2018-0708, State of New Hampshire v. James Folley, 2018-0710, State of New Hampshire v. Karen Folley

the brief), for Karen Folley. Law Office of Michael J. Zaino, PLLC, of Hampton (Michael J. Zaino on

the brief), for James Folley. Law Office of Shepherd & Osborne, of Nashua (Justin C. Shephe rd on

attorney general, on the brief), for the State. Gordon J. MacDonald, attorney general (Bryan J. Townsend, II, assistant

2018 - 0710 No s. 2018 - 0708 Hillsborough - northern judicial district

http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. release. The direct address of the court ’ s home page is: Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 a.m. on the morning of their reported by e - mail at the following address: reporter@courts.state.nh. us. corrections may be made before the opinion goes to press. Errors may be Doe Drive, Concor d, New Hampshire 03301, of any editorial errors in order that requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New Hampshire, One Charles as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. Readers are NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule p. 2 22 as well 2

unauthorized taking, he makes no argument challenging this conviction, so we do not address it. Although the record demonstrates that James was convicted of a third count of theft by 1

time, neither defendant worked due to health problems. assets available for costs associated with living there. During this period of she applied, t he facility staff informed her that she was expected to make her approxima tely $1,9 p. 2 23, and monthly expenses of approximately $346. When assets of $170,000, monthly Social Security and pension income of another assisted living facility. In her application for admission, she listed In October 2011, when the victi m was 77 years old, she moved to

a co - owner of her bank account. small amount to charities. O n September p. 2 28, 2011, the victim added James as consisted mostly of purchases from a gift basket company, and contributed a expenses. She also made small expenditures on retail purchases, which check. The majority of the victim’s spending was on housing and medical bills independently. She did not have a debit card and instead paid her bills by Until 2011, the victim had sole control over her finances and paid her

issues. had been diagnosed with Pa rkinson’ s disease but had no mobility or memory Thereafter, she moved into an assisted living facility. At this time, t he victim decisions in the event she became unable to make decisions for herself. prospectively authorized James to act as her attorney - in - fact on financial sister, the victim, executed a durable power of attorney agreement which trial and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. In p. 2 2006, James’ elderly The jury could have found the following facts based upon the evidence at

direct result of the defendants’ criminal conduct. See RSA 651: 6 p. 2 2, III. restitution order because the economic loss claimed by the facility was not a 651:62 (2016). We aff irm the defendants’ convictions but reverse the restitution to the facility because it is not entitled to compensation under RSA support their convictions; and (2) the trial court erred by ordering the m to pay at the time of the crimes. The y argue that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to that they pay restitution to a n assisted living facility where the victim resided (Supp. 2018). They also appeal the trial court’s restitution order requiring 1 additional coun t of financial exploitation of an elderly adult, see RSA 6 p. 3 31:9 accomplice, see RSA 637:3 (2016); RSA 626:8 (2016), and, as to James, an (Abramson, J.) on two counts of theft by unauthorized taking as a princip a l or appeal their convictions following a joint jury trial in the Superior Court DONOVAN, J. The defendant s, James Folley and his wife, Karen Folley, 3

only $1, p. 3 342 in her account. and retained the remaining $2,500 in cash. By August 2013, the victim had victim’s account and deposited $47,500 into the defendants’ bank accounts made such large deposits. I n March 2013, James withdrew $50,000 fro m the money in their own bank account. P rior to this period, the defendants rarely frequently occurred shortly before the defendants deposited similar amounts of account, often withdrawing hundreds of dollars at a time. These withdrawals The defendants made numerous cash withdrawals from the victim’s

and personal expenses, such as cable, heating, and mobile phone expenses. Karen at the defenda nts’ address. They also used funds to pay for household retailers — 90 of 9 p. 3 3 items purchased from one retailer — were shipped to tickets, and cigarettes. T he large majority of items purchased from online purchases included cookware, pet supplies, groceries, car parts, toys, airplane online stores and to conduct thousands of dollars in AT M withdrawals. These debit card to purchase thousands of dollars of retail items from local and Between August 2012 and September 2013, t he defendants used the

symptoms associated with Parkinson’s disease. challenges, frequent falls, and decline in short - term memory, which are visited her doctor on August 7 to assess concerns about her increased mobility bank account. This spike in spending occurred shortly after the victim had consisting of debit card purchases and cash with drawals from the victim’s in spending” that was “uncharacteristic” of the victim’s spending patterns, had nearly $140,000 in her account, the defendants engaged in an “explosion victim’s bank accoun t to his own address. Then, in August, when the victim victim’s account. However, i n April 2012, James changed the address on the For several months, there were no debit card expenditures from the

purchases at reta il stores totaling approximately $89. November and December 2011, the y also used the debit card to pay for sam e day, $700 was deposited into the defendants’ bank account. Between the debit card in November 2011 to make a $600 ATM withdrawal. On the James obtained a debit card associated with the account. The defendants used Within weeks of being added as a co - owner of the victim’s bank account,

necessities. sneakers. When t he defendants visited the victim, they brought her personal retail purchases, and whe n she did, they consisted of used books and continued to pay for housing and medical expenses by check. She rarely made spent her time reading, playing games, and watching television, and s he upon t he facility to provide her meals, transportation, and entertainment. S he did not drive and could not prepare meals without assistance, and thus relie d $ p. 4 4,000 per month, which did not have a kitchen or other amenities. The victim T he victim moved into a small one - room unit at the facility, at a cost of 4

provide for her; and that the victim purchased satellite cable for the defendants the facility; that the victim wanted “other things” that the facility did not to the facility staff; that Karen purchased items to decorate the victim’s room at sto re purchases of fruits and candy for “huge” gift baskets that the victim gave to the victim’s stepchildren and step - grandchildren; that they made grocery defendants had made cash withdrawals at the victim’s request to give as gifts specific explanations for certain transactions. He represented that the withdrawals and purchases in mostly general te rms, providing only a few over” in August 2013. After receiving an extension, James explained answer and noting that the victim handled the money herself until he “took DHHS, remarking on the number of questions DHHS asked the defendants to requested additional information within 10 days. James sent an e - mail to defendants with a list of transactions it considered to be “questionable” and uncharacteristic of the vi ctim’s previous financial activity. DHHS provided the spending and withdrawals beginning in August 2012 that seemed When DHHS conducted its review, it noticed the high rates of debit card

“inheritance,” but that the transaction occurred prior to the lookback period. reveal a $50,000 gift from the victim, which James described as an flag [s]” would appear. The defendants informed DHHS that its review would history for the last five years (lookback period) and asked whether any “red staff member informed th e m that DHHS would review the victim’s financial the application process, a DHHS staff member met with the defendants. The of moving her into a nursing care facility that accept ed Medicaid. As part of Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), with the intent In April 2015, James applied for Medicaid for the victim through the New

respectively, which were deposited into the defendants’ checking account. March and September 2015, Ja mes made two withdrawals of $812 and $ p. 4 4 25 monthly Social Security and pension income, which the facility accepted. I n informed the facility the victim could pay $1,860 per month, based upon her asked James for an amount the victim could reasonably afford to pay. James had been deplete d. Because the facility did not “want[] to see [the victim] go,” it In February 2014, James informed the facility that the victim ’s funds

their account, and debit card purchases, totaling $3,080. defendants made an additional withdrawal, with a corresponding deposit into use funds from her account. Between O ctober 2013 and November 201 p. 4 4, the in to her account in September 2013 and $ p. 5 500 in May 2014, they continued to per month to $3,500 per month. Although the defendants deposited $5,000 situation, th e facility agreed to reduce the cost of the victim’s room from $5,400 power of attorney. Due to the defendants’ concern about the victim’s financial frame, James began exercising control over the victim’s finances under his result of her frequent falls and increasing memory issues. During this time In July 2013, the facility moved the victim into its memory care unit as a 5

her.” To explain a $ p. 5 59 purchase, they stated that they “took her for things.” For example, to explain cash withdrawals of $60, $200, and $800, th ey simply stated, “cash for 2

charging the victim and the reduced amount that it agreed t o charge. The trial the difference between the monthly cost of $3, p. 5 500 that the facility had been that the defendants pay restitution to the facility, in an amount consisting of defendants on each indictment. As part of the ir sentence, the State requested March and September 2015. Following a joint jury trial, the jury convicted the exploitation of an elderly adult for two ATM withdrawals that occurred between for the $50,000 withdrawal in March 2013, and one count of financial James was also indicted on an additional count of theft by unauthorized taking the other count pertaining to debit card purchases between those same dates. pertaining to ATM withdrawals between November 2011 and August 2014 and indicted on two counts of theft by unauthorized taking, with one count at the facility until her death in 2017. That year, t he defendants were each In April 2016, the victim revoked James’ power of attorney. She resided

direction for gift s and various items for herself. that withdrawals and purchases were conducted by the victim or at the victim’s transactions from the victim’s bank records, they provided vague explanations then met with the defendants a second time. When questioned about specific tools and parts, a hydraulic car lift, and two “hot rod” cars. The investig ator the time the investigator met with the defendants, the garage had a full stock of as an inheritance, which he used to finish building his automotive garage. At the bank, initiated a transaction, and gave him a cashier’s check for $ p. 5 50,000 not on a routine basis. James stated that the victim asked him to take her to When asked, t hey admitted that they occasionally used some of her money, but that they had had “no real awaren ess” of her finances until August 2013. once a month to review her finances and ensure that she paid her bills, but the investigator that, once the victim moved into the facility, they met with her report that the y may have financially exploited the victim. The defendants told Elderly and Adult Services (BEAS) met with the defendants after receiving a In January 2016, a n investigator with the New Hampshire Bureau of

DHHS declined to reopen the application. items purchased or describ e how withdrawn cash was used. Eventually, 2 were similar to James’ previous representations and did not identify specific explanations for the items listed on the log, but many of their explanations defendants thereafter provided DHHS with transaction - by - transaction logs. Subsequently, DHHS sent the def endants a packet containing them. T he the denial, James represented to DHHS that he had not received the lookback provide sufficient information about the questionable transactions. Following D HHS denied the application due, in part, to the defendants’ failure to

only that he “used the debit card,” noting that it was “in both names.” as a Christmas gift. James acknowledged purchase s of car parts, but stated p. 6 6

Instead, they rely upon our decision in Gagne, in which we concluded that, not dispute that the money in the bank account belonged to the victim. another. However, as to the element of property of another, t he defendants do evidence to prove the elements of unauthorized control and property of The defendants argue that the State failed to introduce sufficient

3 p. 6 63, 3 68 (2013). with the purpose to deprive the other of the property. State v. Gagne, 165 N.H. obtained or exer cised unauthorized control over (2) the property of another (3) 637:3, I. Thus, the State was required to prove that the defen dant s (1) over the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof.” RSA unauthorized taking if he or she “obtains or exercises unauthorized control the ATM withdrawals and purchases. A person is guilty of the crime of theft by to convict them of the two count s of theft by unauthorized taking pertaining to The defendants first argue that the State introduced insufficient evidence

whether all reasonable conclusions other than guilt have bee n excluded. Id. possible conclusion consistent with innocence has been excluded, but, rather, Saintil - Brown, 172 N.H. at 117. The proper analysis is not whether every that the evidence does not exclud e all reasonable conclusions except guilt. Under these circumstances, a defendant challenging sufficiency must establish apply a different standard when the evidence is solely circumstantial. Id. reasonabl e doubt. State v. Woodbury, 172 N.H. 358, 3 p. 6 63 (2019). However, we jury’s verdict unless no rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a circumstantial evidence, we apply the standard set forth above and uphold a insufficient to prove guilt. Id. When the proof involves both direct and The defendant s have the burden of demonstrating that t he evidence was

item in the context of all the evidence, and not in isolation. Id. State v. Saintil - Brown, 172 N.H. 110, 117 (2019). We examine each evidentiary reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the State. crime beyond a reasonable doubt, considering all the evidence and all whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the record, including any evidence presented by the defendant, to determine 11 (2019). When considering such a challenge, we objectively review the entire error; therefore, our standard of review is de novo. State v. Leith, 172 N.H. 1, evidence. A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence raises a claim of legal We first address the defendants’ challenges to th e sufficiency of the

consolidated the cases. court granted this request. Each defendant has appealed, and we have p. 7 7

unnecessary retail items, which could not be used at an assisted living facility assets: the defen dants spent thousands of dollars on numerous and inconsistent with the victim’s spending habits and her need to conserve her demonstrating that the defendants’ use of the victim’s money was entirely assets to pay for her living arrangements. The jury then heard evidence giving rise to the inference that the victim understood the need to reserve her that it expected her to make her assets available to fund her residence there, her monthly income and that the facility informed her before her admission also heard evidence that the cost of the victim’s living arrangeme nts exceeded charity and spent a modest amount of money at a gift basket retailer. The jury expenditures, and that she had previously given only small donations to spending h abits, which consisted almost entirely of housing and medical conclusions. The jury heard evidence of the victim’s consistent and frugal was sufficient circumstantial evidence to exclude all other reasonable V iewed in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that there

money. See Sainti l - Brown, 1 p. 7 72 N.H. at 117. the defendants did not have authorization to withdraw or spend the victim’s sufficient to exclude all reasonable conclusions other than the conclusion that Accordingly, we review the circumstantial evidence to determine whether it was evidence was sufficient to prove lack of license or privilege to enter a building). State v. Blow, 135 N.H. 640, 641 - 42 (1992) (concluding that circumstantial circumstantial evidence was sufficient to prove lack of permission); see also (1999) (concluding that, where the owner of the stolen item did not testify, circumstantial evidence is sufficient. See State v. Flynn, 144 N.H. 567, 570 - 71 burden of proof. We have held that, to prove lack of authorization, to introduce direct evidence, in the form of the victim’s testimony, to meet its money. However, we disagree with the ir assertion that the State was required evidence that the y lacked authorization to spend or withdraw the victim’s We agree with the defendants that the State did not intro duce direct

withdrew and spent the victim’s money without authorization. elements — that the State introduced in sufficient evidence to prove that they N.H. at 3 p. 7 7 2. Thus, the defendants present the same challenge to both victim — to withdraw and spend the funds in the account. See Gagne, 165 defendants did not have the privilege — in the form of authorization from the was required, a nd failed, to introduce sufficient evidence to prove that the joint bank account, the defendants argue that, to prove this element, the State an interest in the property”). Based upon James’ status as co - owner of the actor is not privileged to infringe, regardless of the fact that the actor also has “property in which any person other than the actor has an interest which the RSA 637:2, IV (2016) (defining “property of another,” in relevant part, as withdrew them” to meet the element of property of another. Id. at 371 - 72; see funds from the account in the circumstances un der which the [defendant] that the “arrangement does not provide [the defendant] with a privilege to take where a defendant is a co - own er of a joint bank account, the State must prove p. 8 8

authorized the defendants to use the money because she wanted to repay them a lternative, reasonable conclusion consistent with innocence: that the victim The defendants argue that the evidence at trial gave rise to an

and purchases. conclusion that the defendants lacked authorization to make the withdrawals the circumstantial evidence excludes any reasonable conclusion other than the involvement in the victim’s healthcare. Viewing all of this evidence together, testimony from the defendants demonstrating their awareness of and cognitive issues shortly before the defendants’ spending spree began, and heard evidence that the victim had visited the doctor due to mobility and address on the account because of the victim’s memory issues. The jury also months after the victim added James’ name to her account, he changed the conceal their ac tivity from her. Specifically, the jury heard evidence that, a few inference that the defendants took advantage of the victim’s health issues to Moreover, other circumstantial evidence provided the reasonable

never gave staff any gifts, and that such gift - giving violated the facility’s policy. occasional baked good, and testimony from the facility director that the victim their children cash or gifts during this period other than holiday cards and an testimony from the victim’s stepchildren, that the victim never gave them or facility. Further, t he explanations contradicted witness testimony, including the hospital for a head injury or had a significant mobility incident at the defendants claimed they took the victim shopping, she had been admitted to victim’s medical records. For exampl e, on at least two occasions when the defendants’ explanations of other transactions were inconsistent wi th the withdrawn cash from the victim’s account into their own a ccounts. The purchases, and the bank records suggesting that the defendants deposited purchases, including the items listed on receipts, the delivery address of online These explanations, however, squarely contradicte d the records of these

herself or as gifts for facility staff and her family. withdrawals and purchases were made at the victim’s direction to use for BEAS investigator, they contended t hat the thousands of dollars in cash in 2011. Then, when confronted with specific transactions by DHHS and the th e victim’s monthly bank statements with her after she moved into the facility the victim’s fina nces until August 2013, despite their claim that they reviewed themselves from the matter by representing that they had no involvement in their consciousness of guilt. T he defendants initial ly attempt ed to distance Moreover, the defendants ’ out - of - court statements provided evidence of

expenditures. reasonable conclusion that the victim authorized the defendants to make these pay for rent or medical expenses, within a single year. These facts negate any and withdrew or spent nearly all of her money, o ther than the money used to by a resident who was unable to cook or perform other basic tasks on her own, p. 9 9

money or property for [his] own benefit or to make gifts to [him]self or others.” own affairs.” Further, the power of attorney pro hibited James from “us[ing] the in which a person of ordinary judgment would act in carrying out that person’s that is “reasonable in view of the interests of the [victim] and in view of the way placed James under a fiduciary dut y to make such financial decisions in a way regarding the victim’s money and spend the money on her behalf. However, i t According to the power of attorney, James had the authority to make decisio ns power of attorney that were read into the record by a witness at trial. appear in the record before us. Accordingly, we rely upon the portions of the As an initial matter, we note that the power of attorney itself does not

I(a)(2). establishing that fiduciary duty — the power of attorney. See RSA 631: p. 9 9, funds, in breach of a fiduciary duty, without authorization from the instrument without authorization from the victim; it was required to prove that James took elderly adult, the State was not required to prove that James took funds was unauthorized. However, to prove the cri me of financial exploitation of an testimony, to prove that his act of withdrawing funds from the victim’s account the State failed to introduce direct evidence, in the form of the victim’s proffers in challenging his convictions for theft by unauthorized taking — that of the evidence of this offense, James relies upon the same argument he the victim’s account under the power of attorney. In chall enging the sufficiency of financial e xploitation of an elderly adult for making two withdrawals from James also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence used to convict him

conclusion is not reasonable. during a time of financial hardship. Based upon the evidence, such a the defendants tens of thousands of dollars for the purpose of helping them expenses for the foreseeable future, willingly depleted those assets by gifting needed to conserve her assets to pay for her living arrangements and medical conclusion would require the fact finder to conclude that the victim, who presented at trial. Saunders, 164 N.H. at 351. Indeed, this alternative suggested by the defendants cannot be reasonably d rawn from the evidence resolutions in favor of the State,” we conclude that the alternative explanation witness testimony are left to the jury.”). Here, “assuming all credibility as weighing evidence, determining witness credibility, and resolving conflicts in (2012) (emphasis omitted); see also Woodbury, 172 N.H. at 364 (“[M]atters such necessary to support its verdict.” State v. Saunders, 164 N.H. 342, 351 - 52 “assume[] the jury made all factual findings and credibility determinations reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the State, we However, i n a sufficiency challenge, where we consider all the evidence and conclusion would requir e the jury to have credit ed the defendants’ testimony. for all that they had done for her and help them “in their time of need.” This p. 10 10

Accordingly, our review is de novo. State v. Pinault, 168 N.H. 28, 31 (2015). In Resolution of this issue requires us to eng age in statutory interpretation.

defendants ’ conduct. inability to pay the full $3,500 — an inability that resulted from the revenue — when it agreed to reduce the victim’s monthly rent due to her State argues that the facility suffered an economic loss — in the form of lost economic loss as a result of the defendants’ conduct. See RSA 651:62, VI. The is not a “victim” as defined by RSA 651:62, VI, because it did not suffer an receive restitution unde r RSA 651:63. Specifically, they argue that the facility obligation with James. The defendants argue that the facility is not entitled to court ordered Karen to share, jointly and severally, $44,293.27 of that per month rather than the reduced cost the facility agreed to accept. The trial facility “would have” received if it had continued to charge the victim $3,500 facility, based upon the total amount of money, according to the State, that the The trial court ordered James to pay $81,890.83 in restitution to the

novo. Id. clearly erroneous. Id. Our review of the trial court’s legal conclus ions is de we accept its factual findings unless they lack support in the record or are significant relationship to the offense. Id. In reviewing the trial court’s ruling, that the loss or damage is causally connected to t he offense and bears a disputed, however, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence Schwartz, 160 N.H. 68, 71 (20 p. 10 10). If the factual basis for restitution is amount under RSA 651:63, I, is within the discretion of the trial court. State v. court.” RSA 651:63, I (Supp. 2018). Determining the appropriate restitution offender may be sentenced to make restitution in an amount determined by the The defendants next challenge the trial court ’s restitution order. “Any

authorized by the power of attorney to make the two withdrawals. Therefore, the State introduced sufficient evidence to prove that James was not benefit, which was not r easonable in view of the interest s of the victim. reasonable conclusion except that James withdrew the money for his own their own accounts prior to November 20 p. 11 11, was sufficient to exclude any evidence that the defendants typically did not deposit large sums of cash in nearly all of the victim’s funds. This evidence, v iewed togethe r with the also shows that these withdrawals occurred well after the defendants depleted corresponding deposit into the defendants’ checking account. The evidence March 4, 2015, and $425 on September 21, and that there was a The evidence presented at trial establishes that James withdrew $812 on circumstantial evidence to exclude all reasonable conclusions to the contrary. the victim. However, we conclude that the State introduced sufficient conducted the two withdrawals for his own benefit rather than for the b enefit of T he State did not introduce direct evidence to demonstrate that James 11

result of the defendants ’ criminal acts. “Direct” is defined as “proceeding from demonstrate that any lost revenue incurred by the facility was not a direct required to support a restitution award, because the facts of this case exact scope of the connection between the economic loss and criminal conduct As in Armstrong and Pinault, we need not adopt a test to determine the

damage.” Id. at 32. requires a causal connection between the criminal act and the economic loss or we noted that the plain lan guage of the statute “clearly and unambiguously the basis of her conviction). However, similar to our observation in Armstrong, not the direct result of the defendant’s act of leaving the scene of the accident, 32 - 33 (holdin g that damage to a mailbox caused by the defendant’s vehicle was result of the crime for which the defendant was convicted. Pinault, 168 N.H. at support a restitution order, concluding that the damage at issue was not a connection that must exist” between the harm or loss and criminal conduct to Pinault, we also declined to adopt a test to determine “the outer limi ts of the support the conduct covered by the conviction.” Id. at 687. Similarly, i n liable for economic losses directly resulting from the factual allegations that direct result of the escape). We simply note d “that a defendant may be held apprehend the defendant, who was convicted of the crime of escape, w ere a expenses to treat injuries suffered by a police officer when attempting to crime.” Armstro ng, 151 N.H. at 687 - 88 (holding that reasonable medical adopt a test to “ascertain at what point an event is no lo nger a direct result of a Criminal Code. In State v. Armstrong, 151 N.H. 686 (2005), we declined to The phrase “direct result” is not defined in the statute or elsewhere in the

See i d. an out - of - pocket loss or incur expenses as a direct result of a criminal offense. Thus, for a party to fall wit hin the definition of “v ictim,” the party must suffer expenses incurred as a dire ct result of a criminal offense.” RSA 651:62, III. 651:62, VI. “Economic loss” is defined as “out - of - pocket losses or oth er suffers economic loss as a result of an of fender’s criminal conduct.” RSA statute. See id. The statute defines “v ictim” as “a person or claimant who party must be a “victim” to receive compens ation from an offender under the offender to compen sate a victim for economic loss.” RSA 651:62, V. Thus, a The statute defines “r estitution” as “money or service provided by the

cont ext of the overall statutory scheme and no t in isolation. Id. language it did not see fit to include. Id. Finally, we interpret a statute in the as written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add ordinary meaning. Id. Further, we interpret legislative intent from the statute itself, and, if possible, construe that language according to its pl ain and terms and to promote justice. Id. We first look to the language of the statute construe provisions of the Criminal Code according to the fair import of their intent as expressed in the words of the statute cons idered as a whole. Id. We matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiters of the legislature’s p. 12 12

HICKS, BASSETT, and HANTZ MARCONI, JJ., concurred.

Bazinet, 170 N.H. 680, 688 (2018). raised in their notice s of appeal, but did not brief, are deemed waived. State v. result of the defendants’ criminal conduct. Any issues that the defendant s facility because any economic loss incurred by the facility was not a direct convictions. We reverse the trial court’s restitution award to the assisted living exclude all reasonable conclusions other than gu ilt, we affirm the defendants’ Because the State introduced sufficient circumstantial evidence to

may have any other remedies available to recover the losses it alleges. intended by the legislature. We express no opinion as to whether the facility expand the class of victims that could be compensated far beyond that 651:62, III. Were we to adopt the State’s interpretation of the statute, we would suffer an economic loss as a direct result of a criminal offense. See RSA statute that limits the class of victims who may be compensated to those who continue to reside there. However, w e cannot ignore the plain language of the that the facilit y agreed to accept less money from the victim so that she could facility at a reduced rate, sho uld be entitled to compensation. We recognize because it “placed [the victim]’ s needs first” by allowing her to stay at the justice. It argue s that parties like the facility, which suffered an economic loss The State argues that our interpretation of the statu te does not promote

the defendants’ criminal offense. victim’s rent does not constitute an economic loss incurred as a direct result of revenue the facility would have received if it had not decided to reduce the restitution statute. See RSA 651:62, III, VI. Accordingly, we h old that the of the defendants’ criminal conduct, which is not compensable under the victim’s financial situation, this decision was, at most, a collateral consequence the victim’s rent. Although the facility made this decision after learning of the not the revenue the facility could have generated if it did not decide to reduce directly resulting from this criminal conduct is the victim’s loss of her assets, Based upon the plain language of the restitution statute, t he economic loss money used in the withdrawals and purchases. See RSA 631:9; RSA 637:3, I. cash withdrawals and purchases for the purpose of depriving the victim of the utilizin g a debit card linked to the victim’s bank account to make unauthorized Dictionary 640 (unabridged ed. 2002). Here, t he defendants were convicted of “stemming immediately from a source.” Webster’s Third New International one point to another in time or space without deviation or interruption” or