2020-0320, Robert St. Onge v. Oberten, LLC

540:1 - a, IV(c) (Supp. 2020). We affirm. RSA 540:1 - a, IV(c) and, therefore, is exempt from RSA chapter 540 - A. See RSA facility it operates, and in which the plaintiff lived, is a “group home” under 540 - A against the defendant, Oberten, LLC, on the ground that the sober living the Circuit Court (Lyons, J.) dismissing his claim brought under RSA chapter M AC DONALD, C. J. The plaintiff, Robert St. Onge, appeals an order of

defendant. Stephen Zaharias on the memorandum of law, and Craig Donais orally), for the Wadleigh, Starr & Peters, PLLC, of Manchester (Craig Donais and

brief and orally), for the plaintiff. Shaughnessy Raiche, PLLC, of Bedford (Brian C. Shaughnessy on the

No. 2020 - 0320 9th Circuit Co urt - Manchester District Division

http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. direct address of the court ’ s home page is: are available on the Internet by 9:00 a.m. on the morning of their release. The reported by e mail at the following address: reporter@courts.state.nh.u s. Opinions corrections may be made before the opinion goes to press. Errors may be Doe Drive, Concor d, New Hampshire 03301, of any editorial errors in order that requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New Hampshire, One Charles as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. Readers are NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule p. 2 22 as well 2

eviction under RSA [chapter] 540.” RSA 540 - A: p. 2 2 (2007). RSA 540 - A: 3 “forbids tenancy” and from willfully “attempt[ing] to circumvent lawful procedures for landlord from “willfully violat[ing] a tenant’s right to quiet enjoyment of his overall statutory scheme.” Id. at 23. RSA 540 - A:2 generally prohibits a “RSA chapter 540 - A and RSA chapter 540 are . . . part of the same

to construe them in harmony with the overall statutory scheme. Id. at p. 2 22. However, we do not construe statutes in isolation; instead, we attempt its overall purpose and avoid an absurd or unjust result. Anderson, 172 N.H. 453, 460 (2020). We also construe all parts of a statute together to effectuate add language that the legislature did not see fit to include. In re J.P., 173 N.H. whenever possible and will not consider what the legislature might ha ve said or plain and ordinary meaning. Id. We give effect to every word of a statute of the statute itself, and, if possible, construe that language according to its trial court’s statutory interpretation de novo. Id. We first look to the language interpretation. Anderson v. Robitaille, 172 N.H. 20, 22 (2019). We review the Resolving the plaintiff’s appeal req uires that we engage in statutory

II. Analysis

and this appeal followed. protections of RSA chapter 540 - A. The trial court agreed with the defendant, under RSA chapter 540, and the plaintiff is not a “tenant” entitled to the “group home,” it is not a “landlord” required to bring an eviction proceeding defendant moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that because its facility is a defendant violated RSA chapter 540 - A by using “self - help” to evict him. The the sober living facility. He sub sequently filed a petition alleging that the them and, as a result, was discharged from the program and required to vacate Despite being aware of, and agreeing to, these rules, the plaintiff violated

tenant rights.” not a lease and that “reside nts of Live Free Structured Sober Living have no sober residence. The contract the plaintiff signed explicitly provided that it was may result in a participant’s immediate expulsion from the program and the possess, o r seek alcohol, drugs, or paraphernalia. Any violation of the rules must agree, in writing, to certain rules, including that they will not use, residents at the defendant’s Manchester location. A ll program participants are provided sober living accommodations. Th e plaintiff was one of 1 p. 2 2 through multiple pathways to recovery. As part of the program, participants to help men and women recover from chronic drug and alcohol addiction Structured Sober Living.” The purpose of Live Free Structured Sober Living is plaintiff participated in the defendant’s sober living program, “Live Free The following facts are undisputed for the purposes of this appeal. The

I. Background p. 3 3

(DHHS) under RSA 161:2, IV,” which “provide s housing for children in need of “licensed by the [New Hampshire] Depa rtment of Health and Human Services RSA 170 - E:25, II(b), the plaintiff contends that a “group h ome” is a facility the legislature.” Relying upon the definitions of the term in RSA 47:11 - b and according to common usage because it “has a specific meaning when used by The plaintiff counters that the term “group home” cannot be interpreted

sober living facility at issue falls within th at broad definition. Collegiate Dictionary 552 (11th ed. 200 p. 3 3). The defendant reasons that the any “residence for persons requiring care or supe rvision.” Merriam - Webster’s according to its common meaning, and, as defined by a dictionary, refers to RS A chapter 540. The defendant argues that the term can be interpreted a “group home.” “Group home” is not defined in either RSA chapter 540 - A or The primary dispute between the parties is whether the facility at issue is

A. Group Home

“tenant” and his or her occupancy is not a “tenancy.” chapter 540, an occupant of a room in one of the enumerated facilities is not a 540:1 - a, IV(c). Thus, for the purposes of both RSA chapter 540 - A and RSA under RSA 126 - A, convents, monasteries, asylums, or group homes.” RSA homes, hospital s and any other facilities licensed under RSA 151 or certified RSA chapter 540 does not apply are “[r]ooms in student dormitories, nu rsing RSA chapter 540 shall not apply to those places. Among the places to which include occupants or occupancy” in certain places and that the provisions of RSA 540:1 - a, IV provides that “[t]he term ‘tenant’ or ‘tenancy’ shall not

540. Anderson, 172 N.H. at 2 p. 3 3. to t he definition in that chapter; we also examine the definition in RSA chapter “tenant” for the purposes of RSA chapt er 540 - A, we do not confine our review 540 are “part of the same overall statutory scheme,” when determining who is a 540 - A:1, I - II (2007). However, because RSA chapter 540 - A and RSA chapter tenant as one “to whom a landlord re nts or leases,” residential premises. RSA RSA chapter 540 - A defines a landlord as one who “rents or leases,” and a

Anderson, 172 N.H. at 2 p. 3 3; see RSA 5 p. 4 40:13 - a (2007). landlord’s summary possessory action brought under RSA chapter 540. assert a claim under RSA chap ter 540 - A as a defense or counterclaim to a 540 - A:4 (Supp. 2020). In addition, under certain circumstances, a tenant may a landlord’s violation of RSA 540 - A:2 or :3. Anderson, 172 N.H. at 23; see RSA RSA 540 - A:4 affords a tenant the right to seek injunctive relief and damages for Anderson, 172 N.H. at 23 (quotations omitted); see RSA 540 - A:3, II (2007). possession of the rented or leased premises without proper judicial process.” a series of specific acts,” such as “willfully denying a tenant access to and 4

chapters 5 p. 4 40 - A and 540. between that subject matter and the subject matters addressed in RSA 47, which pertai ns to the powers of city councils, and t h ere is no overlap the term in RSA 540:1 - a, IV(c). Moreover, RSA 47:11 - b is part of RSA chapter chapter 540 links the definition of “group home” in RSA 47:11 - b to the use of the age of 21.” No language in RSA chap ter 47, RSA chapter 540 - A, or RSA 161:2, IV, and provides residential and counseling services to pers ons under or home which is supervised and licensed pursuant to the provisions of RSA provides that “[f]or the purposes of this section, a group home is an institution city councils to “appropriate money to support or aid group homes” and the term in RSA 540:1 - a, IV(c) i n a technical sense. RSA 47:11 - b authorizes RSA chapters 540 - A and 540 — fails to persuade us that the legislature used RSA 47:11 - b a nd RS A 170 - E:25, II(b) — two statutes with no relationship to The plaintiff’s reliance upon the statutory definitions of “group home” in

“group home” to facilities licensed under RSA 161:2, IV, it would have said so. certified under RSA 126 - A.” Had the legislature intended to limit the term 5 p. 4 40:1 - a, IV(c) are “hospital s and any other facilities licensed under RS A 1 51 or liability, it knows how to do so”). Among the facilities enumerated in RSA when the legislature intends to create liability for negligence instead of strict (2003) (stating that language elsewhere in statutory scheme “demonstrates that knows how to do so. Cf. Appeal of Baldoumas Enters., 149 N.H. 736, 739 legislature intends to limit a term in that statute to state - licensed facilities, it services. Indeed, the text of RSA 540:1 - a, IV(c) demonstrates that when the technical sense to refer to state - licensed facilities housing children in need of that the legislature used the term “group home” in RSA 540:1 - a, IV(c) in a Nothing in the text of RSA chapters 540 - A and 540 makes it apparent

for electric plant in process of construction” (quotations omitted)). accounting definition of that phrase as “the total of the balances of work orders statute’s use of the term “construction work in progress” assumes a technical N.H., 12 5 N.H. at 50, 53 - 55 (rejecting the public utility’s assertion that the children in need of services is untenable. See Appeal of Public Serv. Co. of “group home” in a technical sense to refer to state - licensed facilities that house meaning”). The plaintiff’s position that in RSA 5 p. 4 40:1 - a the legislature used shall be construed and understood according to such pecu liar and appropriate such others as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law, and approved usage of the language; but technical words and phrases, and statutes, “[w]ords and phrases shall be construed according to the common of N.H., 125 N.H. 46, 52 (1984); see RSA 21:2 (2020) (providing that, for all that a technical term is used in a technical sense.” Appeal of Public Serv. Co. “We will follow common and approved usage except where it is apparent

housing for children, it is not a “group home.” that because the facility at issue is not licensed by DHHS and does not provide services.” See RSA p. 4 47:11 - b (2012); RSA 170 - E:2 p. 5 5 (2014). The plaintiff reasons 5

homes” from the definition of “tenant” and “tenancy” since RSA p. 5 540:1 - a was N.H. 89, 91 (1999) (quotation omitted). RSA chapter 540 has exempted “group mere repassage does not alter that meaning.” Appeal of Naswa Motor Inn, 144 We also note that “[a] law means what it meant to its framers and its

live together, such as those who are elderly or mentally ill”). s mall number of unrelated people in need of care, support, or supervision can Dictionary 768 (3d ed. 2010) (defining a “group home” as “a home where a recorded use of the term “group home” in English); see New Oxford American Dictionary, supra at 17a - 18a, p. 5 552 (providing 1967 as the date of the earliest persons requiring care or supervision.” Merriam - Webster’s Collegiate N.H. 180, 185 (2014). The plain meaning of “group home” is “a residence for dictionary for guidance. See K.L.N. Construction Co. v. Town of Pelham, 167 We, therefore, look to the common usage of “group home,” using the

the wrong forum as matters of policy are reserved for the legislature.” Id. at 26. “especially vulnerable.” The plaintiff’s public policy arguments “are made to fro m “arbitrary or ill motivated evictions” because those individuals are regarding the need to protect those “recovering from alcohol or drug addiction” We are also unpersuaded by the plaintiff’s public policy arguments

between landlords and tenants”). chapt er 78 - A “is not part of the statutory scheme governing the relations demonstrating legislative intent to equate the definitions and when RSA resident” in RSA 78 - A:3, VIII when there was no language in RSA chapter 78 - A the definition of “tenant” in RSA p. 5 540:1 - a, IV with the definition of “permanent these dissimilar statutes. See Anderson, 172 N.H. at 27 (declining to equate IV (c) so that it is consistent with the legislature ’s definition of that term in Accordingly, w e decline to construe the term “group home” in RSA 540:1 - a, home” in RSA 170 - E:25, II(b) to th e use of the term i n RSA 540:1 - a, IV(c). there any language in any of those chapters linking the definition of “group chapter 170 - E and those addressed in RSA chapters 540 - A and 540. Nor is There is no overlap between the subject matters addressed in RSA

or long - term basi s.” than 12 children who can benefit from residential living either on a s hort - term care agency which regularly provides specialized care for at least p. 5 5 but no more chapter 170 - E applies. RSA 170 - E:25, II(b) defines “group home” as “a child chapter 170 - E and specifies the “types of child care agencies” to which RSA 2020), : 25 (2014). RSA 170 - E:25 defines “child care agency” as used in RSA residential care facilities and child - placing agencies. RSA 170 - E: 2 (Supp. to child day care agencies, and RSA 170 - E:25 de fines terms related to child placing agencies. RSA 170 - E:1, :24 (2014). RSA 170 - E:2 defines terms related licensing of child day care agencies, child residential care facilities, and child which the plaintiff relies, RSA 170 - E:25, II(b). RSA chapter 170 - E governs the We reach similar conclusions with respect to the second statute upon p. 6 6

under and a violation of RSA 540 - A:3. term is defined in RSA 540 - A: 1, shall be considered a prohibited act 2. Any violation of Section 1 [of] this Order by a landlord, as tha t

Executive Order 2020 - 04. suspended for the duration of the State of Emergency declared in proceedings or the issuance of an eviction order are hereby other regulation which would allow for the ini tiation of eviction 2020 - 04. All applicable provisions of RSA 540 or any law, rule or enforced during the State of Emergenc y declared in Executive Order in Executive Order 2020 - 04 and no eviction order shall be issued or proceedings under RSA 540 during the State of Emergency declared those terms are defined in RSA 540: 1 - a, may initiate eviction 1. No owner of non - restricted property or restricted property, as

provided: “group home” within the meaning of RSA 540:1 - a, IV(c). Emergency Order #4 him to vacate his room at the sober living facility, even if that facility is a Governor Sununu on March 17, 2020, precluded the defendant from requiring Alternatively, the plaintiff argues that Emergency Order #4, issued by

B. Emergency Order #4

requiring him to vacate his room. not have brought an eviction proceeding under RSA chapter 540 before not entitled to the protections of RSA chapter 540 - A, and the d efendant need defendant and the plaintiff was not a “tenancy.” Accordingly, the plaintiff was is a “group home” under RSA 540:1 - a, IV(c), the relationship between the recovering from alcoholism and drug addic tion”). Because the facility at issue U.S. 725, 729 (1995) (pertaining to “a group home. . . for 10 to 12 adults drug and alcohol addiction. See City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 requiring care or supervision; here, individuals seeking to recover from chronic home” according to the plain meaning of the term. It is a residence for persons Given the u ndisputed facts, the sober living facility at issue is a “group

for persons requiring care or supervision.” plain meaning of “group home” as used in RSA 540 - A: 1 - a, IV(c) is “a residence adults” and their caretakers). Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that the building” housing eight “d evelopmentally - impaired or physically - disabled 8 p. 7 7 (1980) (using the term “group home” to refer to a “ranch style, single - story See, e.g., Region 10 Client Mgt., Inc. v. Town of Hampstead, 120 N.H. 885, 88 p. 6 6 first enacted, “group home” did not refer exclusive ly to a residence for children. ap proximate time period support the inference that, when RSA 540:1 - a was first enacted in 1985. See Laws 1985, 249:1. O ur cases from that 7

arguments and conclude that they warrant no discussion. See Vogel v. Vogel, 540:1 - a, IV and RSA 540 - B:1, II(c). We have reviewed the plaint iff’s remaining living facility at issue constitutes a “group home” for the purposes of both RSA home” has the same meaning in both chapters. See id. Accordingly, the sober chapter 540 concern similar subject matters, we conclude that the term “group from the d efinition of a “shared facility.” Because RSA chapter 540 - B and RSA argument is unavailing because RSA 540 - B:1, II(c) excludes “group homes” constitutes a “shared fa cility” within the meaning of RSA 540 - B:1. This evictions under RSA chapter 540 - B, and that the sober living facility at issue The plaintiff further contends that Emergency Order #4 pertains to

contained in the other. See Anderson, 1 p. 7 72 N.H. at 23. construe the statutory definitions contained in one chapter in light of those RSA chapter s 540 - A and 540 are part of the same overall statutory scheme, we landlord” in RSA 540 - A:1. However, as we have previously explained, because definition of “tenant” and “tenancy” and “[t]he order uses the definition of apply to Emergency Order #4 because RSA 540:1 - a, IV(c) concerns the The plaintiff argues that “the exclusion of RSA 540:1 - a, IV(c)” does not

gency - order - 51.pdf (last checked September 1, 2021). https://www.governor.nh.gov/sites/g/files /ehbemt336/files/documents/emer Orders 2020 - 05, 2020 - 08, 2020 - 09 and 2020 - 10, available at Pursuant to Executive Order 2020 - 04 as Extended by Executive terminated by Emergency Order #51 on July 1, 2020. Emergency Order #51 gency - order - 4.pdf (last checked September 1, 2021). Emergency Order #4 was https://www.governor.nh.gov/sites/g/files/ehbemt336/files/documents/emer Emergency Order #4 Pursuant to Executive Order 2020 - 04, available at

law. provi sions of this Order through any methods provided by current 5. The Attorney General shall have the authority to enforce the

under a tenancy or mortgage. payments, or any other obligation which an individual may have individ ual of their obligation s to pay rent, make mortgage 4. No provision in this Order shall be construed as relieving an

Emergency declared in Executive Order 2020 - 04. proceedings are hereby suspended f or the duration of the State of regulation which would allow for the initiation of foreclosure 04, and all applicable provisions of any law, rule, or other during the State of Emergency declared in Executive Order 2020 or any other applicable law, rule or regulation are hereby prohibited 3. All judicial and n on - judicial f oreclosure actions under RSA 4 p. 7 79 p. 8 8

HICKS, BASSETT, HANTZ MARCONI, and DONOVAN, JJ., concurred.

plaintiff’s petition brought pursuant to RSA chapter 540 - A. For all of the above reasons, we uphold the trial court’s dismissal of the

Sch. Dist. v. State of N.H., 171 N.H. 246, 252 (201 p. 8 8). plaintiff raised at oral argument, but did not adequately brief. See Bedford 137 N.H. 321, 322 (1993). We decline to address any argument that the