2018-0336, State of New Hampshire v. Elizabeth Seibel

convictions, we affirm. State presented sufficient evidence to support each of the defendant’s challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on all three convictions. Because the two counts of theft by unauthorized taking, see RSA 637:3 (2016). She financial exploitation of an elderly person, see RSA 631:9, I(a)(2) (2016), and following a bench tr ial in the Superior Court (Ignatius, J.), on one count of DONOVAN, J. The defendant, Elizabeth Seibel, appeals her convictions,

brief and orally, for the defendant. Thomas Barnard, senior assistant appellate defender, of Concord, on the

assistant attorney general, on the brief and orally), for the State. Gordon J. MacDonald, attorney general (Brandon H. Garod, senior

No. 2018 - 0336 Car roll

page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court’s home reporter@courts.stat e.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 to press. Errors may be reported by email at the following address: editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule p. 2 22 as 2

unimpressed. Afterwards, she told them that she beli eved the house needed The victim visited the house with the defendant and the son, but was and pay rent equal to the monthly amount she paid for her condominium. planned to p urchase a house in Conway and asked her to move in with them In March p. 2 2014, the defendant and the son informed the victim that they

that they had occurred. not authorize any of these online transfers and, at the time, she was unaware account in separate online transactions of $1,000 or $ p. 2 2,000. The victim did May 2014, the defendant transferred $12,000 from Accou nt #1 to her own Account #1 to her own personal checking account. Between October 2013 and In October 2013, the defendant began transferring money online from

living in her condominium, but was concerned about her abi lity to afford it. independently, paying her own bills and shopping for herself. She enjoyed the defendant and the son, with whom she regularly visited. The victim lived In March p. 2 2013, the victim moved into a condominium that was closer to

expenses. the defendant, redeemed one of her CDs to pay her husband ’s funeral account, neither did so. In February p. 2 2013, the victim, with the assistance of believed that the defendant and the son were contributing money to the the account would make it “easier to pay the bills.” Although the victim discovered the arrangement, the defendant and the son told her that co - owning Account #1 without the victim’s knowledge or consent. When the victim In January 2013, the defendant and the son added their names to

if her son became “unavailable or unable” to do so. authority to act on her behalf and authorizing the defendant to act as her agent victim also executed a durable general power of attorney granting her son account (Account #1), in to which she deposited thousand s of dollars. The Shortly after her husband’s death, the victim opened another checking

resources were sufficient to support her for the rest of her life. annuity payments. The victim had concerns about whether these financial received approximately $3,500 each month in social security, pension, and owned four certificates of deposit (CDs) totaling about $110,000. She also that time, the victim had about $11,300 in her personal checking account and his wife, the defendant. About one month later, the victim’s husband died. At victim and her husband moved to New Hampshire to be close to their son and is an elderly widow and the defendant ’s mother - in - law. In November p. 2 2012, the The trial court found or could have found the following facts. The victim

vendors with regular recurring identities” and was “very careful in writing down payments every month with checks [from Account #1]... to a small number of different” f rom the victim’s personal spending habits. The victim “made regular money in Account #2. The defendant’s use of this money was also “radically the defendant and the son, she never authorized the defendant’s use of the Although the victim had agreed to share some household expenses with

2015, the victim’s financial resources were e ssentially depleted. $2,762 on expenses that were unrelated to the Conway house. As of May phone bills. In all, after January 2015, the defendant spent approximately personal to her, such as her hairstylist and her personal credit card and cell defendant also spent some of the funds on goods and services that were used some of the funds in A ccount #2 to renovate and furnish the house. The approximately $ p. 3 33,000 in debit purchases from Account #2. The defendant the defendant issued approximately $42,000 in checks and made personal and household expenses. In total, and unbeknownst to the victim, defendant then began spending money from Account #2 to pay for various In June 2014, all of the parties moved into the Conway house. The

purchased the house on her behalf. a thirty - year mortgage. The victim was unaware that the defendant had to execute legal documents obligating the victim, t hen eighty - four years old, to defendant attended without the victim and used her authority under the SPOA In late May 2014, the closing for the Conway house took place. The

assoc iated with Account #2 was issued in the defendant’s name. which, as previously noted, held the victim’s money. The only debit card existence, the only source of funds deposited into Account #2 was Account #1, began transferring money from Account #1 to Account #2. Throughout its consent, naming themselves and the victim as co - o wners. The defendant then opened another joint account (Account #2) without the victim’s knowledge or proceeds into Account #1. In early May 2014, the defendant and the son remaining CDs, with out the victim’s knowledge or consent, and transferred the As of May 2014, the defendant had redeemed each of the victim’s three

money. no interest in the Conway house and never agreed to purchase it with her own had authorized the defendant to purchase the house on her behalf. She had purchase the house on the victim’ s behalf. The victim was unaware tha t she a special power of attorney (SPOA) granting the defendant authority to various documents without giving her an opportunity to review them, including Shortly thereafter, the defendant and the son asked the victim to sign

payments would help the defendant and the son. concerns, the victim agreed to move into the house, believing that her rental too much work and would cost too much in renovations. Despite these p. 4 4

ent ire record to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found 110, 117 (2019). When considering such challenges, we objectively review the question of law, which we review de novo. State v. Saintil - Brown, 172 N.H. three of her convictions. A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence raises a On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on all

defendant’s post - trial motion to set aside the verdicts. This appeal followed. the defendant on all three counts. The trial court likewise denied the insufficient to convict her. The trial court denied th e motions and convicted defendant moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that the evidence was After the State rested, and again at the close of the evidence, the

purchases total ing more than $1,500 from Account #2 after January 1, 2015. one count of financial exploitation of an elderly person with respect to the defendant made from Account #2 between May 201 p. 4 4 and June 2015; and by unauthorized taking relating to purchases totaling more than $1,500 that #1 to her own account between October 2013 and May 2014; one count of theft money totaling more than $1,500 that the defendant transferred from Account charged with one count of theft by unauthorized taking in connection with owned the Conway house. F ollowing a police investigation, the defendant was In June 2015, the victim contacted an attorney after discovering that she

such lawsuit had ever been brought against her. her remaining CDs to settle a lawsuit on the victim’ s behalf when, in fact, no asked again. The victim was also told that the def endant and the son cashed showed the victim one statement, but due to their resistance, the victim never prevented her from examining her bank statements. On one occasion, they While the victim re sided in the Conway house, the defendant and the son

correspond to any particular expense incurred by the victim. very general” amounts of $1,000 and $2,000, which did not appear to her own personal account were made at consistent intervals, in “broad... and with online banking. By contrast, the defendant’s tr ansfers from Account #1 to accounts online, as she generally did not use computers and was unfamiliar detailed on the checks that she issued. She did not transfer money between amounts, at irregular i ntervals, and for specific reasons, which she often cash. The victim tended to make such gifts and reimbursements in precise reimburse d them for certain expenses, she issued checks to them or gave them spending habits. Whenever the victim gave the defendant or the son money or The defendant’s transfers from Account #1 also differed from the vict im’s

for goods and services that the victim did not normally purchase. expenditures from Account #2 included payments to a wide variety of vendors what the reason for the paym ents were.” By contrast, the defendant’s p. 5 5

recklessly, for his or her own profit or advantage: guardian, conservator, or trustee, a person, k nowingly or limited to, an agent under a durable power of attorney, documented consent by a competent person, including, but not including pertinent regulations, contractual obligations, (a) In breach of a fiduc iary obligation recognized in law,

exploitation... if: disabled, or impaired adult,... shall be guilty of financial I. Whoever commits any of the following acts against an elderly,

relevant part: The defendant was charged with violating RSA 631:9, I(a)(2), which states, in insufficient to support her financial exploitation of an elderly person conviction. We first address the defendant’s argument that the evidence was

N.H. p. 5 553, 569 (2018) (quotation and emphasis omitted). sufficient strength that guilt is the sole rational conclusion.” State v. Ruiz, 170 resolutions in favor of the State, the inferential chain of circumstances is of at issue, the critical question is whether, even assuming all credibility guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. “[W]here solel y circumstantial evidence is sufficiently reasonable that a rational trier of fact could not have found proof of most favorable to the State and determine whether the alternative hypothesis is Roy, 167 N.H. 276, 292 (2015). Rather, we evaluate the evidence in the light hypothesis that could explain the events in an exculpatory fashion. State v. not determine whether the defendant has suggested another possible whether i t has excluded all reasonable conclusions other than guilt. Id. We do the evidence excludes every possible conclusion consistent with innocence, but reasonable conclusions except guilt. Id. The proper analysis is not whether evidence, the defendant must establish that the evidence fails to exclude all reasonable doubt. Id. If, however, the record contains only cir cumstantial verdict unless no rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a circumstantial evidence, we apply the standard set forth above and uphold the If the evidence present ed at trial consists of both direct and

was insufficient to prove guilt. Id. the evidence. Id. The defendant bears the burden of proving that the evidence present a case, we review the entire trial record to determine the sufficiency of they can be reasonably drawn therefrom. Id. B ecause the defendant chose to proved as well as from facts found as the result of other inferences, provided isolation. Id. The trier of fact may draw reasonable inferences from facts examine each item of ev idence in the context of the entire case, and not in inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the State. Id. We guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, considering the evidence, and all reasonable p. 6 6

instrument establishing [the] fiduciary obligation.” RSA p. 6 631:9, I(a)(2). recognized in law” and that the defendant’s actions were not “authorized by the as relevant here, that the defendant acted “[i]n breach of a fiduci ary obligation convict the defendant under RSA 631:9, I(a)(2), the State was required to prove, supports such an interpretation of the State’s burden of proof. I n order to initial matter, we observe that nothing in the plain language of the statute fiduciary capacity or exercised a fiduciary power after January 1, 2015. As an she breached a fiduciary obligation, the State had to prove that she acted in a We disagree with the defendant’s argument that, in order to prove that

statutes in the context of the overall statutory scheme and not in isolation. Id. language that the legislature did not see fit to include. Id. We interpret w ritten and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add ordinary meaning. Id. We interpret legislative intent from the statute as statute itself, and, if possible, construe that language according to its plain and their terms and to promote justice. Id. We first look to the language of the Id. We construe provisions of the Criminal Code according to the fair import of the legislature as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole. In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiters of the intent of of law, which we review de novo. See State v. Pinault, 1 p. 6 68 N.H. 28, 31 (2015). language of RSA 631:9, I(a)(2). The interpretation of a statute raises a question Resolving the defendant’s argument requires that we interpret the

the account without exercising any fiduciary power u nder the SPOA. authorized to make purchases from that account in her capacity as co - owner of that because she co - owned Account #2 with the victim and the son, she was when the Conway house was purchased. Specifically, the defendant asserts exercised a fiduciary power or acted in a fiduciary capacity after May 2014, the State failed to meet this burden because it presented no evidence that she January 1, 2015, when RSA p. 6 631:9 took effect. The defendant contends that that she exercised a fiduciary power or acted in a fiduciary capacity af ter fiduciary obligation, as required by RSA 631:9, I(a)(2), the State had to prove The defendant argues that, in order to prove that she breached a

R SA p. 6 631:9, I(a)(2) (emphas e s added).

disabled, or impaired adult. adult for the benefit of someone other than the elderly, other financial resources of the elderly, disabled, or impaired temporarily or permanently the real or personal property or fiduciary obligation, deprives, uses, manages, or takes either (2) Unless authorized by the instrument establishing

.... p. 7 7

both belonging to the [victim] and to spend the [victim’s] money, property or the defendant had authority “to make decisions about the money, property or Conway] property.” The SPOA provided that, as the victim’s attorney - in - fact, victim] may or could do in person, with regard to [the victim’s] purchase of [t he The SPOA authorized the defendant “to do anything whatsoever that [the

breached a fiduciary obligation, we look to the language of the SPOA. relationship”). Thus, in order to determine whether the defendant here depending on the parties’ agreement and the scope of the parties’ (2006) (explaining that “an agent’s fiduciary duties to the principal vary to the victim); s ee also Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.01 cmt. c at 254 attorney to determine whether the defendant breached his fiduciary obligations relationship. See id. (relying upon the language of the durable power of relationship as informed by the terms of the instrument creating that fiduciary obligation, we look to the nature and scope o f the fiduciary recognized in law.” When determining whether a defendant breached a as relevant here, that the defendant acted “[i]n breach of a fiduciary obligation a fiduciary capacity, we disagree. RSA 631:9, I(a)(2) requires the State to prove, that RSA 631:9, I(a)(2) requires proof in every case that the defendant acted in bank account. See id. at p. 7 770 - 71. To the extent that the defendant here argues when purporting to act in his or her individual capacity as c o - owner of a joint liable for a breach of a f iduciary obligation, as required by RSA 631:9, I(a)(2), whether a defendant, serving as an agent under a power of attorney, can be account, we had no occasion to c onsider the question presented here — to the victim’s durable power of attorney when he spent money from the joint Because the defendant in Folley did not dispute that he acted pursuant

him self or others. ’” Id. (brackets omitted). him from “‘using the money or property for his own benefit or to make gifts to judgment would act in carrying out that person’s own aff airs’” and prohibited the interests of the victim and in view of the way in which a person of ordinary duty to make such financial decisio ns in a way that [was] ‘reasonable i n view of the victim’s money on her behalf, it “placed [the defendant] under a fiduciary observed that, although the power of attorney allowed the defendant to spend establishing t hat fiduciary duty — the power of attorney.” Id. We further funds, in breach of a fiduciary duty, without authorization from the instrument authorization from the victim; it was required to prove that [the defendant] took State was not required to prove that [the defendant] took funds without authorization. Id. at p. 7 770. We rejected this argument, explaining th at “the because the State failed to prove that he acted without the victim’s defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction that he owned with the victim. Folley, 172 N.H. at 762 - 66, 770 - 71. The re, the power of attorney by spending money for his own benefit from a joint account was accused of breaching a fiduciary obligation under the victim’s durable exploitation conviction of a defendant who — similar to the defendant here — In State v. Folley, 172 N.H. 760 (2020), we upheld the financial p. 8 8

637:3.” W hether two offenses constitute the same crime for double jeopardy [RSA 631:9, I(a)(2)] from the crime of theft by unauthorized taking under RSA manner implicates double jeopardy concerns, as it leaves “little to distinguish The defendant also argues that construing RSA 631:9, I(a)(2) in this

consent. See RSA 6 31:9, IV (2016); see also RSA 626: 6, I (2016). reason to know, that the elderly, disabled, or impaired adult lacked capacity to defense under the statute, provided that the defendant did not know, or have a irrelevant to a charge under RSA 631:9, I(a)(2).” Consent remains a viable however, as the defendant asserts here, that “the victim’s authorization [is] authorization from the victim. See Folley, 172 N.H. at 770. We did not hold, R SA 631:9, I(a)(2), the State need not prove that the defendant lacked order to establish that the defendant breached a fiduciary obligation under as a defense to a violation of RSA 631:9, I(a)(2). In Folley, we held that, in Foll e y precludes a defendant from raising the victim’s authorization or consent We reject the premise of the defendant’s argument th at our decision in

absurd results. fiduciary power in accepting it. This, the defendant asserts, would produce elderly person independently authorized the gift or the fiduciary exercised no her own benefit. I t would make no difference, t he defendant posits, that the relationship allowed the fiduciary to use the elderly person’s prop erty for his or from the elderly person unless the instrument creating the fiduciary relationship with an elderly person would be prohibited from accepting gifts powers.” In essence, the defendant asserts that any individual in a fiduciary provision can also apply to acts that do not involve the exercise of fiduciary t he victim authorized, it would produce absurd results to hold that the Folley] a defendant can violate RSA 631:9, I(a)(2) [by] engaging in conduct that The defendant argues, however, that “[i]n light of the fact that [under

631: p. 9 9, I(a)(2). by the SPOA when she used the victim’s money for her own benefit. See RSA limited to proving that the defendant breached a fiduciary obligation imposed established by the SPOA. We therefore conclude that the State’s burden was money for her own personal benefit was contrary to her fiduciary obligation capacity or in her capacity as co - owner of Acco unt #2; any use of the victim’s SPOA, it made no difference whether the defendant acted in a fiduciary victim’s money for her own personal benefit. Thus, under the terms of the suggesting th at, under certain circumstances, the defendant could spend the specifically authorized her to do so. The SPOA did not include any language [her] own benefit or to make gifts to [her]self or others” unless the SPOA another” and prohibited her from using the victim’s “money or property for the standards observed by a prudent person dealing with the property of also placed the defendant “under a duty (called a ‘fiduciary duty’) to observe Similar to the language of the durable power of attorney in Folley, the SPOA both on [the victim’s] behalf in accordance with the terms of [the SPOA].” 9

Conway house. Indeed, the defendant conceded at trial that the SPOA did not expire upon the purchase of the 1

obligations under the SPOA. Specifically, a rational trier of fact could have for her own benefit and to make gifts to herself, in violation of her fiduciary fiduciary relationship with the victim, the defendant spent the victim’s money Moreover, a rational trier of fact could have found that, during her

fiduciary obligations did not expire with the purchase of the property. 1 [victim] dies.” Based upon this language, we concl ude that the def endant’s that the defendant’s authority to act under the SPOA “will end when the generality of the [defendant’s] foregoing broad power.” The SPOA further stated that this additional, s pecified authority was not intended to “limit[] the with [the victim’s] affairs concerning [the Conway house].” The SPOA provided which [the defendant] shall consider advantageous or proper in connection Conway house and “do any and all things, whether herein enumerated or not, to, among other things, “bargain, sell, convey, lease, mortgage or discharge” the the property on the victim’s behalf, the SPOA granted the defendant authority purchase of the property. In addition to authorizing the defendant to purchase indicates that the defendant’s fiduciary obligations continued after the May 2014, before RSA 631: p. 9 9, I(a)(2) took effect, the SPOA’s broad language Although the defendant purchased the Conway house on the victim’s behalf in under the SPOA by spendi ng the victim’s money for her own personal benefit. that, after January 1, 2015, the defendant breached her fiduciary obligation Account #2, we further conclude that the evidence was sufficient to establish the defendant violated a fiduciary obligation when she spent money from In light of our conclusion that the State was required to prove only that

without the victim’s authorization. See Folley, 172 N.H. at 770. RSA 637:3, I, RSA 631: p. 9 9, I(a)(2) does not require proof that the defendant acted property of another with a purpose to deprive him there of.” Moreover, unlike person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the of a fiduciary obligation recognized in law,” RSA 637:3, I, provides only that “[a] Whereas RSA 631:9, I(a)(2) requires proof that the defendant acted “[i]n breach We are not persuaded by the defendant’s double jeopardy argum ent.

purposes. authorization,” thereby rendering them the same offense for double jeopardy proof that [the] defendant used the victim’s property without the victim’s acted in her fiduciary capacity because, otherwise, “both crimes would require defendant argues that RSA 631: p. 9 9, I(a)(2) must require proof that the defendant “each provisi on requires proof of a fact which the other does not”). The (holding that, under the Federal Constitution, two offenses are not the same if 51 (2014); see also Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) ch arged will require a difference in evidence.” State v. Ramsey, 166 N.H. 45, purposes depends upon “whether proof of the elements of the crimes as p. 10 10

unauthorized. reasonable conclusion th at the defendant did not know that her actions were the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, fails to support a proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Roy, 167 N.H. at 292. The totality of is not suffi ciently reasonable t o prevent a rational trier of fact from finding and to spend money from Account #2 on purchases that benefited her alone — authorized her to transfer $12,000 from Account #1 to her personal account that the defendant’s alternative explanation — that she believed the victim defendant’s knowledge was wholly circumstantial. Nonethe less, we conclude unauthorized. We also assume, without deciding, that the evidence of the 637:3, I, requires the State to prove that the defendant knew her actions were For the purposes of this appeal, we assume, without deciding, that RSA

and to spend money from Account #2 on certain purchases. her to transfer money from Account #1 to her own personal checking account possibility that the son deceived her into believing that the victim authorized Specifically, she asserts that the evidence was insufficient to e xclude the was insufficient to prove that she knew her actions were unauthorized. deprive him thereof.” RSA 637:3, I. The defendant argues that the evidence exercises unauthorized control over the property of another with a purpose to person is guilty of theft by unauthorized taking if he or she “obtains or insufficient to support either of her theft by unauthorized taking convictions. A We next address the defendant’s argument that the evidence was

to support her conviction under RSA 631:9, I(a)(2). See Roy, 167 N.H. at 292. has failed to meet her burden of establishing that the evidence was insufficient fact to find that the defendant breached a fiduc iary obligation, the d efendant benefit. Accordingly, because the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of obligations under the SPOA by using the victim’s money for her own personal nonetheless found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that she violated her fiduciary she spent money from that account, a rational trier of fact could have the defendant acted in her individual capacity as co - owner of Account #2 when account for [her] own use” (quotation omitted)). Therefore, even assuming that defendant “to infringe upon the victim’s interest in the funds in the joint the arrangement between the defendant and the victim did not privilege the the victim constituted “property of another,” as defined by RSA 637:2, I V, when (2013) (concluding that funds in a joint account owned by the defendant and her use of the money in Account #2. Cf. State v. Gagne, 165 N.H. 363, 370 - 72 solely to the victim. Nor does she dispute that the victim never consented to bills. The defendant does not dispute that the money in Account #2 belonged defendant, such as the defendant’s hairstylist and credit card and cell phone expenses included payments for goods and services that were personal to the from Account #2 on expenses that were unrelated to the Conway house. These found that, after January 1, 2015, the defendant spent approximately $2,762 p. 11 11

her theft by unauthorized taking convictions. See id. meet her burden of establishing that the evidence was insufficient to support reasonable doubt. Roy, 167 N.H. at 292. The defendant has therefore failed to reasonable t o prevent a rational trier of fact from finding pr oof of guilt beyond a showed no interest and for which she received no benefit — is not sufficiently and spend money from Account #2 to pay for things in which the victim authorized her to transfer $12,000 from Account #1 to her pers onal account believed the victim, an elderly widow with limited financial resources, we conclude that the defendant’s proposed alternative conclusion — that she Accordingly, viewing the evide nce in the light most favorable to the State,

normally spent her money. the purchases and transfers at issue were inconsistent with how the victim statements, a rational trier of fact could have found that the defendant knew defendant, as co - owner of both accounts, had access to the victim’s billing correspond to any particular expense incurred by the victim. Because the personal account were made at regular intervals and in amounts that did not normally spend money, and the transfers from Account #1 to the defendant’s wide variety of vendors for goods and services on which the victim did not spent her money. The expenditures from Account #2 included payments to a use of the victim’s money was markedly different from how the victim normally Moreover, a rational trier of fact could ha ve found that the defendant’s

have inferred that the defendant knew her actions were unauthorized. expressed no interest. Base d upon this evidence, a rational trier of fact could victim’s financ ial resources in order to pay for things in which the victim victim’s financial limitations. Yet, the defendant deplete d nearly all of t he rational trier of fact could have found that the defendant was aware of the victim with her finances and co - owned both Account #1 and Account #2, a to support her in the future. Because the defendant occasionally assisted the relatively limited means and was concerned about having sufficient resources A rational trier of fact could have also found that the victim was of

contrad icted” by certain records). evidenced their consciousness of guilt where their statements were “squarely 172 N.H. at 768 - 69 (concluding that the defendants’ out - of - court statements knowledge that the transfers and expenditures were unauthorized. See Folley, deceptive behavior evidenced her consciousness of guil t, and, thus, her lawsuit. A rational trier of fact could have therefore found that the defendant’s statements and lying to the victim about using the CDs to settle a fictitious conduct from the victim by preve nting the victim from examining her bank State, a rational trier of fact could have found that the defendant concealed her Viewing the evidence and its inferences in the light most favorable to the p. 12 12

HICKS, BASSETT, and HANTZ M ARCONI, J J., co n curred.

waived. State v. Bazinet, 170 N.H. 680, 688 (2018). the defendant raised in her notice of appeal, but did not brief, are deemed two counts of theft by unauthorized taking, see RSA 637:3. Any issues that count of financial exploitation of an elderly person, see RSA 631:9, I(a)(2), and F or the foregoing reasons, we affirm the defendant ’s convictions on one