2018-0086, 2018-0153, 2018-0398, In the Matter of Crystal Ndyaija and Joshua Ndyaija

affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand. lacked jurisdiction over the divorce action under RSA 458:5 and :6 (2018). W e initial child custody determination under RSA chapter 458 - A (2018), and The r espondent also argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to make an granting the petitioner’s motion to approve daycare enrollment for the child. parenting plan, and ordering him to pay the petitioner’s attorney’s fees; and (6) parties’ parenting plan and permanent stipulation, vacating a provision of the obligations for the parties’ minor child; (5) denying his motion to modify the interference; (3) denying his motion to restrain; (4) modi fying his child support petitioner, Crystal Ndyaija; (2) denying his motion regarding parental trial court erred by: (1) dismissing his motion for contempt against the Introcaso, J J.) following the parties’ divorce. The r espondent argues that the Ndyaija, appeals various orders issued by the Circuit Court (Quigley and DONOVAN, J. In this consolidated appeal, the r espondent, Joshua

Joshua Nd yaija, self - represented party, by brief.

for the petitioner. Smith - Weiss Shepard, P.C., of Nashua (Robert M. Shepard on the brief),

2018 - 0398 2018 - 0153 No s. 2018 - 0086 9th Circuit - N ashua Family Division

http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. release. The direct address of the court ’ s home page is: Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 a.m. on the morning of their reported by e - mail at the following address: reporter@courts.state.nh. us. corrections may be made before the opinion goes to press. Errors may be Doe Drive, Concor d, New Hampshire 03301, of any editorial errors in order that requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New Hampshire, One Charles as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. Readers are NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule p. 2 22 as well 2

through their employers. both parties to obtain life insurance for the benefit of the child if available either party obtaining new employment. The permanent stipulation required month in child support and provided that the order shall be reviewed upon The uniform support order required the respondent to pay $50 per

the is sue the parties may seek the assistance of the C ourt. has not been reached. In the event the meeting does not resolve fourteen (14) days of notice by one party that an email resolution meeting to try to resolve the issue. That meeting shall occur within [and] each party sh all have the option of bringing one person to a (14) days, the parties shall seek the assistance of an individual(s), email exchanges. If there has been no resolution within fourteen Parties shall attempt to resolve any disagreement first through

disagreement between the parties arose, stating: of the parenting plan set forth dispute resolution procedures in the event a March, p. 2 2017 to revise this plan before [the child] goes to school.” Paragraph H and adjust the parenting plan, and noted that the parties “agree to meet in the parties meet “as often as necessary for the benefit of the child” t o review holidays. It further required, under paragraph G of the parenting plan, that respondent with parenting time during weekends, vacations, and certain required the child to reside primarily w ith the petitioner and provided the permanent stipulation, and uniform support order. The parenting plan Court (Quigley, J.) approved, a final divorce decree, parenting plan, partial In May 2016, a Marital Master (DalPra, M.) recommended, and the Trial

supervised visits with the child for two days a week. child live primarily with her mother and allowed the respondent to have trial court issued a temporary child custody order, which provided that the petitioner indicated, was still pending at the time of her divorce petition. T he visitation in a Massachusetts court filed by the respondent, which, the petitioner but which expired in July p. 2 2015; and (2) an action for custody and issuance of a restraining order which awarded custody of the child to the (1) a July 2014 matter in a Massachusetts district court that resulted in the trial court of her involvement in two court cases relating to custody of the child: divorce in the New Hampshire Circuit C ourt. In that petition, she notified the not provide additional details. In August 2015, the petitioner filed a petition for domestic violence - related matter from a Massachusetts district court, but did petition, she notified the trial court of an August 2014 court order on a petition for legal separation in the New Hampshire Circuit Court. In her moved to New Hampshire with their child. In May 2015, the petitioner filed a 2012 and lived together in Massachusetts until July 2014, when the petitioner The record supports the following facts. The parties married in July

enroll the child in private daycare and kindergarten in New Hampshire, to be beliefs. T he petitioner objected, and thereafter filed a motion to allow her to requirement in the permanent stipulation because it violated his religious to review and adjust the parenting plan, and remove the life insurance Petitioner accountable for dishonoring” the requirement in paragraph G to meet to, in part, award him additional parenting time with the child, “hold [the] permanent stipulation. He requested that the court modify the parenting plan Subsequently, the respondent moved to modify the parenting plan and

denied. (DCSS). The r espondent filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court immediate income assignment to the Division of Child Support Services order required the respondent to pay the weekl y child support and arrearage by child support obligation, which the trial court determined to be $5,149. p. 3 3 8. The accrued since September 18, 2017, the date he filed his motion to modify his 2019). The order also r equired the respondent to pay an arrearage that had court found “no justification for an adjustment.” See RSA 458 - C:5 (Supp. requested the court to deviate from the child support guidelines, but the trial the respondent’s child support obligation to $274 per week. The respondent Trial C ourt (Introcaso, J.) issued a new uniform support order that increase d into account the respondent’s new source of income. Following a hearing, the child support obligation, while the petitioner sought a modification that took new employment. The respondent sought termination or a reduction of the modify the respondent’s child support obligation after the respondent obtained Thereafter, the respondent and the petitioner filed separate motions to

motion regarding parental interference. dismissing the contempt motion and denying his motion to restrain and his (Dalpra, M.) recommended, and the Trial Court (Quigley, J.) approved, an order any further harm to [his] livelihood.” Following a hearing, the Marital Master and retract “slanderous allegations” against him and “restrain [] her from doing interference” — in which he requested the court to order the petitioner to stop with the trial court — a motion “to restrain” and a motion regarding “parental Shortly thereafter, in September 2017, the respondent filed two motions

paragraph G, but not paragraph H. because the trial c ourt’s order addressed the petitioner’s compliance with r espondent appealed to this court and we vacated and remanded the decision recommended by a Marital Master (DalP ra, M.) dismissing the motion. The objected to the motion. T h e Trial C ourt (Introcaso, J.) approved an order or meet in person within 1 p. 4 4 days as required by paragraph H. T he p etitioner unresolved disputes and alleged that the petitioner failed to respond to emails forth in paragraph H of the parenting plan. His motion set forth several alia, that the petitioner failed to adhere to the dispute resolution procedures set In August 2016, the r espondent filed a contempt motion alleging, inter 4

petitioner filed her original petition for legal separation in New Hampshire. The citing the active status of the Massachusetts restraining order at the time the he disputed the trial court’s conclusion t hat New Hampshire had jurisdiction, court’s factual finding on the dismissal of the Massachusetts action. Instead, respondent filed a motion to reconsider. His motion did not dispute the trial 2015, and, therefore, New Hampshire “had subject matter jurisdiction.” The Massachusetts court dismissed the child custody proceeding o n October 21, On remand, the trial court issued an or der finding that the

appeal. 25, 2019) (slip op. at 2). We retained jurisdiction of the remaining issues on proceeding. See In re Guardianship of K.B., 17 2 N.H. ___, ___ (decided October jurisdiction under the U CCJEA may be challenged at any time during the jurisdiction to make or modify a child custody determination, and, therefore, first time on appeal, the UCCJEA governs the court’s subject matter A:17, II. We noted that, even though the respondent raises this issue for the commenced the child custody proceeding in New Hampshire. See R SA p. 4 458 make findings and rulings as to whether it had jurisdiction when the petitioner remanded the issue of jurisdiction under the UCCJEA to the trial court to proceeding or ruled that New Hamp shire was a more appropriate forum, we nothing in the appellate record showed that Massachusetts had terminated the pending child custody proceeding commenced in a Massachusetts court, and 458 - A:17, I. Because the petitioner’s divorce petition alerted the trial court to a the other state because a court of this state is a more convenient forum.” RSA chapter, unless the proceeding has been terminated or is stayed by the court of of another state having jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this of the proceeding,” a child custody proceeding “has been commenced in a court its jurisdiction” over a child custody case “if, at the time of the commencement Pursuant to the UCCJEA, a court in New Hampshire “may not exercise

ch. p. 4 458 - A. Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcemen t Act (UCCJEA). See RSA including the court’s jurisdiction over the child custody proceeding under the for the first time on appeal, the trial court’s jurisdiction to rule on these issues, cou rt’s decisions. T he respondent also makes several arguments challenging, consolidated, setting forth numerous challenges to the merits of the trial The respond ent filed three separate appeals of these orders, which we

court denied. kindergarten. The r espondent filed a motion for reconsideration, which the petitioner’s request allowing her to enroll the child in private daycare and awarded attorney’s fees to the petitioner. The trial court also granted the G of the parenting plan, and, finding the respondent’s motion to be frivolous, (Introcaso, J.) denied the respondent’s requests, sua sponte vacated p ar agraph paid for solely by her. Following a hearing on these matters, t he Trial Court p. 5 5

of a Massachusetts case relating to domestic violence but provided no further The petitioner’s initial petition for legal separation notified the trial court

custody and visitation was pending. from domestic violence”); and (2) the respondent’s Massachusetts action for (defining “child - custody proceeding” to include a pro ceeding for “protection restraining order against the respondent was still active, see RSA 4 p. 5 58 - A:1, IV time the petitioner filed her petition for legal separation: (1) the Massachusetts in New Hampshire. See RSA 4 58 - A:17, I. Specifically, he contends that, at the Massachusetts at the time the petitioner filed the petition for legal separation jurisdiction because other child custody proceedings had commenced in Nevertheless, t he respondent contends that the trial court lacked

petitioner commenced the proceeding. See RSA 4 p. 5 58 - A:1, VII. months. Therefore, New Hampshire was the child’s home state on the date the time, the petitioner and the c hild had been living in New Hampshire for over six “commencement” as the “filing of the first pleading in a proceeding”). At that proceeding for divorce or separation), RSA 458 - A:1, V (defining physical custody, or visitation with respect to a child is a n issue,” including a (defining “child - custody proceeding” as “a proceeding in which legal custody, when the petitioner filed her petition for legal separation. See RSA 458 - A:1, IV 458 - A:1, VII. The child custody proceeding here commenced in May 2015 immediately before the commencement of a child - c ustody proceeding.” RSA which a child lived with a parent . . . for at least 6 consecutive months of the commencement of the proceeding.” A child’s “home state” is “the state in custody determination” if “[t] his state is the home state of the child on the date 458 - A:12, I, “a court of this state has jurisd iction to make an initial child jurisdiction over the child custody proceeding under the UCCJEA. Under RSA We first address the respondent’s arguments regarding the cour t’s

statutes not in isolation, but in the context of the overall statutory scheme. Id. add words that the lawmakers did not see fit to include. Id. We interpret N.H. at 6 p. 5 5. Courts can neither ignore the plain language of the legislation nor need not look beyond it for further indications of legislative i ntent. Gray, 160 N.H. 82, 86 (2014). When a statute’s language is plain and unambiguous, we ordinary meaning to the words used. In the Matter of Yaman & Yaman, 167 (2010). When examining the langu age of a statute, we ascribe the plain and the relevant statutes. See In the Matter of Gray & Gray, 160 N.H. 62, 65 To resolve the respondent’s jurisdictional challenges, we must interpret

with jurisdiction. trial court denied his motion. We now address all issu es on appeal, beginning p. 6 6

forth in RSA 458 - A:17 when alerted to a child custody proceeding in another Accordingly, while we urge New Hampshire courts to follow the directives set in New Hampshire since they moved here in July 2014. See RSA 458 - A:12, I. another state. Moreover, the petitioner and her child have continued to reside final divorce decree, no simultaneous child custody proceeding was pending in the time the trial court rendered its child custody determination as part of the prior to the court’s approval of the final divorce decree in May 201 p. 6 6. Thus, at 2015, during the pendency of the divorce proceeding in New Hampshire and A:17, II. N evertheless, the Massachusetts proceeding was dismissed in October proceeding and communicate with the Massachusetts court. See RSA 458 - 209B, § 2 (2016), the trial court was required to stay the New Hampshire UCCJEA, RSA 458 - A:17, II; compare RSA 458 - A:12 with Mass. Gen. Laws ch. “state having jurisdiction substantial ly in accordan ce” with New Hampshire’s simultaneous child custody proceeding in Massachusetts, which constitutes a Because the petitioner’s divorce pleading alerted the trial court to a

Hampshire court to dismiss the proceeding. this state is a more appropriate forum,” RSA 45 8 - A:17, II requires a New state.” Id. If the court of the other state “does not determine that the court of court “shall stay its proceedings and communicate with the court of the other having jurisdiction substantial ly in accordance with this chapter,” the trial child - custody proceeding has been commenced in a court in another state information supplied by the parties.” Then, “[i] f the court determines that a A:17, I I requires courts of this state to “examine the court documents and other To avoid jurisdictional conflicts in child custody proceedings, RSA 458 -

determination in August. dismissal occurred after the trial court here made its initial child custody t he Massachusetts court dismissed the action on October 21, 2015, the had “been drafted and will be marked up for Hearing in September.” Althou gh respondent in March 2015. She explained that a motion to dismiss the case pending Massachusetts action for custody and visitation filed by the The petitioner’s divorce petition also notified the trial court of the

stayed by the court of the other state”). jurisdiction where the proceeding in another state “has been terminated or is the UCCJEA. See RSA 458 - A:1 p. 7 7, I (permitting a court of this state to exercise not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to make such a determination under child custody determination made by the trial court here, and, therefore, did custody determination under the restraining order had terminated prior to any which t he respondent does not dispute. Thus, the Massachusetts ch ild notes, however, that the restraining order expired one year after it was issued, which awarded custody of the child to the petitioner. T he divorce petition also specifically, that the case involved a restraining order issued in July 2014, divorce petition provided additional details about the Massachusetts case — information describing the nature of the case. T he petitioner’s subsequent 7

trial court’s jurisdiction, he agreed to the court’s exercise of jurisdiction in this appeared in the trial court proceedings without raising any objection to the first time on appeal. The petitioner argues that, because the respondent As the petitioner notes, the respondent raises these argument s for the

while the plaintiff was domiciled in the state, and not otherwise.” “[j]urisdiction over the cause for divorce exists when it wholly arose or accrued the time when the act ion was commenced.” Pursuant to RSA 458:6, state”; or (3) “the plaintiff was domiciled in the state for one year next preceding the state and “the defendant was personally served with process within the th e state when the action was commenced”; (2) the plaintiff was domiciled in parties to a divorce case exists only where: (1) “both parties were domiciled in divorce, under RSA 458:6. Pursuant to RSA 458:5, a court’s jurisdiction over the parties to the divorce matter, under RSA 458:5, and the cause of the The respondent next argues that the trial court lac ked jurisdiction over

458 - A:19, I. Accordingly, the trial court was not required to decline jurisdiction under RSA that the respondent challenged the court’s jurisdiction prior to this appeal. challenging the court’s jurisdiction. Furthermore, nothing in the record reflect s participated in the litigation before the parenting plan was issued without ever court in May 2016 and, based up on the record before us, the respondent jurisdiction. See RSA 458 - A:1 9, I. The parenting plan was approved by the “unjustifiable,” both parents acquiesced to the trial court’s exercise of (1999)). However, even assuming that the petitioner’s actions were Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act § 101, cmt., 9 - 1A U.L.A. 65 p. 7 7 controversies over child custody. ’” Yaman, 167 N.H. at 87 (quotin g Unif. Child the UCCJEA: to “‘ [d] iscourage the use of the interstate system for continuing complaint for child custody and visitation undermines one of the purposes of in New Hampshire shortly after the respondent filed his Massachusetts We acknowledge that the petitioner’s filing of the petition for separation

acquiesced in the exercise of jurisdiction.” RSA 458 - A:19, I(a). jurisdiction where “[t]he parents and all persons acting as parents have unjustifiable conduct.” However, the statute permits the court to exer cise proceeding where “a person seeking to invoke its jurisdiction has engaged in requires a court to “decline to exercise its jurisdiction” in a child custody to the petitioner’s “unjustifiable conduct,” w e disagree. RSA 458 - A:19, I, argues that RSA 458 - A:19, I, required the trial court to decline jurisdiction due obtaining the restraining order in Massachusetts. To the extent the respondent sought to conceal their child from him by moving to New Hampshire after have jurisdiction over the child custody proceeding because the petitioner T he respondent, however, further argues that New Hampshire does not

custody determination following the dismissal of the Massachusetts action. state, we conclude that the trial court had jurisdiction to render i ts child p. 8 8

of the parties becomes domiciled here.” Id.; see RSA 45 p. 8 8:7 - a (2018). a continuing condition in the marriage relationship which may persist after one one such cause, because “[i]f the differences are not reconciled they constitute the [petitioner] becomes domiciled here.” Id. Irreconcilable differences may be elsewhere” may meet the requirement “if continued for the required time after are of a continuing nature.. . which began while [the petitioner] was domiciled Woodruff v. Woodruff, 114 N.H. 365, 367 (1974). However, “other causes that elsewhere may not meet the jurisdictional requirement und er RSA 458:6. of a crime [or] adultery” which have occurred while the petitioner is domiciled We have held that “causes involving a specific event such as a conviction

breakdown of the marriage.” divorce was “[i]rreconcilable differences which have caused t he irremediable stipulation, approved by the trial court in May 2016, the cause of the parties’ the trial court’s final divorce decree and the parties’ partial permanent representation about the cause for div orce or where it occurred. According to the Massachusetts Department of Family and Ch ildren. However, he makes no custody, the Massachusetts restraining order, and a neglect investigation with by the petitioner to a Massachusetts police department regarding child around July 2014 as the “origin and point of separation” — a n alleged inquiry respondent identifies a series of incidents that occurred in Massachusetts in or A s to the court’s jurisdiction over the cause of the divorce, t he

domici le requirement under RSA 45 p. 8 8:5 was met. See RSA 458:5, III. before she commenced the divorce action in August 2015. Therefore, the petitioner has been domiciled in New Hampshire since July 2014, over one year jurisdiction over the p arties to the divorce, t he record demonstrates that the trial court had jurisdiction over the parties and the cause of the divorce. As to Nevertheless, we conclude that, based upon the record before us, the

(“Consent cannot confer jurisdiction where none exists.” (quotation omitted)). 45 p. 8 8:5 “cannot be conferred by consent”); see also Daine, 157 N.H. at 428 N.H. 403, 405 (1 p. 9 972) (holding that the “domicile requirements” under RSA jurisdicti on if the statutory requirements are not met. See Porter v. Porter, 112 participation in the proceedings below without objection cannot confer circumstances described in RSA 458:5 and :6. Therefore, the respondent’s Accordingly, the court’s jurisdiction to grant a divorce is limited to the parties and of the alleged cause as defined in RSA 458:5 and 458:6.” the court to grant divorce... to cases where there is jurisdiction over the by statute.” Id. Here, RSA 458:4 (2018) expressly limits “[t]he jurisdiction of omitted). Therefore, “the cou rt has only such power in that field as is granted strictly statutory.” Daine v. Daine, 157 N.H. 426, 4 27 (2008) (quotation appeal. However, “[t]he court’s authority in matters of marriage and divorce is case and should not be permitted to raise these arguments for the first time on 9

rendering this decision, t he trial court did not consider some of the disputes reasonable belief that there were no issues that needed resolution.” In malice by not agreeing to meet” with the respondent, and “was under the The trial court further found that the petitioner “did not act willfully or with inquiries” and was “not in co ntempt of any of the parenting time provisions.” court found that “it is clear that P etitioner attempted to answer Respondent’s contempt hearing and a review of the parties’ emails and pleadings, the trial H to re solve those disputes. Based upon the testimony of the parties at the period for email resolution [and] the 14 - day period for a meeting” in paragraph between the parties and alleged that the petitioner failed to “honor[] the 14 - day The respondent’s contempt motion described several disagreements

(2004). refusing to do so. In the Matter of Giacomini & Giacom i ni, 150 N. H. 4 p. 9 98, 500 contempt, but whether the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion in and the proper inquiry is not whether we would have found the petitioner in parenting disputes within specific time limits. Contempt power is discretionary parties to communicate through email and, if necessary, in person, to resolve failure to comply with paragraph H in the parenting plan, which requires the its discretion by denying his motion to hold the petitioner in contempt for Next, the r espondent argues that the trial court unsustainably exercised

B. O rder on Contempt, Restrain t, and Parental Interference Motions

cause for divorce under RSA 458:6. 368. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court had jurisdiction over the could find the marriage to be beyond reconciliation. Woodruff, 11 4 N.H. at petitioner filed her divorce petition, because that was the earliest that the court the breakdown of the marriage could not have occurred until after the explored and have failed.” Id. at 368; see RSA 458:7 - a, :7 - b (2018). Therefo re, judicial determination that “the possibilities of reconciliation have been matter of law, the breakdown of the marriage cannot occur prior to the court’s 11 4 N.H. at 367 (citing RSA 458:7 - a (Supp. 1 p. 9 973)), we have held that, as a differences have caused an irremediable breakdown of the marriage,” Woodruff, divorce can be decreed under this cause... unless the irreconcilable they may form the basis for a cause for divorce”); RSA 458:7 - a. Although “[n]o the irreconcilable differences accrue over any specified period of time before Woodruff, 114 N.H. at 367 (explaining that RSA 458:7 - a “does not require that continued after the petitioner became domiciled in New Hampshire. See the period between July 2014 and August 2015. Thus, cause of the divorce Accordingly, the differences betwee n the parties were not reconciled for at least New Hampshire for over one year before she commenced the divorce action. In this case, the petitioner left the respondent in July 2014 and lived in p. 10 10

review it. See Halifax - American Energy Co. v. Provider Power, LL C, 170 N.H. 569, 574 (2018). I(a) - (b) (2018). However, because h e did not raise this argu ment to the trial c o u rt, we decline to The respo ndent also argues on appeal that the motion to restrain is supported by RSA 458:16, 1

of these motions. 1 support motions of this nature. Accordingly, we uphold the trial court ’s denial filed his motions. We conclude that these events are too distant in time to allegation relating to DCSS, occurred at least p. 10 10 months before the respondent at the contempt hearing demonstrate that all allegations, including the was erroneous. H owever, t he parties’ pleadings and the respondent ’s proffers respondent points to the allegation relating to DCSS to argue that this finding incidents occurred two year s prior to the parties’ agreed Parenting P lan.” The The trial court denied both motions upon finding that “[a] ll the alleged

when the petitioner made the complaint to DCSS. set forth in his motions occurred between July 2014 and November 2016, respondent discussed a timeline of the allegations, contending that the events “have no relevance on issues between the parties to day.” At the hearing, t he was attempting to “revisit issues that have long - since been concluded” and motions, the petitioner denied the allegations and stated that the respondent respondent was trying to kidnap their child. In her objections to these interfere with [his] rights as a father” by telling the child’s doctor that the motion regarding parental interference alleges that the petitioner “continues to accusation to DCSS that he failed to pay child support in May 2016. His enforcement, DCSS, and their child’s doctor, including a “very recent[]” false provided “malicious and unt ruthful information about [him]” to law In his motion to restrain, the respondent alleged that the petitioner

discretion). court’s continuance of a restraining order for an unsust ainable exercise of Matter of Peirano & Larsen, 155 N.H. 738, 752 (2007) (reviewing the trial motions under an unsustainable exercise of discretion standard. See In the parental interference. We review a trial court’s rulings on the denial of these its discretion by denying his motion to restrain and his motion regarding The r espondent next argues that the trial court unsustainabl y exercise d

501. did not unsustainably exercise its discretion by refusing to do so. See id. at that the trial court was not compelled to find the petitioner in contempt and A review of the record provides support for thes e findings. We conclude

the parenting plan. asserted by the respondent because they predated or fell outside of the scope of p. 11 11

$1,440 for 32 hours of work, and three subsequent paystubs showing weekly pay stubs with his financial affidavit, with one paystub showing earning s of contractual nature of his employment. The respondent provided four weekly paystubs and his representation that he does not receive steady pay due to the upon a weekly income of $1,800, despite the inconsistent income shown on his court accepted the petitioner’s calculation of his in come, which was based As for the respondent’s monthly gross income, he contends that the trial

presented at the hearing. Id. court to decide wh ich income figures should be used based upon the facts Matter of Feddersen & Cannon, 149 N.H. 194, 196 (2003). It is up to the trial obligation, the court must first determine each parent’s present income. In the Hampers, 166 N.H. at 442. When calculating a parent’s child support C hild support shou ld be determined on the basis of present income.

by Family Division Rule 1.25 - A(B)(1)(c). failed to provide in her financial affidavit documentation of her income required monthly income from her second, part - time employment; and (3) the petitioner provided in her child su pport guidelines wo rksheet failed to include her gross supported by the paystubs he provided; (2) the petitioner’s monthly income petitioner’s calculation of the respondent’s gross monthly income was not (2018). He argues that these figures were inaccurate because: (1) the the petitioner in her child support guidelines worksheet. See RSA 458 - C:3 - a the amended support order of $274 per week on income figures proposed by The r espondent first argues that the trial court erred because it based

N.H. at 4. absent an unsustainable exercise of discretion or an error of law. Silva, 171 (2014). We will not disturb the trial court’s rulings regarding child support support orders. In the Matter of Hamp ers & Hampers, 166 N.H. 422, 442 Trial courts have broad discretion in reviewing and modifying child

relative percentage of each parent’s income. Silva, 171 N.H. at 4. parents share in the support responsibility for their children, according to the child support, but also to ensure that both the custodial and non - custodial chapter 458 - C is not only to ensure uniformity in determining the amount of including orders modifying an existing support order). The purpose of RSA see RSA 458 - C:4, I (2018) (applying the guidelines to “all child support cases,” of child support awards. In the Matter of Silva & Silva, 171 N.H. 1, 4 (2018); (2018 & Supp. 2019) and esta blish a uniform system to determine the amount Hampshire’s child support guidelines, which are codified in RSA chapter 458 - C The trial court’s amended uniform support order is governed by New calculation of the amended uniform support order issued in February 2018. The r espond ent argues that the trial court erred in several ways in its

should be waived. either submit additional pay stubs or sho w good cause as to why this rule Accordingly, we remand this issue to the trial court to r equire the petitioner to found good cause to waive the paystub requirement under Rule 1.25 - A(B)(1)(c). law,” Fam. Div. R. 1.2, the record does not demonstrate that the trial court may require,” to “waive the application of any rule, except where prohibited by While Rule 1.2 permits the court, “[a]s good cause appears and as justice

one pay stub for each job. disclosure.” T he record before us, however, indicates that she provided only certifies that she has “complied with Rule 1.25 - A regarding mandatory affidavit.” Fam. Div. R. 2.16. The petitioner’s notarized financial affidavit which conta ins the information requested on the family division financial party to “file with the court and with the other party a.. . financial affidavit A(B)(1)(c). Rule 2.16, which governs financial affidavits, further requires each equivalent documentation) from each current employer.” Fam. Div. R. 1.25 initial self - disclosure, to provide the “four (4) most recent pay stub s (or worksheet. Rule 1.25 - A(B)(1)(c) requires the parties, as part of the mandatory income set forth in her financial affidavit and child support guidelines requisite documentation under Rule 1.25 - A(B)(1)(c) to support her asserted The respondent further argues that the petitioner failed to provide the

child support obligation. support order and remand to the trial court to recalculate the respondent’s set fo rth in the petitioner’s guidelines worksheet. Therefore, we vacate the when it based its calculation of the support order on the gross monthly income Accordingly, the trial court committed an unsustainable exercise of discretion guidelines worksheet included her monthly income from only one job. paystub reflecting this additional employment. However, her child support disclosed monthly wages from two jobs in her financial affidavit and provided a support obligation, omitted income from one of her jobs. The petitioner which the trial court relied in calculating the respondent ’s amended child respondent that the petitioner’s child support guidelines worksheet, upon However, a s for the petitioner’s monthly income, w e agree with the

respondent’s mont hly gross income based upon a weekly income of $1,800. exercise of discretion in accepting the petitioner’s calculation of the determination. Accordingly, the trial court did not commit an unsustainable month, rather than four weeks — the respondent does not challenge this gross income — she multiplied the weekly income of $1,800 by 4.33 weeks in a determined that the petitioner provided the accurate calculation of his monthly represented that his income is $1,800 per week. Al though the trial court this figure by multiplying $1,800 by four weeks. Thus, the respondent himself guidelines worksheet, and informed the court at the hearing that he reached $7,200 as his gross monthly in come in his financial affidavit and child support earnings of $1,800 for 40 hours per week. Nevertheless, the respondent listed p. 13 13

so. See RSA 458 - C:3 (2018), :5. identifies no provision in RSA chapter 458 - C that required the trial court to do petitioner’s when calculating his child support obligation, the respondent argues that the trial court was required to compare his expenses with the confiscatory. See RSA 458 - C:5, I(j). Finally, to the extent that the respondent his financial s ituation such that the amount suggested by the guidelines is there is nothing in the record to indicate that the respondent’s expenses affect that he could not make necessary changes to reduce his expenses. Further, the trial court that his expenses prohibit him from meeting the child’s needs, or N.H. at 4. The respondent did not argue or otherwise offer an explanation to financial condition upon his. . . ability to meet [his] child’s needs.” Silva, 171 respondent has not demonstrated that th ey “relate to the impact of [his] exercise its discretion. Although living expenses are “economic in nature,” the In reaching this determination, the trial court did not unsustainabl y

provide a basis to “t reat [t he respondent] differently than... any other parent.” are not “extraordinary, unusual expenses” to the respondent, and did not expenses such as rent, bills, and loan repayments are common expenses that his child support obligation. The trial court explained at the hearing that rejected, the respondent’s basis for his requested adjustment in de termining Here, the record demonstrates that the trial court considered, and

circumstances “in light of the best interests of the child.” RSA 458 - C:5, I. (quotation omitted). Additionally, the trial court must consider any special parent’s financial condition upon his or her ability to meet a child’s needs.” Id. only circumstances that are “economic in nature and relate to the impact of a list is non - exhaustive, we have interpreted “special circumstances” as including deviates from the child support guidelines. Silva, 171 N.H. at 4. Although this a party or the court, the court must consider in making an adjustment that RSA 458 - C:5, I, includes a list of special circumstances that, if raised by

circumstances,” RSA 458 - C: 5, I; Silva, 171 N.H. at 4. “unjust or inappropriate,” RSA 458 - C:4, II, because of “[s] pecial preponderance of the evidence that the application of the guidelines would be trial court may deviate from t he guidelines, when a party shows by a N.H. at 4; RSA 458 - C:4, II (2018). The presumption may be overcome, and the under the guidelines is the correct amount of child support. See Silva, 171 There is a rebuttable presumption that a child support award calculated

obligation. particular, the amount of rent he pays — in determining his child support consider his financial obligations that he raised during the hearing — in deviate from the child support guidelines. He argues that th e court failed to unsustainable exercise of discretion when it failed to consider his request to The respondent next contends that the trial court committed an p. 14 14

obligor’s timely payment” of previously ordered support and a “written suspend immediate i ncome assignment must be based on “[p]roof of the require immediate income assig nment.” However, a finding of “good cause” to suspended by the court” when the court “finds that there is good cause not to B:2, I(c) (2018) provides that immediate income assignment “shall be have found good cause not to require immediate income assignment. RSA 458 contends that, because his previous pa yments were timely, the court should he pay child support directly to DCSS by immediate income assignment. He Finally, t he respondent argues that the trial court erred by ordering that

amount, we vacate the judgment and remand this issue to the trial court. that the respondent paid during the accrual period in calculating the arrearage demonstrate whether the trial court consider ed any child support payments child s upport” after he obtained full employment. Because the record does not reconsideration that the respondent “continued to pay $50.00 per month as this argument on appeal, she acknowledged in her objection to his motion for calculation. Further, we note that, although the petitioner does not address motion for reconsider ation, the trial court did not mo dify or clarify its accrual period. Although t he respondent raised this issue to the trial court in a considered any child support payments the respondent made during the from prior litigation. The record is silent, however, as to whether the trial court arrearage the amount of attorney’s fees the petitioner owed to the respondent The record demonstrates that the trial court deducted from the total

February 12, 2018. respondent, he paid during the accrual period — S eptember 18, 2017, to failed to deduct the $50 monthly child support payments that, according to the calculation of the arrearage amount. Specifically, he argues that the trial court The r espondent further contends that the trial court erred in its

that modification to apply retroactiv ely. unfair, nor an unsustainable exercise of discretion, for the trial court to order trial court’s child support modification — his new employment — it was n either trial court and the petitioner of the change in circumstances that led to the modification retroactively. Given that the respondent himself first notified the II. Thus, the trial court had the discretion to apply its child support petition for modification has been given to the [opposing party].” RSA 458 - C:7, court to modify a child support obligation from “the date that notice of the change of circumstances.” RSA 458 - C:7, I (a). The statute also allows the trial any time for a modification” of a child support order “based on substantial yet been ordered by the court. RSA 458 - C:7 (2018) allows a party to apply “at would be “unfair to hold [him] responsible” for paying an amount that had not compliance with the court’s uniform support order in effect at the time, it him to pay an arrearage. The res pondent asserts that, because he remained in Next, the respondent argues that the trial court erred when it ordered p. 15 15

argue that the trial court erred in denying the request. Instead, he argues that remove the life insurance requirement. The respondent, however, does not T he r espondent next challenges the trial court’s ruling on his request to

See i d. petitioner. Accordingly, this misattribution does not constitute reversible error. Respondent’s Motion” as the basis for the award of attorney’s fees to the order in which they appear... in his motion” and later refers to “the court’s order states that it would “address the Respondent’s requests in the which it heard argument directly from the respondent. Furthermore, the trial respondent made the requests. T he trial court held a hearing on the motion in individual prayers for relief, the trial court was clearly aware that the trial court ’s order refers to “the Petitioner” when discussing the re spondent’s been] prejudicial to the party claiming it.” (quotation omitted)). Although the N.H. 540, 545 (1992) (“For an error to require reversal on appeal, it must [have this discrepancy was prejudicial to the respondent. See Giles v. Giles, 136 petitioner in its order. However, there is nothing in the record to suggest that error because it attributed the respondent’s requested prayers of relief to the The respondent first contends that the trial court committed reversible

attorney’s fees to the petitioner. We address each argument in turn. than non - consecutive, weeks of vacation with the child; and (4) awarded the parenting plan to give him more parenting time and two consecutive, rather to meet with him pursuant to that paragraph; (3) denied his requests to modi fy implicitly denying his request to hold the petitioner “accountable” for refusing child; (2) vacated, sua sponte, paragraph G of the parenting plan, thereby religious grounds, the requirement to obtain life insurance for the benefit of the stipulation, in which t he trial court: (1) denied his request to remove, on court’s order on his motion to modify the parenting plan and permanent The r espondent next makes several arguments challenging the trial

D. Order Modifying Parenting Plan and Permanent S tipulation

income assignment. respondent to pay his child support obligation to DCSS by an immediate that the tr ial court did not unsustainabl y exercise its discretion in ordering the judicial review.” (quotation and brackets omitted)). Accordingly, we conclude the trial court, without developed legal argument, is insufficient to warrant appellate review, a mere laundry list of complaints regarding adverse rulings by Energy Co. v. Provider Power, LLC, 170 N.H. 569, 574 (20 18) (“In the re alm of DCSS, he fails to develop this argument for our review. See Halifax - American challenge the trial court’s requirement that he pay child support directly to made such a det ermination. To the extent that the respondent seeks to I(c)(1) - (2). Th ere is nothing in the record demonstrating that the trial court assignment would not be in the best interests of the child.” RSA 458 - B:2, determination and explanation . . . as to why implementing immediate income p. 16 16

of a child, the court may issue an order modifying any section of a permanent parenting schedules and RSA 461 - A:12 for a request to relocate the residence child.” RSA 4 61 - A:11, II (“E xcept as provided in RSA 461 - A:11, I(b) - (i) for provision requires that the modification be “based on the best interest of the the only authority by which the court could have vacate d this provision. That because neither party requested this modification, RSA 461 - A:11, II provides authorized it to modify the parenting plan. The r espondent argue s that, court here did not specifically identify which of the predicate circumstances circumstances specified in the statute. See Kelly, 170 N.H. at 47. T he trial concerning parental rights and responsibilities if it finds one of the predicate RSA 461 - A:11, I, grants a court authority to modify a permanent order

be avoided” and “not statutorily based.” noted that it was “more a source of conflict than a means b y which conflict can unlikely to prod uce any meaningful agreements of the parties.” The trial court paragraph G, reasoned that it was “not only unnecessary. . ., but also her proposals and would only agree to his own. The trial court, in vacating her feel uncomfortable. She further noted that the respondent did not agree to respondent had not produced any agreements between the parties and made petitioner did not dispute these facts, but contended that meetings with the refused to meet and rejected his proposed changes to th e parenting plan. The again in January 2018 for that purpose. However, the petitioner thereafter discuss changes to the plan before the child began school, and agreed to meet The respondent alleged t hat he and the petitioner met in March 2017 to them to meet in March 2017 to revise the plan before the child began school. as necessary” to review and adjust the parenting plan, and specifically required Paragraph G of the parenting plan required the parties to meet “as often

us to enga ge in statutory interpretation, our review is de novo. Id. 42, 47 (2017). To the extent that resolution of the modification issue requires exercised its discretion. In the Matter of Kelly & Fernandes - Prabhu, 170 N.H. responsibilities unless it clearly appears that the trial court unsustainably trial court’s modification of an order regarding parenting rig hts and parenting plan. See RSA 461 - A:11 (2018). Generally, we will not overturn a statutory authority necessary to vacate, sua sponte, p aragraph G in the T he r espondent next argues that the trial court did not have the

request. Giles, 136 N.H. at 545. Accordingly, we uphold the trial court’s denial of this of the requirement was incorrect or that it prejudiced him in any way, s ee provides no basis to support his assertion that t he trial court’s characterization fail to raise this argument to the trial court, see Halifax, p. 17 170 N.H. at 574, he support obligation with a life insurance policy.” Not only did the respondent requirement, had “imposed an ob ligation on both parties to secure their child requirement when it noted in its order that the court, in ordering the the trial court mischaracterized the intent and effect of the life insurance 17

exercise of discretion. decision to vacate paragraph G of the parenting plan was not an unsustainable interests of the child. See RSA 461 - A:6, I(e). Accordingly, the trial court’s requiring continued contact between the parties w ould not be in the best lack the ability to foster a positive relationship with each other, and that disagreements between the parties, support a determination that the parties facts, viewed in lig ht of the extensive litigation that has resulted from agreement and instead caused at least one party to feel uncomfortable. These the meetings failed to foster negotiations between the parties to reach an parenting plan. Furthermore, their representations provide an inference that they could not reach an agreement when they met regarding changes to the 640 - 41 (2011). Here, the trial court heard testimony from both parties that parent.” RSA 461 - A:6, I(e); see In the Matter of Miller & Todd, 161 N.H. 630, including whether contact is likely to resu lt in harm to the child or to a relationship and frequent and continuing... contact with the other parent, including “[t]he ability and disposition of each parent to foster a positive criteria, setting forth a list of non - exhaustive factors the court must consider, RSA 461 - A:6, I (Supp. 2019) codifies the “best interests of the child”

schedule was not contrary to the best interests of the children). concluding that the record supports, that its modification to a visitation Kosek, 151 N.H. 722, 724 - 25 (2005) (assuming the trial court found, an d child, and find that it is supported by the record. See In the Matter of Kosek & as an implied finding that this modification was in the best interest s of the best interests, w e construe the trial court’s reasoning for vacating paragraph G express finding in its order as to whether the modification was in the child’s child. See RSA 461 - A:11, I(f), II. Although t he trial court did not make an required to find that removal of p aragraph G was in the best interests of the u nder either statutory provision identified by the parties, the trial court was affect the allocation of parenting time under the parenting plan. However, We agree wit h the petitioner that the trial court’s modification did not

best interests of the child. modification had no impact on the allocation of parenting time and was in the the trial court’s modification falls within this provision because the change would be in the best interests of the child.” The petitioner argues that parenting time between the parents, and the court determines that such modification makes either a minimal change or no change in the allocation of permanent order concerning parental rights and responsibilities where “[t]he A:11, I(f). Under RSA 461 - A:11, I(f), a court may issue an ord er modifying a The p etitioner argues that this modification was justified under RSA 461 -

court’s basis for vacating paragraph G does not fall within this provision. parenting plan based on the best inter est of the child.”). He argues that the p. 18 18

against a private party who has acted i n bad faith, the purpose is to do justice to an opponent. Glick, 143 N.H. at 175. When attorney’s fees are awarded commencement of litigation for the sole and specific purpose of causing injury amenable to redress through an award of attorney’s fees as would be the is treated on an objective basis as a variety of bad faith, and made just as I d.; see Kukene v. Genualdo, 145 N.H. 1, 3 (2000). A party’s unreasonableness any reasonable claim in the law as it is, or as it might arguably be held to be. defended without any reasonable basis in the facts provable by evid ence, or claim is patently unreasonable when it is commenced, prolonged, required, or opponent whose position is patently unreasonable. Glick, 143 N.H. at 175. A judicially - created exception exists when a party must litigate against an such fees. Jesurum v. WBTSCC Ltd. P’ship, 169 N.H. 469, 482 (2016). One establ ished judicial exception to the general rule that precludes recovery of that recovery is authorized by statute, an agreement between the parties, or an N.H. 172, 175 (1998). A prevailing party may be awarded attorney’s fees when attorney’s fees, we have recognized various exceptions. Glick v. Naess, 143 While the general rule in New Hampshire is that parties pay their own

determination, we will uphold it. Id. fees. Id. If there is some support in the record for the trial court’s we acknowledge the deference given a trial court’s decision regarding attorney’s of the objecting party. Id. In evaluating the trial court’s ruling on this issue, reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable to the prejudice (2017). To warrant reversal, the discretion must have been exercised for exercise of discretion. Fat Bullies Farm, LLC v. De venport, 170 N.H. 17, 30 the trial court’s decision concerning attorney’s fees absent an unsustainable its discretion by awarding the petitioner attorney’s fees. We will not overturn Next, the respondent argues that the trial court unsustainably exercised

not an unsustainable exercise of discretion. See RSA 461 - A:11, I(h). Thus, the trial court’s decision to deny his request was student, or that the existing parenting time is not in the child’s best interest. parenting time in the plan was based, in whole or in part, on hi s status as a was executed, nothing in the record demonstrate s that the allocation of to reconsider that he was a full - time student at the time the parenting plan this significant modification. Alth ough the respondent asserted in his motion failed to cite a statutory basis or provide evidence to the trial court to support the child’s best interest.” However, as t he p etitioner notes, the respondent substantial change in that work schedule such that the existing order is not in in whole or in part on his or her work schedule and there has been a responsibilities where “one parent’s allocation. . . of parenting time was based allows the court to modify an order concerning parental rights and first time on appeal, that his request falls within RSA 461 - A:11, I(h), which time and two consecutive weeks of vacation with the child. He argues, for the request to modify the parenting plan to allow him to have additional parenting T he r espondent next contends that the trial court erred in denying his p. 19 19

Finally, the respondent argues that the trial court erred when it

E. Order Approving Daycare and Kindergarten Enrollment

attorney’s fees pertaining to those particular claims. court’s award to determine, in light of our decision, whether to award set forth requests that lacked a legal basis, we vacate and remand the trial award of attorney’s fees. Nevertheless, b ecause the respondent’s motion also dispute, had a legal foundation and does not provide a basis to support the respondent’s request to enforce paragraph G, in an effort to resolve the parties’ parties with respect to specific provisions of the parenting plan. Therefore, the enrollment — demonstrate that an ongoing disagreement existed bet ween the including the petitioner’s motion to approve daycare and kindergarten often as necessary for the benefit of the child.” The parties’ pleadings — that required the parties to meet to review and adjust the parenting plan “as respondent filed his motion paragraph G remained an enforceable provision decision, given the parties’ inability to reach an agreement, at the time the responde nt. While it may have been reasonable for the petitioner to make this petitioner did not dispute that she thereafter refused to meet with the parties met in March 2017, they failed to reach an agreement, and the paragraph G was an enforceable provision of the parenting plan. Although the did not lack a legal basis. At the time the r espondent filed his motion, respondent’s request to enforce paragraph G of the parenting plan, this request Nonetheless, while it was reasonable for the trial court to deny the

him whe ther he had recently become a member of a particular faith. trial court at the hearing and ignored the trial court when it specifically asked stipulation violated his religious beliefs, he made no such representation to the although his motion asserted that the life insurance provision of the permanent to modify the parenting time provisions of the parenting plan. Moreo ver, above, the respondent provided no legal or factual basis to support his request s conclude that certain requests in his motion lacked a legal basis. As discussed As an initial matter, it was not unreasonabl e for the trial court to

which the petitioner “appear[ed] to be flouting.” in the parenting plan “put in place for dealing with parenting disagreements,” “approached the court for assistance regarding the enforcement” of provisions parenting plan and the parenting plan generally. He argues that he argues that there was a legal basis for his motion — paragraph G of the was “frivolous... and without any established legal basis.” The respondent respondent’s motion to modify the parenting plan and permanent stipulation The trial court awarded attorney’s fees based upon a finding that the

Bullies Farm, 170 N.H. at 30. and vindicate rights, as well as to discourage frivolous lawsuits. See Fat p. 20 20

HICKS, BASSETT, and HANTZ MARCONI, JJ., concurred.

remand the issue to the trial court. parenting plan. We vacate the award of attorney’s fees to the petitioner and parenting plan and permanent stipulation and vacating par agraph G of the its discretion by denying the respondent’s requests to modify the parties’ Finally, we conclude that the trial court did not unsustainably exercise

period in its arrearage calculation. consider the amount of child support the respondent paid during the arrearage per employer or to establish good cause to waive this requirement; and (3) with Family Division Rules 1.25 - A(B)(1)(c) and 2.16 by providing four pay stubs income from the petitioner’s second job; (2) require the petitioner to comply remand the amended uniform support order for the trial court to: (1) consider obligation to DCSS by immediate income assignment. However, we vacate and the respondent to pay an arrearage, and ordering him to pay his child support support obligation, declining to adju st the child support obligation, ordering calculation of the respondent’s in come in determining his a mended child not unsustainably exercise its discretion by applying the petitioner’s As for the trial court’s amended uniform support order, the trial court did

interference. motion for contempt, motion to restrain, and motion regarding parental commit an unsustainable exercise of discretion in denying the respondent’s under RSA 458:5 and :6. Furthermore, we conclude that the trial court did not child custody proceeding under RSA chapter 458 - A and the divorce action We conclude that the trial court properly exercised jur isdiction over the

exercise of discretion. court’s decision to grant the petitioner’s motion was not an unsustainable with primary residential responsibility resides, we conclude that the trial child primarily reside with the petitioner and attend school where the parent reach an agreement, and the parenting plan’s provisions providing that the trial court’s proper decision to vacate paragraph G, the parties’ inability to changes to the parenting plan before the child begins school. In light of the motion because p aragraph G requires both parties to work together to make court committed an unsustainable exercise of discretion when it rule d on this daycare and kindergarten. Specifically, the respondent contends that the trial considered and approved the petitioner’s motion t o enroll their child in private