2019-0369, In re D.O.

appealed the circuit court’s final dispositional order concerning her to the 15, 2019. According to Father and not disputed by DCYF, Mother timely both abused and neglected her. The dispositional hearing was held on January Father had neglected his daughter, D.O., and that D.O.’s mother (Mother) had issued an adjudicatory o rder in an abuse and neglect proceeding, finding that The relevant facts follow. On December 11, 2018, the circuit court

appeal and remand. appeal. W e reverse the superior court’s denial of Father’s motion to file a late court found that Father failed to demonstrate “good cause” for filing a late Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF). The superior (Ryan, J.) on a n abuse and neglect petition brought by the petitioner, the New per mission to file a late appeal of an adverse ruling issued by the Circuit Court appeals an order of the Superior Court (Nicolosi, J.) denying his motion for HANTZ MARCONI, J. The respondent, the father of the juvenile (Father),

the respondent. Smith - Weiss Shepard, P.C., of Nashua (Tanya L. Spony on the brief), for

assistant attorney general, on the memorandum of law), for the petitioner. Gordon J. MacDonald, attorney general (Laura E. B. Lombardi, senior

No. 2019 - 0369 Hillsborough - northern judicial district

http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. release. The direct address of the court ’ s home page is: Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 a.m. on the morning of their reported by e - mail at the following address: reporter@courts.state.nh. us. corrections may be made before the opinion goes to press. Errors may be Doe Drive, Concor d, New Hampshire 03301, of any editorial errors in order that requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New Hampshire, One Charles as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. Readers are NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule p. 2 22 as well 2

we interpret the order de novo). 698, 70 p. 2 2 (2008) (explaining that the meaning of a trial court order raises an issue of law and that that Father failed to demonstrate “good ca use.” See In the Matter of Salesky & Salesky, 157 N.H. forth in RSA 169 - C:28, I, is not jurisdictional, that the court may waive it for “good cause,” and We interpret the superior court’s order as a determination that the statutory appeal p eriod set 1

subject matter jurisdiction requires that we engage in statutory interpretation. day appeal period in RSA 169 - C: p. 2 28 (2014) deprived the superior court of 624 - 25 (2000). Thus, determining whether the failure to comply with the 30 matter of legislative intent. See Phetteplace v. Town of Lyme, 144 N.H. 621, pr erequisite to the appellate court having subject matter jurisdiction is a Whether compliance with a statutory appeal period is intended as a

jurisdiction.” Id. proceeding, including on appeal, and may not waive subject matter Id. “A party may challenge subject matter jurisdiction at any time during the determine a case concerning subject matter over which it has no jurisdiction.” controversy involved in the action.” Id. “A court lacks power to hear or ( p. 2 2018). “I n other words, it is a tribunal’ s authority to adjudicate the type of conduct of persons or the status of thing s.” Appeal of Cole, 171 N.H. 403, 408 and the type of relief sought: the extent to which a court can rule on the “Subject matter jurisdiction is jurisdiction over the nature of the case

together in the event the decision is reversed.” pending in this court and that “[t]he parties prefer [their] ca ses to be tried noted that Father’s appeal of its denial of his motion to file a late appeal was unrelated to this appeal. In its order granting that motion, the superior court Thereafter, Mo ther moved to recuse the su perior court judge for reasons

late appeal.” T his appeal followed. 1 to file [an] appeal in a timely manner . . . , no good cause is found to allow the “Having considered the history of this case and the reasons provided for failing matter jurisdiction. The superior court denied Father’s motion, stating: to comply with the appeal period did not deprive the superior court of subject deadl ine imposed by RSA 169 - C: p. 2 28, I (2014). Father countered that his failure jurisdiction over Father’s appeal because he failed to file it within the 30 - day DCYF objected, arguing that the superior court lacked subject matter

not yet appeared in superior court. misunderstanding regarding the filing of the appeal,” and that the parties had motion earlier because she was out on maternity leave, that there had been “a child’s mother had assented to his late filing, that his attorney had not filed the app eal. Father averred that the attorney for the child and the attorney for the dispositional order concerning Father, he moved for permission to file a late superior court. Ninety - two days after the circuit court issued its final p. 3 3

with subject matter jurisdiction,” and that because the plaintiffs did not file explained that “[f]iling an appeal in a timely manner vests the superior court involved a challenge to a planning board decision under RSA chapter 677, we 1 p. 3 37 N.H. 294, 296 (1993) (quotation omitted). In Dermody, for instance, which establishing jurisdiction in the appellate body.” Dermody v. Town of Gilford, statutory deadline for filing an appeal “is a necessary prerequisite to administrative bodies. In that context, we have held that compliance with a To support its argument, DCYF relies upon cases discussing app eals from over Father’s appeal because he failed to file it within the statutory deadline. DCYF argues that the superior court lacked subject matter jurisdiction

remote). immediately preceding and are not to be constr ued to apply to others more requires that qualifying phrases are to be applied to the words or phrases (explaining that the last antecedent rule of statutory construction generally Mt. Valley Mall Ass ocs. v. Municipality of Conway, 144 N.H. 642, 652 (2000) order from the circuit court, may then decide whether or not to appeal it. See refers to the discretion of the party who, having received a final dispositional per missive, in context, the word does not modify the appeal period, but rather statute uses the word “may.” Although Father is correct that the word “may” is appeals be filed within thirty days of a final dispositional order because the Father argues that RSA 169 - C:28, I, does not, in fact, require that

superior court must hear the matter de novo. RSA 169 - C:28, I. final dispositional order.” If an appeal is filed under RSA 169 - C:28, I, the administrative decision pursuant to [RSA chapter 169 - C], within p. 3 30 days of the any party having an interest, including the state, or any person subject to any to the superior court by the child or the child’s authorized representative or 748, 759 (2019). Pursuant to RSA 169 - C:28, I, “[a]n appeal . . . may be taken dispositi onal order in an abuse or neglect proceeding. See In re C.O., 171 N.H. RSA 169 - C:28 provides the only statutory right of appeal from a final

advanced by the statutory scheme. Id. interpret statutory language in light of the policy or purpose sought to be construction e nables us to better discern the legislature’ s intent and to isolation, but rather within the context of the statute as a whole. Id. This or unjust result. Id. Moreover, we do not consider words and phrases in parts of a statute together to effectuate its overall purpose and avoid an absurd language that the legislature did not see fit to include. Id. We constr ue all written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add ordinary meaning. Id. We interpret legislative intent from the statute as statute itself, and, if possible, construe that lan guage according to its plain and the statute considered as a whole. Id. We first look to the language of the are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of of Carrier, 165 N.H. 719, 721 (201 p. 3 3). In matters of statutory interpretation, we We review the superior court’s statutory interpretation de novo. Petition p. 4 4

to be jurisdictional simply because it is mandatory. recognized that not every mandatory ti me limit imposed by statute is intended See State v. Fournier, 158 N.H. p. 4 441 (2009). In that context, we have line of cases in which we considered statutory time limits for court hearings. the superio r court of subject matter jurisdiction, Father relies upon a related In arguing that his failure to comply with the 30 - day limit did not deprive

brought under RSA 169 - C:28, I. We decline DCYF’s invitation. this reasoning, developed in the administrative appeal context, to appeals jurisdictional in the subject matter sense. DCYF invites us to further extend statutory appeal periods that are mandatory with statutory time limits that are In the cases described above, without any extended analysis, we equated

jurisdiction). deprived the New Hampshire Board of Tax and Land Appeals of appellate taxpayer’s failure to file an abatement petition within the statutory time period Appeal of City o f Concord, 161 N.H. 169, 172 - 73 (2010) (deciding that a jurisdiction to hear their appeal and properly dismissed it.” Id. at 625; cf. failed to file their appeal by September 1, “the superior court did not have by a date certain.” Id. at 62 p. 4 4. Accordingly, we held that when the plaintiffs “could not have more clearly expressed its intent to require appeals to be fi led over the appeal. Phetteplace, 144 N.H. at 625. The legislature, we explained, necessary prerequisite to vesting that court with subject matter jurisdiction the requirement to file an appeal to the superior court by September 1 was a September 1 following the date of notice of tax.” In Phetteplace, we held that provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he appeal shall be filed on or before tax abatement requests. Phetteplace, 144 N.H. at 62 3 - 25. RSA 76:17 which concerns petitions to the superior court challenging municipal denial of administrative appeal context to appeals governed by RSA 76:17 (Supp. 201 9), In Phetteplace, we extended our reasoning from cases developed in the

jurisdiction, but may not waive a defect in subject matter jurisdiction). N.H. 719, 725 (1985) (clarifying that a party may waive a defect in personal of subject matter jurisdiction “can never be forfeited or waived”); In re Doe, 126 “subject - matter jurisdiction . . . involves a court’s power to hear a ca se,” a lack United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002) (e xplaining that because late, it must be dismissed. See Appeal of Cole, 171 N.H. at p. 4 408; see also jurisdictional deadlines for equitable reasons: i f an appeal is filed just one day In that context, we have also held that courts lack authority to waive

under RSA chapter p. 5 5 p. 4 41). Carreau, 157 N.H. 122, 123 (2008) (addressing administrative board appeals jurisdiction was never conferred upon the supe rior court.” Id.; see Appeal of their appeal within the requisite statutory appeal period, “subject matter 5

New Hampshire Board of Psychologists, 138 N.H. p. 5 548 (1994). See Ruel, 163 Our decision in Ruel was based, i n large part, on our decision in Smith v.

appraiser. Id. at 43. authority to initiate and carry out disciplinary proceedings” against the the board failed to comply with those statutory time limits, it “retained liberty interest. Ruel, 163 N.H. at 36, 4 1 - 43. Accordingly, we held that even if real estate appraiser are not jurisdictional because they do not implicate a Hampshire Real Estate Appraiser Board of a grievance filed against a licensed Ruel, we decided that two 90 - day limits governing the processing by the New are “jurisdictional,” we were referring to jurisdiction over the person). Thus, in mandates to hold adjudicatory hearings under RSA chapters 169 - B and 169 - D (explaining that, in In re Russell C., when we examined whether statutory jurisdictional.” Fournier, 1 p. 5 58 N.H. at 447; see In re Doe, 126 N.H. at 725 parties involved, . . . we have been unwilling to treat the time limit as general interest in hastening adjudicative dispositions for the benefit of all By contrast, when “the legis lature has prescribed time limits out of a

personal jurisdiction, unless waived by the juvenile). interests and, thus, failure to comply with those limits required court to forfeit delinquency and “children in need of services” proceedings implicate liberty (holding that statutory time limits for adjudicatory hearings in juvenile (describing Fournier); see also In re Russell C., 120 N.H. 260, 267 - 68 (1980) 4 p. 5 52 - 53; see Ruel v. N.H. Real Estate Appraiser Bd., 163 N.H. 34, 42 - 43 (2011) interests and, thus, are jurisdictional in nature. Fournier, 158 N.H. at 446 - 47, commitment hearings were intended to protect the person’s substantial liberty violent sexual predators is considered, mandatory time limits for civil For instance, in F ournier, we determined that, where civil commitment of

waived the time limits.” Id. at 4 p. 5 53 (quotation and brackets omitted). requested by the prejudiced party, in which case he will be deemed to have comply with the hearing deadline “is the result of a delay caused by or at 449. We have held that dismissal is, therefore, required unless t he failure to 447 (quotation omitted). Those time limits are deemed “jurisdictional.” See id. lost, absent waiver, if the case is not heard within the statutory period.” Id. at time limits for holding hearings, . . . personal jurisdiction over a defendant is We have held that when the legislature “out of liberty concerns, has mandated involve a general interest in hastening adj udicative dispositions. Id. at 44 p. 6 6. limits on court hearings: those that involve a liberty interest and those that mechanism. Id. In doing so, w e have distinguished between two types of time result of the statutory violation in order to determine the proper enforcement of the statute and whether the party seeking relief has shown prejudice as a provide an enforcement mechanism for that time limit, we focus upon the goals has i mposed a mandatory time limit. Id. at 446. If the legislature has failed to that a hearing “shall” be held within a specified period of time, the legislature In those cases, we have explained that when the legislature has stated 6

In re Cierra L. may be instructive, but it is not dispositive, because in that case the [superior] court had jurisdiction to waive the thirty - day limit prescribed.” the time limits in RSA 1 p. 6 69 - C:28 [is] to hasten the de novo appeal process[,] . . . Father asserts that because we have “alrea dy found that the purpose of

motion to dismiss. Id. appeal prejudiced her, we concluded that the court did not err in denying her case did not argue that the superior court’s failure to “give priority” to her court.” In re Cierra L., 1 p. 6 61 N.H. at 188, 189. Because the respondent in the orders “was intended to hasten the de novo appeal process in the superior that the superior court must “give priority” to appeal s from final dispositional services’ rooted in his right to due process”). We determined that the mandate right to the expeditious resolution of his alleged delinquency or ‘need for RSA chapters 169 - B and 169 - D are a “legislative pronouncement of a child’s (concluding that mandatory time limits on juvenile adjudicatory hearings under child abuse and neglect cases.” Id.; cf. In re Russell C., 120 N.H. at 266 enacted t o protect the liberty interest of those involved in the adjudication of nothing in the statute’s legislative history indicated “that RSA 169 - C:28, I, was We examined the purpose of RSA chapter 169 - C and observed that

L., 1 p. 6 61 N.H. at 188 - 89. th e proper enforcement mechanism was dismissal of the appeal. In re Cierra mechanism to enforce this assumed time limit, proceeded to determine whether impose a mandatory time limit, and, because the legislature failed to provide a court calendar,” RSA 169 - C:28, I. We then assumed that the language did requires the superior court to “give an appeal under this chapter priority on the statute “does not delineate a specific time limit,” id. at 188, b ut rather merely “jurisdictional.” In re Cierra L., 161 N.H. at 187 - 89. We first observed that the required it to forfeit jurisdiction over the accu sed parent, and is, thus, mandatory and, if so, whether the court’s failure to comply with the time limit superior court give priority to an appeal from a final dispositional order is that case, we were asked whet her the requirement in RSA 169 - C:28, I, that the Father relies, in particular, upon In re Cierra L., 161 N.H. 185 (2010). In

prejudice due to the delay of the scheduled hearings.” Id. proceeding unless, “at a minimum,” they met their “burden of showing Accordingly, we held that the psychologists were not entitled to dismissal of the jurisdiction, the statute’s primary purpose would be thwarted. Id. at 551. of the sta tute and determined that, if the board were to lose personal forfeit jurisdiction over them. Id. at 550 - 51. Rather, we evaluat ed the purpose psychologists that the board’s failure to comply with the limit required it to assumed that the time limit was mandatory and disagreed with the within the statutory time limit. Smith, 138 N.H. at 549, 550 - 51. There, w e of the proceeding was required because the board failed to hold a hearing Psychologists proceeding against two psychologists who argued that dismissal N.H. at 43. Smith involved a New Hampshire Board of Examiners of p. 7 7

The Act

RSA 1 69 - C:2, II I (b); see In re C.M., 163 N.H. at p. 7 774 - 75.

better the child. clearly shown that a change in custody and control will plainly welfare or the interests of the public safety and when it can be the child is in danger or when it is clearly necessary for the child’s separating the child from his or her parents only when the safety of a family environment by preserving the unity of the family and keeping a child in contact with his or her home community and in

provisions of RSA chapter 169 - C are intended to achieve the purposes of family.” In re C.M., 163 N.H. at p. 7 774; see RSA 169 - C:2, III (Supp. 2019). The “The overriding goal of abuse or neglect proceedings is to reunify the

155 N.H. 93, 9 p. 7 7 (2007). of all parties involved in abuse or neglect proceedings. In re Father 2006 - 360, important State interests: (1) protecting children; and (2) protecting the rights n eglect cases.” RSA 169 - C:2, II (Supp. 201 9). Thus, the Act advances two protect the rights of all parties involved in the adjudic ation of child abuse or “furthe r purpose” of RSA chapter 169 - C is “to establish a judicial framework to . . . .”), abrogated on other grounds by In re C.M., 16 3 N.H. 768 (2012). A protecting children, which often trumps other competing goals of the Act 148 N.H. 237, 241 (2002) (plurality opinion) (“[T] he Act’ s primary interest is or welfare is endangered.” RSA 169 - C:2, I (Supp. 201 9); see In re Shelby R., Protection Act (the Act), is to “provide protection to children whose life, health The primary purpose of RSA chapter 169 - C, also called the Child

the superior court of subject matter jurisdiction. not intend an appellant’s failure to comply with the 30 - day deadline to deprive examination of t hose provisions lead s us to conclude that the legislatu re d id that an administrative board hold a hearing within a certain deadline). Our personal jurisdiction is the proper mode of enforcing a statutory requirement 138 N.H. at 551 (examining goals of statute to determine whether forfeiture of discern legislative intent. See Petition of Carrier, 165 N.H. at p. 7 721; cf. Smith, We, therefore, examine other provisions in the statutory scheme to

question of whether the legislature int ended it to be jurisdictional. 30 - day appeal period is mandatory, that does not, by itself, answer the ordinary meaning of the language in RSA 169 - C:2 p. 8 8, I, demonstrates that the take a similar approach in this case, recognizing that while the plain and legislature intended the statutory time limit to have jurisdictional effect. We looked beyond the plain language of the statute to determine whether the and the other cases involving statutory time limits for court hearings, we 8

King Poor, The Jurisdiction al Time Limit for an Appeal: The Worst Kind of making appeal periods jurisdictional because of an interest in finality, see E. To the extent tha t the legislature, in other contexts, has an interest in

also Smith, 13 p. 8 8 N.H. at 551. 377, 381 (1983) (discussing termination of parental rights proceedings); see chapter would be thwarted if this were the case. See In re Robyn W., 124 N.H. superior court upon the fil ing of a late appeal, the primary purposes of the interest might be vindicated if subject matter jurisdiction does not vest in the neglect proceeding may have an interest in a speedy disposition, and while that purposes. S ee RSA 169 - C:2, III(c). Moreover, while the parties to an abuse or that the provisions of RSA chapter 169 - C be construed libe rally to effect its C:28, I, has passed. To hold otherwise is contrary to the legislature’s intent appeal of a final dispositional order is filed after the 30 - day period in RSA 169 intend to deprive the superior court of subject matter jurisdiction when an In light of this statutory scheme, we conclude that the legislature did not

(1996). court so orders.” RSA 169 - C:2 p. 8 8, I; see In re Thomas M., 141 N.H. 55, 60 does not “suspend the order or decision of the [circuit] court unless the [circuit] when a final dispositional order is appealed to the superior court, the appeal changed circumstances), :24 (2014) (requiring periodic review hearings). Even (allowing circuit court to modify a dispositional order upon a motion alleging See In re Father 2006 - 360, 155 N.H. at 97; see also RSA 169 - C:22 (2014) is not permanent and i s subject to continual review at the circuit court level. The statutory scheme provides that the circuit court’s dispositional order

in maintaining the parent - child relationship.” I n re C.M., 163 N.H. at 777. under the objectives stated in the statute, the State shares the parents’ interest the parties and assures them a fair hearing.” RSA 169 - C:2, III(c). “Thus, enforced and which recognize and enforce the constitutional and other rights of procedures through which the provisions of this chapter are executed and purpose may be carried out,” which includes “provid [ing] effective judicial RSA 169 - C:2, II. The chapter is to “be liberally construed to the end that its

problems in order to avoid removal of children from the family. (e) Provide assistance to parents to deal with and correct children placed in alternative care. (d) Provide protection, treatment and rehabilitation, as needed, to (c) Preserve the unity of the family. neglect of children. (b) Take such action as may be necessary to prevent abuse or (a) Protect the safet y of the child. groups, and concerned individuals, to: cooperation with private agenc ies and organizations, citizens’ seeks to coordinate efforts by state and local authorities, in p. 9 9

to be jurisdictional. legislature may want to clearly indicate whether the appeal period is intended have that e ffect. In addition, when enacting any future appeal period, the to affect the appellate tribunal’s subject matter jurisdiction should continue to appeal periods such as those in RSA chapter s 541 and 677 that we have held Accordingly, the legislature may want to consider whether statutory

for condoning this bait and switch.” Id. at 215 (Souter, J., dissenting). system to treat people this way, and there is not even a technical justification Souter observed in his dissent, however, “[i]t is intolerable for the judicial the courts lacked authority to create an exception. Id. at 213 - 14. As Justice The Supreme Court ruled that the statutory period was jurisdictional and that order, Bowles filed his appeal on February 26. Id. at 207 (majority opinion). fourteen days); id. at 215 (Souter, J., dissenting). In reliance upon the court though the statute allows district c ourts to extend the appeal period for only tha t the district court gave Bowles seventeen days to file his appeal even the court to extend the time to appeal until February 24. See id. (explaining U.S. at 207. Unfortunately for Bowles, the statute in question only authorized appeal and ordered that he file his appeal by February 27. See Bowles, 551 for example, the district court granted Bowles’ motion to e xtend the time to matter jurisdiction can be severe. In Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007), comply with a statutory appeal period deprives an appellate tribunal of subject We are well aware that the consequ ences of deciding that the failure to

statutory appeal periods remain good law. subject matter jurisdiction. However, o ur prior decisions regarding other did not intend for the appeal period at issue to deprive the superior court of we c onclude by reading the statutory scheme as a whole, that the legislature In this case, the legislature has set forth the purposes of the statute, and

171 N.H. 800, 807 (201 p. 9 9). statute, as it sees fit, within cons titutional limitations. See State v. Proctor, legislature disagrees with our statutory interpretation, it is free to amend the deprive the superior court of subject matter jurisdiction. Of course, if the failure to comply w ith the 30 - day period set forth in RSA 169 - C:28, I, does not of jurisdiction to even consider allowing a late appeal. Thus, we hold that the interest that the legislature intended to protect by depriving the superior court the finality of such decision, we are confident that such reliance is not an day late. To the extent that the accused parent has any “reliance” interest in finds that a child has not been abused or neglected, but the appeal is filed one most clearly when considering the case in which the circuit court erroneously erroneous finding of abuse or neglect is corrected. This concer n can be seen order is not permanent, and all parties have an interest in ensuring that an that interest has little relevance here, where the circuit court’s dispositional Deadline – Except for All Others, p. 10 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 151, 156 (2008), 10

neglect bars relief “from all conse quences of human neglect,” the good cause While t he standard requiring proof of accident, mistak e or misfortune and not and ellipses omitte d); see Donnelly v. Eastman, 149 N.H. 631, 6 33 (2003). and not neglect.” Perron v. Aranosian, 128 N.H. 92, 94 - 95 (1986) (quotations standard than a standard requiring proof of “accident, mistake or misfortune As we have explained in other related contexts, “good cause” is a broader

and ellipsis omitte d). findings.” Lawrence v. Philip Morris USA, 164 N.H. 93, 96 - 97 (2012) (quotation record, “we give less than ordinary deference to the trial court’s factual case relied only upon a paper record and we have before us the same paper Pappas, 171 N.H. 13, 28 (2018). H owever, because the superior court in this support or are legally erroneous. See Vention Med. Advanced Components v. court’ s factual findings, and will uphold them unless they lack evidentiary Ja que s v. Chandler, 73 N.H. 376, 381 (1905). Ordinarily, we defer to the trial Whether “good cause” exists in this context is a question of fact. See

matter of law. was “good cause” to grant Father’s motion for leave to file his late appeal as a superior court make any such finding. As for “good cause,” we hold that there comply with the 30 - day appeal period caused it any prejudice, nor did the standard. DCYF did not argue in the superior court that Father’s failure to Father demonstrates “good cause,” because Father prevails under either period is enforced only if DCYF shows prejudice or whether it is waived only if lack of legislative direction, w e need not decide whether the statutory appeal circumstances u nder which it may be waived, if any. In this case, despite the legislature has the authority to determine how to enforce the mandate and the Because the appeal period in this case is mandated by statute, the

to file his appeal 62 days past the statutory deadline.” court “reasonably could have found it not r easonable and just to allow Father demonstrate “good cause” for his late appeal. DCYF argues that the superior correctly declined to waive the appeal period because Father failed to denying his moti on to file a late appeal. DCYF counters that the superior court that, because DCYF did not show prejudice, the superior court erred by we examine “whether the party seeking relief has shown prejudice”). He argues legislature “failed to provide a method for enforcing [that] statutory mandate,” forfeit personal jurisdiction over the claimant, and explaining that bec ause the thirty days of a hearing, as required by statute, did not require the board to the New Hampshire Compensation Appeals Board to render a decision within Appeal of Martino, 138 N.H. 612, 613, 616 (1994) (deciding that the failure of [showed] any prejudice as a result of [his] request to file a late appeal.” See prove “good cause.” He asserts that the proper inquiry is “whether DCYF court of subject matter jurisdiction, then the c ourt erred by requiring him to Father contends that if the appeal period did not deprive the superior p. 11 11

attorney, assented to Father’s motion for late entry of the appeal. in light of that interest. It is significant, therefore, tha t in this case, the child, through her and, therefore, determining whether it is “reasonable and just” to allow a late appeal must be done As noted above, the Act’s primary interest is protecting children, Shelby R., 148 N.H. at 241, 2

HICKS, BASSETT, and DONOVAN, JJ., concurred.

as a matter of law, to grant Father ’s motion to file a late appeal. together.” Under these circumstances, we conclude that there was good cause, the superior court, the parties prefer that Father’s and M other’s case s “be tried child and the attorney for M other assented to Father’s motion. According to 2 [his] counsel’s office regarding the filing of the appeal.” The attorney for the order was entered, and “[t]here was a misunderstanding between father and earlier because his attorney was on maternity leave when the dispositional parties had ever appeared in the superior court. Father did not file his appeal partially - assente d - to motion to file a late appeal on April 17, 2019, before the and just” to grant Father’s m otion to file his appeal late. Father filed his In the instant case, we hold, as a matter of law, that it was “reasonable

is “reasonable and just.” Jaques, 73 N.H. at 381. standard does not. Perron, 128 N.H. at 95. Good cause is equivalent to what