during this medications did not help and she had difficulty sleeping. She was also treated opioids to control her pain though the petitioner reported that these Between 2012 and 2016, the petitioner was consist ently treated with

enough to “resume life.” muscle relaxers and opioids, but the relief they provided was not significant see a specialist. She was prescribed several types of medications, including as though she had “hit a wall and was not improving,” and that she needed to treatment failed to fully control the petitioner’s pain, and she reported feeling combination of ice, physical therapy, and trigger point injections. This was diagnosed with a trapezius strain and was initially prescribed a shoulder, and upper right side of her body. Shortly thereafter, the petitioner bed. The petitioner reported feeling sudden and severe pain in her jaw, neck, petitioner was injured when she was transitioning a patient from a chair to a p. 3 3

and qualifications. The evidence provided to the CAB also included Farber’s the two New York LMTs, and letters from the LMTs explaining their training contemporaneous treatment notes and opinion letters, treatment records from medical history, including treatment records from her previous doctors, Kim’s For her hearing before t he CAB, t he petitioner provided evidence of her

related or medically necessary to her [2011] injury.” therapy treatment was “excessive” and “[t]herefore, . . . was not reasonable, medical endpoint.” Farber concluded that the petitioner’s ongoing massage treatment,” but also stated that the petitioner ha d not reached a “maximum reported that “[t] here is no need for further physical therapy or surgical spent five minutes with the petitioner and reviewed her medical records. He petitioner and conducted an Independent Medical Examination (IME). Farber Prior to th e department hearing, Dr. Andrew Farber met with the

A:4 p. 3 3, I(b) (20 10). petitioner appealed the hearing officer’s decision to the CAB. See RSA 281 for reimbursement shall remain denied.” See RSA 281 - A:43, I(a) (2010). The hearing, the department hearing officer concluded that the petitioner’s “claim with the New Hampshire Department of Labor to review this decision. After a for personally. Her claim was denied, and t he petitioner requested a hearing massage therapy tre atment in New York, submitting the bills that she had paid customary 20% tip. In 2017, the petitioner requested reimbursement for her sessions in blocks of 10 because it was less expensive, and including a however, t he petitioner paid for her treatment s out of pocket, purchasing respondent had covered the cost of her massage therapy. In New York, P rior to the start of the petitioner’s treatments in New York, the

baseline pain level of 4 out of 10 and that she tries not to miss a treatment. right shoulder. She reported that the massage therapy has maintained her myofascial release in sixty - minute session s, once a week, with a focus on her 2017 to January 2018. The petitioner received deep tissue massages with received in New York from two licensed massage therapists (LMTs) from May The treatments at issue are the massage therapy that the petitio ner

Kim at the time of the C A B ’s hearing. “fog” due to the opioid medications. The petitioner was still being treated by led to a better quality of life, and that she can sleep now and is no longer in a combination of the new muscle relaxer and the continued massage therapy has pain jumps to a 6 or 7 out of 10. However, the petitioner also reported that the her baseline for pain is a 4 out of 10, and she experiences flare - ups where the The petitioner reported to the C A B that she still experiences pain “24/7,”

narcotics. mental health and enables her to manage pain without the use of p. 4 4

(2007). As the appealing party, the petitioner has the burden of demonstrating unreasonable. Appeal of Panaggio, 172 N.H. 13, 15 (2019); see RSA 5 p. 4 41:13 by a clear preponderance of the evidence, we find it to be unjust or We will not disturb the CAB’s decision absent an error of law, or unless,

See RSA 281 - A: p. 4 43, I(c) (2010). objected. The CAB denied the petitioner’s motion, and t his appeal followed. The petitioner filed a motion for a rehearing, to which the respondent

requirement. CAB determined that there was not good cause to waive the 10 - day reporting Compensation Medical Form (form) within 10 days of the first treatment. The waive the requirement for submi ssion of the New Hampshire Workers’ evaluate d whether the petitioner met the statute’s “good cause” exception to The CAB discuss ed and appl ied the requirements of RSA 281 - A:23, V(c), and

submit the workers compensation form . . . . should be denied, because the New York LMTs did not complete or New Hampshire. However, the [respondent] argues that the claim comple te the required workers compensation form for the State of therapy. . . because those Licensed Massage Therapists. . . did reasonable. It further argued that it did cover [prior] massage not meet her burden of proof, and that the treatment was not H owever, the [respondent] argued that the [petitioner] did

(Record citations omitted.) The CAB continued:

review of her medical records. that only spent five minutes with the [petitioner] and conducted a than those of Dr. Farber, who is an independent m edical examiner Kim’s medical opinions t o be slightly more reasonable and sounder were written at the request of the [petitioner]. We also find that Dr. does explain th e treatmen t plan more clearly in two letters that therapy was missing from several of his notes disturbing. Dr. Kim weight as a treating physician, but found the fact that massage gives Dr. Kim’s medical opinions and recommendations substantial The panel finds that Ms. LeBorgne was a credible witness. It also

her workplace injury on May 19, 2011.” In its discussion, the CAB stated: treatments . . . are reasonable, medically necessary, and [ca u sally] related to burden of proof to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the medical conclud ed “[o]n the issue of RSA 281 - A:23,. . . the [petitioner] has not met her IME report and the petitioner’s testimony. Following the heari ng, t he CAB p. 5 5

employee’s ability to return to work, “and any other information to enable the limited to, information relating to the medical status of the employee and the remedial treatment.” RSA 281 - A:23, V(b). The report shall include, but is not providers and health care facilities shall report medical, surgical or other was developed pursuant to paragraph V as the “form on which health care decision in context. The New Hampshire Workers’ Compensation Medical Form A brief description of RSA 281 - A:23, V is also necessary to put the CAB ’s

id. treat ment is reasonable, necessary, and related to the workplace injury. See medical treatment under RSA 281 - A:23, I, the claimant must prove that the to the initial compensable treatment. Id. Thus, to obtain reimbursement for so long as the condition or disability requiring the treatment is causally related injury. Id. The claimant is entitled to compensation for medical treatment only subsequent medical treatment is reasonable and required as a result of the N.H. 12, 1 p. 5 5 (2002). The claimant bears the burden of proving that the injury that necessitated the subs equent health care. Appeal of Wingate, 149 required by an injured employee’s condition when it bears liability for the initial employer has a continuing obligation to pay for medical care for as long as is period as the nat ure of the injury may require.” RSA 281 - A:23, I. Thus, an furnished to an injured employee reasonable medical . . . services . . . for such statute, “[a]n employer subject to this chapter. . . shall furnish or cause to be are contained in RSA 281 - A:23 (Supp. 2019). Pursuant to p aragraph I of this The relevant provisions of New Hampshire’s Workers’ Compensation Law

injury. whether the treatment was reasonable, necessary, and related to her work place considered non compliance with RSA 281 - A:23, V(c) in its determination of CAB’s decision, we agree with the petitioner that the CAB errone ously v. Town of Temple, 1 p. 5 57 N.H. 642, 649 (2008). Based upon our review of th e CAB’s decision presents a question of law, which we review de novo. See Guy from conflicting interpretation s of the CAB ’s decision. The interpretation of the barring the petitioner from receiving reimbursement. These arguments ar ise under RSA 281 - A:23, V (c) amounted to a separate and alternative finding injury. The respondent counters that the CAB’s analysis of the requirements treatment itself was not reasonable, necessary, and related to her workplace by RSA 281 - A:23, V(c) in making its determination that the massage therapy considering the failure of her massage therapists to submit the form required On appeal, the petitioner argues that the CAB erred by improperly

We review its statutory interpretation de novo. Id. the CAB’s factual findings deferentially. Appeal of Panaggio, 172 N.H. at 1 p. 5 5. be prima facie lawful and reasonable. Id.; see RSA 541:13. Thus, we review All findings of the CAB upon questions of fact properly before it are deemed to that the CAB’s decision was erroneous. Appeal of Panaggio, 172 N.H. at 15. p. 6 6

York LMTs failed to submit the required form. Following it s application of petitioner’s current claim for reimbursement should be denied because the New New Hampshire,” as required by RSA 281 - A: 23, and further argued that the Therapists. . . complete [d] the. .. workers compensation form for the State of argued that it cover ed prior massage therapy “because those Licensed Massage reasonable.” Immediately thereafter, the CAB specifically noted the respondent [petitioner] di d not meet her burden of proof, and that the treatment was not beginning its analysis by saying, “H owever, the [respondent] argued that the The CAB then transition ed to a discussion of RSA 281 - A:23, V(c),

manage her work - related injury, “was a credible witness.” the benefits of massage therapy a s part of her ongoing treatment plan to her medical records. The CAB also found that the petitioner, who testified to who the CAB noted “only spent five minutes with the” petitioner and reviewed opinions to b e “slightly more reasonable and sounder than those of Dr. Farber,” physician,” see Appeal of Morin, 140 N.H. 515, 519 (1995), and found his medical opinions and recommendations substantial weight as a treating workplace injury.” In reaching this conclusion, the CAB gave “Dr. Kim’s . . . are reasonable, medically necessary, and [causally] related to her proof to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the medical treatments conclusion, in its entirety, was that the petitioner had “not met her burden of limited to a decision “[o]n the i ssue of RSA 281 - A:23.” (E mphasis added.) That the issue of the requirements of RSA 281 - A:23, V(c). The CAB’s conclusion is reasonable, necessary, and related to her work place injury; and the second on first on the issue of the petitioner’s burden to prove the treatment w as characterized as having articulated two separate and alternative rulings — the Turning now to the CAB’s decision, we conclude that it can not be fairly

RSA 281 - A:23, V(c) (emphasis added).

f acility within 30 days of receipt of a bill for services. insurer or insurer shall pay the health care provider or health care treatment.. . . The employer, claims adjustment company, self company, or claims adjusting company within 10 days of the first repor t required in subparagraph (b) to the employer, insurance giving medical, surgical, or other remedial treatment furnishes the rendered, unless the health care provider or health care facility under this chapter. There shall be no reimbursement for services or her employer for services covered by insurers or self - insurers determined by the commissioner, bills an injured employee or his any health care provider who without sufficient cause, as The commissioner may assess a civil penalty of up to $2,500 on

and payable.” Id. Subparagraph V(c) provides in relevant part: employer or insurance carrier to determine the benefits, if any, that are due p. 7 7

cause within the meaning of RSA 281 - A:23 V.” [petitioner’s] providers to complete and submit Worker’s Compensation Medical Forms is not good reason explicitly ar ticulated within the CAB’s decision for denying the motion was: “The refusal of the medical treatment itself is reasonable, necessary, and related to the work injury,” the only the requirements of subparagraph V(c) have “nothing to do with the threshold issue of whether motion for rehearing. Although the petitioner argued, inter alia, in her motion for rehearing that Our interpretation of the CAB ’s decision is strengthened by the CAB’s ruling on the petitioner’s 1

to determine whether we would have found differently than did the board, or to massage therapy as part of the petitioner’s treatment plan, and “our task is not Although some of Kim’s contemporaneous treatment notes did not explicitly list that massag e therapy was missing from several of [Kim’s] notes disturbing.” grounding this interpretation i n the CAB ’s statement that it “found the fact found that Kim’s opinion failed to support the petitioner’s contentions, petitioner’s 2011 injury. The responden t interprets the CAB ’s order as having massage therapy treatment was not reasonable, necessary, and related to the discussion of the evidence presented supports its finding that the New York the LMTs ’ failure to submit a Workers ’ Compensation Medical Form, the CAB’s The respondent argues that, notwithstandi ng the CAB’s consideration of

281 - A:23, V(c) had not been submitted. necessary, and related to her 2011 injury because the form required by RSA establish that her New York massage therapy treatment was reasonable, 53 p. 7 7 - 38. Th u s, the CAB improperly determined that the petitioner had failed to workplace injury. See RSA 281 - A:23, I, V(c); cf. Appeal of Lalime, 141 N.H. at treatment itself was reasonable, necessary, and related to a patient - employee’s the first treatment simply does not bear on the question of whether the provider furnished a Workers ’ Compensation Medical Form within 10 days of render the cost of testing and treatment unreasonable). Whether a health care N.H. 534, 538 (1996) (holding that the petitioner’s negative test results did not seek further treatment, be it diagnostic or palliative.” Appeal of Lalime, 141 the time the [treatment was] ordered, it was reasonable for [the petitioner] to analysis is whether the petitioner presented objective evidence showing, that at RSA 281 - A:23. W hen determining the reasonableness of treatment, “t he proper necessary, and related to the workplace injury under RSA 281 - A:23, I. See the determination of whether the treatment received was reasonable, Failure to meet the requirements of RSA 281 - A:23, V(c) is irrelevant to

constituted legal error. w as reasonable, necessary, and related to her work place injury. This 1 single conclusion — that the petitioner failed to establish that her treatment weight,” and finding Kim’s opinions more reasonable than Farber’s, to reach a petitioner’s tes timony credible, affording Kim’s medical opinions “substantial non compliance with RSA 2 p. 8 81 - A:23, V(c) against its prior statements finding the burden of proof. We understand the CAB to have weighed its finding of subparagraph V(c), the CAB concluded that the petitioner had not met her 8

treatment at issue was reasonable, necessary, and related to her workplace have found that the petitioner failed to prove that the massage therapy necessary in treating her work - related injury. The CAB could not reasonably substantial weight to his opi nion that massage therapy was reasonable and explicitly found that Kim ordered the continuance of massage therapy and gave recommendation that the petitioner continue massage therapy, the CAB As discussed above, although some of Kim’s notes did not contain his

in light of its other findings. proof could not “reasonably . . . have been made” based upon Kim’s notes, id., 474, the CAB ’s decision finding that the petitioner had not met her burden of decision reasonably could have been made,” Appeal of Dean Foods, 15 p. 8 8 N.H. at supported by competent evidence in the record “upon which the board’s administrative board’s findin gs of fact will not be disturbed if they are the petitioner did not carry her burden of proof. Although it is true that an competent evidence in the record to support the CAB’s ultimate decision that The respondent also argues that Kim’s contemporaneous notes qualify as

that Kim’s “opinion failed to support the [petitioner’s] contentions.” Kim’s medical opinion, the C AB did not conclude, as the respondent asser ts, Even assuming the CAB discounted the weight it might have otherwise afforded opinions to be slightly more reasonable and sounder than those of Dr. Farber.” “explain [ed] the treatment plan more clearly,” and found “Dr. Kim’s medical Kim provided, but immediately thereafter note d that Kim’s two opinion letter s what it deemed to be a “disturbing” discrepancy in the documentary evidence treatment, and the CAB credited the petitioner’s testimony. The CAB did note her visits with Kim, he verbally recommended that she receive massage therapy continuance of massage therapy.” Moreover, the petitioner testified that during To the contrary, the C AB explicitly found that Kim “ordered the

medical evidence provided by Kim, see G uy, 157 N.H. at 649. 41 p. 8 8 - 19 (1996), we do not interpret the CAB ’s decision as having rejected the considerations supporting its decision to do so, Appeal of Kehoe, 141 N.H. 412, reject even an uncontradicted medical opinion so long as it identifies the workers’ compensation case . . . .”). Although an administrative board is free to of Morin, 140 N.H. at 519 (“Treating physicians are especially important in a contemporaneous treatment notes and subsequent opinion letters. See Appeal work related injury” despite the apparent disconnect between some of his massage therapy is reasonable and necessary in managing . . . [the petitioner’s] The C AB afforded “substantial weight” to Kim’s opinion that “weekly

at 64 p. 9 9. belies the respondent’s interpretation of the CAB ’s decisio n, see Guy, 157 N.H. (quotation omitted), the CAB ’s own characterization of the evidence before it reweigh the evidence,” Appeal of Dean Foods, 15 p. 8 8 N.H. 467, 474 (2009) 9

Compensation Law liberally to give the broade st reasonable effect to its legislature did not see fit to include. Id. We construe the Workers’ will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the words used. Id. We i nterpret legislative intent from the statute as written and language of the statute and ascribe the plain and ordinary meanings to the as a whole. Appeal of Phillips, 16 p. 9 9 N.H. 177, 180 (2016). We first examine the th e intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered On questions of statutory interpretation, this court is the final arbiter of

language of the statute supports the petitioner’s interpretation. be submitted within 10 days of the first treatment to her case. The plain subparagraph V(c)’s requirement that a Workers’ Compensation Medical Form treatments she had paid for personally, the CAB erred in applying employer. Therefore, she asserts, because she is seeking reimbursement for arr angements between a health care provider and an insurance carrier and/or that the requirements of RSA 281 - A:23, V(c) apply only to reimbursement CAB’s refusal to order the [petitioner] be reimbursed.” The petitioner argues respondent asserts provides “a stand - alone basis sufficient to support the LMTs failed to comply with the requirements of RSA 281 - A:23, V(c), which the being reimburse d for her New York massage therapy treatment because the The respondent maintains that the petitioner is nonetheless barred from

14 p. 9 9 N.H. at 15; see also RSA 541:13. workplace injury. See Appeal of Panaggio, 172 N.H. at 15; Appeal of Wingate, prove that the treatment at issue was reasonable, necessary, and related to her reverse the board’s decision that the petitioner did not m e et her burden to the petitioner did not carry her burden under RSA 281 - A:23, I. W e therefore evidence in the record upon which we could affirm the CAB ’s conclusion that CAB’s factual findings and credibility determinations, there is not competent 281 - A:23, I; Ap peal of Wingate, 149 N.H. at 15. We also find that, given the reasonable, necessary, and related to her 2011 work place injury. See RSA in its determination that the petitioner failed to establish the treatment was considered the LMTs’ failure to submit forms pursuant to RSA 281 - A:23, V(c) To summarize, we agree with the petitioner that the C AB improperly

158 N.H. at 474. CAB ’s decision could reasonably have been made. See Appeal of Dean Foods, Kim’s notes do n ot constitute competent evidence in the record upon which the board cannot rest its decision on contradictory factual findings). Therefore, Courville Associates, 127 N.H. 21, 32 (1 p. 9 985) (explaining that an administrative Kim ordered the continuance of massage therapy. See Appeal of Lemire recommendation, while also finding, based upon the evidence befor e it, that injury because some of Kim’s notes did not contain the massage p. 10 10

of the subparagraph supports this construction as well. It provides, “The days of receipt of a bill for services.” Id. (emphasis added). The first sentence or insurer shall pay the health care provider or health care facility within 30 subparagraph states, “The employer, claims adjustment company, self - insurer recipients of treatment from such entities. See id. The final sentence of the a whole, is focused on health care providers and healt h care facilities, not the This interpretation is strengthened by the fact that subparagraph V(c), as

V(c). to another, i.e., the health care provider or health care facility. RSA 281 - A:23, party seeking reimbursement is the party “render[ing],” or delivering, services subpar a graph V(c) a ddresses the requirements for reimbursement when the guidance.”); see also RSA 21:2 (2012). In other words, this language in in the statute, we look to its common usage, using the dictionary for Co. v. Town of Pelham, 167 N.H. 180, 185 (2014) (“When a term is not defined International Dictionary 1922 (unabridged ed. 2002); see K.L.N. Constr uction cause to become,” and “to do (a service) for another.” Webster ’ s Third New The plain and ordinary meaning of “render” is “to give back, deliver, yield, effectuate “reimbursement for services rendered.” RSA 281 - A:23, V(c); see id. T he health care provider or facility must furnish the pertinent report to

contemplates as the actor seeking reimbursement under subparagraph V(c). accordingly. RSA 281 - A:23, V(b) - (c). The parties dispute who m the statute “report” information via the developed form and “furnish[] th e report” and (c), it is the health care provider and /or health care facilit y that must both RSA 281 - A:23, V(c). The parties do not dispute that under subparagraphs V(b) company, or claims adjusting company within p. 10 10 days of the first treatment.” furnishes the report required in subparagraph (b) to the employer, insurance health care facility giving medical, surgical, or other remedial treatment be no reimbursemen t for services rendered, unless the health care provider or The sentence to which the respondent refers reads in full — “There shall

arrive at the opposite conclusion, see id.; Appeal of Morin, 140 N.H. at 519. statute as a whole, see Appeal of Phillips, 169 N.H. at 180, and i n doing so, seeking to be reimbursed. We must interpret this clause in the context of the that the legislature did not intend to create a distinction based upon the party stating, “[t]here shall be no reimbursement for services rendered,” as evidence The respondent points to the mandatory language i n RSA 281 - A:23, V(c),

distinguish between palliative and curative care). Levesque, 136 N.H. 2 p. 11 11, 213 - 14 (1992) (holding RSA 281 - A:23, I, does not the remedial purpose of workers’ compensation laws”); cf., e.g., Appeal of favor of the injured employee in order to give the broadest reasonable eff ect to (explaining that we “resolv[e] all reasonable doubts in statutory construction in remedial purpose. Id.; see Appeal of Griffin, 140 N.H. 650, 654 (1996) 11

HICKS, BASSETT, and DONOVAN, JJ., concurred.

the petitioner’s benefits. See Appeal of Kehoe, 141 N.H. at 420. to her 20 p. 11 11 workplace injury, and we remand to the CAB for a calculation of the massage therapy treatment at issue was reasonable, necessary, and related In sum, we reverse the CAB’s decision that the petitioner failed to prove

“good cause” exception of subparagraph V(c). See RSA 281 - A:23, V(c). petitioner’s case, we need not address the parties’ arguments pertaining to the Because we construe RSA 281 - A:23, V(c) as inapplicable to the

See Appeal of Morin, 140 N.H. at 519; Appeal of P hillips, 169 N.H. at 180. reasonable effect to the remedial purpose of the Workers’ Compensation Law. construction of the statut e i s consistent with o ur goal of giving the broadest Admin. R., Lab 508. 01 (b) (tracking language of RSA 281 - A:23, V (c)). Our Administrative Rules, Lab 508.01(b) supports a different conclusion. See N.H. .. . .”). We also disagree with the respondent that New Hampshire recover any amount expended by him for such treatment or services unless L.2020, chapters 1 to 56, 58 to 127) (“The employee shall not be entitled to Compensation Law § 13 (West, Westlaw through L.2019, chapter 758 & did not see fit to include.”). Compare RSA 281 - A:23, with N.Y. Workers’ consider what the legislature might have said or add language the legislature 180 (“We interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and will not providers does not change o ur conclusion. See Appeal of Phillips, 169 N.H. at employees who are seeking reimbursement for payments made to health care legislature did not see fit to create a parallel set of requirements for patient that she made to providers for treatment she received. See id. That the do not apply to a patient - employee who is seeking reimbursement of payments rendered.” Id. By the plain language of RSA 281 - A:23, V(c), its requirements care providers and health care facilities seeking “reimbursement for services “[t]here shall be no reimbursement for services rendered” applies only to health Thus, we conclude th at RSA 281 - A:23, V(c) ’s provision stating that

services are covered by insurers or self - insurers. See id. from a patien t - employee or her employer without sufficient cause when the provision states that it is improper for any such provider to seek payment seeking to be paid for services rendered is “any health care provider,” id., and insurers or self - insurers under this chapter.” Id. The contemplated actor bills an injured employee or his or her employer for services cove red by provider who without sufficient cause, as determined by the commissioner, commissioner may assess a civil penalty of up to $2,500 on any health care